Back in the fall of 1943, the territory of Italy was divided in two. Its southern part was occupied by American-British troops, and the German occupation of the northern and parts central regions lasted for two years. In the southern part of Italy, the government formed by Badoglio from “specialists” did not have any support among the people and did not enjoy authority among the Anglo-American authorities.
The anti-fascist parties were not united on the issue of their attitude towards the monarchy, since the Action Party and the Socialists demanded the immediate abdication of the king. This made it possible for the occupying powers to sabotage the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and England on the need to include in the government “representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism.” In March, direct diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Italy were restored.
On April 24, 1944, a new government was formed under the chairmanship of Badoglio, which included anti-fascist parties. After the liberation of Rome, the government was reorganized: the leader of the Labor Democracy Party, I. Bonomi, became the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and anti-fascist parties gained predominant influence in the government.
The most important events took place during this period in Northern Italy, where the Germans became the true masters, establishing strict control over all the activities of the Italian administration. They carried out a systematic export of industrial raw materials and equipment, food, and various valuables from Northern Italy. Skilled workers and captured Italian soldiers were forcibly sent to Germany. Without even notifying Mussolini, Hitler tore the region of Venice, along with Trieste, from Italy and included it in the Reich. After his return to power in Northern Italy, Mussolini publicly declared the “anti-capitalism” of the neo-fascist party he created. In November 1943, the “Verona Manifesto” of the neo-fascist party was published, which contained a number of promises, including the convening of a Constituent Assembly, the “socialization” of enterprises through the participation of workers in their management, freedom of criticism, etc.
At the same time, a wide network of repressive bodies appeared. “Special tribunals” were established in all provinces, and special police units were created everywhere to assist the Gestapo.
Having disbanded the royal army, Mussolini tried to create armed forces to continue the war on the side of Germany. However, numerous recruitments into this army did not produce results, since most of those mobilized preferred to go to the mountains. The four Italian fascist divisions, as well as various paramilitary organizations such as the "black brigades", "Mussolini's battalions", etc., were completely occupied with actions against the partisans.
On the day the German occupation began, September 9, 1943, the anti-fascist parties in Rome formed the Committee for National Liberation. It included representatives of six parties: Communist, Socialist, Action Party, Labor Democracy Party, Christian Democratic and Liberal. This event was the beginning of the Resistance movement.
By the summer of 1944, partisan detachments in Northern and Central Italy numbered 50-60 thousand people in their ranks and represented a formidable force. More than half of them were units named after Garibaldi.
The March general strike served as a powerful stimulus for the expansion of the anti-fascist struggle in the occupied territory. In the history of Italy there have never been such unanimous protests of the working people. The preparation of this strike was reminiscent of an open declaration of war against fascism by the working people of Northern Italy. It was led by a specially created committee, which included representatives of the largest enterprises. Unlike the March 1943 strikes, when enterprises were drawn into the struggle gradually, in March 1944 about a million people stopped working simultaneously. The Italian fascists were so frightened that almost nowhere did they dare to openly oppose the workers and preferred to hide behind the backs of the German military administration. Just as the March 1943 strikes served as a prelude to the fall of Mussolini's dictatorship, the March 1944 movement opened the way to the war of national liberation. During the summer months of 1944, the partisan army launched continuous attacks on German troops. From June 1944 to March 30, 1945, the partisans killed 16,380 Nazis and Italian fascists in Italy, wounded 10,536 people, carried out 6,449 operations and 5,571 acts of sabotage, destroyed 230 locomotives and 760 carriages, blew up 276 bridges, destroyed or rendered unusable 237 airplanes. As a result of the partisan offensive in a number of areas, the power of the fascist administration was preserved only nominally.
The number of liberated areas completely controlled by partisans grew. The German commander-in-chief in Italy, Kesselring, admitted in his memoirs: “After leaving Rome (June 1944), there was an increase in partisan activity on a scale completely unexpected for us... From that moment on, the partisan movement became a real danger for the German command, and its elimination became task of paramount importance." Despite the fact that all the forces of Mussolini's government and a significant part of the German army were thrown against the partisans, Italian patriots, acting with widespread support from the population, firmly held the initiative in their hands. Only the sudden cessation of the offensive by the Anglo-American troops in October 1944 and the winter cold forced the partisan army to reduce the scale of operations and temporarily go on the defensive. However, it was clear that the German occupation of Italy was coming to an end and the days of Italian neo-fascism were numbered. In December 1944, Mussolini, after a long silence, made a big speech in Milan. This turned out to be his last political speech, and it seemed to sum up the history of neo-fascism in Northern Italy.
Mussolini was forced to admit that many promises since the convening of the Constituent Assembly had not been fulfilled, and justified this by the need to direct all efforts to create an armed force. Moreover, in essence, he said that neo-fascism failed to create states in the full sense of the word; it limited itself to practically creating an army, which was almost entirely absorbed in waging a civil war. This was a recognition of the strength of the anti-fascist movement and the failure of attempts to revive Italian fascism. In January 1945, Italian patriots began preparations for a decisive offensive. During February and March, the number of the partisan army grew rapidly and reached 130 thousand. The difficult situation in Italy attracted the close attention of the British Office of Special Operations and the American Office of Strategic Intelligence. Despite some differences between the British and Americans regarding the attitude towards the forces of the Italian Resistance, both of these organizations were of the same opinion on the need to limit the scope of the partisan movement. Supplying partisans with weapons was used as one of the means to make the Resistance dependent on American-British policy, in particular to support anti-communist forces.
Even the Minister of War in the Badoglio government and the military leader of the Italian Resistance, General Cadorna, were forced to declare that the “anti-revolutionary detachments” of the Resistance enjoy special favor from the Western allies and receive greatest number weapons and ammunition. When it was not possible to contain and limit the scope of the people's liberation movement, the American-British command officially prohibited the increase in the number of partisan formations and sent an order to its liaison officers to stop the "indiscriminate" distribution of weapons among the partisans.
RESISTANCE. THE END OF A DICTATOR
Where is the history of the Popular Front? Where is the unification of anti-fascist forces? Why did Italy's political parties fail to stop Mussolini? Why didn't they unite?
Several reasons are obvious.
Firstly, those who tried to unite different forces against fascism were persecuted and repressed. First of all, the repressions were directed against Italian communists.
Secondly, in principle, it is not easy for all parliamentary parties to unite, because the very essence of representation in parliament requires a fight for votes, and therefore with each other.
Thirdly, the parties – potential allies in the fight against fascism – had disagreements on important fundamental issues, which, as it turned out later, were not the most important. But who knew it then?
Communists(the leaders of the Communist Party were A. Bordiga before his arrest in 1923, then P. Togliatti and U. Terracini, from 1924 - A. Gramsci)) called for a decisive revolutionary struggle, denounced the fascists, the socialists, and the “popolari”. The Communist Party was a member of the Comintern, which in the early 20s aimed the fraternal communist parties at an early world revolution and promoted the tactics of a “united workers’ front”, the creation of “workers’ governments” and the fight against enemies of any kind. And Lenin assessed the situation in Italy as pre-revolutionary.
One of the founders of the Communist Party, Amedeo Bordiga, was a supporter of radical action, who believed that the path of parliamentary struggle was not for communists. He considered the bourgeoisie to be the main enemy and probably underestimated the potential of the emerging fascist movement. In addition, he did not consider it necessary to create tactical coalitions with the socialists, since any coalitions require concessions on both sides, and rebuff to fascist terror could only be by force, which was rejected by the socialists (and many communists too).
Antonio Gramsci, who headed the PCI in absentia in 1924, sympathized with the Russian revolution no less than others, but understood better than others the essence and danger of the emerging fascism, which was not only a consequence of poverty, remnantism, demagoguery, but also a weapon in the fight against the ideas of socialism and communism. In Italy there was hardly a truly revolutionary situation, the signs of which were seen by V.I. Lenin, but the crisis was severe. And fascism in Italy, which Gramsci later noted, was supported ruling classes as a weapon of counter-revolution, as a means of preventing either revolution or radical reforms in the economy and social sphere (seizures of enterprises, the creation of workers' councils were precisely manifestations of the impatience of the “lower classes”, to which the “tops” were able to find an answer and begin to govern “the new").
Probably, the situation in the leadership of the PCI can be described as internally conflicting - due to the need to follow the guidelines of the Comintern and the need to look for an adequate response to the fascist threat in a unique situation. Unique, since in no other European country was there anything similar to fascism, just as there was no experience of countering it.
Socialists- a party that rejected violence, both revolutionary and fascist, and advocated the path of negotiations in solving economic and social problems. In addition, the socialists, despite the split as a result of which the Communist Party was formed, had a powerful parliamentary faction and could really influence government policy. Did socialist leaders see the fascist movement as a threat? Of course we saw it. But they probably believed that the state should first of all fight extremism, and their task was to encourage the state to do this. In particular, through parliament, but there were not enough socialist deputies for this.
Both parties relied on the working class and partly the peasantry. But there were more socialists.
The very fact of the formation of the Communist Party weakened the strength of the left. In 1919, the Socialist Party welcomed the creation of the Comintern and even practically joined it, but the persistent demands of the Comintern leaders to get rid of the reformists led to a split. At the same time, one of the leaders of the Socialist Party suggested to Lenin that each national section of the Comintern be given greater freedom of action - after all, a “cleansing” of moderates, reformists, and centrists would lead to a weakening of the party’s position, a loss of influence both in trade unions and in local authorities. But Ilyich was adamant.
The consignment "Popolari"(The People's Party), like the socialists, stood for the search for compromises, agreement and against fascist terror. However, the “popolari” united many zealous Catholics, while the socialists were a party of “materialists”, most of them anti-clerical. To the founder of the Popolari party, priest Luigi Sturzo, the revolution seemed evil, so they were not on the same path with the communists. Moreover, the communists were even more anti-clerical than the socialists. And for the leadership of the Vatican, Mussolini seemed more acceptable than the communists, socialists, and, in the end, the leader of Popolari.
The point of disagreement was, of course, the occupation of enterprises by workers. The communists welcomed these actions and participated in their organization. Gramsci saw in workers' self-government of enterprises a new form of power that could decide economic and social problems in the interests of workers. “Popolari” and the socialists considered such actions unjustified. At the same time, both the communists and especially the socialists controlled a certain part of the trade unions.
The leaders of the parties that could unite against fascism - the socialists and the "popolari" - tried to "come to an amicable agreement" with Mussolini. This agreement was not fulfilled by the Nazis. The policy of “appeasement” of arrogant fanatics most often turns out to be useless.
All parties seemed to “not notice” the huge army of people who returned from the war and found themselves poor and unemployed. Namely, it was to these people that Mussolini’s rhetoric and demagogy was addressed, it was they who joined his party (although, of course, not only them).
It is worth remembering that in Russia a significant part of the soldiers and sailors supported the Bolsheviks and became their support in the revolution. But the Bolsheviks spent more than one month working in the army. In addition, the composition Russian army- these are predominantly peasants, for whom the revolutionary slogans “land to the peasants!” and "peace to the nations!" no special explanation was required.
The fascists very quickly found themselves in power (already in 1922) and, having gained power, took measures to not only weaken and eliminate any opposition, but also to legitimize its political liquidation.
And, of course, the position of the king, the position of the army and police leadership, the position of industrialists, the demagogic propaganda of the Italian fascists and the position of the Catholic Church - all this also had an impact.
Could the murder of Deputy Matteotti be a signal for the unification of forces that could potentially unite against fascism? Perhaps it could. But opposition deputies simply left parliament and waited until the king dismissed Mussolini.
What if Popolari leader Don Sturzo, who condemned fascist terror, had not resigned as party leader? He could simply be excommunicated from the church, or even killed. Sturzo, after leaving his post as head of Popolari, was forced to go abroad.
Was it a mistake for the Socialists and Popolari to vote in parliament for the adoption of a new electoral law in 1924? Undoubtedly. However, not only the law determines the voting results, but also the course of the election campaign. If it takes place peacefully, in a “civilized” manner, the result is one, but if it is accompanied by demagoguery and violence, another.
Yes, there were anti-fascists in Italy. Yes, they tried to fight the fascist regime, but...
Soon after Mussolini came to power, there were practically no elections or parliament. Consequently, it was impossible to achieve success by participating in elections.
Trade unions were virtually liquidated, therefore, the strike struggle also became either impossible or unsuccessful.
Hold rallies and demonstrations? What kind of rallies are there...
IN AND. Lenin, in a report to the IV Congress of the Comintern on November 13, 1922, said: “Perhaps, for example, the fascists in Italy will do us a great service by explaining to the Italians that they are not yet sufficiently enlightened and that their country is not yet guaranteed against the Black Hundreds. Maybe this will be very useful."
And the Chairman of the Comintern, G. Zinoviev, noted: “We must understand that what happened in Italy is not a local phenomenon. We will inevitably have to face the same phenomena in other countries, although perhaps in other forms. We probably will not we can avoid such a period of more or less fascist coups throughout Central and Central Europe."
Karl Radek (representative of the Polish communists in the Comintern) said approximately the same thing: “If our comrades in Italy, if the Social Democratic Party of Italy does not understand the reasons for this victory of fascism and the reasons for our defeat, then we will face the long reign of fascism.”
Terror by one political force against political opponents was truly a completely new phenomenon for Italy, and none of the politicians knew what fascism was and what would happen next. What armed suppression of strikes or dispersal of demonstrators was represented in all countries. But perhaps no one knew what terror was, carried out by a parliamentary party, and even supported by the security forces of the state.
Russian revolutionaries knew about pogroms and about the non-interference of the police and army in them, as they say, firsthand. All this happened in Russia in 1905-1906.
However, the course that the Comintern proposed to the communist parties in the early 20s was to prepare for the world communist revolution, and not at all to establish cooperation with other parties. However, this was the beginning of the 20s, when a world revolution might have seemed possible, and the fascists were just beginning their path to power. Moscow in the early 20s was worried about its own problems - the NEP, the struggle for power under the sick Lenin, the prospects for revolution in Germany. In general, there was no time for Italy.
In 1922 (several months before Mussolini’s campaign against Rome), the leadership of the Comintern (that is, the RCP (b)) negotiated with the leaders of the Second International. Negotiations on building and possibly establishing relationships and interaction in the struggle in the name of the proletariat. Western socialists were worried about the fate of the opposition socialists in Russia (Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists) and talked about the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. And the Bolsheviks responded with reproaches for betraying the interests of the working class of Russia, the proletarian revolution... They did not agree...
And at the end of the 20s, the leadership of the Comintern oriented the Communist Parties of other countries towards a decisive struggle against the Social Democrats and Socialists, who were called nothing less than “social fascists”.
And the head of the PCI, Palmiro Togliatti, was forced to support this line and refuse to cooperate with anti-fascists from among the socialists and other parties. Although in the event of arrests, both communists, socialists, and “popolari” ended up in the same cells.
The tactics of “class against class”, the fight against social democracy in practice, particularly in Italy, led to the fact that in underground conditions the communists blamed the socialists.
In the magazine "Communist International" dated October 31, 1930, in the article "The Communist Party of Italy and the leadership of the struggle of the masses", signed simply with the initials M.G. said:
"Based on the nature of the Italian economic crisis and its interaction with the world crisis, it can be seen that the current development of mass movements gives the prospect of their rapid growth and their rapid transformation into broad political battles.
Fascism, which was supposed to prove (as opposed to Bolshevism!) its ability to solve the problems of the working classes, brought the working people to hunger and doomed them to slavery.
The collapse of fascism gives rise to a reshuffle of political forces in the country."
The author further wrote that the ruling fascist party was decomposing, dissatisfaction with the regime was growing within the fascist trade unions, leaflets and appeals were being distributed among Catholic organizations, Freemasons and Social Democratic organizations.
“The so-called Anti-Fascist Concentration recently came up with the “Pact of Unity and Action,” which is the program of its member parties. This program is valid “until the overthrow of fascism and until the stabilization of the indestructible Italian state by republican democracy.”
It is clear that the Concentration wants to use the movement of the working masses for its own purposes; The concentration wants to prevent the struggle of the worker and peasant masses from leading to the overthrow of capitalism, to the socialist revolution, to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Italy, defined in the “Pact” as an “illusion”, as “despotism of the party”, “an attack on the normal laws of economic evolution."
It is clear that the Concentration wants to prevent the orientation of the Italian proletariat towards the Communist Party, wants to prevent the establishment of a bloc of workers, peasants, national minorities and the native population of the African colonies, because such a bloc means the victorious struggle of the working masses against fascism, means the overthrow and destruction of the capitalist state.
For the servants of the bourgeoisie who lead the so-called Anti-Fascist Concentration, capitalism currently still has the “normal” function of progressive development. They deny that the Italian crisis is one of the manifestations of the mortal crisis of the capitalist system. They want to be believed that they have the means to solve the crisis. But their “Pact” will not be able to deceive the masses. Much chatter about freedom and democracy cannot obscure what is essential in the “Pact”; and the essential idea in it is that the transition from fascism to an “indestructible” democratic state is nothing more than new form fascist regime.
Social democracy can therefore only think politically in a fascist way. It does not put forward any of the demands of the masses directed against the bourgeoisie; all demands of the Concentration are directed against the workers and peasants.
She promises to clear the way for the workers “for all their just demands.” The plagiarism here is completely obvious. These gentlemen kindly promise the workers to give them the right to fight for “every just demand.” They, like the fascists, become “above classes,” i.e. actually take the side of entrepreneurs. They are preparing to strangle the struggle of workers defending their demands, which are always just, because they are the cement of the struggle of the exploited against the exploiters.
Our Social Democrats have gone over to the enemy camp, like their comrades in all countries, and therefore they are afraid to even make democratic promises that would still remain unfulfilled.
The “Pact of Unity and Action” confronts the Italian Communist Party with the need for a decisive and merciless struggle against social fascism, a competitor of fascism, in preserving and defending the capitalist system.
... The Pact of Concentration is opposed by the PCI to the goals of the struggle of the Italian proletariat.
The resolution of the crisis of Italian fascism lies in the seizure of power by the proletariat and in the organization of power on the basis of councils of workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors' deputies; in the expropriation and socialization of factories and banks; in the expropriation of large landowners; in recognizing the right of “national minorities and colonial peoples to independence up to the point of separation from Italy; in arming the proletariat to ensure the defense of the workers' state and to suppress the slightest attempt at resistance on the part of its enemies; in the abolition of freedom of the press, organizations and all political rights for the bourgeoisie.
Our program is not only not utopian, but it is relevant."
It is difficult, of course, to assess the true intentions of the mentioned anti-fascist “Concentration”. The author described another group, “Justice and Freedom,” in approximately the same terms.
And, of course, it is completely difficult to imagine what opponents of the fascist regime inside the country (and outside the country too) could have done to overthrow or soften it. But still, probably, the most important thing was not to sort things out among themselves, but to prepare for the moment when it would be possible to act and determine how the further future of Italy after Mussolini would be determined.
There is no doubt that parliamentary democracy provides more opportunities for workers, intelligentsia, and even the bourgeoisie (in the terms of that time) to assert rights and express their position than dictatorship. Nevertheless, the author argued that “The Soviet and socialist solution to the crisis is the only one capable of answering the questions posed by Italian reality, is the only national and democratic solution to the crisis. Any other solution opposed to this is a mystification, dictated by the interests of protecting the capitalist “order” and society."
The article admitted that the successes of the Italian communists were small:
"...we must call out that the activity of our party, as one of the elements determining the political crisis, is very lagging behind.
So far, however, we have succeeded only to a very limited extent in mobilizing and organizing the broad masses on the basis of their most pressing demands. With the aim of restructuring the entire work of the party in this direction, the Politburo of the CPI undertook a campaign, the center of which is placed at the center of the most important immediate economic and political demands of the masses, namely:
a) Increase all wages by 20%.
b) Benefits to all unemployed in industry and agriculture in the amount of at least 10 liras per day for the entire period of unemployment.
c) Elections of internal factory commissions.
d) Freedom of trade unions, the press and strikes for the proletariat.
e) Refusal of sharecroppers, colones, small tenants and small owners to pay taxes.
f) Release of all political prisoners; abolition of the Special Tribunal in emergency laws.
The campaign for these demands, linked to our extensive revolutionary slogans, should take place in the form of conferences in factories, rural households. enterprises and villages, meetings of the unemployed, on the basis of the broadest possible united front from below, at these conferences and meetings struggle committees should be elected to mobilize the masses and to lead the struggle. At the same time, the party gave directives on the organization of workers’ defense groups.”
How realistic were the ideas of the Comintern about the seizure of power by the proletariat and the creation of soviets in Italy in 1930? It was unrealistic and utopian...
The Comintern's course of cooperation with other left-wing parties, and not of confrontation with them, of creating popular fronts to fight fascism was announced only in the mid-30s, when not only Mussolini, but also Hitler, and their supporters were in power (albeit less numerous, but just as aggressive) existed in many European countries.
On August 17, 1934, the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party signed the first pact on unity of action in Paris (in Paris -!!!).
How to stop the fascists rushing to power? Strikes? Rallies? Demands for authorities to take decisive action? Armed resistance? Speeches in parliament or the press?
Can politicians even unite to achieve some common goals, and not just when voting on this or that bill?
In 1921, the "Arditi del Popolo" ("People's Daredevils") began to be created - fighting squads from among anarchists, socialists, communists, and trade union activists to organize armed resistance to the terror of Mussolini's blackshirts. Among the organizers and leaders of these squads were Apro Secondari, Mingrino, Gino Luchetti (he tried to kill Mussolini on September 11, 1926) and others.
Although the squads included members of different parties, the leadership of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party did not officially support them and even critical articles appeared in the relevant party publications. It is known that Lenin in 1921 criticized the then Communist leader A. Bordiga for sectarianism and unwillingness to support the revolutionary initiative (the leadership of the Communist Party demanded that the Communists not participate in the squads, since they included members of other “unfriendly” parties).
After the Socialist Party signed a “pacification agreement” with Mussolini, it refused to recognize the people’s squads. The leadership of the General Confederation of Labor took the same position.
The communists tried to organize their own combat self-defense units (Squadre comuniste d'azione), but their numbers were small, and in general the party adhered to a strategy of nonviolent action.
The most consistent in supporting the People's Brigades were the anarchists who tried to engage in individual terror against fascist activists and leaders.
One of the most important successes of the Vigilantes was achieved in Parma in August 1922, when 350 Vigilantes, led by World War I veterans Antonio Cieri and Guido Pisegli, successfully defended the city against an advance of 20,000 fascists.
Parma 1922. Barricades against the Nazis on the streets of the city.
The total number of "vigilantes" was up to 20,000 people throughout the country, but within a few years the leaders were either arrested or killed and the movement was virtually liquidated by 1924.
The intelligentsia expressed their protest. Thus, Benedetto Croce wrote the Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intelligentsia, which was published in 1925. Anti-fascist resistance groups arose and in some territories that were annexed to Italy following the First World War, the Slovenians and Croats created the TIGR organization, which organized acts of sabotage and attacks on members of the fascist party and the military.
Joint (but organizationally weak) actions of anti-fascists began not in Italy, but outside it.
Emigrants from Italy (and most of them were in France) - socialists, republicans create small anti-fascist cells in Marseille, Toulouse, and Paris.
In 1929, the socialist Carlo Roselli, who escaped from an Italian prison on the Aeolian Islands, creates the anti-fascist movement “Justice and Freedom” with the participation of socialists, radicals, and even “popolari”. This “popular front”, modest in its capabilities, prepared a program that envisaged the establishment of a republican system in Italy and, of course, the fight against the Mussolini regime, tried to organize underground resistance groups in northern Italy, and smuggle anti-fascist literature into the country.
However, the underground cells were defeated, and Roselli himself was killed in 1937.
Small anti-fascist underground cells in Italy itself could do little - except perhaps publish semi-handwritten newspaper leaflets.
Underground publication
During the Spanish Civil War, Mussolini sent about 70,000 soldiers and officers to help General Franco. Volunteers from around the world fought on the side of the anti-fascists in Spain, including 4,000 Italians - including activists and leaders of various parties - Carlo Roselli himself, and general secretary Republican Party Angeloni, and the communist Luigi Longo (later leader of the PCI), and the socialist Pietro Nenni. The battles in Spain showed that in the fight against a common enemy, ideological differences do not matter much. The Garibaldi brigade managed to inflict several defeats on its compatriots sent by Mussolini. And when notes about this appeared in several Italian newspapers, Mussolini was furious.
Italian volunteers in Spain
In September 1938, the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party addressed an open letter to Italian Catholics with a proposal for cooperation in the fight against fascism, and later issued a statement on the need to create a Popular Front.
Representatives of different parties also united in partisan detachments, which in 1943, after the resignation of Mussolini, began an active armed struggle with both Italian and German fascists, and the organization of strikes in the occupied territory.
Guerrilla resistance was widespread, especially in the northern regions of the country. Approximately 44,700 partisans died in battles with the Nazis, and more than 21,000 people were wounded. Several tens of thousands of people died in concentration camps, about 15,000 civilians were killed during acts of retaliation and intimidation carried out by the fascists - both Italian and German.
Italians who emigrated from the country also fought in partisan detachments. More than 250,000 people took part in the fighting in Italy and abroad. More than 70,000 died and more than 30,000 were injured.
The Italians also helped prisoners of war who managed to escape from concentration camps. And in the ranks of the partisans operating in Italy there were German, French, and Russian anti-fascists.
seven Cervi brothers killed on December 28, 1943 -
Allied troops landed in southern Italy in 1943, but some cities in the north of the country were liberated before they arrived. In June 1944, the first "free government" was formed by the National Liberation Committee.
toppled dictator monument
In conclusion, it is worth adding that in April 1945, Mussolini was captured by Italian partisans while trying to cross into Switzerland and, together with his mistress Clara Petacci, was shot. Their bodies were transported to Milan and hanged upside down in Piazza Loretto.
This was the end of Mussolini.In the first post-war elections in 1946, the Socialists received 21% of the votes, the Communists - 19%, and the Christian Democratic Party - 35% of the votes.
In the 1948 Senate elections, the joint list of communists and socialists received 31% of the vote.
Back in the fall of 1943, the territory of Italy was divided in two. Its southern part was occupied by American-British troops, and the German occupation of the northern and part of the central regions dragged on for almost two years.
In the southern part of Italy, the government formed by Badoglio from “specialists” did not have any support among the people and did not enjoy authority among the Anglo-American authorities. The anti-fascist parties were not united on the issue of attitude towards the monarchy, since the Action Party and the Socialists demanded the immediate abdication of the king.
This made it possible for the occupying powers to sabotage the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and England on the need to include in the government “representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism.”
In the spring of 1944, the Soviet Union took a new step, indicating its desire to promote the granting of sovereign rights to the Italian people. In March, direct diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Italy were restored.
On March 29, the leader of the Italian communists, P. Togliatti, proposed the creation of a government of national unity, postponing the decision on the monarchy until after the end of the war. The Communist Party's proposal was the only possible way out of the impasse, and all anti-fascist parties agreed with it.
On April 24, 1944, a new government was formed under the chairmanship of Badoglio, which, together with other anti-fascist parties, included the communists for the first time in Italian history.
After the liberation of Rome, the government was reorganized: the leader of the Labor Democracy Party, I. Bonomi, became the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and anti-fascist parties gained predominant influence in the government.
The most important events took place during this period on the other side of the front. The true masters of Northern Italy were the Nazis, who established strict control over all the activities of the Italian administration.
They carried out a systematic export of industrial raw materials and equipment, food, and various valuables from Northern Italy. Skilled workers and captured Italian soldiers were forcibly sent to Germany.
Without even notifying Mussolini, Hitler tore the region of Venice, along with Trieste, from Italy and included it in the Reich.
After his return to power in Northern Italy, Mussolini publicly declared the “anti-capitalism” of the neo-fascist party he created.
In November 1943, the “Verona Manifesto” of the neo-fascist party was published, which contained a number of demagogic promises, including the convening of a Constituent Assembly, the “socialization” of enterprises through the participation of workers in their management, freedom of criticism, etc.
However, such promises could not deceive, especially since the fascists, soon after they proclaimed the “Social Republic”, began organizing a wide network of repressive bodies. “Special tribunals” were established in all provinces, and special police units were created everywhere to help the Gestapo, which dealt with anti-fascists without trial or investigation.
Having disbanded the royal army, Mussolini tried to create armed forces to continue the war on the side of Germany. However, numerous recruitments into this army did not produce results, since most of those mobilized preferred to go to the mountains.
The four Italian fascist divisions, as well as various paramilitary organizations such as the "black brigades", "Mussolini's battalions", etc., were completely occupied with actions against the partisans.
On the day the German occupation began, September 9, 1943, the anti-fascist parties in Rome formed the Committee of National Liberation. It included representatives of six parties: Communist, Socialist, Action Party, Labor Democracy Party, Christian Democratic and Liberal.
Although representatives of all parties advocated the development of armed struggle, in fact, right-wing parties did their best to slow down the development of mass resistance and sought to turn the Committee into a consultative inter-party body.
As a result of the paralyzing influence of the bourgeois parties, which found support from the leaders of the Vatican, the Roman Committee for National Liberation failed to become a combat center for the leadership of the partisan movement. Despite the heroic efforts of the communists and representatives of some other parties who created partisan detachments around the city, Rome turned out to be one of the few Italian cities where the struggle of the patriots did not culminate in a victorious uprising.
The situation was different in Northern Italy: the Milan Committee of National Liberation, which took the name of the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy, from the first days of its existence became the true political leader of the Resistance movement.
Numerous national liberation committees were associated with him, created in regions, cities, villages, and sometimes in neighborhoods and individual enterprises. These bodies in Northern Italy consisted of representatives of five parties (there was no Democratic Labor Party).
The leading role of the left parties, and especially the communists, manifested itself in full force in the North. The communists were the first to begin the struggle in the cities, creating combat groups of patriotic action, which, through bold raids on enemy headquarters, holding rallies and other actions, immediately created a fighting atmosphere that mobilized the masses for the fight.
In October 1943, the Communist Party began to form the “model Garibaldi brigades” in the mountains, which not only served as the core of the partisan army, but also set an example for other political parties. The Action Party and the Socialists also began to create their own combat units, largely borrowing organizational principles Garibaldi brigades. Later than others, Christian Democrats and Liberals decided to create armed formations.
The Communist Party relied on the powerful support of the working class. Already in the autumn months of 1943, the strike movement in cities such as Turin affected several enterprises simultaneously. In the early spring of 1944, the communists put forward the task of holding a general strike, which they viewed as a dress rehearsal for a national uprising.
The strike began on March 1 following a signal from a specially created committee to lead the movement. It was the largest uprising of the Italian working class; About 1 million workers took part in the movement, supported by more than 20 thousand partisans and numerous groups of patriotic action.
Just as the spring strike of 1943 served as a prelude to the fall of fascism, the movement of 1944 opened the way for a national uprising.
On the initiative of the Communist Party, in the spring of 1944, patriotic action units began to be created in villages, which, starting with the tasks of local self-defense, gradually turned into combat units. The partisan army was widely replenished during this period by young peasants who evaded conscription into the fascist army.
If before March 1944 there were 30 thousand partisans in the mountains, then in the summer the partisan army increased to 80 thousand fighters. The partisans waged continuous offensive battles, liberating vast territories from the Nazis and creating partisan areas. In total, by the autumn of 1944, there were 15 liberated zones in Northern Italy, where power belonged to the national liberation committees.
The summer of 1944 was marked by the political and organizational unity of the Resistance forces. In June, the partisan detachments of the various parties were united under a common command, which took the name Command of the Freedom Volunteer Corps.
The leading position in the command was occupied by the communist L. Longo and the leader of the Action Party F. Parry. During this period, the Committee for the National Liberation of Northern Italy put forward the task of preparing a national uprising and adopted a number of program documents in which it stated that the goal of the uprising was to establish a new democracy in which “all working classes will have a decisive influence.”
It seemed that the liberation of Italy from Hitler's occupation was a matter of several weeks. However, the reality turned out to be different.
In the fall of 1944, in addition to all the armed formations of the Social Republic, at least a third of the German forces in Italy acted against the partisans.
The difficult situation in Italy attracted the close attention of the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Intelligence. Despite some differences between the British and Americans regarding the attitude towards the forces of the Italian Resistance, both of these organizations were of the same opinion on the need to limit the scope of the partisan movement.
Supplying partisans with weapons was used by the Allies as one of the means to make the Resistance dependent on American-British policy, in particular to support anti-communist forces.
Even the Minister of War in the Badoglio government and the military leader of the Italian Resistance, General Cadorna, were forced to declare that the “anti-revolutionary detachments” of the Resistance enjoyed special favor from the Western allies and received the largest amount of weapons and ammunition.
When it was not possible to contain and limit the scope of the people's liberation movement, the American-British command officially prohibited the increase in the number of partisan formations and sent an order to its liaison officers to stop the “indiscriminate” distribution of weapons among the partisans.
In 1933, the National Socialists, led by Adolf Hitler, came to power in Germany during parliamentary elections. Throughout the 1920s - in the first half of the 1930s. Authoritarian, fascist and pro-fascist regimes were established in many European countries. The main fascist countries in Europe were Italy and Germany. Why did citizens of certain countries voluntarily begin to support fascism? This is explained by the fact that in the wake of the World Economic Crisis, people’s lives are falling apart from hopelessness. And it is precisely on the wave of a decadent mood that a force appears that promises the people a quick solution to all their problems, looks for the main enemy, onto whom they blame all troubles and misfortunes. The fight against fascism and the activities of the anti-fascist movement will be discussed in this lesson.
Anti-fascist movement in European countries in the 1930s
Background
The creation of fascist parties (and sometimes their rise to power) became an important feature of the political life of Europe after the First World War. The masses were in many ways close and understandable to their ideology, characteristic features which included a commitment to conservative values, an authoritarian model of power, and reliance on national identity up to aggressive nationalism. The popularity of fascist parties was often facilitated by the low efficiency of the institutions of democracy and parliamentarism: often the confrontation of political parties unable to reach a compromise led to a crisis, while current state problems remained unresolved. Effective propaganda of fascist forces also played a role.
The main political opponents of the fascists, as a rule, were left-wing forces - socialists and communists. The rhetoric of both opposing camps was often based on accusations against their opponents. Where the fascists managed to come to power (for example, in Italy and Germany), leftist forces were invariably subjected to persecution and repression. The opposition of leftist forces to the fascists in Europe in the 1930s is often considered as a single anti-fascist movement: firstly, due to the similarity of the processes in different countries; secondly, due to the inherent internationalism and international solidarity of European communism (History of anti-fascism).
Events
1935- VII Congress of the Comintern (Communist International), an international communist organization. The main theme of the congress was the increasing fascist threat. Within the framework of the congress, a decision was made to create popular fronts in European countries - organizations whose goal is to counter fascism, including through legal political methods.
1936- Germany and Japan conclude the Anti-Comintern Pact, which Italy later joins. The purpose of the pact was to counter the spread of communist ideology.
1936- The French Popular Front wins a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections. One of the decisions of the Popular Front government was to ban fascist parties and organizations in France (in previous years they had increased their popularity, largely due to the domestic political successes of the German fascists). It should be noted that in foreign policy France did not oppose Nazi Germany.
1936- The Spanish Popular Front wins the parliamentary elections by a minimal margin. After this, conservative forces, primarily in the army, staged a military coup, which escalated into a civil war (1936-1939), in which the leftist forces and their allies were defeated. A conservative dictatorship under General Franco was established in Spain.
Conclusion
Success factors for anti-fascist movements
In general, France is perhaps the only example where the confrontation between fascists and anti-fascists was simultaneously a full-scale political struggle with a chance of victory for each side and at the same time ended in the victory of the anti-fascists. This makes it difficult to analyze the reasons for the success of anti-fascists in some cases and failures in others. However, it is reasonable to assume that republican traditions played a role in France, as well as the image of Germany as an eternal enemy, according to which the values that won in Germany were perceived as something alien.
Abstract
In the 1930s, in response to the advent of Nazi and fascist regimes in a number of countries, such as Germany, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Poland, etc., in response to the inability of governments to deal with the global economic crisis and its consequences, to be created so-called " Popular Fronts", organizations that united left and center-left forces - communists, social democrats, radicals, etc.
IN 1935 onVIICongress of the international communist organization - Comintern- it was decided to create Popular Fronts, the purpose of which would be to confront the fascists and their sympathizers (Fig. 1). The creation of the Popular Front was a response to the formation of the so-called. " Anti-Comintern Pact" Enjoying great support among workers and minor employees, the Popular Fronts won the elections in Spain and France.
Rice. 1. VII Congress of the Comintern ()
In France, the Popular Front banned fascist organizations, and in Spain began an armed struggle against them. One of the main and consistent fighters against world fascism was the Soviet Union. The USSR sought to create a system of “collective security” in Europe in order to prevent the spread of fascism and the outbreak of a new war in Europe. The USSR directly pointed out the inhumane regime of fascism.
The inability of the Spanish government to bring the country to the proper level of development, social and economic problems allowed the Popular Front to win elections to the Spanish Parliament in 1936 and take power into their own hands.
The new government carried out a number of reforms: amnestied political prisoners, allowed strikes, guaranteed civil rights and freedom, eased the plight of the workers. At the same time, the country split into two opposing camps - those who supported the Popular Front, and those who advocated maintaining the existing situation, i.e. opponents of trade unions and leftist parties.
Summer 1936 military, opponents of the Popular Front, led by a general Francisco Franco started a fascist rebellion. The civil war began. The conspirators captured cities and provinces, but the forces Republicans were more numerous, therefore francoists were soon defeated and blocked in the Spanish colony of Morocco. At a critical moment for Franco, Germany and Italy provided assistance. In essence, by providing assistance to Franco, these countries carried out a military intervention. German and Italian “volunteers” were sent to Spain - soldiers and officers - pilots, tank crews, infantrymen, sailors.
Rice. 2. Republican Poster
Inspired by the Francoists, they marched on Madrid with the goal of establishing their power in Spain. In response to this, the USSR and a number of European Popular Fronts extended a helping hand to the Republicans, also sending military specialists to Spain. In the skies of Spain, Soviet and German pilots met for the first time in air combat.
The defeat of the Popular Front became inevitable when its anarchists and communists began to argue among themselves over what to do next. The Frankists, on the contrary, represented a powerful single fist.
In 1938, General Franco took advantage of differences in the Popular Front powerful blow cuts Spain in two and finishes off each part one by one. In addition, new political forces that came to power in France began to block cargo sent by the USSR to Republican Spain.
Spain lay in ruins. Common name became the name of the Spanish city of Guernica, which was wiped off the face of the earth during the battles (Fig. 3).
Rice. 3. Guernica after a Nazi air raid ()
At the beginning of 1939, the Francoists finally won. Mass terror began in the country. Franco restored the monarchy, abolished in 1931, but bequeathed the reins of power to the king only after his death.
The era of the sole rule of General Franco began in the country.
The confrontation between communist and fascist forces in Spain was the first open conflict in Europe before World War II.
1. Aleksashkina L.N. General history. XX - early XXI centuries. - M.: Mnemosyne, 2011.
2. Zagladin N.V. General history. XX century Textbook for 11th grade. - M.: Russian Word, 2009.
3. Plenkov O.Yu., Andreevskaya T.P., Shevchenko S.V. General history. 11th grade / Ed. Myasnikova V.S. - M., 2011.
1. Read Chapter 8 of the textbook by Aleksashkina L.N. General history. XX - early XXI century pp. 88-89 and give answers to question 7 on p. 90, as well as Chapter 11 pp. 115-120 and answer questions 1-2 on p. 122.
2. Why do you think the USSR turned out to be alone in its desire to really resist fascism?
3. How can one explain the defeat of the Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War?
Italian patriots played a major role in the fight against fascist enslavers in Italy. Their activities became especially intensified since the summer of 1944 under the influence of major victories of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the Western allies. This was also facilitated by the strengthening of the positions of progressive forces in Italy itself. During this period, the number of partisans increased sharply. So, if in February - March 1944 in Northern Italy there were 20 - 30 thousand of them, then by June 15 - already 82 thousand (768). A significant number of them fought in their ranks. Soviet citizens who fled from fascist camps.
Changed and organizational structure partisan formations. The detachments made up battalions, which were organized into brigades, and the brigades into divisions. The underground groups of the patriotic movement in cities (GAP) and armed self-defense units in rural areas (SAP) also strengthened organizationally. The main partisan forces were concentrated in Piedmont, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, and Veneto. In June 1944, all units were consolidated into a single partisan army - the Freedom Volunteer Corps (FVC) with a single main command. Although the initiator of the unification was the Italian Communist Party, under pressure from the Western allies and the Bonomi government, a representative of the liberal party, General R. Cadorna, was appointed commander-in-chief of the CDS in August. The left parties agreed to this appointment on the condition that the political commissars under the commander-in-chief would be one of the leaders of the PCI, L. Longo, and a prominent figure in the Action Party, F. Parry. They became Cadorna's deputies, but in fact the leading role in the leadership of the partisan movement belonged to them, which corresponded to the real ratio of the fighters of the partisan army by party affiliation.
The main command of the CDS, in the very first documents it adopted, pledged to carry out the functions assigned to it under the leadership of the Committee for the National Liberation of Northern Italy (KNOSI), to coordinate its actions with the Italian government and the allied command (769).
On June 2, 1944, KNOSI assumed the functions of the “emergency government” of the occupied part of Italy and declared that its goal was to prepare a national uprising. The directives prepared by the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party P. Togliatti and sent out on June 6, 1944 to all party organizations and Garibaldian detachments contained instructions on the deployment of preparations for a general uprising in the occupied areas. The directives emphasized that it should not be the work of one party or part of the anti-fascist front, but of the entire people, the entire nation.
KNOSI was subordinate to all partisan formations created by various political parties. In each area where partisan actions unfolded, a corresponding command was appointed, subordinate to the center, as well as a command of underground fighters operating in the cities. 41 percent of the partisan formations were communist Garibaldian detachments, 29 percent were units of the Action Party (770).
The communists sought to strengthen party cells not only in their own, but also in other partisan detachments, and advocated the agreed line of all patriots: communists, socialists and members of the Action Party. The leading role of the Communist Party in the armed struggle and its line of uniting left-wing political forces provided it with decisive influence in the partisan army. The majority of the political commissars of the units supported the communist policy aimed at expelling the German occupiers.
In the summer and autumn of 1944, the issue of coordinating the actions of the partisan army and allied forces became particularly acute. Typically, the Anglo-American command relied heavily on the help of Italian patriots, but did not always coordinate its plans with the leadership of the partisan movement. It set only general tasks for the Resistance forces. Thus, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, in his address of June 6, 1944, called on all patriots in the occupied territory of Italy to “unanimously rise up against the common enemy” (771). The partisan command did not receive the necessary information and therefore was forced to independently determine the goals and objectives of its actions, based on assumptions about the possible development of the course of the Allied operations. At the same time, it believed that “detachments of patriots operating in the mountains should in no case seek to transfer their actions to the cities at any cost,” that they should enter the “enemy’s retreat route” and actively pursue him (772 ) .
In a number of cases, the Anglo-American command not only ignored the partisan movement, but also created difficulties in its deployment. The first British and American missions, which began to arrive in the partisan detachments in the spring of 1944, settled under those commands that they considered “more right-wing”. When distributing weapons, ammunition and sabotage dropped by Allied aircraft, the missions pursued a policy of discrimination against leftist forces. “This discrimination,” writes the former commander of the partisan division R. Battaglia, “was most definitely directed precisely against the most powerful formations, that is, against the Garibaldian detachments...” (773) Thus, in Liguria, in the province of La Spezia, mission 5- The first American army demanded categorical assurance that weapons and food would not go to communist partisan detachments.
These actions of the allies made it difficult, but could not stop the development of the partisan movement in Italy, in which the main force was units led by communists (774). Since the rally of 1944, the anti-fascist armed struggle entered a new phase and acquired the character of a broad people's war against the German occupiers and their accomplices. During the summer-autumn offensive, the partisans liberated Florence and assisted the allied forces in expelling the enemy from the regions of Tuscany and Marche, from many settlements and entire regions of Piedmont. Liguria, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto.
In a number of Nazi-occupied areas of Northern Italy, there was actually a dual power: the fascist regime, which increasingly discredited itself, and the power of anti-fascist bodies, exercised illegally, but very popular among the population (775). In addition, patriots in Northern Italy, at the direction of KNOSI, created 15 liberated zones behind enemy lines in June and July. The largest of them were called “partisan republics.” In particular, in the Republic of Carnia (the administrative center is the city of Ampezzo) there were 70 thousand inhabitants, in the territory of the Republic of Montefiorino - 30 thousand. Most of the “republics” created in June - July existed until August, and some of them - until October, when they were occupied by the Nazis. But as a result of the autumn partisan offensive, new liberated zones emerged. There were ten in total between September and December. The largest of them were the Republic of Torrilla (between Genoa and Piacenza), the Republic of Monferrato (in Piedmont) and the Republic of Ossola (in Lombardy, between the Monte Rosa mountain range and Lake Maggiore), the administrative center of which was the city of Domodossola. In the Republic of Ossola, more than 70 thousand inhabitants lived in 28 communes, and it had direct railway connections with Switzerland (776).
At first, the partisan command often took over the functions of administrative control in the liberated zones. But from the very first days of their emergence, the Italian communists did a lot of work to create democratic governing bodies. In this regard, the message of the Federal Committee of the Communist Party of Genoa, sent at the end of August 1944 to the command of the Garibaldian division, is characteristic. It, in particular, emphasized: “We must help, encourage, advise, but at the same time we need to find people among the local population who will be responsible leaders of the new democratic administration” (777). Gradually, power in the liberated zones passed into the hands of the central junta, which included representatives of various anti-fascist political parties (communists, socialists, Christian democrats and others). They energetically carried out the democratization of social and political life on the ground. People's tribunals tried fascist criminals. By decision of the Junta, a progressive property tax was introduced, price controls were established, surplus food was distributed among those in need, and material assistance was provided to partisans, and sometimes to workers of cities occupied by the Nazis.
The sabotage actions of partisan detachments intensified. Number of acts of sabotage on highways and railways, telephone lines increased from 241 in May to 344 in June. The partisans destroyed bridges, set up ambushes on roads, raided transport convoys, derailed trains with military supplies and troops, and sowed panic in the enemy camp. To fight them, the German command often even had to remove units from the front. If at first the fascists used ordinary infantry formations, armed mainly with small arms, against the partisans, then later they brought in specially trained troops, used tanks and artillery. Since the summer of 1944 fighting Participants in the Italian Resistance movement were pinned down by large enemy forces. “From that time on,” Field Marshal Kesselring later admitted, “partisan warfare became a real danger for the German command, the elimination of which was decisive for the outcome of the military campaign” (778).
In September, the Nazis and their accomplices decided to carry out an operation with the goal of liquidating the liberated areas and capturing all key positions of the partisans. It was prepared secretly, was started suddenly and was accompanied by brutal repressions. The troops participating in it went on the offensive on September 20 and continued it for three months. Moreover, the operation used the same forces, which were transferred from one zone to another.
For the partisan command, the enemy’s plan of action was unexpected. It hoped that the Nazis would strike from the Venetian lowland at the center of the front of the partisan forces. The punitive forces decided to first defeat his flanks: in the west - near Mount Grappa and the adjacent area, in the east - in the area of the Isonzo River. Only then did they strike the center, but not from the south, as the partisans had assumed, but from the north. Having captured the partisan forces in a giant ring, the Nazis pushed them out of the foothills of the Carnic Alps into a narrower area. The punitive operation was accompanied by mass shootings and executions of local residents and the destruction of populated areas. This was the most difficult period in the Italian Resistance movement. And during this difficult time, the Anglo-American command not only did not provide assistance to the partisan detachments, but also stopped supplying them (779). On November 10, an appeal from General Alexander was published, in which the partisans were asked to stop conducting operations on a large scale for a while, save weapons and ammunition and be ready until further orders.
This appeal was transmitted over the radio in clear text, and the enemy, having intercepted it, realized that the Anglo-American command intended to postpone all offensive actions in Italy and that, thus, a respite was coming at the front. Alexander's proposal to weaken the fight against the occupiers and Italian fascists significantly facilitated their counter-guerrilla operations. In the winter of 1944/45, the Nazi command involved up to 15 divisions, including 10 German ones, in punitive expeditions.
In this situation, the Italian Communist Party made great efforts to ensure the activity of the partisan movement. As one of the leaders of the partisan movement, L. Longo, wrote, she energetically opposed the demoralizing and demobilizing measures of the Anglo-American command and “appealed to the entire people, organized the collection of food, clothing and all materials necessary for partisan warfare in the harsh winter . This campaign made it possible ... not only to preserve the combat effectiveness of the partisan organization, but also to create new bonds of solidarity between the Resistance fighters and the people” (780).
By the end of 1944, the partisans suffered heavy losses in the fight against the invaders. According to G. Serbandini (Bini), one of the organizers of the Resistance movement in Italy, at that time they had ten times fewer forces than the enemy operating against them (781). However, this time too the Italian-German fascists failed to suppress the Resistance movement. The partisan detachments, led by the Italian Communist Party, inspired by the decisive victories of the Soviet Armed Forces and the lofty goals of the liberation struggle, withstood the new onslaught of the enemy. Despite significant losses, the Resistance army became an even more united and organized fighting force.
Thus, the Anglo-American troops on the Italian front, operating in mountainous area, within seven months they advanced northward up to 320 km and captured the central part of the country, ending up 280 km from the southern border of Nazi-occupied Austria. Having captured air bases in the areas of Rome and Florence and relocated large aviation forces here, the Allies gained greater opportunities to launch powerful air strikes on Germany from the south. With the capture of a number of Italian seaports (Livorno, Ancona, etc.), the basing of the allied naval forces that provided support to coastal groups was improved, and the supply of troops was facilitated.
During the operations of the allied forces, in whose ranks the British, Americans, Algerians, Brazilians, Greeks, Indians, Italians, Canadians, Poles, French and representatives of other nations fought, 15 German divisions were defeated, including 1 tank and 3 motorized. In total, Wehrmacht troops in June - December lost 19 thousand people killed, 65 thousand wounded and 65 thousand missing (782). At the same time, they suffered significant losses from attacks by Anglo-American aircraft. Allied damage amounted to about 32 thousand people killed, over 134 thousand wounded and about 23 thousand missing (783).
The Allied success in Italy was achieved through the joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces. Actions ground forces, which played a major role in the battles on the Apennine Peninsula, were supported by massive air strikes. The ships of the navy provided fire support to the troops advancing along the coast, covered their coastal flanks, disrupted enemy lines and protected their sea communications.
In mountainous areas, the Allied command sought to strike along the valleys in order to use all types of troops. Breakthroughs of enemy defenses were carried out on narrow sections of the front. 45-60 percent of all infantry formations, about 70 percent of tanks, up to 70 percent of artillery and the bulk of aviation were concentrated here.
To break through the defensive lines, the troops of the army group were formed in one echelon. The breakthrough of defenses by infantry divisions was usually carried out after long-term aviation and powerful artillery preparation, with the support of tanks, aircraft and artillery by sequentially capturing individual strong points. The average rate of advance when crossing the tactical defense zone in mountainous areas did not exceed 1 - 2 km per day. The troops pursued the enemy indecisively; they failed to take advantage of favorable opportunities to cut off his retreat routes. As a rule, the Nazis retreated almost unhindered to previously prepared lines, and the Anglo-American troops had to break through again.
Italian partisans actively contributed to the offensive of the allied forces. In the period from June 1944 until March 1945, they carried out 6,449 armed actions, 5,570 acts of sabotage, destroyed at least 16 thousand fascists and captured a large number of enemy weapons (784). These successes of the Italian partisans and all patriots were achieved in an extremely difficult situation created by the mass terror of Hitler’s troops and the Italian fascists who collaborated with them, as well as by the policy of reactionary circles in the USA and Great Britain, directed against the communists and other progressive forces in Italy.
The Allied forces in Italy could have achieved greater successes and carried operations to completion if consistency had always been achieved in their actions. The offensive of the British and American armies, as a rule, was planned and carried out at different times: if one of them went on the offensive, the other was just preparing for it, and vice versa. This allowed the German command not only to maneuver on its own and quite quickly localize breakthroughs of the Allied forces, but also to transfer formations from the Italian front to Southern France, Greece and the eastern front.
One of the main reasons for the incompleteness of the Allied operations in Italy is the indecision of the Anglo-American command. Former Nazi general Z. Westphal writes in this regard: “... if the Western allies had shown more courage in resolving operational issues, they would have been able to victoriously end the campaign on the Apennine Peninsula much earlier and with significantly less losses for themselves and others” ( 785) Meanwhile, a number of English and American military historical works ignore this circumstance. The military actions of the allied forces against an enemy significantly inferior to them in strength and means are presented as an “assault on a European fortress,” while the “power” of the defense and the fierceness of the Nazi resistance are exaggerated. The authors of such books argue that the Allied command always showed courage and determination when planning operations in Italy, but all its efforts were minimized by the enemy's supposedly constant superiority in the number of troops (with the exception of a short period of time in the summer of 1944).
Do not match historical facts and Churchill’s statements that the main task of the Anglo-American armies in Italy, which was to pin down as many German forces as possible, “was perfectly accomplished” (786) and this supposedly greatly facilitated the Allied landing in Normandy and the offensive Soviet army. Of course, the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy fettered a certain group of Nazi troops, but the Nazi command kept a small part of its forces here. In addition, taking advantage of the indecisiveness of the Americans and British during the battles, it withdrew 6 of the most combat-ready divisions from Italy, sending 3 of them (including the Hermann Goering tank division) to the eastern front and 3 (including 2 motorized) - To France. The 4 divisions that arrived in return from France, 2 from the Balkans and Norway, and 11 newly formed formations in Italy (9 divisions and two brigades) had low combat effectiveness and could be used mainly for occupation service and coastal defense.
The fascist German command adhered to a purely defensive strategy in Italy. Skillfully using the mountain conditions to create a defense and repel attacks by the allied forces, it avoided the defeat of its Italian group and stopped their advance at a previously prepared line.
