Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 -- an armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a small curtain in this war, namely, the reasons and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

Cause of hostilities

The main reason The war was foreign intervention in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between the Afghan government and numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), enjoying political and financial support from the leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the “April Revolution” - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose leader was in 1978, came to power. Nur Mohammad Taraki (killed by order of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, Afghanistan began Civil War.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and infighting between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to introduce .troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention. But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obviousness negative consequences direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the USSR's intervention was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. Shpaka.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. Sending in troops is not easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events " cold war", which provoked a crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet military personnel, the appearance of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, aggravated the already severe socio-economic crisis in which the Soviet Union found itself in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military expenditures exorbitant for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The true causes of the war lay in the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, and the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth due to the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

In the region, from the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which in abundance began to spread everywhere. The political divide in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow mistakenly imagined, but along religious lines.

The introduction of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States, as the arena of some kind of “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow’s lack of understanding of its national interests, an incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political myopia.

In Afghanistan, the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy with the real state of affairs in the world was revealed.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by increased instability in the Middle East, which was a consequence of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes a storm of indignation in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a reason for an armed conflict and finds it in the war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (the elder), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya, under the leadership of Gaddafi, sponsors various terrorist groups; The center-left government in Turkey resigns.

The situation in peripheral Afghanistan is also becoming radicalized. In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. On political language At that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a “client” of the USSR, counting on financial, economic and military assistance.

With Afghanistan Soviet Union good, even excellent relations since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendships With Soviet Russia. For all the decades that have passed since then, one cannot find in Soviet history mentioning Afghanistan in a negative context. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West tacitly recognized this fact and was never interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from monarchy to republic in 1973 as a result palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April “revolution” of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. The leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many of the participants in the coup were well known in Moscow - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) closely communicated and worked with them.

It seemed that Moscow had lost nothing from the regime change. However, the “socialists” repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures caused resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the “socialists” steadily narrowed. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began sending groups of their military personnel in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as supporting the opposition with weapons. China has shown activity. At the same time, the historical and previously existing contradictions between the leaders of the “socialists” intensified.

As a result, just a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more of the 34 provinces remained under its control.

March 18, 1979 Taraki, in a long telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin, explains the current situation and persistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. In every word of Taraki one can see despair, a consciousness of hopelessness. He returns every question from the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send in troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite a large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin is perplexed as to why you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin’s naive, ideologically driven proposals to rely on the “workers,” Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet prime minister proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls the several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told almost the same thing to the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his Politburo colleagues about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly common-sense considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean a war with the population. It seems that there is a reason to review or at least adjust the policy in Afghanistan: to begin contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, to find common ground for reconciliation, form a coalition government, etc. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin proposed to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send in troops. Then the question had to be answered: what to do in the event of the imminent fall of the regime, which is what the regime itself warns about? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of wait-and-see and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

Three groups are gradually being identified in the Politburo: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The sick Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on the problems that need to be solved. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making relevant decisions.

Throughout the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increased pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help with troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, was heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin occurs in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power and removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since then, Moscow has set itself the goal of eliminating Amin, whom it does not trust, bringing “its” man, Karmal, to power and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these in themselves reasonable actions, but carried out without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are viewed as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to remove Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, issues of a special operation by Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, the cover for which should be a second, parallel and subordinate operation to the first operation of introducing a “limited” contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with Amin’s support among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin, were replaced with new ones.

By December 1, the work on the issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note to this effect. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the deployment of troops is made.

Before acceptance final decision the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov, actively resisted him. It came to the point of his open clashes and wrangling in raised voices with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the area, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and great losses, that these actions will weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border or crossing the border either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was removed and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. Troops gradually began to be brought in - more and more.

What is the history of the Afghan war of 1979-1989?

Afghan War 1979–1989

An armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied Soviet troops, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

The main cause of the war was foreign interference in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power.

The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. The “limited contingent” of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted to 100 thousand military personnel. A total of 546,255 took part in hostilities Soviet soldiers and officers. 71 soldiers became Hero of the Soviet Union. Government armed forces also took part in the conflict Democratic Republic Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other. The Mujahideen were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services. During 1980–1988 Western aid to the mujahideen amounted to $8.5 billion, half of which was provided by the United States. The war continued from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 (3338 days).

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. The entry of troops was relatively easy; During the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul, the President of Afghanistan was killed. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, 4 divisions, 5 separate brigades, 4 separate regiments, 4 combat aviation regiments, 3 helicopter regiments, 1 pipeline brigade, 1 logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.

For a number of years, a “limited contingent” controlled the situation in the main cities, while the rebels felt relatively free in the countryside. Changing tactics, Soviet troops tried to deal with the rebels using tanks, helicopters and airplanes, but highly mobile groups of Mujahideen easily avoided attacks.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander limited contingent Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as various mujahideen factions continued to fight for power among themselves.

According to updated official data, the irretrievable losses of Soviet army personnel in the Afghan War amounted to 14,427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. St. received wounds and concussions. 53 thousand people. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These people who died in hospitals were not included in the number of officially announced losses. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

The term “Afghan War” in Russia refers to the period of armed confrontation between the current and opposition regimes in Afghanistan 1979-1989, when USSR troops were involved in the conflict. In fact, the civil war in this state continues to this day.

Among the reasons for the Soviet Union's entry into the war, historians note the desire to support a friendly regime - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan - and the desire to secure its own southern borders.

At first, the idea of sending troops into Afghanistan did not meet with support from the then head of government, Brezhnev. However, information soon appeared in the USSR that the CIA was providing assistance to the Mujahideen. It was then that the decision was made to intervene, since fears arose about the victory of political forces hostile to the USSR in Afghanistan.

USSR troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979. They were supposed to overthrow Amin's government. As a result of the storming of Amin's palace, the ruler, who was distrusted by the top of the USSR, was killed. They wanted to replace him with a more loyal leader.

The military conflict flared up with renewed vigor. From 1980 to 1989 There were battles in which losses were significant on both sides. A number of battles ended in the defeat of the Mujahideen, but it was not possible to radically turn the tide of hostilities: the Mujahideen still held power.

In the summer of 1985, USSR policy outlined new course- for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. At that time Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev became the Central Committee of the CPSU. He considered it inappropriate further management war on the territory of a foreign state, entailing only large losses of people and equipment. In February 1986, Gorbachev declared: “Our troops will gradually withdraw from Afghanistan.” Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev confirmed the pointlessness of the further presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the republic: “Despite the fact that we control Kabul and the provinces, we are unable to establish power in the areas under our control.”

In April 1988, an agreement was signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan on a peaceful solution to the conflict in Switzerland. The guarantors were the USSR and the USA, which pledged to withdraw their troops and not provide support to the warring parties. The phased withdrawal of army units began. The last of the Soviet military units left Afghanistan in April 1989. However, prisoners remained. The fate of some of them is still unknown.

Our losses in Afghanistan were enormous for a period of peace: 14,427 deaths are known. At the same time, the reports noted 54 thousand injuries, as well as outbreaks infectious diseases, which claimed the health and lives of soldiers. Unusual harsh climate, lack of clean water, confrontation in unfamiliar terrain with an enemy who was well versed in the mountains - all this additionally undermined the strength of Soviet soldiers.

The losses of equipment were considerable: 1314 armored vehicles, 118 aircraft, 147 tanks - this is far from full list. A fabulous amount - up to $800 million - was withdrawn from the USSR budget every year to maintain our army in Afghanistan. And who, in what units, will measure the tears and grief of mothers whose sons returned home in zinc coffins?

“Not in forty-first near Kaluga, where the hill is high,

- in the eighties near Kabul, face in the sand ... "

What were the results of the Afghan War? For the USSR - losses. For the people of Afghanistan, it is completely impossible to talk about any results: for them, the war continues. Should we have intervened in this conflict? Perhaps this will become clearer centuries later. For now good reasons can not see…

Afghan war brief information.

Essay

Afghan war 1979 – 1989

1. Causes of war 3

2. Goals of the war, its participants, duration 4

3. Progress of the war 5

4. Afghan war (1979-1989) 6

5. Conclusion Soviet wars from Afghanistan 10

6. Losses 11

7. Political assessment of the war 12

8. Consequences of the war 13

References 14

1. Causes of the war

The main cause of the war was foreign intervention in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between local traditionalists and left-radical modernists. After the coup of April 27, 1978 (the so-called “April Revolution”), the left-wing military transferred power to two Marxist parties (Khalq and Parcham), united into the People’s Democratic Party.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and strife between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham, taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to send troops to Afghanistan in December 1979 under the pretext of providing international assistance . The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

2. Goals of the war, its participants, duration

The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. The “limited contingent” of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted to 100 thousand military personnel. In total, 546,255 Soviet soldiers and officers took part in the hostilities. 71 soldiers became Hero of the Soviet Union. The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other also took part in the conflict. The Mujahideen were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services. During 1980–1988 Western aid to the mujahideen amounted to $8.5 billion, half of which was provided by the United States. The war lasted from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 (2238 days).

3. Progress of the war

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. The entry of troops was relatively easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

The Soviet command hoped to entrust the suppression of the uprising to Kabul troops, which, however, were greatly weakened by mass desertion and were unable to cope with this task. For a number of years, a “limited contingent” controlled the situation in the main cities, while the rebels felt relatively free in the countryside. Changing tactics, Soviet troops tried to deal with the rebels using tanks, helicopters and airplanes, but highly mobile groups of Mujahideen easily avoided attacks. Bombardment settlements and the destruction of crops also did not produce results, but by 1982, about 4 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran. Supplies of weapons from other countries allowed the partisans to hold out until 1989, when the new Soviet leadership withdrew troops from Afghanistan.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages:

Stage I: December 1979 - February 1980. Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage II: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Stage III: May 1985 - December 1986. Transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

Stage IV: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

4. Afghan war (1979-1989)

Afghan War 1979–1989 - an armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied Soviet troops, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

The war between the communist government of Afghanistan and the invading Soviet troops against Islamic insurgents.

After World War II, Afghanistan, which had the status of a neutral state, was actually in the sphere of Soviet influence. Cooperation with the USSR was very close. A large number of Soviet specialists were constantly in the country, and many Afghans studied at Soviet universities.

In 1973, the monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. As a result of the coup, the brother of the last king, Zakir Shah, Muhammad Daoud, came to power and established a presidential dictatorship. The regime change had no effect on relations with the USSR.

But the overthrow and murder of Daoud during the coup on April 27-28, 1978 by military units loyal to the pro-communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the prologue to many years of bloody war that continues in Afghanistan to this day. The Soviet side was not directly involved in the coup, but military advisers in the country knew about its preparations, but did not receive orders to warn Daoud. On the contrary, KGB representatives made it clear to the leaders of the coup that if successful, recognition and assistance were guaranteed.

The PDPA was a small party of the intelligentsia. In addition, it split into two warring factions: “Khalq” (“People”) and “Parcham” (“Banner”). The leader of the Khalq, the poet Hyp Muhammad Taraki, who became president, began intensive transformations in the country. Islam ceased to be the state religion, women were allowed to remove their veils and were allowed to participate in education. A literacy campaign was launched agrarian reform, the beginning of collectivization.

All this caused discontent among the Muslim clergy and nobility. Afghan society, with the exception of a thin layer of city dwellers, remained essentially feudal and was not ready for radical transformations.

Among the main population, the Pashtuns, a tribal structure was still preserved, and tribal leaders were especially influential. Islam was declared a religion that reflected only the interests of the “exploiting classes,” and terror was launched against the clergy. The Pashtun tribes fared no better, they tried to disarm them (traditionally all Pashtuns carried weapons), and deprive the tribal elite of power and even destroy it. The peasants refused the land plots provided because they did not have the means to cultivate them, and the state was not able to provide these funds.

Already in the summer of 1978, supporters of Islamic fundamentalism, who had fought against Daoud, began to put up armed resistance to the new government. They were joined by Pashtun tribal militias. By that time, Taraki's relations with the Parchamists had worsened, many of whom were executed.

On December 5, 1978, a Soviet-Afghan treaty on friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation was concluded, providing for mutual assistance of the parties in repelling an external threat. Gradually, the Taraki administration, despite the terror, increasingly lost control over the country. There are about 2 million Afghan refugees in neighboring Pakistan. Due to the failures, the president’s relations with the second person in the Khalq faction, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, who enjoyed influence in the army, sharply deteriorated. Amin was a more decisive leader and tried to strengthen the weakening power by seeking allies among various social and ethnic groups (both Amin and Taraki were Pashtuns). But Moscow decided to bet on Taraki and advised him to eliminate his opponent.

The Kremlin hoped to find a springboard in Afghanistan for a push to Indian Ocean. In neighboring Pakistan, tribes of Pashtuns and Baluchis, related to the Afghans, lived, and the leaders of the PDPA made territorial claims to their neighbor, hoping to occupy most Pakistani territory.

General D. A. Volkogonov recalled that on September 8, 1978, in the presidential palace, Taraki’s guards tried to kill Amin, but only his bodyguard was killed. Amin survived, raised the loyal units of the Kabul garrison and displaced Taraki. Soon the hapless president was strangled. Amin intensified the terror, but did not achieve his goal. They decided to remove him.

Both Taraki and Amin repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send troops to Afghanistan. We were talking about small units designed, in particular, to provide protection for Afghan leaders and help conduct operations against Mujahideen rebels.

The Kremlin decided differently. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo approved the removal of Amin, and the subsequent entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. KGB agents slipped poison into Amin's food. An unsuspecting Soviet doctor literally pulled the dictator out of the other world. Then the special KGB group “Alpha” went into action. Its fighters, together with special forces from the Main Intelligence Directorate, freely arrived in the Afghan capital, ostensibly to guard Amin, and on the night of December 27, 1979, stormed the presidential palace on the outskirts of Kabul, destroying Amin along with his family, associates and several dozen security soldiers. TASS later announced that the dictator was killed by “the healthy forces of the Afghan revolution.”

The next morning, Soviet troops began to arrive in Kabul. Their arrival was justified by external aggression against Afghanistan, expressed in the support of Afghan rebels by Pakistan, Iran, China and the United States, and by urgent requests from the “legitimate Afghan authorities.” There is a problem with the legality. After all, before the Soviet invasion, the “legitimate authority” was Amin, who was posthumously declared a CIA agent. It turned out that he himself invited his death, and besides, he was “not entirely legal”, since he had to be eliminated and urgently replaced by the leader of the Parcham faction, Babrak Karmal, who had returned to the convoy of Soviet troops.

Soviet propaganda was never able to clearly explain to the world community who exactly invited our “limited contingent,” whose number at times reached 120 thousand people. But in the USSR, rumors were spread that Soviet soldiers were only a few hours ahead of the American landing force, which was supposed to land in Kabul (although there were no US troops or bases within a thousand miles of Afghanistan) In connection with the entry of Soviet Army units into Afghanistan in Moscow a joke was born. "What should we call now? Tatar-Mongol yoke? “The introduction of a limited contingent of Tatar-Mongol troops into Rus' to protect against the Lithuanian threat.”

The limited contingent was unable to change the situation in the country, although by the beginning of 1980 there were 50 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers in the country, and in the second half of the year the contingent reached its maximum number. The majority of the population perceived Karmal as a puppet sitting on Soviet bayonets. The Afghan government army, melting from desertion, held only the capital and provincial centers with Soviet support. The rebels controlled the countryside, which was mountainous and difficult to access. The Mujahideen received help from the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan, and it was almost impossible to close the Afghan-Pakistani border, which was a conventional line on rough terrain with many mountain paths. Fleeing from the war, over 4 million refugees fled to Pakistan and Iran. Raids of Soviet troops against partisans, as As a rule, the Mujahideen did not achieve success and disappeared into the mountains. The Soviet 40th Army suffered losses; the rebels fired at Soviet transports and attacked small detachments and garrisons. Some groups, in particular the army of the Tajik field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, concentrated in the Panjshir Valley, fought successful battles with entire Soviet divisions, which repeatedly tried to destroy the “lion of Panjshir.”

By the mid-80s, the futility of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan became obvious. In 1985, after the rise of Gorbachev, Karmal was replaced by the former head of the security service, Dr. Najibullah, who had a reputation as a cruel but cunning man, representing the larger Khalq faction. He tried to find support for the regime both among part of the Pashtun tribes and among the peoples of the north. Here, however, he was able to rely only on the Uzbek division of General Rashid Dostum.

The Kabul government was completely dependent on Soviet military and food aid. The United States stepped up assistance to the rebels by starting to supply them with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Several planes and helicopters were shot down and absolute Soviet air supremacy was called into question. It became clear that we had to leave Afghanistan

On April 14, 1988, an agreement was concluded in Geneva between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA on a political settlement. It was announced that Soviet troops would leave the country. On February 15, 1989, the commander of the limited contingent, General Boris Gromov, was the last to cross the border river Pyanj. According to official data, the losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted to 14,433 military personnel and 20 civilians killed, 298 missing, 54 thousand wounded and 416 thousand sick. There are also higher estimates of Soviet losses at 35, 50, 70 and 140 thousand dead. Afghan casualties, mainly among civilians, were significantly higher. Many villages were leveled by aircraft, and residents were shot as hostages for the actions of the partisans. Sometimes they talk about a million dead Afghans, but no one has accurately counted the Afghan losses.

After the withdrawal of troops, the Soviet side continued to provide massive military assistance to Najibullah. Gorbachev said: “It is important that this regime and all its cadres are not swept away to the ground. We cannot appear before the world in just panties or even without them...” After the August putsch and the collapse of the USSR, a denouement came.

In March 1992, Dostum rebelled against Najibullah, who had lost Soviet support, and occupied Kabul. The former dictator took refuge in a UN mission. In Afghanistan, a war began between various ethnic and political groups, previously united in the fight against the pro-Soviet regime. It continues to this day.

In 1996, the Taliban, led by madrassa students and relying on the Pashtun population, occupied Kabul. Najibullah was captured at the mission premises and hanged.

At the beginning of 2000, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan, with the exception of the Panjshir Valley and some adjacent areas with a predominantly Tajik population. During the offensive launched in the fall of 2000, the Taliban movement established control over almost the entire territory of the country, with the exception of a few internal enclaves and a narrow border strip in some northern regions.

5. Withdrawal of Soviet wars from Afghanistan

Changes in foreign policy Soviet leadership during the period of “perestroika” contributed to a political settlement of the situation. On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the USSR, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a phased peaceful solution to the Afghan problem. The Soviet government pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as various mujahideen factions continued to fight for power among themselves.

6. Losses

According to updated official data, the irretrievable losses of Soviet army personnel in the Afghan War amounted to 14,433 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. Over 53 thousand people were injured and concussed. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These people who died in hospitals were not included in the number of officially announced losses. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

7. Political assessment of the war

In Soviet Union long time The actions of Soviet troops in Afghanistan were characterized as “international assistance.” II Congress people's deputies The USSR (1989) declared the Afghan war criminal.

8. Consequences of the war

After withdrawal Soviet army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986–1992) lasted another 3 years and, having lost Russian support, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of mujahideen field commanders. During the war years in Afghanistan, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared, and groups of Islamic radicals grew stronger.

Bibliography

1. Encyclopedia of the history of Ukraine. Article “Afghan War 1979–1989” (Ukrainian);

2. Historical dictionary on the World of Dictionaries website. Article "Afghan War";

3. “War in Afghanistan 1979–1989.” (RIAN reference);

4. Zgursky G.V. Dictionary historical terms. M.: EKSMO, 2008;

5. V. Grigoriev. Afghan War 1979–1989: server for Afghan war veterans;

6. B. Yamshanov. The full truth about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has not yet been revealed.