Russian-Japanese disagreements over the Kuril Islands. History of the Kuril Islands

Disputes about the four South Kuril Islands currently owned by Russian Federation, have been going on for quite some time. This land as a result of the signed different time agreements and wars changed hands several times. Currently, these islands are the cause of an unresolved territorial dispute between Russia and Japan.

Discovery of the islands


The issue of the discovery of the Kuril Islands is controversial. According to the Japanese side, the Japanese were the first to set foot on the islands in 1644. A map of that time with the designations marked on it - “Kunasiri”, “Etorofu”, etc. is carefully preserved in the National Museum Japanese history. And Russian pioneers, the Japanese believe, first came to the Kuril ridge only during the time of Tsar Peter I, in 1711, and on the Russian map of 1721 these islands are called “Japanese Islands”.

But in reality the situation is different: firstly, the Japanese received the first information about the Kuril Islands (from the Ainu language - “kuru” means “a person who came from nowhere”) from the local Ainu residents (the oldest non-Japanese population of the Kuril Islands and the Japanese Islands) during an expedition to Hokkaido in 1635. Moreover, the Japanese did not reach the Kuril lands themselves due to constant conflicts with the local population.

It should be noted that the Ainu were hostile to the Japanese, and initially treated the Russians well, considering them their “brothers”, due to the similarity in appearance and methods of communication between the Russians and small nations.

Secondly, the Kuril Islands were discovered by the Dutch expedition of Maarten Gerritsen de Vries (Fries) in 1643, the Dutch were looking for the so-called. "Golden Lands" The Dutch did not like the lands, and they sold their detailed description and map to the Japanese. It was on the basis of Dutch data that the Japanese compiled their maps.

Thirdly, the Japanese at that time did not control not only the Kuril Islands, but even Hokkaido; only their stronghold was in its southern part. The Japanese began conquering the island at the beginning of the 17th century, and the fight against the Ainu continued for two centuries. That is, if the Russians were interested in expansion, then Hokkaido could become a Russian island. This was made easier by the good attitude of the Ainu towards the Russians and their hostility towards the Japanese. There are also records of this fact. The Japanese state of that time did not officially consider itself the sovereign of not only Sakhalin and the Kuril lands, but also Hokkaido (Matsumae) - this was confirmed in a circular by the head of the Japanese government, Matsudaira, during Russian-Japanese negotiations on the border and trade in 1772.

Fourthly, Russian explorers visited the islands before the Japanese. In the Russian state, the first mention of the Kuril lands dates back to 1646, when Nekhoroshko Ivanovich Kolobov gave a report to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich about the campaigns of Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin and spoke about the bearded Ainu inhabiting the Kuril Islands. In addition, Dutch, Scandinavian and German medieval chronicles and maps report about the first Russian settlements in the Kuril Islands at that time. The first reports about the Kuril lands and their inhabitants reached the Russians back in mid-17th century century.

In 1697, during the expedition of Vladimir Atlasov to Kamchatka, new information about the islands appeared; the Russians explored the islands as far as Simushir (island middle group Great ridge of the Kuril Islands).

XVIII century

Peter I knew about the Kuril Islands; in 1719, the tsar sent a secret expedition to Kamchatka under the leadership of Ivan Mikhailovich Evreinov and Fyodor Fedorovich Luzhin. Marine surveyor Evreinov and surveyor-cartographer Luzhin had to determine whether there was a strait between Asia and America. The expedition reached the island of Simushir in the south and brought local residents and rulers to swear allegiance to the Russian state.

In 1738-1739, the navigator Martyn Petrovich Shpanberg (Danish by origin) walked along the entire Kuril ridge, put all the islands he encountered on the map, including the entire Small Kuril ridge (these are 6 large and a number of small islands that are separated from the Great Kuril ridge in the South -Kuril Strait). He explored the lands as far as Hokkaido (Matsumaya), bringing the local Ainu rulers to swear allegiance to the Russian state.

Subsequently, the Russians avoided voyages to the southern islands and developed the northern territories. Unfortunately, at this time, abuses against the Ainu were noted not only by the Japanese, but also by the Russians.

In 1771, the Lesser Kuril Ridge was removed from Russia and came under the protectorate of Japan. The Russian authorities sent the nobleman Antipin with the translator Shabalin to rectify the situation. They were able to persuade the Ainu to restore Russian citizenship. In 1778-1779, Russian envoys brought more than 1.5 thousand people from Iturup, Kunashir and even Hokkaido into citizenship. In 1779, Catherine II freed those who had accepted Russian citizenship from all taxes.

In 1787, the “Extensive Land Description of the Russian State...” contained a list of the Kuril Islands up to Hokkaido-Matsumaya, the status of which had not yet been determined. Although the Russians did not control the lands south of Urup Island, the Japanese were active there.

In 1799, by order of seii-taishogun Tokugawa Ienari, he headed the Tokugawa Shogunate, two outposts were built on Kunashir and Iturup, and permanent garrisons were placed there. Thus, the Japanese secured the status of these territories within Japan by military means.


Satellite image of the Lesser Kuril Ridge

Treaty

In 1845, the Empire of Japan unilaterally declared its power over all of Sakhalin and the Kuril ridge. This naturally caused a violent negative reaction from the Russian Emperor Nicholas I. But the Russian Empire did not have time to take action; the events of the Crimean War prevented it. Therefore, it was decided to make concessions and not bring matters to war.

On February 7, 1855, the first diplomatic agreement was concluded between Russia and Japan - Treaty of Shimoda. It was signed by Vice Admiral E.V. Putyatin and Toshiakira Kawaji. According to Article 9 of the treaty, “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan” were established. Japan ceded the islands from Iturup and to the south, Sakhalin was declared a joint, indivisible possession. Russians in Japan received consular jurisdiction, Russian ships received the right to enter the ports of Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki. The Russian Empire received most favored nation treatment in trade with Japan and received the right to open consulates in ports open to Russians. That is, in general, especially considering the difficult international situation Russia, the agreement can be assessed positively. Since 1981, the Japanese have celebrated the day of signing the Shimoda Treaty as “Day northern territories».

It should be noted that in fact, the Japanese received the right to the “Northern Territories” only for “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia,” most favored nation treatment in trade relations. Their further actions de facto annulled this agreement.

Initially, the provision of the Shimoda Treaty on joint ownership of Sakhalin Island was more beneficial for the Russian Empire, which was actively colonizing this territory. The Japanese Empire did not have a good navy, so at that time it did not have such an opportunity. But later the Japanese began to intensively populate the territory of Sakhalin, and the question of its ownership began to become increasingly controversial and acute. The contradictions between Russia and Japan were resolved by signing the St. Petersburg Treaty.

St. Petersburg Treaty. It was signed in the capital of the Russian Empire on April 25 (May 7), 1875. Under this agreement, the Empire of Japan transferred Sakhalin to Russia as full ownership, and in exchange received all the islands of the Kuril chain.


St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 (Japanese Foreign Ministry Archive).

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and Treaty of Portsmouth On August 23 (September 5), 1905, the Russian Empire, according to Article 9 of the agreement, ceded southern Sakhalin to Japan, south of 50 degrees north latitude. Article 12 contained an agreement to conclude a convention on Japanese fishing along the Russian shores of the Japanese, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.

After the death of the Russian Empire and the beginning of foreign intervention, the Japanese occupied Northern Sakhalin and participated in the occupation of the Far East. When the Bolshevik Party won the Civil War, Japan did not want to recognize the USSR for a long time. Only after the Soviet authorities canceled the status of the Japanese consulate in Vladivostok in 1924 and in the same year the USSR was recognized by Great Britain, France and China, the Japanese authorities decided to normalize relations with Moscow.

Beijing Treaty. On February 3, 1924, official negotiations between the USSR and Japan began in Beijing. Only on January 20, 1925, the Soviet-Japanese convention on the basic principles of relations between countries was signed. The Japanese pledged to withdraw their forces from the territory of Northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925. The declaration of the USSR government, which was attached to the convention, emphasized that the Soviet government did not share with the former government of the Russian Empire political responsibility for the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905. In addition, the convention enshrined the agreement of the parties that all agreements, treaties and conventions concluded between Russia and Japan before November 7, 1917, except for the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, should be revised.

In general, the USSR made great concessions: in particular, Japanese citizens, companies and associations were granted the rights to exploit natural raw materials throughout the Soviet Union. On July 22, 1925, a contract was signed to grant the Japanese Empire a coal concession, and on December 14, 1925, an oil concession in Northern Sakhalin. Moscow agreed to this agreement in order to stabilize the situation in the Russian Far East, since the Japanese supported the White Guards outside the USSR. But in the end, the Japanese began to systematically violate the convention and create conflict situations.

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that took place in the spring of 1941 regarding the conclusion of a neutrality treaty, the Soviet side raised the issue of liquidating Japan's concessions in Northern Sakhalin. The Japanese gave their written consent to this, but delayed the implementation of the agreement for 3 years. Only when the USSR began to gain the upper hand over the Third Reich did the Japanese government implement the agreement that had been given earlier. Thus, on March 30, 1944, a Protocol was signed in Moscow on the destruction of Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin and the transfer of all Japanese concession property to the Soviet Union.

February 11, 1945 at the Yalta conference three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain - reached a verbal agreement on the USSR's entry into the war with the Japanese Empire on the terms of the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril ridge to it after the end of World War II.

In the Potsdam Declaration dated July 26, 1945, it was stated that Japanese sovereignty would be limited only to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and other smaller islands, which would be designated by the victorious countries. The Kuril Islands were not mentioned.

After the defeat of Japan, on January 29, 1946, Memorandum No. 677 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers, American General Douglas MacArthur, excluded the Chishima Islands (Kuril Islands), the Habomadze group of islands (Habomai) and the Sikotan Island (Shikotan) from Japanese territory.

According to San Francisco Peace Treaty dated September 8, 1951, the Japanese side renounced all rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. But the Japanese claim that Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and Habomai (islands of the Lesser Kuril Islands) were not part of the Chishima Islands (Kuril Islands) and they did not abandon them.


Negotiations in Portsmouth (1905) - from left to right: from the Russian side (far part of the table) - Planson, Nabokov, Witte, Rosen, Korostovets.

Further agreements

Joint Declaration. On October 19, 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan adopted a Joint Declaration. The document ended the state of war between the countries and restored diplomatic relations, and also spoke of Moscow’s consent to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to the Japanese side. But they were supposed to be handed over only after the signing of a peace treaty. However, later Japan was forced to refuse to sign a peace treaty with the USSR. The United States threatened not to give up Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu Archipelago to the Japanese if they renounced their claims to the other islands of the Lesser Kuril chain.

After Tokyo signed the Cooperation and Security Treaty with Washington in January 1960, extending the American military presence on the Japanese Islands, Moscow announced that it refused to consider the issue of transferring the islands to the Japanese side. The statement was justified by the security issue of the USSR and China.

In 1993 it was signed Tokyo Declaration about Russian-Japanese relations. It stated that the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR and recognizes the 1956 agreement. Moscow expressed its readiness to begin negotiations regarding Japan's territorial claims. In Tokyo this was assessed as a sign of impending victory.

In 2004, the head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, made a statement that Moscow recognizes the 1956 Declaration and is ready to negotiate a peace treaty based on it. In 2004-2005, this position was confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But the Japanese insisted on the transfer of 4 islands, so the issue was not resolved. Moreover, the Japanese gradually increased their pressure; for example, in 2009, the head of the Japanese government at a government meeting called the Lesser Kuril Ridge “illegally occupied territories.” In 2010 and early 2011, the Japanese became so excited that some military experts began to talk about the possibility of a new Russian-Japanese war. Only spring natural disaster- the consequences of the tsunami and terrible earthquake, the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant - cooled the ardor of Japan.

As a result, the loud statements of the Japanese led to Moscow declaring that the islands are the territory of the Russian Federation legally following the Second World War, this is enshrined in the UN Charter. And Russian sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which has the appropriate international legal confirmation, is beyond doubt. Plans were also announced to develop the islands' economy and strengthen Russia's military presence there.

Strategic importance of the islands

Economic factor. The islands are economically underdeveloped, but they have deposits of valuable and rare earth metals - gold, silver, rhenium, titanium. The waters are rich in biological resources; the seas that wash the shores of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands are among the most productive areas of the World Ocean. Great importance They also have shelves where hydrocarbon deposits have been found.

Political factor. The cession of the islands will sharply lower Russia’s status in the world, and there will be a legal opportunity to review other results of the Second World War. For example, they may demand that the Kaliningrad region be given to Germany or part of Karelia to Finland.

Military factor. The transfer of the South Kuril Islands will provide the Japanese and US naval forces with free access to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. It will allow our potential adversaries to exercise control over strategically important strait zones, which will sharply worsen the deployment capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet, including nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles. These will be with a strong blow on military security of the Russian Federation.

(currently the Frieza Strait). De Vries mistakenly considered Iturup Island to be the northeastern tip of Hokkaido, and Urup to be part of the American continent. On June 20, Dutch sailors landed on Urup for the first time. On June 23, 1643, de Vries installed on the flat top high mountain island of Urupa wooden cross and declared this land the property of the Dutch East India Company.

In Russia, the first official mention of the Kuril Islands dates back to 1646, when the Cossack Nekhoroshko Ivanovich Kolobov, a member of Ivan Moskvitin’s expedition to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk (Lama) spoke about the bearded Ainu inhabiting the islands. New information about the Kuril Islands appeared after Vladimir Atlasov's campaign against Kamchatka in 1697, during which the Russians first saw the northern Kuril Islands from the southwestern coast of Kamchatka. In August 1711, a detachment of Kamchatka Cossacks under the leadership of Danila Antsiferov and Ivan Kozyrevsky first landed on the northernmost island of Shumshu, defeating a detachment of local Ainu here, and then on the second island of the ridge - Paramushir.

In 1738-1739, a scientific expedition took place under the leadership of the captain of the Russian fleet, Martyn Petrovich Shpanberg. This expedition was the first to map the Lesser Kuril Ridge (Shikotan and Habomai islands). Based on the results of the expedition, the atlas “General Map of Russia” was compiled depicting the 40 islands of the Kuril archipelago. After news of the discovery of the Kuril Islands by Russian navigators was published in Europe in the 1740s, the governments of other powers sought permission from the Russian authorities to visit the islands of this area with their ships. In 1772, Russian authorities placed the Kuril Islands under the control of the chief commander of Kamchatka, and in 1786, Empress Catherine II issued a decree on the protection (“preservation”) of rights to “lands discovered by Russian sailors,” among which was the “ridge of the Kuril Islands, concerning Japan". This decree was published in foreign languages. After publication, not a single state challenged Russia’s rights to the Kuril Islands. State cross signs and copper plaques with the inscription “Land of Russian Dominion” were installed on the islands.

19th century

General Map of the State of Japan, 1809

On February 7, 1855, Japan and Russia signed the first Russian-Japanese treaty - the Shimoda Treaty on Trade and Borders. The document established the border of the countries between the islands of Iturup and Urup. The islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands went to Japan, and the rest were recognized as Russian possessions. That is why February 7 has been celebrated annually in Japan as Northern Territories Day since 1981. At the same time, questions about the status of Sakhalin remained unresolved, which led to conflicts between Russian and Japanese merchants and sailors.

Russo-Japanese War

Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands on a map of 1912

Up: Agreement on the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan
At the bottom: Map of Japan and Korea published by the National geographical society USA, 1945. Fragment. The signature in red under the Kuril Islands reads: “In 1945, in Yalta, it was agreed that Russia would regain Karafuto (Karafuto Prefecture - the southern part of Sakhalin Island) and the Kuril Islands.”

On February 2, 1946, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, the South Sakhalin Region was formed in these territories as part of the Khabarovsk Territory of the RSFSR, which on January 2, 1947 became part of the newly formed Sakhalin Region as part of the RSFSR.

History of ownership of the Kuril Islands under Russian-Japanese treaties

Joint Declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan (1956). Article 9.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agreed to continue negotiations on concluding a Peace Treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.

At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and the island of Shikotan with the fact that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan .

On January 19, 1960, Japan signed the Treaty on Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan with the United States, thereby extending the “Security Pact” signed on September 8, 1951, which was the legal basis for the presence of American troops on Japanese territory. On January 27, 1960, the USSR stated that since this agreement was directed against the USSR and the PRC, the Soviet government refused to consider the issue of transferring the islands to Japan, since this would lead to an expansion of the territory used by American troops.

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the question of the ownership of the southern group of the Kuril islands Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and Habomai (in the Japanese interpretation - the question of the “northern territories”) remained the main stumbling block in Japanese-Soviet (later Japanese-Russian) relations. At the same time, until the end " cold war“The USSR did not recognize the existence of a territorial dispute with Japan and always considered the southern Kuril Islands as an integral part of its territory.

On April 18, 1991, during a visit to Japan, Mikhail Gorbachev actually acknowledged the existence of a territorial problem for the first time.

In 1993, the Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese relations was signed, which states that Russia is the legal successor of the USSR and all agreements signed between the USSR and Japan will be recognized by both Russia and Japan. The parties’ desire to resolve the issue of the territorial ownership of the four southern islands of the Kuril chain was also recorded, which in Japan was regarded as a success and, to a certain extent, raised hopes of resolving the issue in favor of Tokyo.

XXI Century

On November 14, 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on the eve of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Japan, stated that Russia, as a successor state of the USSR, recognizes the 1956 Declaration as existing and is ready to conduct territorial negotiations with Japan on its basis. This formulation of the question caused a lively discussion among Russian politicians. Vladimir Putin supported the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stipulating that Russia “will fulfill all its obligations” only “to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill these agreements.” Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi responded by saying that Japan was not satisfied with the transfer of only two islands: “If the ownership of all the islands is not determined, the peace treaty will not be signed.” At the same time, the Japanese prime minister promised to show flexibility in determining the timing of the transfer of the islands.

On December 14, 2004, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed his readiness to assist Japan in resolving the dispute with Russia over the southern Kuril Islands.

In 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his readiness to resolve the territorial dispute in accordance with the provisions of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Declaration, that is, with the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but the Japanese side did not compromise.

On August 16, 2006, a Japanese fishing schooner was detained by Russian border guards. The schooner refused to obey the commands of the border guards, and warning fire was opened on it. During the incident, one member of the schooner's crew was fatally wounded in the head. This caused a sharp protest from the Japanese side; it demanded the immediate release of the body of the deceased and the release of the crew. Both sides said the incident occurred in their own territorial waters. In 50 years of dispute over the islands, this is the first recorded death.

December 13, 2006. The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Taro Aso, at a meeting of the foreign policy committee of the lower house of representatives of parliament spoke in favor of dividing the southern part of the disputed Kuril Islands in half with Russia. There is a point of view that in this way the Japanese side hopes to solve a long-standing problem in Russian-Japanese relations. However, immediately after Taro Aso’s statement, the Japanese Foreign Ministry disavowed his words, emphasizing that they were misinterpreted.

On July 2, 2007, to reduce tensions between the two countries, Japanese Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki proposed, and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Naryshkin accepted Japan's proposals for assistance in the development of the Far Eastern region. It is planned to develop nuclear energy, lay optical Internet cables through Russian territory to connect Europe and Asia, develop infrastructure, as well as cooperation in the field of tourism, ecology and security. This proposal was previously considered in June 2007 at a G8 meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

On May 21, 2009, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, during a meeting of the upper house of parliament, called the southern Kuril Islands “illegally occupied territories” and said that he was waiting for Russia to propose approaches to solving this problem. The official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Nesterenko, commented on this statement as “illegal” and “politically incorrect.”

On June 11, 2009, the lower house of the Japanese parliament approved amendments to the law “On special measures to promote the resolution of the issue of the Northern Territories and similar ones,” which contain a provision on Japan’s ownership of the four islands of the South Kuril ridge. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it called such actions by the Japanese side inappropriate and unacceptable. On June 24, 2009, a State Duma statement was published, which, in particular, stated the opinion of the State Duma that in the current conditions, efforts to resolve the problem of a peace treaty, in fact, have lost both political and practical perspective and will make sense only in case of disavowal of amendments adopted by Japanese parliamentarians. On July 3, 2009, the amendments were approved by the Upper House of the Japanese Diet.

On September 14, 2009, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said that he hoped to make progress in negotiations with Russia on the southern Kuril Islands "in the next six months to a year."

On September 23, 2009, at a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Hatoyama spoke of his desire to resolve the territorial dispute and conclude a peace treaty with Russia.

February 7, 2010. On February 7, since 1982, Japan has celebrated Northern Territories Day (as the southern Kuril Islands are called). Cars with loudspeakers are running around Tokyo, from which demands for the return of four islands to Japan and the music of military marches are heard. Also an event of this day is the speech of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to participants in the movement for the return of the northern territories. This year, Hatoyama said that Japan was not satisfied with the return of only two islands and that he would make every effort to return all four islands within the lifetime of current generations. He also noted that it is very important for Russia to be friends with such an economically and technologically developed country as Japan. The words that these were “illegally occupied territories” were not said.

On April 1, 2010, official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Andrei Nesterenko made a comment in which he announced the approval on April 1 by the Government of Japan of changes and additions to the so-called. “The main course to promote the solution of the problem of the northern territories” and stated that the repetition of unfounded territorial claims against Russia cannot benefit the dialogue on the issue of concluding a Russian-Japanese peace treaty, as well as maintaining normal contacts between the southern Kuril Islands, which are part of the Sakhalin regions of Russia, and Japan.

On September 11, 2011, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev visited the southern Kuril Islands, where he held a meeting with the leadership of the Sakhalin region, and visited the border post on Tanfilyev Island, closest to Japan. At the meeting in the village of Yuzhno-Kurilsk on Kunashir Island, issues of ensuring the security of the region, the progress of construction of civil and border infrastructure facilities were discussed, security issues were considered during the construction and operation of the port berthing complex in Yuzhno-Kurilsk and the reconstruction of Mendeleevo airport. Secretary General Japanese government Osamu Fujimura said that Nikolai Patrushev's visit to the southern Kuril Islands deeply regrets Japan.

On February 14, 2012, the Chief of the Russian General Staff of the Armed Forces, Army General Nikolai Makarov, announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense would create two military camps on the southern Kuril Islands (Kunashir and Iturup) in 2013.

On October 26, 2017, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security Franz Klintsevich said that Russia plans to create a naval base on the Kuril Islands.

Russia's basic position

The position of both countries on the issue of ownership of the islands. Russia considers all of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands its territory. Japan considers the southern Kuril Islands its territory, the northern Kuril Islands and Sakhalin - the territory of Russia.

Moscow’s principled position is that the southern Kuril Islands became part of the USSR, of which Russia became the legal successor, are an integral part of the territory of the Russian Federation legally following the Second World War and enshrined in the UN Charter, and Russian sovereignty over them, which has the corresponding international -legal confirmation is beyond doubt. According to media reports, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 2012 said that the problem of the Kuril Islands could be solved in Russia only by holding a referendum. Subsequently, the Russian Foreign Ministry officially denied raising the question of any referendum: “This is a gross distortion of the minister’s words. We regard such interpretations as provocative. No sane politician would ever put this issue to a referendum." In addition, the Russian authorities once again officially declared the unconditional indisputability of the ownership of the islands by Russia, stating that in connection with this, the question of any referendum cannot by definition arise. On February 18, 2014, the Russian Foreign Minister stated that “Russia does not consider the situation with Japan on the issue of borders as some kind of territorial dispute.” The Russian Federation, the minister explained, proceeds from the reality that there are generally recognized and enshrined in the UN Charter results of the Second World War. On August 22, 2015, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, in connection with his visit to Iturup Island, formulated Russia’s position, stating that the Kuril Islands “are part of the Russian Federation, they are part of a subject of the Russian Federation called the Sakhalin Region, and therefore we have visited, are visiting and will visit the Kuril Islands.”

Japan's Basic Position

Japan's basic position on this issue is formulated in four points:

(1) The Northern Territories are centuries-old Japanese territories that continue to be under illegal Russian occupation. The government of the United States of America also consistently supports Japan's position.

(2) In order to resolve this issue and conclude a peace treaty as quickly as possible, Japan is vigorously continuing negotiations with Russia on the basis of agreements already reached, such as the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, the 2001 Irkutsk Statement and the Japanese-Soviet Declaration. Russian action plan 2003.

(3) According to the Japanese position, if it is confirmed that the Northern Territories belong to Japan, Japan is ready to be flexible in the time and procedure for their return. In addition, since Japanese citizens living in the Northern Territories were forcibly evicted by Joseph Stalin, Japan is willing to reach an agreement with the Russian government so that Russian citizens living there will not suffer the same tragedy. In other words, after the return of the islands to Japan, Japan intends to respect the rights, interests and desires of the Russians currently living on the islands.

(4) The Government of Japan has urged the Japanese population not to visit the Northern Territories outside of the visa-free procedure until the territorial dispute is resolved. Likewise, Japan cannot permit any activity, including the economic activity of third parties, that could be considered subject to Russia's “jurisdiction,” nor may it permit any activity that would imply Russia's “jurisdiction” over the Northern Territories. It is Japan's policy to take appropriate measures to prevent such activities.

Original text (English)

Japan's Basic Position

(1) The Northern Territories are inherent territories of Japan that continues to be illegally occupied by Russia. The Government of the United States of America has also consistently supported Japan's position.

(2) In order to solve this issue and to conclude a peace treaty as soon as possible, Japan has energetically continued negotiations with Russia on the basis of the agreements and documents created by the two sides so far, such as the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956, the Tokyo Declaration of 1993, the Irkutsk Statement of 2001 and the Japan-Russia Action Plan of 2003.

(3) Japan's position is that if the attribution of the Northern Territories to Japan is confirmed, Japan is prepared to respond flexibly to the timing and manner of their actual return. In addition, since Japanese citizens who once lived in the Northern Territories were forcibly displaced by Joseph Stalin, Japan is ready to forge a settlement with the Russian government so that the Russian citizens living there will not experience the same tragedy. In other words, after the return of the islands to Japan, Japan intends to respect the rights, interests and wishes of the Russian current residents on the islands.

(4) The Japanese government has requested Japanese people not to enter the Northern Territories without using the non-visa visit frameworks until the territorial issue is resolved. Similarly, Japan cannot allow any activities, including economic activities by a third party, which could be regarded as submitting to Russian “jurisdiction,” nor allow any activities carried out under the presumption that Russia has “jurisdiction” in the Northern Territories. Japan is of the policy to take appropriate steps to ensure that this does not happen. .

Original text (Japanese)

日本の基本的立場

⑴北方領土は、ロシアによる不法占拠が続いていますが、日本固有の領土であり、この点については例えば米国政府も一貫して日本の立場を支持しています。政府は、北方四島の帰属の問題を解決して平和条約を締結するという基本的方針に基づいて、ロシア政府との間で強い意思をもって交渉を行っています。

⑵ 北方 領土 問題 の 解決 に 当たって 我 が 国 として は 、 1) 北方 領土 の 日本 へ 帰属 が 確認 さ れる のであれ 、 実際 の の 時期 態様 について は 、 柔軟 に 対応 する 2) 領土 領土 現在 現在 に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に に & Home page尊重していくこととしています。

⑶我が国固有の領土である北方領土に対するロシアによる不法占拠が続いている状況の中でHomeア側の「管轄権 」に服したかのごとき行為を行うこと, Home容れず、 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989 ) することを行わないよう要請しています。

⑷また、政府は、第三国国民がロシアの査証を取得した上で北方四島へ入域する、または第三国企業が北方領土において経済活動を行っているという情報に接した場合、従来から、しかるべく事実関係を確認の上、申入れを行ってきています 。

Other opinions

Defense aspect and the danger of armed conflict

In connection with the territorial dispute over the ownership of the southern Kuril Islands, there is a danger of military conflict with Japan. Currently, the Kuril Islands are defended by the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division (the only one in Russia), and Sakhalin by a motorized rifle brigade. These formations are armed with 41 T-80 tanks, 120 MT-LB transporters, 20 coastal anti-ship missile systems, 130 artillery systems, 60 anti-aircraft weapons (Buk, Tunguska, Shilka complexes), 6 Mi-8 helicopters.

As stated in the Law of the Sea:

A state has the right to temporarily suspend peaceful passage through certain sections of its territorial waters if this is urgently required by the interests of its security.

However, restricting Russian shipping - except for warships in conflict - in these straits, and even more so introducing a fee, would contradict some provisions of the generally recognized in international law (including that recognized in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Japan signed and ratified) the right of innocent passage. especially since Japan does not have archipelagic waters [ ] :

If a foreign merchant vessel complies with these requirements, the coastal state must not impede innocent passage through territorial waters and must accept all necessary measures for the safe implementation of innocent passage - to announce, in particular, for general information about all the dangers to navigation known to him. Foreign vessels should not be subject to any passage charges other than fees and charges for services actually rendered, which should be collected without any discrimination.

Further, almost the entire remaining water area of ​​the Sea of ​​Okhotsk freezes and the ports of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk freeze, and, therefore, shipping without icebreakers is still impossible here; La Perouse Strait, connecting the Sea of ​​Okhotsk with the Sea of ​​Japan, is also clogged with ice in winter and is navigable only with the help of icebreakers:

The Sea of ​​Okhotsk has the most severe ice regime. Ice appears here at the end of October and lasts until July. IN winter time all Northern part The sea is covered with thick floating ice, which in some places freezes into a vast area of ​​motionless ice. The boundary of the stationary fast ice extends out to sea for 40-60 miles. A constant current carries ice from the western regions to the southern part of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. As a result, an accumulation of floating ice forms near the southern islands of the Kuril ridge in winter, and the La Perouse Strait is clogged with ice and is navigable only with the help of icebreakers. .

Moreover, the shortest route from Vladivostok to the Pacific Ocean lies through the ice-free Sangar Strait between the islands of Hokkaido and Honshu. This strait is not covered by Japanese territorial waters, although it can be included in territorial waters unilaterally at any time.

Natural resources

There are areas of possible oil and gas accumulation on the islands. Reserves are estimated at 364 million tons of oil equivalent. In addition, there may be gold on the islands. In June 2011, it became known that Russia was inviting Japan to jointly develop oil and gas fields located in the Kuril Islands area.

The islands are adjacent to a 200-mile fishing zone. Thanks to the South Kuril Islands, this zone covers the entire water area of ​​the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, with the exception of a small coastal area near the island. Hokkaido. Thus, in economic terms, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk is actually an inland sea of ​​Russia with an annual fish catch of about three million tons.

Positions of third countries and organizations

As of 2014, the United States believes that Japan has sovereignty over the disputed islands, while noting that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty (that an attack on either side in Japanese-administered territory is considered a threat to both sides) does not apply to these islands as not governed by Japan. The position of the Bush Jr. administration was similar. There is debate in the academic literature as to whether the US position was previously different. It is believed that in the 1950s, the sovereignty of the islands was linked to the sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands, which had a similar legal status. In 2011, the press service of the US Embassy in the Russian Federation noted that this US position has existed for a long time and individual politicians only confirm it.

see also

  • Liancourt (islands disputed between Japan and South Korea)
  • Senkaku (islands disputed between Japan and China)

TASS DOSSIER. On December 15, 2016, the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Japan begins. It is expected that one of the topics during his negotiations with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be the issue of ownership of the Kuril Islands.

Currently, Japan is making territorial claims to the Russian islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a group of small islands of the Lesser Kuril chain (Japanese name Habomai).

The editors of TASS-DOSSIER have prepared material about the history of this problem and attempts to solve it.

Background

The Kuril Archipelago is a chain of islands between Kamchatka and the Japanese island of Hokkaido. It is formed by two ridges. The largest of the islands of the Great Kuril chain are Iturup, Paramushir, Kunashir. The largest island of the Lesser Kuril ridge is Shikotan.

The islands were originally inhabited by Ainu tribes. The first information about the Kuril Islands was obtained by the Japanese during the expedition of 1635-1637. In 1643 they were surveyed by the Dutch (led by Martin de Vries). The first Russian expedition (led by V.V. Atlasov) reached the northern part of the Kuril Islands in 1697. In 1786, by decree of Catherine II, the Kuril Archipelago was included in the Russian Empire.

On February 7, 1855, Japan and Russia signed the Treaty of Shimoda, according to which Iturup, Kunashir and the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge were transferred to Japan, and the rest of the Kuril Islands were recognized as Russian. Sakhalin was declared a joint possession - an "undivided" territory. However, some unresolved issues about the status of Sakhalin led to conflicts between Russian and Japanese merchants and sailors. The contradictions between the parties were resolved in 1875 with the signing of the St. Petersburg Treaty on the Exchange of Territories. In accordance with it, Russia transferred all the Kuril Islands to Japan, and Japan renounced its claims to Sakhalin.

On September 5, 1905, as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was signed, according to which part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel came into the possession of Japan.

Return of the islands

At the final stage of World War II, during the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the USSR named the return of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands among the conditions for the start of hostilities against Japan. This decision was enshrined in the Yalta Agreement between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain of February 11, 1945 (“Crimean Agreement of the Three Great Powers on Far East Issues”). On August 9, 1945, the USSR entered the war against Japan. From August 18 to September 1, 1945, Soviet troops carried out the Kuril landing operation, which led to the surrender of the Japanese garrisons on the archipelago.

On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. According to the document, Japanese sovereignty was limited to the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido, as well as smaller islands of the Japanese archipelago.

On January 29, 1946, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Japan, American General Douglas MacArthur, notified the Japanese government of the exclusion of the Kuril Islands from the country's territory. On February 2, 1946, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Kuril Islands were included in the USSR.

According to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, concluded between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan, Tokyo renounced all rights, legal grounds and claims to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. However, the Soviet delegation did not sign this document, since it did not stipulate the issue of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Japanese territory. In addition, the agreement did not specify which islands of the Kuril archipelago were discussed and in whose favor Japan was abandoning them.

This became the main reason for the existing territorial problem, which is still the main obstacle to concluding a peace treaty between Russia and Japan.

The essence of the disagreement

The principled position of the USSR and Russia was and is that “the belonging of the southern Kuril Islands (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai) to the Russian Federation is based on the generally accepted results of the Second World War and the unshakable post-war international legal framework, including the UN Charter. Thus, Russian sovereignty over them has the appropriate international legal form and is not subject to doubt" (statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry dated February 7, 2015).

Japan, citing the Shimoda Treaty of 1855, claims that Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a number of small islands never belonged to the Russian Empire and considers their inclusion in the USSR illegal. In addition, according to the Japanese side, these islands are not part of the Kuril archipelago and therefore they do not fall under the term “Kuril Islands”, which was used in the San Francisco Treaty of 1951. Currently, in Japanese political terminology, the disputed islands are usually called " northern territories."

Declaration of 1956

In 1956, the USSR and Japan concluded a Joint Declaration, which formally declared the end of the war and restored bilateral diplomatic relations. In it, the USSR agreed to transfer the island of Shikotan and the uninhabited islands to Japan (reserving Iturup and Kunashir) after concluding a full-fledged peace treaty. The declaration was ratified by the parliaments of two states.

However, in 1960, the Japanese government agreed to sign a security treaty with the United States, which provided for the maintenance of the American military presence on Japanese territory. In response, the USSR annulled the obligations assumed in 1956. At the same time, the Soviet Union stipulated the transfer of the islands by Japan fulfilling two conditions - the signing of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country's territory.

Until the early 1990s. the Soviet side did not mention the 1956 declaration, although Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka tried to return to discussing it during a visit to Moscow in 1973 (the first Soviet-Japanese summit).

Intensification of dialogue in the 1990s.

The situation began to change with the beginning of perestroika in the 1980s, the USSR recognized the existence of a territorial problem. Following the visit of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan in April 1991, the joint communiqué included a provision on the parties’ intention to continue negotiations on the normalization of relations and a peaceful settlement, including territorial issues.

The existence of a territorial problem was also confirmed in the Tokyo Declaration, signed following negotiations between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in October 1993. The document recorded the parties’ desire to resolve the issue of the territorial ownership of the disputed islands.

In the Moscow Declaration (November 1998), President Yeltsin and Premier Keizo Obuchi "reaffirmed their determination to make every effort to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000." Then the Russian side for the first time expressed the opinion that it was necessary to create conditions and a favorable atmosphere for “joint economic and other activities” in the South Kuril Islands without prejudice to the legal positions of both parties.

Modern stage

In 2008, Japanese politicians began to introduce the term “illegally occupied northern territories” in relation to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai. In June 2009, the Japanese Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Special Measures to Promote Resolution of the “Northern Territories Problem,” according to which Japanese government agencies ordered to make every effort to return the "ancestral lands of Japan" as quickly as possible.

Visits to the islands by senior Russian officials cause a negative reaction in Tokyo (Dmitry Medvedev visited the islands in 2010 as president, in 2012 and 2015 as chairman of the government; the first two times he was in Kunashir, the last in Iturup). Japanese leaders periodically make “inspections of the northern territories” from an airplane or boat (the first such inspection was made by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in 1981).

The territorial issue is regularly discussed at Russian-Japanese negotiations. It was raised especially often by the administration of Shinzo Abe, who again took the post of Prime Minister in 2012. However, it has still not been possible to finally bring the positions closer together.

In March 2012, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that on the territorial issue it is necessary to “achieve an acceptable compromise or something like “hikiwake” (“draw”, a term from judo). In May 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister -Japanese Minister Shinzo Abe agreed on the need to develop dialogue in a “constructive manner, without emotional outbursts or public polemics” and agreed on a “new approach” to solving bilateral problems, but the details of the agreements were not reported.

The conflict over the Kuril Islands began long before World War II.

The dispute over the southernmost Kuril Islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai - has been a point of tension between Japan and Russia since they were captured by the Soviet Union in 1945. More than 70 years later, Russian-Japanese relations are still not normal due to the ongoing territorial dispute. To a large extent, it was historical factors that prevented the solution of this issue. These include demographics, mentality, institutions, geography and economics—all of which encourage tough policies rather than compromise. The first four factors contribute to the continuation of the impasse, while the economy in the form of oil policy is associated with some hope of resolution.

Russia's claims to the Kuril Islands date back to the 17th century, resulting from periodic contacts with Japan through Hokkaido. In 1821, a de facto border was established, according to which Iturup became Japanese territory, and Russian land began with the island of Urup. Subsequently, according to the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) and the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875), all four islands were recognized as Japanese territory. The last time the Kuril Islands changed their owner was as a result of World War II - in 1945 in Yalta, the Allies essentially agreed to transfer these islands to Russia.

The dispute over the islands became part of Cold War politics during the negotiations for the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Article 2c of which forced Japan to renounce all its claims to the Kuril Islands. However, the Soviet Union's refusal to sign this agreement left these islands in a state of uncertainty. In 1956, a joint Soviet-Japanese declaration was signed, which de facto meant the end of the state of war, but could not resolve the territorial conflict. After the ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, further negotiations ceased, and this continued until the 1990s.

However, after the end of the Cold War in 1991, a new opportunity to resolve this issue seemed to arise. Despite the turbulent events in world affairs, the positions of Japan and Russia on the Kuril Islands issue have not undergone much change since 1956, and the reason for this situation was five historical factors outside the Cold War.

The first factor is demographic. Japan's population is already declining due to low level fertility and aging, while Russia's population has been declining since 1992 due to excess alcohol consumption and other social ills. This shift, coupled with the weakening of international influence, has led to the emergence of backward-looking trends, and both nations are now largely trying to resolve the issue by looking back rather than forward. Given these attitudes, it can be concluded that the aging populations of Japan and Russia are making it impossible for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Vladimir Putin to negotiate due to their deeply entrenched views on the Kuril Islands issue.

Context

Is Russia ready to return the two islands?

Sankei Shimbun 10/12/2016

Military construction in the Kuril Islands

The Guardian 06/11/2015

Is it possible to agree on the Kuril Islands?

BBC Russian Service 05/21/2015
All this also plays into the mentality and perceptions of the outside world, which are shaped by how history is taught and, more broadly, by how it is presented by the media and public opinion. For Russia, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a severe psychological blow, accompanied by a loss of status and power, as many former Soviet republics seceded. This significantly changed Russia's borders and created significant uncertainty about the future of the Russian nation. It is well known that in times of crisis, citizens often exhibit stronger feelings of patriotism and defensive nationalism. The Kuril Islands dispute fills a void in Russia and also provides an opportunity to speak out against perceived historical injustices committed by Japan.

The perception of Japan in Russia was largely shaped by the issue of the Kuril Islands, and this continued until the end of the Cold War. Anti-Japanese propaganda became common after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and it was intensified by Japanese intervention during the Russian Civil War (1918–1922). This led many Russians to believe that as a result, all previously concluded treaties were annulled. However, Russia's victory over Japan in World War II ended the previous humiliation and strengthened the symbolic significance of the Kuril Islands, which came to represent (1) the irreversibility of the results of World War II and (2) Russia's status as a great power. From this point of view, the transfer of territory is seen as a revision of the outcome of the war. Therefore, control of the Kuril Islands remains of great psychological importance for the Russians.

Japan is trying to define its place in the world as a “normal” state, located next to an increasingly powerful China. The issue of the return of the Kuril Islands is directly related to the national identity of Japan, and these territories themselves are perceived as the last symbol of defeat in World War II. The Russian offensive and seizure of Japan's "inalienable territory" contributed to the victim mentality that became the dominant narrative after the end of the war.

This attitude is reinforced by Japanese conservative media, which often support foreign policy government. In addition, nationalists often use the media to viciously attack academics and politicians who hint at the possibility of compromise on the issue, leaving little room for maneuver.

This, in turn, influences the political institutions of both Japan and Russia. In the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin's position was so weak that he feared possible impeachment if the Kuril Islands were transferred to Japan. At the same time, the central Russian government was weakened as a result of the growing influence of regional politicians, including two governors of the Sakhalin region - Valentin Fedorov (1990 - 1993) and Igor Fakhrutdinov (1995 - 2003), who actively opposed possible sale Smoked Japan. They relied on nationalist feelings, and this was enough to prevent the completion of the treaty and its implementation in the 1990s.

Since President Putin came to power, Moscow has brought regional governments under its influence, but other institutional factors have also contributed to the stalemate. One example is the idea that a situation must mature before some issue or problem can be resolved. During the initial period of his rule, President Putin had the opportunity, but did not have the desire, to negotiate with Japan over the Kuril Islands. Instead, he decided to spend his time and energy trying to resolve the Sino-Russian border conflict through the issue of the Kuril Islands.

Since returning to the presidency in 2013, Putin has become increasingly dependent on the support of nationalist forces, and it is unlikely that he will be willing to cede the Kuril Islands in any meaningful sense. Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine clearly demonstrate how far Putin is willing to go to protect Russia's national status.

Japanese political institutions, although they differ from Russian ones, also support a tough course of action in negotiations regarding the Kuril Islands. As a result of reforms carried out after the end of World War II, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) occupies a dominant position in Japan. With the exception of the period from 1993 to 1995 and from 2009 to 2012, the LDP has had and continues to have a majority in the national legislative assembly, and in fact its party platform on the return of the four southern islands of the Kuril chain has been an integral part of national policy since 1956.

Moreover, as a result of the 1990-1991 real estate crash, the Liberal Democratic Party has produced only two effective prime ministers, Koizumi Junichiro and Shinzo Abe, both of whom rely on nationalist support to maintain their positions. Finally, regional politics plays an important role in Japan, and elected politicians on the island of Hokkaido are pushing the central government to take an assertive stance in the dispute. Taken together, all these factors are not conducive to reaching a compromise that would include the return of all four islands.

Sakhalin and Hokkaido emphasize the importance of geography and regional interests in this dispute. Geography influences how people see the world and how they observe policy formation and implementation. Russia's most important interests are in Europe, followed by the Middle East and Central Asia, and only after that Japan. Here is one example: Russia devotes a significant part of its time and effort to the issue of NATO expansion to the east, into the eastern part of Europe, as well as negative consequences related to events in Crimea and Ukraine. As for Japan, for it the alliance with the United States, China and the Korean Peninsula have a higher priority than relations with Moscow. The Japanese government must also take into account public pressure to resolve issues with North Korea regarding kidnapping and nuclear weapons, which Abe has promised to do several times. As a result, the issue of the Kuril Islands is often relegated to the background.

Probably the only factor contributing to a possible resolution of the Kuril Islands issue is economic interests. After 1991, both Japan and Russia entered a period of prolonged economic crisis. The Russian economy hit its lowest point during its currency crisis in 1997, and is currently facing serious difficulties due to the collapse of oil prices and economic sanctions. However, the development of oil and gas fields in Siberia, in the process of which there is a combination of Japanese capital and Russian natural resources, promotes cooperation and possible resolution of the Kuril Islands issue. Despite the sanctions imposed, 8% of Japan's oil consumption in 2014 was imported from Russia, and the increase in oil and natural gas consumption is largely due to the consequences of the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

Taken together, historical factors largely determine the continued stagnation in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands. Demographics, geography, political institutions, and the attitudes of Japanese and Russian citizens all contribute to a tough negotiating position. Oil policy provides some incentives for both nations to resolve controversial issues and normalization of relations. However, this has not yet been enough to break the deadlock. Despite the possible change of leaders around the world, the main factors that have driven this dispute to an impasse will most likely remain unchanged.

Michael Bacalu is a member of the Council on Asian Affairs. He received a master's degree in international relations from Seoul University, South Korea, and a bachelor's degree in history and political science from Arcadia University. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author as an individual and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which he has an association.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Everyone knows about Japan's claims to Southern Kuriles, but not everyone knows in detail the history of the Kuril Islands and their role in Russian-Japanese relations. This is what this article will focus on.

Everyone knows about Japan's claims to the Southern Kuril Islands, but not everyone knows in detail the history of the Kuril Islands and their role in Russian-Japanese relations. This is what this article will focus on.

Before moving on to the history of the issue, it is worth telling why the Southern Kuril Islands are so important for Russia *.
1. Strategic location. It is in the ice-free deep-sea straits between the South Kuril islands that submarines can enter the Pacific Ocean underwater at any time of the year.
2. Iturup has the world's largest deposit of the rare metal rhenium, which is used in superalloys for space and aviation technology. World production of rhenium in 2006 amounted to 40 tons, while the Kudryavy volcano releases 20 tons of rhenium every year. This is the only place in the world where rhenium is found in pure form and not in the form of impurities. 1 kg of rhenium, depending on purity, costs from 1000 to 10 thousand dollars. There is no other rhenium deposit in Russia (in Soviet times, rhenium was mined in Kazakhstan).
3. Reserves of other mineral resources of the Southern Kuril Islands are: hydrocarbons - about 2 billion tons, gold and silver - 2 thousand tons, titanium - 40 million tons, iron - 270 million tons
4. The Southern Kuril Islands are one of 10 places in the world where, due to water turbulence due to the meeting of warm and cold sea currents, food for fish rises from the seabed. This attracts huge schools of fish. The value of seafood produced here exceeds $4 billion a year.

Let us briefly note the key dates of the 17th-18th centuries in Russian history associated with the Kuril Islands.

1654 or, according to other sources, 1667-1668- the voyage of a detachment led by Cossack Mikhail Stadukhin near the northern Kuril Island of Alaid. In general, the first Europeans to visit the Kuril Islands were the expedition of the Dutchman Martin Moritz de Vries in 1643, which mapped Iturup and Urup, but these islands were not assigned to Holland. Frieze became so confused during his journey that he mistook Urup for the tip of the North American continent. The strait between Urup and Iturup 1 now bears the name of de Vries.

1697 Siberian Cossack Vladimir Atlasov led an expedition to Kamchatka to conquer local tribes and impose taxes on them. The descriptions of the Kuril Islands he heard from the Kamchadals formed the basis of the earliest Russian map of the Kuril Islands, compiled by Semyon Remezov in 1700. 2

1710 The Yakut administration, guided by the instructions of Peter I “on inspecting the Japanese state and conducting trades with it,” orders the Kamchatka clerks, “to conduct the courts, which are decent, for the overflow of land and people to the sea by all sorts of measures, how to inspect; and if people appear on that land, and those people of the great sovereign under the tsar’s highly autocratic hand will again, as soon as possible, by all means, depending on the local situation, be brought and tribute collected from them with great zeal, and a special plan be made for that land.” 3

1711- A detachment led by ataman Danila Antsiferov and captain Ivan Kozyrevsky will explore the northern Kuril Islands - Shumshu and Kunashir 4. The Ainu who lived on Shumshu tried to resist the Cossacks, but were defeated.

1713 Ivan Kozyrevsky leads the second expedition to the Kuril Islands. At Paramushir, the Ainu gave the Cossacks three battles, but were defeated. For the first time in the history of the Kuril Islands, their residents paid tribute and recognized the power of Russia 5 . After this campaign, Kozyrevsky produced a “Drawing map of the Kamchadal nose and sea islands.” This map for the first time depicts the Kuril Islands from the Kamchatka Cape Lopatka to the Japanese island of Hokkaido. It also includes a description of the islands and the Ainu - the people who inhabited the Kuril Islands. Moreover, in the descriptions attached to the final “drawing”, Kozyrevsky also provided a number of information about Japan. In addition, he found out that the Japanese were forbidden to sail north of the island of Hokkaido. And that “Iturupians and Urupians live autocratically and are not subject to citizenship.” The inhabitants of another large island of the Kuril ridge - Kunashir 6 - were also independent.

1727 Catherine I approves the "Opinion of the Senate" on the Eastern Islands. It pointed out the need to “take possession of the islands lying near Kamchatka, since those lands belong to Russian ownership and are not subject to anyone. The Eastern Sea is warm, not ice-cold... and may in the future lead to commerce with Japan or Chinese Korea "7.

1738-1739- The Kamchatka expedition of Martyn Shpanberg took place, during which the entire ridge of the Kuril Islands was traversed. For the first time in Russian history, contact took place with the Japanese on their territory - at an anchorage near the island of Honshu, sailors purchased food from local residents 8. After this expedition, a map of the Kuril Islands was published, which in 1745 became part of the Atlas of the Russian Empire 9, which was published in Russian, French and Dutch. In the 18th century, when not all territories on the globe had yet been surveyed by European countries, the prevailing “international law” (which, however, concerned only European countries) gave a preferential right to own “new lands” if the country had priority in the publication maps of the relevant territories 10.

1761 The Senate decree of August 24 allows free fishing of sea animals in the Kuril Islands with the return of 10th of the catch to the treasury (PSZ-XV, 11315). During the second half of the 18th century, the Russians developed the Kuril Islands and created settlements on them. They existed on the islands of Shumshu, Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup, Kunashir 11. Yasak is regularly collected from local residents.

1786 December 22 On December 22, 1786, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire was supposed to officially declare that the lands discovered in the Pacific Ocean belonged to the Russian crown. The reason for the decree was “attacks by English commercial industrialists on the production of trade and animal trade in the Eastern Sea” 12. In pursuance of the decree, a note was drawn up in the highest name about “announcing through Russian ministers at the courts of all European maritime powers that these lands discovered by Russia cannot otherwise be recognized as belonging to your empire.” Among the territories included in the Russian Empire was the “ridge of the Kuril Islands touching Japan, discovered by Captain Shpanberg and Walton” 13 .

In 1836, jurist and historian of international law Henry Wheaton published the classic work “Fundamentals of International Law,” which also addressed issues of ownership of new lands. Viton identified the following conditions for the acquisition by the state of the right to a new territory 14:

1. Discovery
2. First development-first occupation
3. Long-term continuous possession of the territory

As we see, by 1786, Russia had fulfilled all these three conditions in relation to the Kuril Islands. Russia was the first to publish a map of the territory, including in foreign languages, it was the first to establish its own settlements there and began to collect yasak from local residents, and its possession of the Kuril Islands was not interrupted.

Only Russian actions regarding the Kuril Islands in the 17-18th century were described above. Let's see what Japan has done in this direction.
Today, the northernmost island of Japan is Hokkaido. However, it was not always Japanese. The first Japanese colonists appeared on the southern coast of Hokkaido in the 16th century, but their settlement received administrative registration only in 1604, when the administration of the Principality of Matsumae (in Russia then called Matmai) was established here. The main population of Hokkaido at that time was the Ainu, the island was considered a non-Japanese territory, and the Matsumae domain (which did not occupy all of Hokkaido, but only its southern part) was considered “independent” of the central government. The principality was very small in size - by 1788 its population was only 26.5 thousand people 15. Hokkaido became fully part of Japan only in 1869.
If Russia had more actively developed the Kuril Islands, then Russian settlements could have appeared in Hokkaido itself - it is known from documents that at least in 1778-1779 the Russians collected yasak from the inhabitants of the northern coast of Hokkaido 16 .

To assert their priority in the discovery of the Kuril Islands, Japanese historians point to the “Map of the Shoho Period” dated 1644, which shows the group of Habomai islands, the islands of Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. However, it is unlikely that this map was compiled by the Japanese as a result of the expedition to Iturup. Indeed, by that time, the successors of the Tokugawa shogun continued his course of isolating the country, and in 1636 a law was passed according to which the Japanese were forbidden to leave the country, as well as to build ships suitable for long voyages. As Japanese scholar Anatoly Koshkin writes, the “Map of the Shoho period” “is not so much a map in the true sense of the word, but a plan-scheme similar to a drawing, most likely made by one of the Japanese without personal acquaintance with the islands, according to the stories of the Ainu” 17 .

At the same time, the first attempts of the Matsumae principality to establish a Japanese trading post on the island of Kunashir, closest to Hokkaido, date back only to 1754, and in 1786, an official of the Japanese government, Tokunai Mogami, examined Iturup and Urup. Anatoly Koshkin notes that “neither the Principality of Matsumae nor the central Japanese government, having no official relations with any of the states, could legally put forward claims to “exercise sovereignty” over these territories. In addition, as evidenced by documents and confessions of Japanese scientists, the bakufu government (the shogun's headquarters) considered the Kuril Islands a "foreign land." Therefore, the above actions of Japanese officials in the southern Kuril Islands can be considered as arbitrariness, carried out in the interests of seizing new possessions. Russia, in the absence of official claims to the Kuril Islands from other states, according to the laws of that time and according to generally accepted practice, included the newly discovered lands into its state, notifying the rest of the world about this.” 18

The colonization of the Kuril Islands was complicated by two factors - the complexity of supplies and the general shortage of people in the Russian Far East. By 1786, the southernmost outpost of the Russians became a small village on the southwestern coast of the island. Iturup, where three Russians and several Ainu settled, having moved from Urup 19. The Japanese could not help but take advantage of this, and began to show increased interest in the Kuril Islands. In 1798, on the southern tip of Iturup Island, the Japanese overturned Russian signposts and erected pillars with the inscription: “Etorofu - the possession of Great Japan.” In 1801, the Japanese landed on Urup and arbitrarily erected a signpost on which they carved an inscription of nine hieroglyphs: “The island has belonged to Great Japan since ancient times.” 20
In January 1799, small Japanese military units were deployed in fortified camps at two points on Iturup: in the area of ​​​​modern Good Beginning Bay (Naibo) and in the area modern city Kurilsk (Syana) 21. The Russian colony on Urup languished, and in May 1806, Japanese envoys did not find any Russians on the island - there were only a few Ainu there 22 .

Russia was interested in establishing trade with Japan, and on October 8, 1804, on the ship “Nadezhda” (participating in I.F. Krusenstern’s round-the-world expedition), the Russian ambassador, actual state councilor Nikolai Rezanov arrived in Nagasaki. The Japanese government was playing for time, and Rezanov managed to meet with the secret surveillance inspector K. Toyama only six months later - on March 23, 1805. In an insulting manner, the Japanese refused to trade with Russia. Most likely, this was caused by the fact that the Western Europeans who were in Japan were setting the Japanese government anti-Russian. For his part, Rezanov made a sharp statement: “I, the undersigned of the Most Serene Sovereign Emperor Alexander 1st, actual chamberlain and cavalier Nikolai Rezanov, declare to the Japanese government: ... So that the Japanese Empire does not extend its possessions beyond the northern tip of the island of Matmaya, since all lands and waters to the north belongs to my sovereign" 23

As for the anti-Russian sentiments that were fueled by Western Europeans, the story of Count Moritz-August Beniovsky, who was exiled to Kamchatka for participating in hostilities on the side of the Polish confederates, is very indicative. There, in May 1771, together with the Confederates, he captured the galliot St. Peter and sailed to Japan. There he gave the Dutch several letters, which they in turn translated into Japanese and delivered to the Japanese authorities. One of them later became widely known as the “Beniovsky warning.” Here it is:


“Honorable and noble gentlemen, officers of the glorious Republic of the Netherlands!
Cruel fate for a long time who carried me across the seas, brought me a second time to Japanese waters. I went ashore in the hope that I might perhaps be able to meet your Excellencies here and receive your help. I am truly very upset that I did not have the opportunity to talk with you personally, because I have important information that I wanted to tell you. The high regard I have for your glorious state prompts me to inform you that this year two Russian galliots and one frigate, in fulfillment of secret orders, sailed around the coast of Japan and recorded their observations on the map in preparation for the attack on Matsuma and the adjacent islands, located in latitude 41°38′ north, an attack planned for the following year. For this purpose, on one of the Kuril Islands, located closest to Kamchatka, a fortress was built and shells, artillery and food warehouses were prepared.
If I could talk to you in person, I would tell you more than what can be entrusted to paper. Let your Excellencies take such precautions as you deem necessary, but, as your fellow believer and zealous well-wisher of your glorious state, I would advise, if possible, to have a cruiser ready.
With this I will allow myself to introduce myself and remain, as follows, your humble servant.
Baron Aladar von Bengoro, army commander in captivity.
July 20, 1771, on the island of Usma.
P.S. I left a map of Kamchatka on the shore that may be of use to you.”

There is not a word of truth in this document. “It is puzzling what Beniovsky’s goal was in telling the Dutch such false information,” noted American researcher Donald Keene. - There can be no doubt about their unreliability. Far from any aggressive plans towards Japan, the Russians strained every effort to preserve their Pacific possessions... Beniovsky undoubtedly knew the real state of affairs, but love of truth was never one of his virtues. Perhaps he hoped to curry favor with the Dutch by exposing to them the fictitious Russian conspiracy." 24

However, let's return to Nikolai Rezanov. After unsuccessful negotiations in Japan, Rezanov went on an inspection to the Russian colonies on the northwestern coast of America and the Aleutian Islands.
From the Aleutian island of Unalaska, where one of the offices of the Russian-American Company was located, on July 18, 1805, he wrote letter 25 to Alexander I:


By strengthening American institutions and building courts, we can force the Japanese to open trade, which the people very much want from them. I don’t think that Your Majesty will charge me with a crime, when now having worthy employees, such as Khvostov and Davydov, and with whose help, having built ships, I set off next year to the Japanese shores to destroy their village on Matsmai, drive them out of Sakhalin and smash them along the shores fear, so that, meanwhile, taking away the fisheries and depriving 200,000 people of food, the sooner force them to open a trade with us, to which they will be obliged. Meanwhile, I heard that they had already dared to establish a trading post on Urup. Your will, Most Gracious Sovereign, is with me, punish me as a criminal for not waiting for the command, I get down to business; but my conscience will reproach me even more if I waste time in vain and do not sacrifice Your glory, and especially when I see that I can contribute to the fulfillment of Your Imperial Majesty’s great intentions.

So, Rezanov, in the interests of the state, under his own responsibility, made an important decision - to organize a military operation against Japan. He assigned its leadership to Lieutenant Nikolai Khvostov and Midshipman Gavriil Davydov, who were in the service of the Russian-American Company. For this purpose, the frigate “Juno” and the tender “Avos” were transferred under their command. The officers' task was to sail to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and find out whether the Japanese, having penetrated these islands, were really oppressing the Kuriles brought into Russian citizenship. If this information was confirmed, the officers were to “drive away” the Japanese. That is, it was about protecting the territories belonging to the Russian Empire from the illegal actions of the Japanese.

In Southern Sakhalin, which Khvostov and Davydov visited twice, they liquidated a Japanese settlement, burned two small ships and captured several merchants from Matsumae. In addition, Khvostov issued a letter to the local Ainu elder, accepting the inhabitants of Sakhalin as Russian citizenship and under the protection of the Russian emperor. At the same time, Khvostov hoisted two Russian flags (RAK and state) on the shore of the bay and landed several sailors who founded a settlement that existed until 1847. In 1807, a Russian expedition liquidated the Japanese military settlement on Iturup. The Japanese captured were also released there, with the exception of two who were left as translators 26 .
Through the released prisoners, Khvostov conveyed his demands to the Japanese authorities 27:


“The proximity of Russia to Japan made us desire friendly ties for the true well-being of this last empire, for which an embassy was sent to Nagasaki; but the refusal to do so, which was insulting to Russia, and the spread of Japanese trade across the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, as possessions of the Russian Empire, finally forced this power to take other measures, which will show that the Russians can always harm Japanese trade until they are notified through the inhabitants of Urup or Sakhalin about the desire to trade with us. The Russians, having now caused such little harm to the Japanese empire, wanted to show them only by the fact that the northern countries of it could always be harmed by them, and that further stubbornness of the Japanese government could completely deprive it of these lands.”

It is characteristic that the Dutch, having translated Khvostov's ultimatum to the Japanese, added on their own that the Russians were threatening to conquer Japan and send priests to convert the Japanese to Christianity 28 .

Rezanov, who gave the order to Khvostov and Davydov, died in 1807, so he could not protect them from punishment for military actions that were not coordinated with the central government. In 1808, the Admiralty Board found Khvostov and Davydov guilty of unauthorized violation of government instructions on the purely peaceful development of relations with Japan and atrocities against the Japanese. As punishment, awards to officers for their bravery and courage shown in the war with Sweden were revoked. It is worth noting that the punishment is very mild. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the Russian government understood the correctness of the actions of the officers who actually expelled the invaders from Russian territory, but could not help but punish them due to violation of instructions.
In 1811, captain Vasily Golovnin, who landed on Kunashir to replenish water and food supplies, was captured by the Japanese along with a group of sailors. Golovnin was on a circumnavigation of the world, which he set off on in 1807 from Kronstadt, and the purpose of the expedition, as he wrote in his memoirs, was “the discovery and inventory of little-known lands of the eastern edge of the Russian Empire.” 29 He was accused by the Japanese of violating the principles of self-isolation of the country and together with his comrades spent more than two years in captivity.
The shogun's government also intended to use the incident with the capture of Golovnin to force the Russian authorities to make an official apology for the raids of Khvostov and Davydov on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Instead of an apology, the Irkutsk governor sent an explanation to the shogun's governor on Ezo Island that these officers had taken their actions without the consent of the Russian government. This turned out to be enough to free Golovnin and other prisoners.
The monopoly right to develop the Kuril Islands belonged to the Russian-American Company (RAC), created in 1799. Its main efforts were aimed at the colonization of Alaska, as a region much richer than the Kuril Islands. As a result, by the 1820s, the actual border on the Kuril Islands was established along the southern tip of the island of Urup, on which there was a settlement of RAK 30.
This fact is confirmed by the decree of Alexander I of September 1, 1821 “On the limits of navigation and the order of coastal relations along the coasts of Eastern Siberia, North-West America and the Aleutian, Kuril and other islands.” The first two paragraphs of this decree state (PSZ-XXVII, N28747):


1. Carrying out trade in whaling and fishing and all kinds of industry on the islands, in ports and bays and in general along the entire North-West Coast of America, starting from the Bering Strait to 51" North latitude, also along the Aleutian Islands and along the Eastern coast of Siberia; since along the Kuril Islands, that is, starting from the same Bering Strait to the Southern Cape of the island of Urupa, and precisely up to 45" 50" North latitude is granted for the use of the only Russian subjects.

2. Therefore, it is forbidden for any Foreign vessel not only to land on the shores and islands subject to Russia, indicated in the previous article; but also to approach them at a distance of less than a hundred Italian miles. Anyone who violates this prohibition will be subject to confiscation of all cargo.

Nevertheless, as noted by A.Yu. Plotnikov, Russia could also lay claim to, at a minimum, the island of Iturup, because Japanese settlements were only in the southern and central parts of the island, and the northern part remained uninhabited 31.

Russia made the next attempt to establish trade with Japan in 1853. On July 25, 1853, Russian ambassador Evfimy Putyatin arrived in the Land of the Rising Sun. As in the case with Rezanov, negotiations began only six months later - on January 3, 1854 (the Japanese wanted to get rid of Putyatin by starving him out). The issue of trade with Japan was important for Russia, because The population of the Russian Far East was growing, and it was much cheaper to supply it from Japan than from Siberia. Naturally, during the negotiations Putyatin also had to resolve the issue of territorial demarcation. On February 24, 1853, he received “Additional instructions” from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Here is an excerpt from it 32:


On this subject of boundaries, our desire is to be as lenient as possible (without sacrificing our interests), bearing in mind that the achievement of another goal - the benefits of trade - is of essential importance to us.

Of the Kuril Islands, the southernmost, which belongs to Russia, is the island of Urup, which we could limit ourselves to, designating it as the last point of Russian possessions to the south - so that on our side the southern tip of this island would be (as it is now in essence) the border with Japan, and so that on the Japanese side the northern tip of Iturupa Island is considered the border.

When starting negotiations to clarify the border possessions of ours and Japan, the issue of Sakhalin Island seems important.

This island is of particular importance to us because it lies opposite the very mouth of the Amur. The power that will own this island will own the key to the Amur. The Japanese Government, without a doubt, will firmly stand for its rights, if not to the entire island, which will be difficult for it to support with sufficient arguments, then at least to the southern part of the island: in Aniva Bay the Japanese have fishing grounds that provide food for many the inhabitants of their other islands, and for this circumstance alone they cannot help but value the said point.

If their Government, during negotiations with you, shows compliance with our other demands - demands regarding trade - then it will be possible to provide you with concessions on the subject of the southern tip of the island of Sakhalin, but this compliance should be limited to this, i.e. In no case can we recognize their rights to other parts of Sakhalin Island.

When explaining all this, it will be useful for you to point out to the Japanese Government that given the situation in which this island is located, given the impossibility of the Japanese to maintain their rights to it - rights that are not recognized by anyone - the said island can become in a very short time the prey of some strong maritime power, whose neighborhood is unlikely to be as beneficial and safe for the Japanese as the neighborhood of Russia, whose selflessness they have experienced for centuries.

In general, it is desirable that you arrange this issue of Sakhalin in accordance with the existing benefits of Russia. If you encounter insurmountable obstacles on the part of the Japanese Government to the recognition of our rights to Sakhalin, then it is better in this case to leave the matter in its current position ( those. undelimited - statehistory).

In general, while giving you these additional instructions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not at all prescribe them for indispensable execution, knowing full well that at such a far distance nothing unconditional and indispensable can be prescribed.

Your Excellency therefore remains complete freedom of action.

So, we see that this document recognizes that the actual border between Russia and Japan runs along the southern tip of Urup. Putyatin’s main task becomes, at a minimum, to reject Japan’s claims to all of Sakhalin, and, at a maximum, to force the Japanese to recognize it as completely Russian, because This island is of strategic importance.
Putyatin, however, decided to go further and in his message to the Supreme Council of Japan dated November 18, 1853, he proposed drawing a border between Iturup and Kunashir. As A. Koshkin notes, the Japanese government, at that moment experiencing pressure from the United States and Western European countries that wanted to open Japan to trade, was afraid that Russia might join them, and therefore did not exclude the possibility of demarcation, according to which all the islands, including the most southern - Kunashir, were recognized as Russian. In 1854, Japan compiled a “Map of the Most Important Maritime Borders of Great Japan,” on which its northern border was drawn along the northern coast of Hokkaido. Those. under favorable circumstances, Putyatin could return Iturup and Kunashir to Russia 33.

However, the negotiations reached a dead end, and in January 1854 Putyatin decided to interrupt them and return to Russia to find out about the progress of the Crimean War. This was important because... The Anglo-French squadron also operated off the Pacific coast of Russia.
On March 31, 1854, Japan signed a trade treaty with the United States. Putyatin again went to Japan to achieve for Russia the establishment of relations with Japan at a level no lower than with the United States.
Negotiations again dragged on, and on December 11, 1854 they were complicated by the fact that as a result of the tsunami, the frigate “Diana”, on which Putyatin arrived (during his second arrival in Japan, he specially sailed on only one ship, so that the Japanese would not get the impression that Russia wants to demonstrate strength), crashed, the team found itself ashore and the Russian ambassador found himself completely dependent on the Japanese. The negotiations took place in the city of Shimoda.

As a result of the intransigence of the Japanese on the issue of Sakhalin, Putyatin made the maximum compromise in order to sign an agreement with Japan. On February 7, 1855, the Shimoda Treaty was signed, according to which Sakhalin was recognized as undivided, and Russia recognized Japan's rights to Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Thus, the situation with the Southern Kuril Islands, which had existed de facto for many years, was officially recognized. However, because legally, these 4 islands were part of the Russian Empire, which was officially announced back in 1786; many historians now reproach the Russian ambassador for the fact that the Southern Kuril Islands were given to Japan without any compensation and that he should have defended at least to the end the largest of them is the island of Iturup 34. According to the agreement, three Japanese ports were opened for trade with Russia - Nagasaki, Shimoda and Hakodate. In strict accordance with the Japanese-American treaty, the Russians in these ports received the right of extraterritoriality, i.e. they could not be tried in Japan.
To justify Putyatin, it is worth noting that the negotiations were conducted at a time when there was no telegraph connection between Japan and St. Petersburg, and he could not promptly consult with the government. And the journey, either by sea or by land from Japan to St. Petersburg in one direction only, took a little less than a year. In such conditions, Putyatin had to take full responsibility upon himself. From the moment of his arrival in Japan until the signing of the Shimoda Treaty, negotiations lasted 1.5 years, so it is clear that Putyatin really did not want to leave with nothing. And since the instructions he received gave him the opportunity to make concessions on the Southern Kuril Islands, he made them, having first tried to bargain for Iturup.

The problem of using Sakhalin, caused by the absence of a Russian-Japanese border on it, required a solution. On March 18, 1867, the “Temporary Agreement on Sakhalin Island” was signed, drawn up on the basis of the “Proposals for a temporary agreement on cohabitation” of the Russian side. According to this agreement, both parties could move freely throughout the island and erect buildings on it. This was a step forward, because... Previously, although the island was considered undivided, the Russians did not use the southern part of Sakhalin, which the Japanese considered theirs. After this agreement, by order of the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia M. Korsakov, the Muravyovsky military post was founded in the vicinity of Busse Bay, which turned into the center of the Russian development of Southern Sakhalin. This was the southernmost post on Sakhalin, and it was located significantly south of the Japanese posts 35.
The Japanese at that time did not have the opportunity to actively develop Sakhalin, so this agreement was more beneficial for Russia than for Japan.

Russia sought to solve the problem of Sakhalin completely and completely obtain it into its own possession. For this, the tsarist government was ready to cede part of the Kuril Islands.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorized the military governor A.E. Crown and E.K. Byutsov, appointed Russian charge d'affaires in China, to continue negotiations on Sakhalin. Instructions were prepared for them. Byutsov was instructed to convince the Japanese Foreign Ministry to send its representatives to Nikolaevsk or Vladivostok to finally resolve the issue of Sakhalin on the basis of establishing a border along the La Perouse Strait, exchanging Sakhalin for Urup with adjacent islands and preserving Japanese fishing rights.
Negotiations began in July 1872. The Japanese government stated that the concession of Sakhalin would be perceived by the Japanese people and foreign countries as the weakness of Japan and Urup with the adjacent islands would be insufficient compensation 35 .
Negotiations that began in Japan were difficult and intermittent. They resumed in the summer of 1874 already in St. Petersburg, when one of the most educated people of then Japan, Enomoto Takeaki, arrived in the Russian capital with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

On March 4, 1875, Enomoto first spoke about abandoning Sakhalin for compensation in the form of all the Kuril Islands - from Japan to Kamchatka 36. At this time, the situation in the Balkans was deteriorating, the war with Turkey (which, as during the Crimean War, could again be supported by England and France) was becoming more and more real, and Russia was interested in solving Far Eastern problems as soon as possible, incl. Sakhalin

Unfortunately, the Russian government did not show sufficient persistence and did not appreciate the strategic importance of the Kuril Islands, which closed the exit to the Pacific Ocean from the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk, and agreed to the demands of the Japanese. On April 25 (May 7), 1875, in St. Petersburg, Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov from Russia and Enomoto Takeaki from Japan signed an agreement under which Japan renounced its rights to Sakhalin in exchange for Russia’s cession of all the Kuril Islands. Also, under this agreement, Russia allowed Japanese ships to visit the port of Korsakov on South Sakhalin, where the Japanese consulate was established, without paying trade and customs duties for 10 years. Japanese ships, merchants and fishing merchants were given most favored nation treatment in the ports and waters of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and Kamchatka 36 .

This agreement is often called an exchange agreement, but in fact we are not talking about an exchange of territories, because Japan did not have a strong presence on Sakhalin and no real ability to hold it - giving up rights to Sakhalin became a mere formality. In fact, we can say that the treaty of 1875 recorded the surrender of the Kuril Islands without any real compensation.

The next point in the history of the Kuril issue is the Russian-Japanese War. Russia lost this war and, according to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905, ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin along the 50th parallel.

This agreement has the important legal significance that it actually terminated the agreement of 1875. After all, the meaning of the “exchange” agreement was that Japan renounced its rights to Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands. At the same time, on the initiative of the Japanese side, a condition was included in the protocols of the Portsmouth Treaty that all previous Russian-Japanese agreements would be annulled. Thus, Japan deprived itself of the legal right to own the Kuril Islands.

The 1875 treaty, which is regularly referred to by the Japanese side in disputes about the ownership of the Kuril Islands, after 1905 became simply a historical monument, and not a document with legal force. It would not be amiss to recall that by attacking Russia, Japan also violated paragraph 1 of the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 - “From now on, let there be permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan.”

Next Key Point – Second World War. On April 13, 1941, the USSR signed a neutrality pact with Japan. It was concluded for 5 years from the date of ratification: from April 25, 1941 to April 25, 1946. According to this pact, it could be denounced a year before expiration.
The United States was interested in the USSR entering the war with Japan in order to speed up its defeat. Stalin, as a condition, put forward the demand that after the victory over Japan, the Kuril Islands and Southern Sakhalin would pass to the Soviet Union. Not everyone in the American leadership agreed with these demands, but Roosevelt agreed. The reason, apparently, was his sincere concern that after the end of World War II, the USSR and the USA would maintain a good relationship achieved during military cooperation.
The transfer of the Kuril Islands and Southern Sakhalin was recorded in the Yalta Agreement of the three great powers on issues of the Far East on February 11, 1945. 37 It is worth noting that paragraph 3 of the agreement reads as follows:


The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - agreed that two to three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies, subject to:

3. Transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union.

Those. We are talking about the transfer of all the Kuril Islands without exception, incl. Kunashir and Iturup, which were ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855.

On April 5, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, and on August 8 declared war on Japan.

On September 2, the act of surrender of Japan was signed. Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands went to the USSR. However, after the act of surrender, a peace treaty had yet to be concluded in which new borders would be fixed.
Franklin Roosevelt, who was friendly towards the USSR, died on April 12, 1945, and was succeeded by the anti-Soviet Truman. On October 26, 1950, American ideas on concluding a peace treaty with Japan were conveyed to the Soviet representative at the UN as a means of familiarization. In addition to such unpleasant details for the USSR as the retention of American troops on Japanese territory for an indefinite period, they revised the Yalta agreement, according to which Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were transferred to the USSR 38 .
In fact, the United States decided to remove the USSR from the process of agreeing on a peace treaty with Japan. In September 1951, a conference was to be held in San Francisco, at which a peace treaty between Japan and the allies was to be signed, but the United States did everything to make the USSR find it impossible for itself to participate in the conference (in particular, they did not receive an invitation to the conference China, North Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam, which the USSR insisted on and what was fundamental for it) - then a separate peace treaty would have been concluded with Japan in its American formulation without taking into account the interests of the Soviet Union.

However, these American calculations did not come true. The USSR decided to use the San Francisco conference to expose the separate nature of the treaty.
Among the amendments to the draft peace treaty proposed by the Soviet delegation were the following 39:

Paragraph “c” should be stated as follows:
“Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the adjacent islands and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, title and claims to these territories.”
According to Article 3.
Revise the article as follows:
“The sovereignty of Japan will extend to the territory consisting of the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, Hokkaido, as well as Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Pares Vela, Marcus, Tsushima and other islands that were part of Japan before December 7, 1941, with the exception of those territories and islands specified in Art. 2".

These amendments were rejected, but the United States could not ignore the Yalta agreements at all. The text of the treaty included a provision that “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.” 40. From a layman's point of view, it may seem that this is the same as the Soviet amendments. From a legal point of view, the situation is different - Japan renounces its claims to the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, but at the same time does not recognize the sovereignty of the USSR over these territories. With this wording, the agreement was signed on September 8, 1951 between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan. Representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland who participated in the conference refused to sign it.


Modern Japanese historians and politicians differ in their assessments of Japan's renunciation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands contained in the text of the peace treaty. Some demand the abolition of this clause of the agreement and the return of all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka. Others are trying to prove that the South Kuril Islands (Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan) are not included in the concept of the “Kuril Islands”, which Japan abandoned in the San Francisco Treaty. The latter circumstance is refuted both by established cartographic practice, when the entire group of islands - from Kunashir to Shumshu on maps is called the Kuril Islands, and by the texts of Russian-Japanese negotiations on this issue. Here, for example, is an excerpt from Putyatin’s negotiations with Japanese commissioners in January 1854. 41


« Putyatin: The Kuril Islands have belonged to us since ancient times and Russian leaders are now on them. The Russian-American company annually sends ships to Urup to buy furs, etc., and on Iturup the Russians had their settlement even before, but since it is now occupied by the Japanese, we have to talk about this.

Japanese side: We thought all Kuril Islands have long belonged to Japan, but since most of of them passed one after another to you, then there is nothing to say about these islands. Iturup but it was always considered ours and we considered it a settled matter, as well as the island of Sakhalin or Crafto, although we do not know how far the latter extends to the north...”

From this dialogue it is clear that in 1854 the Japanese did not divide the Kuril Islands into “Northern” and “Southern” - and recognized Russia’s right to most islands of the archipelago, with the exception of some of them, in particular Iturup. Fun fact - the Japanese claimed that all of Sakhalin belonged to them, but did not have a geographical map of it. By the way, using a similar argument, Russia could lay claim to Hokkaido on the grounds that in 1811 V.M. Golovnin in his “Notes on the Kuril Islands” ranked Fr. Matsmai, i.e. Hokkaido, to the Kuril Islands. Moreover, as noted above, at least in 1778-1779, the Russians collected yasak from the residents of the northern coast of Hokkaido.

Unsettled relations with Japan prevented the establishment of trade, resolving issues in the field of fisheries, and also contributed to the involvement of this country in the anti-Soviet policy of the United States. At the beginning of 1955, the USSR representative in Japan approached Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu with a proposal to begin negotiations on the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. On June 3, 1955, Soviet-Japanese negotiations began in the building of the Soviet embassy in London. The Japanese delegation, as a condition for concluding a peace treaty, put forward obviously unacceptable demands - for “the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, the Chishima archipelago (Kuril Islands) and the southern part of Karafuto Island (Sakhalin).”

In fact, the Japanese understood the impossibility of these conditions. The secret instruction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry provided for three stages in putting forward territorial demands: “First, demand the transfer of all the Kuril Islands to Japan with the expectation of further discussion; then, retreating somewhat, seek the cession of the southern Kuril Islands to Japan for “historical reasons,” and, finally, insist on at least the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, making this demand an indispensable condition for the successful completion of negotiations.”
The Japanese Prime Minister himself has repeatedly said that the ultimate goal of diplomatic bargaining was Habomai and Shikotan. Thus, during a conversation with a Soviet representative in January 1955, Hatoyama stated that “Japan will insist during negotiations on the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to it.” There was no talk about any other territories 42.

This “soft” position of Japan did not suit the United States. Thus, it was for this reason that in March 1955 the American government refused to receive the Japanese Foreign Minister in Washington.

Khrushchev was ready to make concessions. On August 9 in London, during an informal conversation, the head of the Soviet delegation A.Ya. Malik (during the war he was the USSR Ambassador to Japan, and then, with the rank of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the representative of the Soviet Union at the UN) suggested that a Japanese diplomat in the rank after Shun'ichi Matsumoto transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but only after signing a peace treaty.
This is the assessment of this initiative given by one of the members of the Soviet delegation at the London negotiations, later Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences S. L. Tikhvinsky 43:


"I. A. Malik, acutely experiencing Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the negotiations and without consulting with the other members of the delegation, prematurely expressed in this conversation with Matsumoto the reserve that the delegation had from the very beginning of the negotiations, approved by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (i.e., N.S. Khrushchev himself) position without fully exhausting the defense of the main position in the negotiations. His statement first caused bewilderment, and then joy and further exorbitant demands on the part of the Japanese delegation... N. S. Khrushchev’s decision to renounce sovereignty over part of the Kuril Islands in favor of Japan was a rash, voluntaristic act... The cession to Japan of a part of Soviet territory, which was claimed without permission Khrushchev went to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet people, destroyed the international legal basis of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and contradicted the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which recorded Japan’s renunciation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands...”

As this quote makes clear, the Japanese perceived Malik's initiative as weakness and put forward other territorial demands. Negotiations stopped. This suited the USA too. In October 1955, J. Dulles warned in a note to the Japanese government that expanding economic ties and normalizing relations with the USSR “could become an obstacle to the implementation of the Japanese assistance program being developed by the US government.”

Inside Japan, fishermen who needed to obtain licenses to fish in the Kuril Islands were primarily interested in concluding a peace treaty. This process was greatly hampered by the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which, in turn, was due to the absence of a peace treaty. Negotiations resumed. The United States exerted serious pressure on the Japanese government. Thus, on September 7, 1956, the State Department sent a memorandum to the Japanese government in which it stated that the United States would not recognize any decision confirming the sovereignty of the USSR over the territories that Japan had renounced under the peace treaty.

As a result of difficult negotiations, the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan was signed on October 19. It proclaimed the end of the state of war between the USSR and Japan and the restoration of diplomatic relations. Paragraph 9 of the declaration read 44:


9. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agreed to continue negotiations on a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.
At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and the island of Shikotan with the fact that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan .

However, as we know, the signing of a peace treaty never took place. Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro, who signed the Declaration, resigned, and the new cabinet was headed by Kishi Nobusuke, an openly pro-American politician. The Americans, back in August 1956, through the mouth of Secretary of State Allen Dulles, openly proclaimed that if the Japanese government recognizes the Kuril Islands as Soviet, then the United States will forever retain the island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu Archipelago, which were then under American control 45 .

On January 19, 1960, Japan signed the Treaty on Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan with the United States, according to which the Japanese authorities allowed the Americans to use military bases on their territory for the next 10 years and maintain ground, air and naval forces there. . On January 27, 1960, the USSR government announced that since this agreement was directed against the USSR and the PRC, the Soviet government refused to consider the issue of transferring the islands to Japan, since this would lead to an expansion of the territory used by American troops.

Now Japan claims not only Shikotan and Habomai, but also Iturup and Kunashir, citing the bilateral Treaty on Trade and Boundaries of 1855 - therefore, signing a peace treaty based on the 1956 declaration is impossible. However, if Japan renounced its claim to Iturup and Kunashir and signed a peace treaty, would Russia have to comply with the terms of the Declaration and give up Shikotan and Habomai? Let's consider this issue in more detail.

On April 13, 1976, the United States unilaterally adopted the Fish Conservation and Fisheries Management Act, according to which, from March 1, 1977, it moved the border of its fishing zone from 12 to 200 nautical miles from the coast, establishing strict rules for foreign access to it. fishermen Following the United States in 1976, by adopting the relevant laws, Great Britain, France, Norway, Canada, Australia and a number of other countries, including developing ones, unilaterally established 200-mile fishing or economic zones.
In the same year, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of December 10 “On temporary measures for the conservation of living resources and regulation of fisheries in marine areas adjacent to the coast of the USSR,” the Soviet Union also established sovereign rights over fish and other biological resources in its 200-mile coastal zone 46 .
New realities were recorded in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The concept of an “exclusive economic zone” was introduced, the width of which should not exceed 200 nautical miles. Article 55 of the convention provides that a coastal state in an exclusive economic zone has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration, development and conservation of natural resources, both living and non-living, in the waters covering the seabed, on the seabed and in its subsoil, and in for the management of these resources, and in relation to other activities for economic exploration and development of the said zone, such as the production of energy through the use of water, currents and wind." Moreover, in this zone it exercises jurisdiction over the “creation and use artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; protection and conservation of the marine environment" 47.

Earlier, in 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted.
Article 62 “Fundamental Change of Circumstances” of this convention states (emphasis added in bold) 48:


1. A fundamental change that occurred in relation to the circumstances that existed at the conclusion of the contract, and which was not foreseen by the parties, cannot be invoked as a basis for termination of the contract or withdrawal from it, except when:
a) the presence of such circumstances constituted an essential basis for the consent of the participants to be bound by the contract; And
b) the consequence of a change in circumstances fundamentally changes the scope of obligations, still subject to performance under the contract.
2. A fundamental change in circumstances cannot be cited as a basis for termination or withdrawal from a contract:
A) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
b) if such a fundamental change referred to by a party to the treaty is the result of a violation by that party either of an obligation under the treaty or of another international obligation undertaken by it in relation to any other party to the treaty.
3. If, in accordance with the previous paragraphs, the participants have the right to refer to a fundamental change in circumstances as a basis for terminating the contract or withdrawing from it, then he has the right to also refer to this change as a basis for suspending the validity of the contract.

The introduction of a 200-mile economic zone is a circumstance that radically changes the scope of the obligations. It is one thing to transfer islands when there was no talk of any 200-mile exclusive zone, and it is a completely different matter when this zone appeared. However, can it be considered that the 1956 declaration falls under paragraph 2a, i.e. to establish a border? The declaration deals with sovereignty over land territories, while between maritime states the border runs along the sea. After the transfer of the islands to Japan, an additional agreement would be required to determine the maritime boundary.
Thus, it can be argued that the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was signed by both the USSR and Japan, is a fundamental change falling under paragraph 1b of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Those. Russia is not obliged to fulfill the condition of the 1956 Declaration on the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan if Japan suddenly agreed to sign a peace treaty.

On November 14, 2004, the then Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a statement on the NTV channel that Russia recognizes the 1956 Declaration “as existing.”
The next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia is always ready to fulfill its obligations, especially with regard to ratified documents. But these obligations will be fulfilled “only to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill the same agreements.”
On May 24, 2005, deputies of the Sakhalin Regional Duma published an open appeal to Sergei Lavrov before his trip to Japan, where they indicated that the 1956 Declaration was no longer binding:


“However, in 1956 there were no internationally recognized 200-mile economic zones, the starting point of which in this case is the coast of the Kuril Islands. Thus, now, in the case of the transfer of territories, the object of transfer is not only and not so much the islands, but the adjacent economic zones inseparable from them, which provide up to 1 billion US dollars per year in smuggled seafood alone. Isn’t the emergence of maritime economic zones in the world after 1956 a significant change in the situation?”

To summarize, let us briefly note the main points.

1. The Treaty of Portsmouth 1905 annuls the Treaty of 1875, so references to it as a legal document are not valid. The reference to the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 is irrelevant, because Japan violated this treaty by attacking Russia in 1904.
2. The transfer of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union was recorded in the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945. The return of these territories can be considered both as a restoration of historical justice and as a legitimate war trophy. This is a completely normal practice, with a huge number of examples in history.
3. Japan may not recognize Russia’s sovereignty over these territories, but it also does not have legal rights to them - its renunciation of claims to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands is recorded in the peace treaty signed in San Francisco in 1951.
4. The Japanese indications that Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup are not part of the Kuril Islands (and, therefore, do not fall under the 1951 treaty) do not correspond to either geographical science or the history of previous Russian-Japanese negotiations.
5. After the signing of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the legalization of a 200-mile exclusive zone in international law, adherence to the 1956 Declaration becomes optional for Russia. Its possible implementation today, as stated by Putin and Lavrov, is not an obligation, but a gesture of goodwill.
6. The Southern Kuril Islands are of great strategic and economic importance, so there can be no question that these are just pieces of land that are not to be pitied.
7. The Kuril Islands - from Alaid to Kunashir and Habomai - Russian land.

* Anatoly Koshkin. Russia and Japan. Knots of contradictions. M.: Veche, 2010. P. 405-406.