Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905 briefly. War between Russia and Japan

One of the largest confrontations is considered to be Russian- Japanese war 1904-1905. The reasons for this will be discussed in the article. As a result of the conflict, guns from battleships, long-range artillery, and destroyers were used.

The essence of this war was which of the two warring empires would dominate the Far East. Emperor Nicholas II of Russia considered it his first priority to strengthen the influence of his power in East Asia. At the same time, Emperor Meiji of Japan sought to gain complete control of Korea. War became inevitable.

Prerequisites for the conflict

It is clear that the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 (the reasons are related to the Far East) did not begin instantly. She had her own reasons.

Russia advanced in Central Asia to the border with Afghanistan and Persia, which affected the interests of Great Britain. Unable to expand in this direction, the empire switched to the East. There was China, which, due to complete exhaustion in the Opium Wars, was forced to transfer part of its territory to Russia. So she gained control of Primorye (the territory of modern Vladivostok), the Kuril Islands, and partly the island of Sakhalin. To connect distant borders, the Trans-Siberian Railway was created, which provided communication between Chelyabinsk and Vladivostok along the railway line. In addition to the railway, Russia planned to trade along the ice-free Yellow Sea through Port Arthur.

Japan was undergoing its own transformations at the same time. Having come to power, Emperor Meiji stopped the policy of self-isolation and began modernizing the state. All his reforms were so successful that a quarter of a century after they began, the empire was able to seriously think about military expansion to other states. Its first targets were China and Korea. Japan's victory over China allowed it to gain rights to Korea, the island of Taiwan and other lands in 1895.

A conflict was brewing between two powerful empires for dominance in East Asia. The result was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The causes of the conflict are worth considering in more detail.

Main causes of war

It was extremely important for both powers to show their military achievements, so the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 unfolded. The reasons for this confrontation lie not only in claims to the territory of China, but also in the internal political situations that had developed by this time in both empires. A successful campaign in war not only provides the winner with economic benefits, but also increases its status on the world stage and silences opponents of the existing government. What did both states count on in this conflict? What were the main causes of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905? The table below reveals the answers to these questions.

It was precisely because both powers sought an armed solution to the conflict that all diplomatic negotiations did not bring results.

Balance of forces on land

The causes of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were both economic and political. The 23rd Artillery Brigade was sent to the Eastern Front from Russia. As for the numerical advantage of the armies, the leadership belonged to Russia. However, in the East the army was limited to 150 thousand people. Moreover, they were scattered over a vast territory.

• Vladivostok - 45,000 people.
• Manchuria - 28,000 people.
• Port Arthur - 22,000 people.
• Security of the CER - 35,000 people.
• Artillery, engineering troops - up to 8000 people.

The biggest problem for the Russian army was its remoteness from the European part. Communication was carried out by telegraph, and delivery was carried out by the CER line. However, a limited amount of cargo could be transported by rail. In addition, the leadership did not have accurate maps of the area, which negatively affected the course of the war.

Japan before the war had an army of 375 thousand people. They studied the area well and had fairly accurate maps. The army was modernized by English specialists, and the soldiers were loyal to their emperor to death.

Relationships of forces on water

In addition to land, battles also took place on water. The Japanese fleet was led by Admiral Heihachiro Togo. His task was to block the enemy squadron near Port Arthur. In another sea (Japanese), the squadron of the Land of the Rising Sun opposed the Vladivostok group of cruisers.

Understanding the reasons for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Meiji power thoroughly prepared for battles on the water. The most important ships of its United Fleet were produced in England, France, and Germany and were significantly superior to Russian ships.

Main events of the war

When Japanese forces began to move to Korea in February 1904, the Russian command did not attach any importance to this, although they understood the reasons for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Briefly about the main events.

• 09.02.1904. The historical battle of the cruiser “Varyag” against the Japanese squadron near Chemulpo.
• 27.02.1904. The Japanese fleet attacked the Russian Port Arthur without declaring war. The Japanese used torpedoes for the first time and disabled 90% of the Pacific Fleet.
• April 1904. A clash of armies on land, which showed Russia's unpreparedness for war (inconsistency of uniform, lack of military maps, inability to fencing). Because Russian officers had white jackets, Japanese soldiers easily identified and killed them.
• May 1904. Capture of the port of Dalny by the Japanese.
• August 1904. Successful Russian defense of Port Arthur.
• January 1905. Surrender of Port Arthur by Stessel.
• May 1905. Sea battle near Tsushima, destroyed the Russian squadron (one ship returned to Vladivostok), while not a single Japanese ship was damaged.
• July 1905. Invasion of Japanese troops on Sakhalin.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905, the reasons for which were of an economic nature, led to the exhaustion of both powers. Japan began to look for ways to resolve the conflict. She resorted to the help of Great Britain and the USA.

Battle of Chemulpo

The famous battle took place on 02/09/1904 off the coast of Korea (the city of Chemulpo). The two Russian ships were commanded by Captain Vsevolod Rudnev. These were the cruiser "Varyag" and the boat "Koreets". The Japanese squadron under the command of Sotokichi Uriu consisted of 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers. They blocked Russian ships and forced them into battle.

In the morning, in clear weather, the “Varyag” and the “Koreyets” weighed anchor and tried to leave the bay. Music played for them in honor of leaving the port, but after only five minutes the alarm sounded on deck. The battle flag went up.

The Japanese did not expect such actions and hoped to destroy the Russian ships in the port. The enemy squadron hastily raised anchors and battle flags and began to prepare for battle. The battle began with a shot from the Asama. Then there was a battle using armor-piercing and high-explosive shells on both sides.

In unequal forces, the Varyag was badly damaged, and Rudnev decided to turn back to the anchorage. There, the Japanese could not continue shelling due to the danger of damaging the ships of other countries.

Having lowered the anchor, the Varyag crew began to examine the condition of the ship. Rudnev, meanwhile, went for permission to destroy the cruiser and transfer its crew to neutral ships. Not all officers supported Rudnev’s decision, but two hours later the team was evacuated. They decided to sink the Varyag by opening its floodgates. The bodies of the dead sailors were left on the cruiser.

It was decided to blow up the Korean boat, having evacuated the crew first. All things were left on the ship, and secret documents were burned.

The sailors were received by French, English and Italian ships. After all necessary procedures they were delivered to Odessa and Sevastopol, from where they were disbanded by the fleet. According to the agreement, they could not continue to participate in the Russian-Japanese conflict, so they were not allowed into the Pacific Fleet.

Results of the war

Japan agreed to sign the peace treaty with the complete surrender of Russia, in which the revolution had already begun. According to the Portsmoon Peace Treaty (08/23/1905), Russia was obliged to fulfill the following points:

1. Give up claims to Manchuria.
2. Refuse in favor of Japan from Kuril Islands and half of Sakhalin Island.
3. Recognize Japan's right to Korea.
4. Transfer to Japan the right to lease Port Arthur.
5. Pay Japan an indemnity for the “maintenance of prisoners.”

In addition, defeat in the war meant for Russia Negative consequences in economic terms. Stagnation began in some industries, as their lending from foreign banks decreased. Life in the country has become significantly more expensive. Industrialists insisted on a speedy conclusion of peace.

Even those countries that initially supported Japan (Great Britain and the USA) realized how difficult the situation in Russia was. The war had to be stopped in order to direct all forces to fight the revolution, which the world states equally feared.

Mass movements began among workers and military personnel. A striking example is the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin.

The causes and results of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are clear. It remains to be seen what the losses were in human equivalent. Russia lost 270 thousand, of which 50 thousand were killed. Japan lost the same number of soldiers, but more than 80 thousand were killed.

Value judgments

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which were economic and political in nature, showed serious problems inside Russian Empire. He also wrote about this. The war revealed problems in the army, its weapons, command, as well as mistakes in diplomacy.

Japan was not in fully satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. The state has lost too much in the fight against the European enemy. She expected to get more territory, however, the United States did not support her in this. Discontent began to brew within the country, and Japan continued on the path of militarization.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which were considered, brought many military tricks:

• use of spotlights;
• use of wire fences under high voltage current;
• field kitchen;
• radio telegraphy made it possible for the first time to control ships from a distance;
• switching to petroleum fuel, which produces no smoke and makes ships less visible;
• the appearance of minelayer ships, which began to be produced with the proliferation of mine weapons;
• flamethrowers.

One of the heroic battles of the war with Japan is the battle of the cruiser “Varyag” at Chemulpo (1904). Together with the ship "Korean" they confronted an entire squadron of the enemy. The battle was obviously lost, but the sailors still made an attempt to break through. It turned out to be unsuccessful, and in order not to surrender, the crew led by Rudnev sank their ship. For their courage and heroism they were praised by Nicholas II. The Japanese were so impressed by the character and resilience of Rudnev and his sailors that in 1907 they awarded him the Order of the Rising Sun. The captain of the sunken cruiser accepted the award, but never wore it.

There is a version according to which Stoessel surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese for a reward. It is no longer possible to verify how true this version is. Be that as it may, because of his action, the campaign was doomed to failure. For this, the general was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in the fortress, but he was pardoned a year after his imprisonment. He was stripped of all titles and awards, leaving him with a pension.

The Russo-Japanese War in brief.

Reasons for the outbreak of war with Japan.

During the period of 1904, Russia was actively developing land Far East, developing trade and industry. The Land of the Rising Sun blocked access to these lands; at that time it occupied China and Korea. But the fact is that one of the territories of China, Manchuria, was under Russian jurisdiction. This is one of the main reasons for the start of the war. In addition, by decision of the Triple Alliance, Russia was given the Liaodong Peninsula, which once belonged to Japan. Thus, differences arose between Russia and Japan, and a struggle for dominance in the Far East arose.

The course of events of the Russo-Japanese War.

Using the effect of surprise, Japan attacked Russia at Port Arthur. After the landing of Japanese amphibious troops on the Kwantung Peninsula, Port Athrut remained cut off from the outside world, and therefore helpless. Within two months he was forced to resort to capitulation. Next, the Russian army loses the battle of Liaoyang and the battle of Mukden. Before the start of the First World War, these battles were considered the largest in the history of the Russian state.

After the Battle of Tsushima, almost the entire Soviet flotilla was destroyed. The events took place on the Yellow Sea. After another battle, Russia loses the Sakhalin Peninsula in an unequal battle. General Kuropatkin, leader Soviet army for some reason he used passive fighting tactics. In his opinion, it was necessary to wait until the enemy’s forces and supplies were running out. And the king at that time did not attach any importance to this of great importance, since a revolution began on Russian territory at that time.

When both sides of the hostilities were morally and materially exhausted, they agreed to sign a peace treaty in the American Portsmouth in 1905.

Results of the Russian-Japanese War.

Russia lost southern part of its Sakhalin Peninsula. Manchuria was now neutral territory and all troops were withdrawn. Oddly enough, but the agreement was conducted on equal terms, and not as a winner with a loser.

The main reason for the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 1904 lies on the surface 1 . The geopolitical ambitions of these powers collided in Northeast Asia. But as with many armed conflicts, the immediate causes of the war are more complex.

These include Russia’s plans to build a railway in the Russian Far East, and Japan’s victory in the war with China in 1895, and the project of some St. Petersburg guards officers to open a logging enterprise on the Yalu River, and Tokyo’s concerns about St. Petersburg’s influence in Korea. Erratic, fickle diplomacy also played a big role.

But, as with the outbreak of the First World War, a clear understanding of how the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out can take us beyond the bounds of historical scholarship.

The answer concerns an important but often elusive concept in diplomacy, namely honor 2 . When attempts to encroach on the international authority of a state can be considered as dangerous as a military invasion of its territory. Alexander II once stated that in the life of states, as in the life of any person, there are moments when you need to forget everything except protecting your own honor 3 .

CONFUSION ON PEVCHESKY BRIDGE

Russia and Japan had been headed toward war since 1895, when the Japanese spectacularly defeated the Chinese in a brief conflict over Korea. Russia's attempt to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on Chinese territory caused extreme indignation in the island empire. Russian intervention began after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty on April 17, 1895, which marked the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Among the demands of the Japanese side was the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, located not far from Beijing, with the strategically important naval base of Port Arthur. The Qing Dynasty agreed to cede rights to the peninsula, but St. Petersburg attracted Berlin and Paris to jointly demand the concession of Liaodong to Russia.

The Russian demarche came after heated debates among the dignitaries of Nicholas II, caused primarily by the proximity of Eastern Siberia to the theater of military operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The main goal of the Romanovs was ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean. Owning the Pacific port of Vladivostok, surrounded by freezing seas, Russia did not have a convenient, washed warm waters a harbor for the final station of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was under construction at that time. Prominent Russian naval commanders believed that the time had come to capture the port in Korea. This idea was enthusiastically shared by Nicholas II. Lacking the necessary support to take such a step, Foreign Minister Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky proposed an agreement with Tokyo on a new port in the region.

But there was another point of view. Its most influential supporter was Finance Minister Sergei Witte, who considered good relations with China essential for the development of the Russian Far East. He had no doubt that the Romanovs would eventually dominate China. But the empire must go towards this peacefully and economic methods. Russians and Chinese must compete with each other railways, banks, trading houses and not troops. Among other things, Witte often reminded Nikolai: “...for the general state of affairs within Russia, it is essential to avoid everything that could cause external complications” 4 .

As a result, after the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia played more of a role as a defender of Beijing. The Minister of Finance quickly reaped dividends from the Chinese goodwill. He secured the consent of the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office - Translator's note) to build the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, which significantly shortened the eastern section of the railway. And on June 3, 1896, the two empires entered into a secret agreement on joint confrontation in the event of possible aggression from Japan 5 .

However, just a year later, Emperor Nicholas abruptly changed course. Imitating his cousin William, who had captured Qingdao, he occupied the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, which included Port Arthur. Three years later, the Cossacks unexpectedly entered the hereditary provinces of the Qing dynasty in Manchuria. Although Nicholas's diplomats officially promised to withdraw them, the military did not budge and even planned a campaign against neighboring Korea.

Such inconstancy reflected deep divisions in the Far Eastern policy of St. Petersburg. An unwavering supporter of friendly relations with China remained Sergei Witte, who was supported by Count Vladimir Lamsdorff, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906. A coalition of “hawks”, which included different time naval commanders, Lamsdorf's predecessor Count Mikhail Muravyov, retired guards captain and dubious businessman Alexander Bezobrazov and the imperial governor in the Russian Far East, Admiral Evgeny Alekseev. However, disagreements did not prevent the opponents from agreeing on one thing: Russia should play an active role in Northeast Asia.

"KOREA FOR MANCHURI"

Japanese dignitaries also agreed on one thing: the main goal of their country's geopolitics was Korea, a hermit state for a long time which was a tributary of the Qing dynasty. However, by the end of the 19th century, China's progressive weakness led to the weakening of its rule on the peninsula and opened the door for stronger powers to operate there. The latter included Japan, which, during the Meiji Restoration, ended medieval isolation and became a modern state with a Europeanized army and its own colonial aspirations.

The simple logic of geography pointed to Korea as one of the main targets of the genro, the group of nine statesmen who determined the policy of the empire. At its narrowest point, only 60 kilometers separated Japan from Korea.

Already in 1875, Japanese troops clashed with the Koreans on the island of Ganghwado, and 20 years later the empire began a war with China, weakening its influence on the hermit country. As the Western powers divided China into spheres of influence, the Genro decided that they could fulfill their colonial ambitions by giving Russia a dominant role in Manchuria in exchange for their control of Korea. For the next eight years, the slogan "Man-Kan kokan" ("Korea for Manchuria") became one of the leading imperatives of Japanese foreign policy 6 .

On April 13, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian envoy, and Japanese Foreign Minister Tokujiro Nishi signed a joint protocol in Tokyo recognizing Japanese economic dominance in Korea. But at the same time, both sides pledged to defend the country's political sovereignty. Rosen himself called the treaty “incomplete and meaningless,” and the Japanese were also not better opinion about him 7.

Over the next four years, as Russia increasingly distanced itself from Korean affairs, Japan made repeated attempts to achieve official recognition of its primacy on the peninsula. However, Russian diplomats were unable to obtain permission from the government for such a turn in policy. As Alexander Izvolsky, then envoy to Tokyo, explained, both the tsar and his admirals “were too interested in Korea” 8 . At the same time, Lamsdorff feared Japanese hostility, warning in letters to Witte, General Kuropatkin and Naval Minister Tyrtov: if Russia cannot appease a new serious rival, then “the obvious danger of an armed clash with Japan” will remain 9.

When the Japanese government was headed by Marquis Hirobumi Ito, cool heads prevailed in Tokyo. Since the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Marquis was inclined to a cautious policy towards Russia. One of the most prominent statesmen of the Meiji era, Ito had great authority among both dignitaries and the emperor. But despite this, in May 1901 his cabinet lost the confidence of parliament, and a new prime minister, Prince Taro Katsura, took office. The younger members of his cabinet were much more aggressive towards Russia 10 .

True, Marquis Ito, who found himself outside the government, did not give up. During a private visit to St. Petersburg in November 1901, he looked for ways to pursue a policy of reconciliation. The experienced dignitary received a warm welcome in St. Petersburg and was awarded the Order of St. by Nicholas II. Alexander Nevsky, and during meetings with Witte and Lamsdorff he defended the Korean-Manchurian project. But if the Minister of Finance was sympathetic to this idea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was still against 11.

Most importantly, while Ito was negotiating with the king and his officials, the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Tadasu Hayashi, secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Great Britain 12 . Russian diplomats were taken by surprise by this news. Two main adversaries in the Far East have joined forces, simultaneously changing the political landscape in the Pacific region.

ST. PETERSBURG CONTINUES CONTINUES

Nicholas II's ministers hastily assured the world that Russian troops would leave Manchuria in the near future. However, even here opinions in St. Petersburg were sharply divided. Count Lamsdorff and Witte believed that Manchuria should be returned as soon as possible. They predicted that the reluctance to calm the atmosphere in the region would cause new unrest there 13 . This point of view was also supported by many Russians - for the simple reasons that there are no less problems at home 14. In addition, the “Kingdom of Witte” - the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - flourished, and the military presence in Manchuria posed a serious threat to the plans of the Minister of Finance.

However, the idea of ​​preserving Manchuria for Russia had no less influential defenders. The military believed that Manchuria would become part of the Russian Empire like Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, annexed in the second half of the 19th century 15 . The most prominent "hawk" was Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who was in Port Arthur. This naval commander had authority not only in the Pacific Fleet, but also among the garrison of the Liaodong Peninsula. His irrepressible temperament and ambition, coupled with rumors that Alekseev was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, ensured that he was the enmity of many of his contemporaries. And above all, Sergei Witte, who saw him as a dangerous rival in the Russian Far East.

The pathologically indecisive Nicholas II hesitated. The empire's confused and unstable policies sharply increased the hostility of other powers. Nevertheless, after a year of difficult negotiations with China, on April 8, 1902, Russia signed an agreement in Beijing, according to which the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was to take place in three stages over 18 months 16 . On October 8, 1902, the first phase of evacuation of troops began in the southern part of Fengtian province, including in the ancient capital of the Qing dynasty, Mukden (modern Shenyang). But the second stage, planned for April 1903, did not take place; Russian dignitaries could not agree among themselves. Petersburg did not keep its word.

"FUTULE NEGOTIATIONS"

In the summer of 1903, Russia and Japan again entered into debate, wanting to resolve their differences in East Asia. Moreover, the initiative was taken by the intractable Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura. By this point, the Russian line had also hardened significantly as the influence of Witte, a principled advocate of peace in East Asia, had plummeted at court. The Tsar called the hard line adopted in the spring of 1903 the “new course” 17. His goal was “to prevent foreign influence in any form from entering Manchuria” 18. Russia will emphasize its determination, he wrote to Alekseev, by embarking on a military and economic presence in East Asia 19 .

Tired of endless bickering among the ministers, Nikolai accepted two important decisions. On August 12, he appointed Admiral Alekseev as governor in the Far East, which actually made him the tsar’s personal representative in the Pacific region with full power here 20. And two weeks later, Nikolai removed Alekseev’s main opponent, Sergei Witte, from the post of Minister of Finance 21.

Alekseev's rise caused a sharp reaction in Tokyo. Baron Roman Rosen, the Russian envoy, reported that in Japan the appearance of the governor of the Far East was perceived as an act of aggression 22. The Japanese were especially offended by the fact that the appointment happened two weeks after their government proposed starting a new round of negotiations 23 .

Throughout 1903, European foreign ministers were confused, alarmed, and often irritated by the constant reversals of tsarist policy that exposed Russia to increasing international isolation. But a compromise was still possible even at this late stage. However, the king and his viceroy still did not take Japan seriously.

Nicholas, of course, did not consider endless negotiations a worthy reason to interrupt his long autumn trips abroad or hunting. And he believed that “there will be no war because I don’t want it” 24. As a result of fruitless negotiations until the winter, the Japanese cabinet finally came to the conclusion that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible. On February 6, 1904, Foreign Minister Komura summoned Baron Rosen to announce that the government had lost patience with all these “futile negotiations.” Therefore, it decided to end them and break off diplomatic relations with Russia 25 .

Upon returning to his residence, the Russian envoy learned from the naval attaché that earlier that day, at 6 a.m. local time, two Japanese squadrons had weighed anchor for unknown reasons. Shortly after midnight on February 8, 1904, torpedoes from Japanese destroyers hit three Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. Two empires went to war...

CONCLUSION

The Russo-Japanese War is often seen as a classic imperialist conflict. This is only partly true. Although expansionist goals have led St. Petersburg and Tokyo to disagree over Northeast Asia, such rivalry is not unique in the age of aggressive colonial wars. In the decades since the 1880s. and before the outbreak of the First World War, there were repeated clashes between the great states of Europe in Asia and Africa. However, none of them escalated into open war. Disagreements were invariably resolved by “imperial diplomacy,” 27 a tool for solving colonial disputes that were gaining momentum at the end of the 19th century.

An unwritten code governed the relations between the great powers of Europe. Although there were no strictly fixed rules here, they were quite clear. Based on rigid calculation and feeling fair play, the diplomacy of imperialism was effective. Crucial to its success was the understanding by the great powers that they all had legitimate interests outside of Europe. And this line successfully saved countries from open struggle on other continents.

But the diplomacy of imperialism itself was not without flaws. Chief among these was the failure of states to recognize newly developing non-European countries. Like an old-fashioned gentlemen's club, membership was limited to European governments. Thus, the tiny Belgian monarchy was considered a colonial power, while the ambitions of the United States or Japan were questioned. It was precisely this inability of a member of this club - Russia - to take seriously the colonial aspirations of an outsider - Japan - that led on February 8, 1904 to the outbreak of war in East Asia.

Tokyo saw how St. Petersburg trampled on its honor. And statesmen who do not properly respect the interests of other countries have put their own at serious risk. And more than a hundred years later, this conflict has not lost its relevance in international relations.

Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova

Notes
1. This article is based on the chapter Russia's Relations with Japan before and after the War: An Episode in the Diplomacy of Imperialism from the book: The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies. Steven Ericson and Alan Hockley, eds. Hanover, NH, 2008. pp. 11-23, as well as in my monograph: Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, 2001.
2. Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy. Elliot Abrams, ed. Washington, DC, 1998; Tsygankov A.P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge, 2012. P. 13-27.
3. Wohlforth W. Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War 1600-1995 // Honor Among Nations...
4. Witte to Nicholas II, memorandum, August 11, 1900 // RGIA. F. 560. Op. 28. D. 218. L. 71.
5. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states in 1856-1917. M., 1952. S. 292-294.
6. Nish I. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1985. P. 45.
7. Rosen R.R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. London, 1922. P. 159.
8. A.P. Izvolsky L.P. Urusov. Letter dated March 9, 1901 // Bakhmetyevsky archive. Box 1.
9. V.N. Lamsdorf S.Yu. Witte, A.N. Kuropatkin and P.P. Tyrtov. Letter dated May 22, 1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 175. L. 2-3.
10. Okamoto S. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. N.Y., 1970. P. 24-31.
11. V.N. Lamsdorf, reports 11/20/1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 43-45; V.N. Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, memorandum, 11/22/1901 // Red Archive (M.-L.). 1934. T. 63. P. 44-45; V.N. Lamsdorf A.P. Izvolsky, telegram, November 22, 1901 // Ibid. pp. 47-48.
12. Nish I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907. L., 1966. P. 143-228.
13. V.N. Lamsdorf A.N. Kuropatkin. Letter dated March 31, 1900 // RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 759. L. 1-2. See also: A.N. Kuropatkin V.V. Sakharov. Letter dated July 1, 1901 // Ibid. D. 702. L. 2.
14. Suvorin A. Small letters. New time. 1903. February 22. S. 3; Chinese Railway // New Times. 1902. May 3. S. 2; Kravchenko N. From the Far East. // New time. 1902. October 22. S. 2.
15. Good example For similar opinions, see: I.P. Balashev to Nicholas II, memorandum, March 25, 1902 // GARF. F. 543. Op. 1. D. 180. L. 1-26.
16. Glinsky B.B. Prologue of the Russian-Japanese War: materials from the archive of Count S.Yu. Witte. Pg., 1916. P. 180-183.
17. Although Nikolai coined this term, B.A. Romanov popularized it among historians to describe Bezobrazov's growing influence.
18. Romanov V.A. Russia in Manchuria. Ann Arbor, 1952. R. 284.
19. Ibidem.
20. Nicholas II E.I. Alekseev, telegram, September 10, 1903 // RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 2865. L. 31.
21. Nicholas II S.Yu. Witte, letter, August 16, 1903 // RGVIA. F. 1622. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 1.
22. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 219.
23. Gurko V.I. Facts and Features of the Past. Stanford, 1939. P. 281.
24. MacKenzie D. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917. Fort Worth, 1994. P. 145.
25. Nish I. The Origins... P. 213.
26. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 231.
27. The phrase is taken from the title of William Langer’s classic work on European diplomacy at the turn of the 20th century: Langer W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. N.Y., 1956.

* Mikado is the oldest title of the secular supreme overlord of Japan.

The article briefly talks about the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. This war became one of the most shameful in Russian history. The expectation of a “small victorious war” turned into a disaster.

1. Introduction
2. Progress of the Russo-Japanese War
3. Results of the Russo-Japanese War

Causes of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

• The main prerequisite for the outbreak of the war was the growth of imperialist contradictions at the turn of the century. European powers sought to divide China. Russia, which did not have colonies in other parts of the world, was interested in maximizing the penetration of its capital into China and Korea. This desire ran counter to Japan's plans. The rapidly developing Japanese industry also required the seizure of new territories to allocate capital.
• The Russian government did not take into account the increased combat effectiveness of the Japanese army. In the event of a quick and decisive victory, it was planned to significantly reduce revolutionary sentiment in the country. The Japanese elite relied on chauvinistic sentiments in society. It was planned to create Greater Japan through territorial conquests.

Progress of the Russo-Japanese War

• At the end of January 1904, the Japanese, without declaring war, attacked Russian ships based in Port Arthur. And already in June, the successful actions of the Japanese led to the complete defeat of the Russian Pacific squadron. The Baltic fleet (2nd squadron) sent to help, after a six-month journey, was completely defeated by Japan in Battle of Tsushima(May 1905). Sending the 3rd squadron was becoming pointless. Russia has lost its main trump card in its strategic plans. The defeat was a consequence of underestimating the Japanese fleet, which consisted of the latest warships. The reasons were insufficient training of Russian sailors, Russian warships that were outdated at that time, and defective ammunition.
• In military operations on land, Russia also showed a significant lag in many respects. The General Staff did not take into account experience recent wars. Military science adhered to outdated concepts and principles of the era of the Napoleonic wars. It was assumed that the main forces would gather together followed by a massive strike. Japanese strategy, under the guidance of foreign advisers, relied on the development of maneuver operations.
• The Russian command under the leadership of General Kuropatkin acted passively and indecisively. The Russian army suffered its first defeat near Liaoyang. By June 1904, Port Arthur was surrounded. The defense lasted for six months, which can be regarded as the only success of the Russians in the entire war. In December the port was handed over to the Japanese. The decisive battle on land was the so-called “Mukden Meat Grinder” (February 1905), as a result of which the Russian army was practically surrounded, but at the cost of heavy losses it managed to retreat. Russian losses amounted to about 120 thousand people. This failure, coupled with the Tsushima tragedy, showed the futility of further military action. The situation was complicated by the fact that the “victorious war” caused a revolution in Russia itself.
• It was the outbreak of the revolution and the unpopularity of the war in society that forced Russia to enter into peace negotiations. The Japanese economy was significantly damaged as a result of the war. Japan was inferior to Russia both in the number of armed forces and in material capabilities. Even a successful continuation of the war would have led Japan to an economic crisis. Therefore, Japan, having won a number of spectacular victories, was content with this and also sought to conclude a peace treaty.

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

• In August 1905, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded, containing humiliating conditions for Russia. Japan included South Sakhalin, Korea, and Port Arthur. The Japanese gained control of Manchuria. Russia's authority on the world stage was greatly undermined. Japan has demonstrated that its army is combat-ready and armed with the latest technology.
• In general, Russia was forced to abandon active actions in the Far East.

Abstract on the history of Russia

The nature of the war: imperialistic, unfair on both sides. Forces of the parties: Russia - 1 million 135 thousand people (total), actually 100 thousand people, Japan - 143 thousand people + navy + reserve (about 200 thousand). Quantitative and qualitative superiority of Japan at sea (80:63).

Plans of the parties:
Japan- an offensive strategy, the goal of which is dominance at sea, the capture of Korea, possession of Port Arthur, and the defeat of the Russian group.
Russia- did not have general plan war, ensuring interaction between the army and navy. Defensive strategy.

Dates. Events. Notes

January 27, 1904 - A sudden attack by a Japanese squadron on Russian ships near Port Arthur. The heroic battle of the Varangian and the Korean. The attack was repulsed. Russian losses: Varyag is sunk. The Korean is blown up. Japan secured superiority at sea.
January 28 - Repeated bombing of the city and Port Arthur. The attack was repulsed.
February 24 - Arrival in Port Arthur of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarova. Makarov’s active actions in preparation for a general battle with Japan at sea (offensive tactics).
March 31 - Death of Makarov. Inaction of the fleet, refusal of offensive tactics.
April 1904 - Landing of Japanese armies in Korea, crossing the river. Yaly and entry into Manchuria. The initiative in actions on land belongs to the Japanese.
May 1904 - The Japanese began the siege of Port Arthur. Port Arthur found itself cut off from the Russian army. An attempt to unblock it in June 1904 was unsuccessful.
August 13-21 - Battle of Liaoyang. The forces are approximately equal (160 thousand each). The attacks of Japanese troops were repulsed. Kuropatkin's indecisiveness prevented him from developing his success. On August 24, Russian troops retreated to the Shakhe River.
October 5 - The battle on the Shahe River begins. Fog and mountainous terrain, as well as Kuropatkin’s lack of initiative (he acted only with part of the forces he had), were a hindrance.
December 2 - Death of General Kondratenko. R.I. Kondratenko led the defense of the fortress.
July 28 - December 20, 1904 - Besieged Port Arthur heroically defended himself. On December 20, Stesil gives the order to surrender the fortress. The defenders withstood 6 assaults on the fortress. The fall of Port Arthur was a turning point in the Russo-Japanese War.
February 1905 - Battle of Mukden. 550 thousand people participated on both sides. Passivity of Kuropatkin. Losses: Russians -90 thousand, Japanese - 70 thousand. The battle was lost by the Russians.
May 14-15, 1905 - Sea battle at o. Tsushima in the Sea of ​​Japan.
Tactical mistakes of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. Our losses - 19 ships were sunk, 5 thousand died, 5 thousand were captured. Defeat of the Russian fleet
5 August 1905 - Peace of Portsmouth
By the summer of 1905, Japan began to clearly feel a shortage of material and human resources and turned to the USA, Germany, and France for help. The USA stands for peace. Peace was signed in Portsmouth, our delegation was headed by S.Yu. Witte.

Peace terms: Korea is a sphere of interest for Japan, both sides are withdrawing their troops from Manchuria, Russia cedes Liaodong and Port Arthur, half of Sakhalin and railways to Japan. This treaty became invalid after Japan's surrender in 1914.

Causes of defeat: technical, economic and military superiority of Japan, military-political and diplomatic isolation of Russia, operational-tactical and strategic unpreparedness of the Russian army to conduct combat operations in difficult conditions, mediocrity and betrayal of the tsarist generals, unpopularity of the war among all segments of the population.