The partisan movement is “the club of the people's war. Start in science

The reasons for the outbreak of guerrilla warfare

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having flared up after the invasion of Napoleonic troops in Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took more and more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, represented by the performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to form, thousands of national heroes appeared, and talented organizers of the partisan struggle emerged.

Why did the disenfranchised peasantry, ruthlessly oppressed by the feudal landlords, rise to fight against their seemingly "liberator"? Napoleon did not even think of any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. And this did not correspond to his political goals when joining Russia. In the opinion of Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was important for him to consolidate monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach a revolution to Russia.

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf-owning landlords. The provisional Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to obey the landlords unquestioningly, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving for this military force if circumstances so require.

Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality, the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, residents, when the French approached, went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be plundered and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position than they were in before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of freeing them from serfdom.

Peasant war

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants took on the character of a mass abandonment of villages and villages and the withdrawal of the population to forests and areas far from hostilities. And although this was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. French troops, with a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This did not take long to affect the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers were starving, and looting intensified. More than 10 thousand horses died before Vilna.

French foragers sent to villages for food were not confronted with passive resistance. One French general after the war wrote in his memoirs: “The army could feed only on what was obtained by marauders organized into whole detachments; Cossacks and peasants daily killed many of our people who dared to go in search. ”In the villages there were clashes, including shooting, between the French soldiers sent for food and the peasants. Skirmishes like this happened quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance was born - partisan struggle.

The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev detachments of peasants - partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced to remind chief of staff Berthier more and more often about the large losses in people and strictly ordered to allocate an increasing number of troops to cover the foragers.

The peasants' partisan struggle acquired the broadest scope in August in the Smolensk province.

It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be brought to justice.

In the city of White and Belsk Uyezd, partisan detachments attacked the French parties making their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk partisans, police chief Boguslavskaya and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their detachments with rifles taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. The Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they killed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.

The inhabitants of the Roslavl district created several cavalry and foot partisan detachments, armed with lances, sabers and rifles. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders who made their way into the neighboring Yelnensky district. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized a defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment of Denis Davydov.

The largest Gzhatsky partisan detachment operated successfully. It was organized by Fedor Potopov (Samus), a soldier of the Elizavetgrad regiment. Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself in the rear of the enemy and, after recovering, immediately set about organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2 thousand people (according to other sources, 3 thousand). Its striking force consisted of an equestrian group of 200 people, armed and dressed in the armor of French cuirassiers. The Samusia detachment had its own organization, strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system of warning the population about the approach of the enemy through bell ringing and other conventional signs. Often in such cases, the villages were emptied, according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes informed when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, to go into battle. In one of the battles, the members of this detachment managed to capture the cannon. Samusia's detachment inflicted significant damage on the French troops. In the Smolensk province, he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.

Another partisan detachment made up of peasants, headed by Yermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private of the Kiev dragoon regiment, also actively operated in the Gzhatsk district. He was wounded in the battle near Tsarevo-Zaymishche, and was taken prisoner, but he managed to escape. From the peasants of the villages of Basmana and Zadnovo, he organized a partisan detachment, which at first consisted of 40 people, but soon increased to 300 people. Chetvertakov's detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him.

In the Sychevsky district, the partisan Vasilisa Kozhina became famous for her brave actions.

There are many facts and evidence that the partisan peasant detachments of Gzhatsk and other areas located along the main road to Moscow caused great trouble for the French troops.

The actions of partisan detachments became especially active during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed a front of struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. Not a day passed that in one or another place the partisans did not raid a moving enemy convoy with food or defeated a French detachment, or, finally, did not suddenly attack the French soldiers and officers stationed in the village.

In the Zvenigorod district, peasant partisan detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here, the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centenary Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk uyezd, partisan detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant partisan detachments united up to 2 thousand people. They repeatedly attacked large parties of the enemy and defeated them. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants - partisans from the Bronnitskaya district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev, Vladimir Afanasyev.

The largest peasant partisan detachment in the Moscow region was the detachment of the Bogorodsk partisans. He numbered about 6 thousand people in his ranks. The talented leader of this detachment was the serf peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle against the enemy troops. So, on October 1, partisans led by Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov entered into battle with two enemy squadrons and, skillfully acting, defeated them.

Peasant partisan detachments received assistance from the commander-in-chief of the Russian army M.I.Kutuzov. With satisfaction and pride, Kutuzov wrote to St. Petersburg: “The peasants, burning with love for the Motherland, arrange militias among themselves ... Every day they come to the Main Apartment, convincingly asking for firearms and cartridges for protection from enemies. The requests of these venerable peasants, true sons of the fatherland, are satisfied as far as possible and they are supplied with guns, pistols and cartridges ”.

During the preparation of the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militia and partisans fettered the actions of Napoleon's troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only protected postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly raided by partisans. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones delivered to the headquarters of the Russian army.

The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. "The peasants," wrote Kutuzov, "from the villages adjacent to the theater of war, inflict the greatest harm on the enemy ... They kill enemies in great numbers, and they take prisoners to the army." The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6 thousand Frenchmen. During the capture of Vereya, a peasant partisan detachment (up to 1,000 people), led by priest Ivan Skobeev, distinguished himself.

In addition to direct hostilities, the involvement of militias and peasants in intelligence should be noted.

Army guerrilla units

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly.

Its commander was General F.F. Vintzengerode, who headed the united Kazan dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of Dukhovshchina.

Denis Davydov's squad was a real thunderstorm for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyr hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodino. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention, he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the riots, the poor defense of the rear in the French army.

As he traveled through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food depots, guarded by small detachments, were. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was for the flying peasant detachments to fight without an agreed plan of action. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent to the rear of the enemy could inflict great damage on him, help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General PI Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For the "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the enemy's rear. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaymishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several detachments of the French, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous moving ring.

A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. From Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I.S.Dorokhov operated. Captain A. S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the area of Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol hussar regiment and 500 Cossacks. The roads between Borovsk and Moscow were controlled by the detachment of Captain A. N. Seslavin. Colonel ND Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road was a detachment of Colonel I. Ye. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Vintzengerode, which, separating from itself small detachments to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrovskaya roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from Cossack troops and were unequal in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were challenged by bold and sudden actions in the rear of the enemy, destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder for himself, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Headquarters of the Russian army. The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action and were informed of the areas of action of neighboring detachments in case of joint operations.

The partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first, there were many difficulties. Even the inhabitants of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Quite often the hussars had to change into peasant caftans and grow beards.

The partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one, except the commander, knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift. To fly like snow on your head and quickly hide became the main rule of the partisans.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Davydov's detachment in the evening of September 3, 1812 went to Tsarev - Zaymishch. Not reaching 6 versts to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French train with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. A detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo - Zaymishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost broke into the village with them. The wagon train and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of French to resist was quickly suppressed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 carts with food and fodder were in the hands of the partisans.

Sometimes, knowing in advance the location of the enemy, the partisans made a surprise attack. So, General Vincengerode, having established that in the village of Sokolovo there is an outpost of two cavalry squadrons and three infantry companies, he singled out 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly rushed into the village, killed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers , 83 soldiers.

The detachment of Colonel Kudashiv, having established that there are about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolskoye, suddenly attacked the enemy, killed more than 100 people and took 200 prisoners.

Most often, partisan detachments ambushed and attacked enemy vehicles on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of General Dorokhov's detachment, operating along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12, seized two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 16, Colonel Efremov's detachment, meeting an enemy column heading for Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people.

The detachment of Captain Figner, who was always in the vicinity of the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all foodstuffs in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up an artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, exterminated up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers.

Later, the partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, took Vereya on September 28, 1812, destroying part of the French garrison.

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the war of 1812 was named the Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of "war not according to the rules", Kutuzov said that such are the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop the people, hardened by everything they saw; a people who for so many years did not know the war on their territory; people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland ... "

Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war proceeded from the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that manifested themselves in the national liberation war.

While Napoleon's troops relax with drunkenness and looting in Moscow, and the regular Russian army retreats, making ingenious maneuvers that will later allow it to rest, gather strength, significantly replenish its composition and defeat the enemy, let's talk about the cudgel of the people's war, as we like with the light hand of Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy to call the partisan movement of 1812.

Partisans of Denisov's detachment
Illustration for Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace
Andrey NIKOLAEV

Firstly, I would like to say that this club has a very distant relation to the guerrilla war in the form in which it existed. Namely - army partisan detachments of military personnel of regular units and Cossacks, created in the Russian army to operate in the rear and on enemy communications. Secondly, reading even in recent times various materials, not to mention Soviet sources, you often come across the idea that the alleged ideological inspirer and organizer of them was exclusively Denis Davydov, the famous poet and partisan of that time, who was the first to come out with a proposal to create detachments, like the Spanish guerrilla, through Prince Bagration to Field Marshal Kutuzov before the Battle of Borodino. I must say that the dashing hussar himself put a lot of effort into this legend. It happens...

Portrait of Denis Davydov
Yuri IVANOV

In fact, the first partisan detachment in this war was created near Smolensk by order of the same Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, even before the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. By the time Davydov turned to Bagration with a request to allow the creation of an army partisan detachment, Major General Ferdinand Fedorovich Vintsingerode (commander of the first partisan detachment) was already in full swing and successfully smashed the rear of the French. The detachment occupied the cities of Surazh, Velezh, Usvyat, constantly threatening the outskirts of Vitebsk, which became the reason that Napoleon was forced to send the Italian division of General Pino to help the Vitebsk garrison. As usual, we have forgotten the affairs of these "Germans" ...

Portrait of General Baron Ferdinand Fedorovich Vintsingerode
Unknown artist

After Borodino, in addition to Davydov's (by the way, the smallest detachment), several more were created that began active fighting after leaving Moscow. Some detachments consisted of several regiments and could independently solve major combat missions, for example, the detachment of Major General Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov, which included the dragoon, hussar and 3 cavalry regiments. Large detachments were commanded by colonels Vadbolsky, Efremov, Kudashev, captains Seslavin, Figner and others. Many glorious officers fought in the partisan detachments, including the future satraps(as they were previously presented to us) Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf, Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev.

Portraits of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov and Ivan Efremovich Efremov
George DOE Unknown artist

At the beginning of October 1812, it was decided to surround the Napoleonic army with a ring of army partisan detachments, with a clear plan of action and a certain area of deployment for each of them. So, Davydov's detachment was ordered to function between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, Major General Dorokhov - between Gzhatsk and Mozhaisk, Captain Figner - between Mozhaisk and Moscow. The detachments of Colonel Vadbolsky and Colonel Chernozubov were also in the Mozhaisk area.

Portraits of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev and Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky
George DOE

Between Borovsk and Moscow, the units of Captain Seslavin and Lieutenant Fonvizin inflicted blows on enemy communications. North of Moscow, a group of detachments under the general command of General Vintzingerode conducted an armed struggle. On the Ryazan road, a detachment of Colonel Efremov operated, on Serpukhovskaya - Colonel Kudashev, on Kashirskaya - Major Lesovsky. The main advantage of the partisan detachments was their mobility, surprise and swiftness. They never stood in one place, they constantly moved, and no one, except the commander, knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. If necessary, several detachments were temporarily united to carry out major operations.

Portraits of Alexander Samoilovich Figner and Alexander Nikitich Seslavin
Yuri IVANOV

Without belittling the exploits of Denis Davydov's detachment and himself, it must be said that many commanders took offense at the memoirist after the publication of his military notes, in which he often exaggerated his own merits and forgot to mention his comrades. To which Davydov answered innocently: Fortunately, there is something to say about yourself, why not? And it's true that the organizers, Generals Barclay de Tolly and Vintzingerode passed away one after another in 1818, what can you remember about them ... And written in a captivating juicy language, Denis Vasilyevich's works were very popular in Russia. True, Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky wrote to Xenophon Polevoy in 1832: Between us, be it said, he wrote out more than cut himself the glory of a brave man.

A memoirist, and even more so a poet, and even a hussar, well, how can we do without fantasies :) So let's forgive him these little pranks? ..

Denis Davydov at the head of the partisans in the vicinity of Lyakhovo
A. VEAL

Portrait of Denis Davydov
Alexander ORLOVSKY

In addition to the partisan detachments, there was also the so-called people's war, which was waged by spontaneously created self-defense detachments of the villagers and the importance of which, in my opinion, is greatly exaggerated. And she's teeming with myths ... Now, they say, they have concocted a film about the elder Vasilisa Kozhina, whose very existence is still disputed, and the language does not dare to speak about her exploits.

But oddly enough, the same "German" Barclay de Tolly, who in July, without waiting for instructions from above, turned to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga regions through the Smolensk governor, Baron Casimir Asch, also had a hand in this movement. proclamation:

The inhabitants of Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga! Listen to the voice calling you to your own comfort, to your own safety. Our implacable enemy, having undertaken a greedy intention against us, has hitherto nourished himself with the hope that even his insolence will be enough to frighten us, to triumph over us. But our two brave armies, stopping the daring flight of his violence, with their bosom opposed him on the ancient borders of our ... Avoiding a decisive battle ... his bandit gangs, attacking unarmed villagers, tyrannize over them with all the cruelty of barbaric times: rob and burn their houses; desecrate the temples of God ... But many of the inhabitants of the province of Smolensk have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the name of the Russian, punish the villains without mercy. Imitate them all, those who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign!

Of course, the townsfolk and peasants behaved differently in the territories left by the Russians. When the French army approached, they fled away from home or into the woods. But often, first of all, some ruined the estates of their tyrant landlords (do not forget that the peasants were serfs), robbed, set fire, ran away in the hope that the French would come now and they would be freed (rumors about Napoleon's intentions to rid the peasants of serfdom were full of land ).

The defeat of the manor house. Patriotic War 1812 year
The plundering of the manor by the peasants after the retreat of the Russian troops in front of the army of Napoleon
V.N. KURDYUMOV

During the retreat of our troops and the entry of the French into Russia, the landlord peasants often rose up against their masters, shared the manor's estate, even torn up and burned houses, killed landlords and managers- in a word, they smashed the estates. The passing troops joined the peasants and, in turn, carried out the plunder. Our picture depicts an episode from such a joint robbery of civilians with the military. The action takes place in one of the wealthy manor houses. The owner himself is no longer there, and the remaining clerk was seized so that he would not interfere. The furniture was taken out into the garden and broken. The statues that adorn the garden are broken; flowers are dented. A wine barrel with a knocked out bottom is lying there and then. The wine spilled. Everyone takes whatever is horrible. And unnecessary things are thrown away and destroyed. The cavalryman on horseback stands and looks calmly at this picture of destruction.(original illustration caption)

Partisans of 1812.
Boris ZVORYKIN

Where the landowners behaved like human beings, the peasants and courtyard people armed themselves with whatever they could, sometimes under the leadership of the owners themselves, attacked the French detachments and carts and fought them back. Some detachments were led by Russian soldiers who lagged behind their units due to illness, injury, captivity and subsequent flight from it. So the audience was motley.

Defenders of the home
Alexander APSIT

Plastun Scouts
Alexander APSIT

It can also be said that these units acted on a permanent basis. They organized while the enemy was on their territory, and then disbanded, all for the same reason that the peasants were serfs. Indeed, even from the militias created at the behest of the emperor, the fugitive peasants were escorted home and subjected to trial. So the detachment of Kurin, whose exploits were glorified by Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, existed for 10 days - from October 5 to 14, as long as the French were in the Bogorodsky district, and then it was disbanded. Yes, and not the entire Russian people participated in the people's war, but only residents of several provinces where the hostilities took place, or adjacent to them.

French guards under the escort of grandmother Spiridonovna
Alexey VENETSIANOV, 1813

This whole conversation I started to ensure that, firstly, to understand that our cudgel of the people's war I could not stand any comparison with the Spanish-Portuguese guerrilla (you can read a little about this), which, allegedly, we looked up to, and, secondly, once again to show that the Patriotic War was won primarily thanks to the actions of our commanders, generals, officers , soldier. And the emperor. And not by the forces of the Gerasims Kurins, the mythical lieutenants of the Rzhevsky, Vasilis Kozhins and other entertaining characters ... Although it was not without them ... And more specifically, we will talk about partisan war ahead ...

And finally, a picture of today:

Archpriest of the Cavalry Regiment Gratinsky, serving a prayer service in the parish church of St. Euplus, in Moscow, in the presence of the French on September 27, 1812.
Engraving from a drawing by an unknown artist

... Wishing to create a more favorable attitude towards himself in the population, Napoleon ordered not to interfere with the performance of divine services in churches; but this was possible only in a few temples not touched by the enemy. From September 15th, divine services were regularly performed in the church of Archdeacon Evpl (on Myasnitskaya); Divine services were held daily in the Kharitoniya church in Ogorodniki. A particularly deep impression was made in Zamoskorechye by the first evangelism in the Church of Peter and Paul on Yakimanka ...(g-l Tourist companion No. 3, published for the centenary of the war of 1812)

The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of Russian troops deep into the territory of the state showed that the enemy could hardly be overthrown by the forces of one regular army. The efforts of the entire Russian people were needed to defeat a strong enemy. In the overwhelming majority of the enemy-occupied counties, people perceived Napoleon's troops not as liberators from serfdom, but as rapists, robbers and enslavers. The actions of the occupiers only confirmed the opinion of the people - the European hordes robbed, killed, raped, rampaged in churches. Another invasion of foreigners was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the people as an invasion that had the goal of eradicating Orthodox faith and affirm godlessness.

Studying the topic of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, it should be remembered that partisans were then called temporary detachments of regular troops and Cossacks, which were purposefully created by the Russian command to operate on the flanks, in the rear and communications of the enemy. The actions of spontaneously organized self-defense detachments of local residents were designated by the term "people's war".

Some researchers associate the beginning of the partisan movement during the war of 1812 with the manifesto Russian emperor Alexander I of July 6, 1812, who, as it were, allowed the people to take up and actively participate in the struggle against the French. In reality, the situation was somewhat different, the first centers of resistance to the invaders appeared in Belarus and Lithuania. Moreover, often the peasants did not understand where the invaders were, and where their nobles collaborating with them.

People's war

With the invasion of the “Great Army” into Russia, many local residents initially simply left the villages and went into forests and areas far from the hostilities, taking away their livestock. Retreating through the Smolensk region, the commander-in-chief of the Russian 1st Western Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly called on his compatriots to take up arms against the enemy. In the appeal of Barclay de Tolly, it was reported how to act against the enemy. The first detachments were created from local residents who wanted to protect themselves and their property. They were joined by soldiers who had lagged behind their units.

French foragers gradually began to face not only passive resistance, when the cattle were driven into the forest, hiding food, but also with the active actions of the peasants. In the region of Vitebsk, Mogilev, Orsha, peasant detachments themselves attacked the enemy, making not only night, but also daytime attacks on small units of the enemy. French soldiers were killed or taken prisoner. The widest scope of the people's war was in the Smolensk province. It covered the Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts.

In the city of White and Belsk Uyezd, the peasants attacked the parties of French foragers moving towards them. Police chief Boguslavsky and retired major Yemelyanov led the Sychev detachments, establishing proper order and discipline in them. In just two weeks - from August 18 to September 1, they carried out 15 attacks on the enemy. During this time, they killed more than 500 enemy soldiers and captured over 300. Several horse and peasant detachments were created in the Roslavl district. They not only defended their district, but also attacked enemy units operating in the neighboring Yelnensky district. Peasant detachments acted actively in the Yukhnovsky district, they interfered with the advance of the enemy to Kaluga, assisted the army partisan detachment of D.V. Davydov. In the Gzhatsky district, a detachment created by a private of the Kiev dragoon regiment, Yermolai Chetvertakov, received great fame. He not only defended the land at the Gzhatskaya pier from enemy soldiers, but also attacked the enemy himself.

The people's war was even more widespread during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, the peasant movement took on a significant character not only in the Smolensk, but also in the Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. Thus, in the Zvenigorod district, people's detachments destroyed or captured more than 2 thousand enemy soldiers. The most famous detachments were led by the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centenary Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk uyezd, detachments led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semyonov acted. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, local detachments included up to 2 thousand warriors. The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was the Bogorodsk partisans, which included up to 6 thousand people. It was headed by the peasant Gerasim Kurin. He not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodsk district, but also struck at the enemy himself.

It should be noted that Russian women also took part in the fight against the enemy. Peasant and army partisan detachments operated on enemy lines of communication, fettered the actions of the "Great Army", attacked individual enemy units, destroying the enemy's manpower and property, and interfered with the collection of food and fodder. The Smolensk road, where the postal service was organized, was regularly attacked. The most valuable documents were delivered to the headquarters of the Russian army. According to some estimates, peasant detachments killed up to 15 thousand enemy soldiers, about the same number were taken prisoner. Due to the actions of the militia, partisan and peasant detachments, the enemy was unable to expand the zone he controlled and receive additional opportunities to collect food and fodder. The French failed to gain a foothold in Bogorodsk, Dmitrov, Voskresensk, capture Bryansk and reach Kiev, create additional communication for communication of the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier.

Prisoners of the French. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873 g.

Army squads

Army partisan detachments also played an important role in the 1812 campaign. The idea of their creation appeared even before the Battle of Borodino, when the command analyzed the actions of individual cavalry detachments, which, by chance, fell into enemy communications. The first to start partisan actions was the commander of the 3rd Western Army, Alexander Petrovich Tormasov, who formed the "flying corps". In early August, Barclay de Tolly formed a detachment under the command of General Ferdinand Fedorovich Vintsingerode. The number of the detachment was 1.3 thousand soldiers. Vintzingerode received the task of covering the St. Petersburg highway, operating on the flank and behind enemy lines.

M.I. Kutuzov gave great importance the action of partisan detachments, they were supposed to wage a "small war", exterminate individual enemy detachments. The detachments were usually created from mobile, cavalry units, often Cossack, they were most adapted to irregular warfare. Their number was usually insignificant - 50-500 people. If necessary, they interacted and combined into larger units. Army partisan detachments received the task of delivering surprise strikes behind enemy lines, destroying his manpower, disrupting communications, attacking garrisons, suitable reserves, and disrupting actions aimed at obtaining food and fodder. In addition, the partisans performed the role of army intelligence. The main advantage of the partisan detachments was their speed and mobility. The most famous were the units under the command of Vintsingerode, Denis Vasilyevich Davydov, Ivan Semyonovich Dorokhov, Alexander Samoilovich Figner, Alexander Nikitich Seslavin and other commanders.

In the fall of 1812, the actions of partisan detachments took on a wide scale, 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 separate squadrons and a team of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 ranger battalions and 22 regimental guns acted as part of the army flying detachments. Partisans set up ambushes, attacked enemy carts, intercepted couriers. They daily made reports on the movement of enemy forces, handed over captured mail, information received from prisoners. Alexander Figner, after the capture of Moscow by the enemy, was sent to the city as a scout, he cherished the dream of killing Napoleon. He did not succeed in eliminating the French emperor, but thanks to his extraordinary resourcefulness and knowledge of foreign languages, Figner was able to obtain important information, which he transmitted to the headquarters (headquarters). Then he formed a partisan (sabotage) detachment from volunteers and stragglers, which operated on the Mozhaisk road. His ventures so worried the enemy that he attracted the attention of Napoleon, who appointed a bounty on his head.

In the north of Moscow, a large detachment of General Vintsingerode operated, which, having allocated small formations to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrovskaya roads, blocked the enemy's access to the northern regions of the Moscow region. Dorokhov's detachment was actively operating, which destroyed several enemy teams. A detachment under the command of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev was sent to the Serpukhovskaya and Kolomenskaya roads. His partisans made a successful attack on the village of Nikolskoye, killing more than 100 people and capturing 200 enemy soldiers. Seslavin's partisans acted between Borovsk and Moscow, he had the task of coordinating his actions with Figner. Seslavin was the first to reveal the movement of Napoleon's troops to Kaluga. Thanks to this valuable report, the Russian army managed to block the road to the enemy at Maloyaroslavets. In the area of Mozhaisk, a detachment of Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky operated, under his command was the Mariupol hussar regiment and five hundred Cossacks. He established control over the Ruza road. In addition, a detachment of Ilya Fedorovich Chernozubov was sent to Mozhaisk, a detachment of Alexander Khristoforovich Benckendorff operated in the Volokolamsk region, Viktor Antonovich Prendel's detachment operated near Ruza, the Cossacks of Grigory Petrovich Pobednov were behind Klin in the direction of the Yaroslavl tract, etc.

An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.

In fact, Napoleon's "Great Army" in Moscow was surrounded. Army and peasant detachments hindered the search for food and fodder, kept enemy units in constant tension, this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army. The active actions of the partisans were one of the reasons that made Napoleon decide to leave Moscow.

On September 28 (October 10), 1812, several united partisan detachments under the command of Dorokhov took Vereya by storm. The enemy was taken by surprise, about 400 soldiers of the Westphalian regiment with a banner were captured. In total, in the period from September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), due to the actions of the partisans, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed and 6.5 thousand enemies were captured. To ensure security in communications, the supply of ammunition, food and fodder, the French command had to allocate more and more forces.

October 28 (November 9) near the village. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya, partisans of Davydov, Seslavin and Figner, reinforced by V.V. Orlova-Denisov, were able to defeat an entire enemy brigade (she was the vanguard of the 1st Infantry Division of Louis Baraguay d "Ilya.) After a fierce battle, the French brigade under the command of Jean-Pierre Augereau capitulated. The commander himself and 2 thousand soldiers were captured. Napoleon was extremely angry upon learning of what had happened, and ordered to disband the division and conduct an investigation into the behavior of General Baraguay d'Hillier, who hesitated and did not provide timely assistance to Augereau's brigade. The general was removed from command and placed under house arrest on his estate in France.

Partisans acted actively during the retreat of the "Great Army". Platov's Cossacks struck at the rear units of the enemy. Davydov's detachment and other partisan formations operated from the flanks, followed the enemy army, raiding individual French units. Partisan and peasant detachments made a significant contribution to the common cause of the victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.

Cossacks attack the retreating French. Drawing by Atkinson (1813).

Guerrilla war (partisan movement) of 1812 - an armed conflict between Napoleon's troops and Russian partisans during the Patriotic War of 1812.

The partisan troops consisted of detachments of the Russian army located in the rear, escaping Russian prisoners of war and numerous volunteers from civilian population... Guerrilla units were one of the main forces involved in the war and resisting the attackers.

Prerequisites for the creation of partisan detachments

The troops of Napoleon, who attacked Russia, rather quickly moved inland, pursuing the retreating Russian army. This led to the fact that the French army was quite stretched across the territory of the state, from the borders to the capital itself - thanks to the extended communication lines, the French received food and weapons. Seeing this, the leadership of the Russian army decided to create mobile detachments that would operate in the rear and try to cut off the channels through which the French received food. This is how partisan detachments appeared, the first of which was formed by order of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.

Partisan detachments from the Cossacks and the regular army

Davydov drew up a very effective plan for conducting partisan warfare, thanks to which he received a detachment of 50 hussars and 50 Cossacks from Kutuzov. Together with his detachment, Davydov went to the rear of the French army and began subversive activities there.

In September, this detachment attacked a French detachment transporting food and additional manpower (soldiers). The French were captured or killed, and all the goods were destroyed. There were several such attacks - the partisans acted cautiously and always unexpectedly for the French soldiers, thanks to which it was almost always possible to destroy the carts with food and other belongings.

Soon, peasants and Russian soldiers freed from captivity began to join Davydov's detachment. Despite the fact that the partisans had strained relations with local peasants at first, quite soon local residents began to take part in Davydov's raids themselves and actively help in the partisan movement.

Davydov, along with his soldiers, regularly disrupted food supplies, freed prisoners and sometimes took weapons from the French.

When Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow, he gave the order to start an active partisan war in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments began to grow and appeared throughout the country, they consisted mainly of the Cossacks. Partisan detachments usually numbered several hundred people, but there were also larger formations (up to 1,500 people), which could well cope with small detachments of the regular French army.

Several factors contributed to the success of the partisans. Firstly, they always acted suddenly, which gave an advantage, and secondly, the locals quickly established contact with partisan detachments than with the regular army.

By the middle of the war, the partisan detachments had grown so large that they began to pose a significant danger to the French, and a real partisan war began.

Peasant partisan detachments

The success of the partisan war of 1812 would not have been so overwhelming if it were not for the active participation of the peasants in the life of the partisans. They always actively supported the detachments working in their area, brought them food and provided assistance in every possible way.

The peasants also put up all possible resistance to the French army. First of all, they refused to conduct any trade with the French - often it came to the point that the peasants burned their own houses and food supplies if they knew that the French would come to them.

After the fall of Moscow and the discord in Napoleon's army, the Russian peasantry moved on to more active actions. Peasant partisan detachments began to be created, which also offered armed resistance to the French and made raids.

Results and role of the partisan war of 1812

Largely thanks to the active and skillful actions of the Russian partisan detachments, which eventually turned into a huge force, Napoleon's army fell and was expelled from Russia. The partisans actively undermined the ties of the French with their own, cut off the routes of supply of weapons and food, simply smashed small detachments in deep forests - all this greatly weakened Napoleon's army and led to its internal disintegration and weakening.

The war was won and the heroes of the partisan war were awarded.

The text of the work is placed without images and formulas.
Full version work is available in the tab "Files of work" in PDF format

The Patriotic War of 1812 was one of the turning points in Russian history, a serious shock for Russian society, which faced a number of new problems and phenomena that still require interpretation by modern historians.

One of these phenomena was the People's War, which gave rise to an incredible number of rumors, and then enduring legends.

The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 has been studied sufficiently, but at the same time there are many controversial episodes in it, since there are conflicting opinions in the assessment of this event. Differences begin from the very beginning - from the causes of the war, go through all battles and personalities and end only with the departure of the French from Russia. The issue of the popular partisan movement is not fully understood until today, which is why this topic will always be relevant.

In historiography, this topic is presented quite fully, however, the opinions of domestic historians about the partisan war itself and its participants, about their role in the Patriotic War of 1812 are extremely ambiguous.

Dzhivelegov A.K. wrote the following: “The peasants took part in the war only after Smolensk, but especially after the surrender of Moscow. If there was more discipline in the Grand Army, normal relations with the peasants would be established very soon. But the foragers turned into marauders, from whom the peasants “naturally defended themselves, and for protection, precisely for protection and nothing else, peasant detachments were formed ... all of them, we repeat, had in mind exclusively self-defense. The people's war of 1812 is nothing more than an optical illusion created by the ideology of the nobility ... ”(6, p. 219).

The opinion of the historian Tarle E.V. was a little more condescending, but on the whole it was similar to the opinion of the author presented above: “All this led to the fact that the mythical“ peasant partisans ”began to ascribe what in reality was carried out by the retreating Russian army. There were classical partisans, but mostly only in the Smolensk province. On the other hand, the peasants were terribly annoyed by endless foreign foragers and marauders. And they, naturally, were given active resistance... And also “many peasants fled into the woods when the French army approached, often just out of fear. And not from some great patriotism ”(9, p. 12).

Historian Popov A.I. does not deny the existence of peasant partisan detachments, however, believes that it is wrong to call them the word "partisans", that they were rather a militia (8, p. 9). Davydov clearly distinguished between "partisans and villagers." In leaflets, partisan detachments clearly differ from "peasants from villages adjacent to the theater of war", which "arrange militias among themselves"; they record the difference between armed settlers and partisans, between “our detached units and zemstvo militias"(8, p. 10). So the accusations by Soviet authors of noble and bourgeois historians that they did not consider the peasants to be partisans are completely groundless, because their contemporaries did not consider them as such.

Contemporary historian N.A. Troitsky, in his article "The Patriotic War of 1812 From Moscow to the Neman," wrote: "Meanwhile, around Moscow, a partisan war, destructive for the French, flared up. Peaceful townspeople and villagers of both sexes and all ages, armed with anything - from axes to simple clubs, multiplied the ranks of partisans and militias ... The total number of the people's militia exceeded 400 thousand people. In the combat zone, almost all peasants capable of carrying weapons became partisans. It was the nationwide upsurge of the masses who spoke out in defense of the Fatherland that became the main reason Russia's victories in the war of 1812 "(11)

In pre-revolutionary historiography, there were facts discrediting the actions of partisans. Some historians called the partisans marauders, showed their indecent actions not only in relation to the French, but also in relation to ordinary residents. In many works of domestic and foreign historians, the role of the resistance movement of the broad masses, who responded to a foreign invasion with a national war, is clearly belittled.

Our study presents an analysis of the works of such historians as: Alekseev V.P., Babkin V.I., Beskrovny L.G., Bichkov L.N., Knyazkov S.A., Popov A.I., Tarle E.V. ., Dzhivilegov A.K., Troitsky N.A.

The object of our research is the partisan war of 1812, and the subject of our research is the historical assessment of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

At the same time, we used the following research methods: narrative, hermeneutic, content analysis, historical-comparative, historical-genetic.

Based on the above, the purpose of our work is to give a historical assessment of such a phenomenon as the partisan war of 1812.

1. Theoretical analysis of sources and works related to the topic of our research;

2. Identify whether such a phenomenon as "People's War" took place according to the narrative tradition;

3. Consider the concept of "partisan movement of 1812" and its reasons;

4. Consider the peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812;

5. Carry out their comparative analysis in order to determine the role of peasant and army partisan detachments in achieving victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Thus, the structure of our work looks like this:

Introduction

Chapter 1: The People's War according to Narrative Tradition

Chapter 2: General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

Conclusion

Bibliography

Chapter 1. People's war according to the narrative tradition

Modern historians often question the existence of the People's War, believing that such actions of the peasants were carried out solely for the purpose of self-defense and that detachments of peasants should in no case be distinguished as separate types of partisans.

In the course of our work, we analyzed a large number of sources, ranging from essays, ending with collections of documents, and allowing to understand whether such a phenomenon as the "People's War" took place.

Reporting documentation always provides the most reliable evidence, since it lacks subjectivity and clearly traces information proving certain hypotheses. In it you can find many different facts, such as: the size of the army, the names of the detachments, actions at various stages of the war, the number of losses and, in our case, facts about the location, number, methods and motives of peasant partisan detachments. In our case, this documentation includes manifests, reports, government messages.

1) It all started with the "Manifesto of Alexander I on the collection of the zemstvo militia from 1812 on July 6". In it, in plain text, the tsar calls on the peasants to fight the French troops, believing that only a regular army will not be enough to win the war (4, p. 14).

2) Typical raids on small detachments of the French are perfectly traced in the report of the Zhizdrinsky district leader of the nobility to the Kaluga civil governor (10, p. 117)

3) From the report of E.I. Vlastova Y.X. Wittgenstein from the town of Bely "On the actions of the peasants against the enemy" from the government message "On the activities of peasant detachments against the army of Napoleon in the Moscow province", from the "Brief journal of military actions" on the struggle of the peasants in Velsky. Smolensk lips. with the army of Napoleon, we see that the actions of peasant partisan detachments really took place during the Patriotic War of 1812, mainly in the Smolensk province (10, p. 118, 119, 123).

Memoirs like memories, are not the most reliable source of information, since, by definition, memoirs are notes of contemporaries telling about events in which their author directly took part. Memoirs are not identical to the chronicle of events, since in the memoirs the author tries to comprehend the historical context of his own life, respectively, memoirs differ from the chronicles of events in subjectivity - in that the events described are refracted through the prism of the author's consciousness with their sympathy and vision of what is happening. Therefore, the memoirs, unfortunately, in our case provide practically no evidence.

1) The attitude of the peasants in the Smolensk province and their willingness to fight is clearly traced in the memoirs of A.P. Buteneva (10, p. 28)

2) From the memoirs of I.V. Snegirev, we can conclude that the peasants are ready to defend Moscow (10, p. 75)

However, we see that memoirs and memories are not a reliable source of information, since there are too many subjective assessments in them, and we will not take them into account in the end.

Notes and letters are also subject to subjectivity, but their difference from memoirs is such that they were written directly at the time of the given historical events, and not for the purpose of subsequent acquaintance with the masses of the people, as in the case of journalism, but as personal correspondence or notes, respectively, their reliability is questioned, but they can be considered as evidence. In our case, the notes and letters provide us with evidence not so much of the existence of the People's War as such, but prove the courage and strong spirit of the Russian people, showing that peasant partisan detachments in large numbers were created based on patriotism, and not out of the need for self-defense.

1) The first attempts to resist the peasants can be traced in a letter from Rostopchin to Balashov dated August 1, 1812 (10, p. 28)

2) From the notes of A.D. Bestuzhev-Ryumin dated August 31, 1812, from a letter to P.M. Longinova S.R. Vorontsov, from the diary of Ya.N. Pushchin about the battle of the peasants with the enemy detachment near Borodino and the mood of the officers after leaving Moscow, we see that the actions of the peasant partisan detachments during the Patriotic War of 1812 were caused not only by the need for self-defense, but also by deep patriotic feelings and the desire to protect their homeland. enemy (10, p. 74, 76, 114).

Journalism at the beginning of the 19th century Russian Empire was censored. So in the "First censorship decree" of Alexander I of July 9, 1804 reads the following: "... censorship is obliged to consider all books and works intended for distribution in society", i.e. in fact, it was impossible to publish anything without the permission of the supervisory authority, and accordingly all descriptions of the exploits of the Russian people could turn out to be banal propaganda or a kind of "call to action" (12, p. 32). However, this does not mean that journalism does not provide us with any evidence of the existence of the People's War. Despite the seeming severity of censorship, it is worth noting that it did not cope with the tasks set. the best way... Professor of the University of Illion, Marianne Taks Choldin writes: "... a significant number of" harmful "writings penetrated the country despite all the efforts of the government to prevent this" (12, p. 37). Accordingly, journalism does not claim to be one hundred percent authentic, but it also provides us with some evidence of the existence of the People's War and a description of the exploits of the Russian people.

After analyzing the "Otechestvennye zapiski" about the activities of one of the organizers of the peasant partisan detachments, Yemelyanov, correspondence to the newspaper "Severnaya Pochta" about the actions of the peasants against the enemy and an article by N.P. Polikarpov "Unknown and elusive Russian partisan detachment", we see that excerpts from these newspapers and magazines support evidence of the existence of peasant partisan detachments as such and confirms their patriotic motives (10, p. 31, 118; 1, p. 125) ...

Based on this reasoning, it can be concluded that the most useful in proving the existence of the People's War were reporting documentation due to the lack of subjectivity. Reporting documentation provides evidence of the People's War(description of the actions of peasant partisan detachments, their methods, number and motives), and scraps and letters confirm that the formation of such units and the People's War itself was caused by Not only in order to self-defense but also proceeding from deep patriotism and courage of the Russian people. Journalism also reinforces both these judgments. Based on the above analysis of numerous documentation, we can conclude that the contemporaries of the Patriotic War of 1812 realized that the People's War had taken place and clearly distinguished peasant partisan detachments from army partisan detachments, and also realized that this phenomenon was not caused by self-defense. Thus, from all of the above, we can assert that the People's War was.

Chapter 2. General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is an armed conflict between the multinational army of Napoleon and Russian partisans on the territory of Russia in 1812 (1, p. 227).

Guerrilla warfare was one of the three main forms of war of the Russian people against the invasion of Napoleon, along with passive resistance (for example, the destruction of food and fodder, setting fire to their own homes, leaving the forests) and massive participation in the militias.

The reasons for the outbreak of the Partisan War were associated, first of all, with the unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be overthrown by the forces of regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the entire people. In the overwhelming majority of the areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived “ A great army”Not as a liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. Napoleon did not even think of any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at the beginning promising phrases were uttered about the liberation of serfs from serfdom and even talked about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, this was only a tactical move with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landlords.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. And this did not correspond to his political goals when joining Russia. In the opinion of Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was important for him to consolidate monarchism in France, and it was difficult for him to preach the revolution to Russia ”(3, p. 12).

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf-owning landlords. The provisional Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to obey the landlords unquestioningly, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving , if circumstances so require, military force (3, p. 15).

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of freeing them from serfdom.

In reality, the situation was somewhat different. Even before the start of the war, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuykevich drew up a note on the conduct of an active partisan war, and in 1811 the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini "Little War" was published in Russian. This was the beginning of the creation of partisan detachments in the war of 1812. However, in the Russian army they looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement "a destructive system of fragmentation of the army" (2, p. 27).

The partisan forces consisted of detachments of the Russian army operating in the rear of Napoleon's troops; Russian soldiers who escaped from captivity; volunteers from the local community.

§2.1 Peasant partisan detachments

The first partisan detachments were created even before the Battle of Borodino. On July 23, after joining Bagration near Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly formed a flying partisan detachment from the Kazan Dragoon, three Don Cossack and Stavropol Kalmyk regiments under the general command of F. Vintsingerode. Winzingerode was to act against the left flank of the French and provide communication with Wittgenstein's corps. The flying detachment of Vintsingerode showed itself and important source information. On the night of July 26-27, Barclay received news from Vintsingerode from Velizh about Napoleon's plans to advance from Porechye to Smolensk in order to cut off the escape routes of the Russian army. After the Battle of Borodino, the Vintsingerode detachment was reinforced with three Cossack regiments and two battalions of gamekeepers and continued to operate against the enemy's flanks, breaking up into smaller detachments (5, p. 31).

With the invasion of the Napoleonic hordes, the locals initially simply left the villages and went into the forests and areas far from hostilities. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly called on his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was apparently drawn up on the basis of the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to wage a guerrilla war.

It arose spontaneously and represented the performances of small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers who lagged behind their units against the plundering actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to the memoirs of D.V. Davydov, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms ”(8, p. 74).

French foragers sent to villages for food were not confronted with passive resistance. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers.

Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became patriotic for the Russian people. Here popular resistance also acquired the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would then be brought to justice. However, later this process became more active (3, p. 13).

In the city of White and Belsk Uyezd, peasant detachments attacked the French parties making their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk detachments, police chief Boguslavsky and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their villagers with rifles taken from the French, and established proper order and discipline. The Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people (7, p. 209).

The inhabitants of the Roslavl district created several horse and foot peasant detachments, equipping the villagers with lances, sabers and rifles. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders who made their way into the neighboring Yelnensky district. Many peasant detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized the defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, provided substantial assistance to the army partisan detachment of D.V. Davydov.

In the Gzhatsk district, another detachment, created from peasants, was actively operating, headed by Yermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), an ordinary Kiev dragoon regiment. Chetvertakov's detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting tangible losses on him. As a result, in the entire area 35 versts from the Gzhatskaya pier, the lands were not devastated, while all the surrounding villages were in ruins. For this feat, the inhabitants of those places "with sensitive gratitude" called Chetvertakov "the savior of the other side" (5, p. 39).

Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner s. Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.

The actions of peasant detachments became especially active during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed a front of struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.

In the Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here, the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centenary Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk uyezd, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitskaya district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev, Vladimir Afanasyev (5, p. 46).

The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of the Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications in 1813 about the formation of this detachment it was written that "the economic volosts of Vokhnovskoy head Yegor Stulov, centenary Ivan Chushkin and peasant Gerasim Kurin, Amerevsky head Emelyan Vasiliev gathered the peasants subordinate to them, invited also neighboring ones" (1, p. . 228).

The detachment numbered about 6 thousand people, the peasant Gerasim Kurin became the leader of this detachment. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle against the enemy troops.

It should be noted that even women took part in sorties against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes were overgrown with legends and in individual cases did not even remotely remind of real events... A typical example is with Vasilisa Kozhina, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed neither more nor less leadership of a peasant detachment, which in reality did not exist.

During the war, many active participants in peasant detachments were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward people subordinate to Count F.V. Rostopchin: 23 people "in charge" - with insignia of the Military Order (St. George's Crosses), and the other 27 people - with a special silver medal "For Love of the Fatherland" on the Vladimir ribbon.

Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militia warriors, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone under his control and create additional bases for supplying the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to obtain additional communication that would connect the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kiev.

§2.2 Army guerrilla units

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintzengerode, who headed the united Kazan Dragoon, 11 Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of the town of Dukhovshchina.

Denis Davydov's squad was a real thunderstorm for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyr hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodino. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the riots, poor protection of the rear in the French army (8, p. 83).

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration allowed him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For the "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and - 1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the enemy's rear. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaymishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several detachments of the French, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous moving ring.

A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. From Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I.S. Dorokhova. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the area of Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol hussar regiment and 500 Cossacks. The roads between Borovsk and Moscow were controlled by the detachment of Captain A.N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. Kudashiv. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I.E. Efremova. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Vintzengerode, who, separating from himself small detachments to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrovskaya roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region (6, p. 210).

The main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight provide me with more ways to destroy him , and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I give away important units in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk ”(2, p. 74). Army partisan detachments were created mainly from Cossack troops and were unequal in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Headquarters of the Russian army ... The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action and were informed of the areas of action of neighboring detachments in case of joint operations.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Sometimes, knowing in advance the location of the enemy, the partisans made a surprise attack. So, General Vincengerode, having established that in the village of Sokolove - 15 there is an outpost of two cavalry squadrons and three infantry companies, he singled out 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly rushed into the village, destroyed more than 120 people and took 3 officers prisoner, 15 non-commissioned officers -officers, 83 soldiers (1, p. 249).

Most often, partisan detachments ambushed and attacked enemy vehicles on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of General Dorokhov's detachment, operating along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12, seized two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 6, a detachment of Colonel Efremov, meeting an enemy column heading for Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people (5, p. 56).

Captain Figner's detachment, which was always in the vicinity of the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all foodstuffs in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up an artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, exterminated up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers (7 , p. 215).

§2.3 Comparative analysis of peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812

Peasant partisan detachments arose spontaneously in connection with the oppression of the peasants by French troops. Army partisan detachments arose with the consent of the top command leadership in connection with the insufficient effectiveness of the regular regular army, on the one hand, and with the chosen tactics aimed at separating and exhausting the enemy, on the other hand.

Basically, both types of partisan detachments operated in the region of Smolensk and adjacent cities: Gzhaisk, Mozhaisk, etc., as well as in the following districts: Krasnensky, Porechsky, Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavlsky, Gzhatsky, Vyazemsky.

The composition and degree of organization of the partisan detachments was radically different: the first group consisted of peasants who began their activities due to the fact that the invading French troops, by their first actions, aggravated the already poor situation of the peasants. In this regard, this group included men and women, young and old, and at first acted spontaneously and not always harmoniously. The second group consisted of the military (hussars, Cossacks, officers, soldiers), created to help the regular army. This group, being professional soldiers, acted more unitedly and harmoniously, taking more often not by quantity, but by skill and ingenuity.

Peasant partisan detachments were mainly armed with pitchforks, spears, axes, less often firearms. Army guerrilla units were better equipped and of better quality.

In this regard, peasant partisan detachments carried out raids on carts, ambushed, and sorties to the rear. Army partisan detachments monitored roads, destroyed food depots and small French detachments, raided and raided larger enemy units, and sabotaged them.

In quantitative terms, the peasant partisan detachments outnumbered the army.

The results of the activity were also not very similar, but, perhaps, equally important. With the help of peasant partisan detachments, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone under his control and create additional bases for supplying the main forces, while with the help of army partisan detachments, Napoleon's army was weakened and subsequently destroyed.

Thus, the peasant partisan detachments stopped the strengthening of Napoleon's army, and the army partisan detachments helped the regular army to destroy it, which was no longer able to increase its power.

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the war of 1812 was named the Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of "war not according to the rules", Kutuzov said that such were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop the people, hardened by everything they saw; a people who for so many years did not know the war on their territory; people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland ... ”(1, p. 310).

In our work, based on evidence from multiple analyzed sources and works, we proved that peasant partisan detachments existed on a par with army partisan detachments, and this phenomenon was also caused by a wave of patriotism, and not out of people's fear of the French "oppressors".

The partisan war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.

Bibliography

1. Alekseev VP People's War. // Patriotic War and Russian society: in 7 volumes. - M .: Publishing House of I.D.Sytin, 1911. V.4. - P.227-337 [electronic document] ( www.museum.ru) Retrieved 01/23/2016

2. Babkin V.I.

3. Bloodless L. G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of history. No. 1, 1972 - S. 12-16.

4. Bloodless L.G. Militia in the Patriotic War of 1812: Collection of documents [electronic document] ( http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/narodnoe-opolchenie1812/index.html) Retrieved 06/23/2016

5. Bichkov L.N. Peasant partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812. - M .: Publishing house polit. literature, 1954 - 103 p.

6. Jivilegov A.K. Alexander I and Napoleon: East. essays. M., 1915.S. 219.

7. Knyazkov S.A. Partisans and guerrilla warfare in 1812. // Patriotic War and Russian Society: in 7 volumes. - M .: Publishing House of I.D.Sytin, 1911. V.4. - S. 208-226 [electronic document] ( www.museum.ru) Retrieved 01/23/2016

8. Popov A.I. Partisans 1812 g. // Historical research. Issue 3. Samara, 2000. - S. 73-93

9. Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia - M .: Giz, 1941 [electronic document] ( http://militera.lib.ru/h/tarle1/index.html) Retrieved 09/13/2016

10. Tarle E.V. Patriotic War of 1812: Collection of documents and materials [electronic document] ( http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/otechestvennaya-voina/index.html) Retrieved 09/11/2016

11. Troitsky N.A. Patriotic War of 1812 From Moscow to Neman [electronic document] ( http://scepsis.net/library/id_1428.html) Checked 10.02.2017

12. Choldin M.T. The history of censorship in tsarist Russia - M.: Rudomino, 2002 - 309 p.