The day of February 2, 1943, when Soviet troops defeated the fascist invaders near the great Volga River, is a very memorable date. The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the turning points in World War II. Such as the Battle of Moscow or the Battle of Kursk. It gave a significant advantage to our army on its path to victory over the invaders.
Losses in the battle
According to official figures, the Battle of Stalingrad claimed the lives of two million people. According to unofficial estimates - about three. It was this battle that became the reason for mourning in Nazi Germany, declared by Adolf Hitler. And it was precisely this that, figuratively speaking, inflicted a mortal wound on the army of the Third Reich.
The Battle of Stalingrad lasted about two hundred days and turned the once thriving peaceful city into smoking ruins. Of the half a million civilian population listed before the start of hostilities, by the end of the battle only about ten thousand people remained. It cannot be said that the arrival of the Germans was a surprise to the city residents. The authorities hoped that the situation would be resolved and did not pay due attention to the evacuation. However, it was possible to remove most of the children before the aircraft razed the orphanages and schools to the ground.
The battle for Stalingrad began on July 17, and already on the first day of battle colossal losses were noted both among the fascist invaders and in the ranks of the valiant defenders of the city.
German intentions
As was typical for Hitler, his plan was to take the city as quickly as possible. Having learned nothing from previous battles, the German command was inspired by the victories won before coming to Russia. No more than two weeks were allotted for the capture of Stalingrad.
For this purpose the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht was assigned. In theory, it should have been enough to suppress the actions of Soviet defensive detachments, subjugate the civilian population and introduce their own regime in the city. This is how the battle for Stalingrad seemed to the Germans. Summary Hitler's plan was to seize the industries in which the city was rich, as well as crossings on the Volga River, which gave him access to the Caspian Sea. And from there a direct path to the Caucasus was open for him. In other words, to rich oil deposits. If Hitler had succeeded in his plans, the results of the war could have been completely different.
Approaches to the city, or "Not a step back!"
The Barbarossa plan was a fiasco, and after the defeat near Moscow, Hitler was forced to reconsider all his ideas. Abandoning previous goals, the German command took a different path, deciding to seize the Caucasus oil field. Following the established route, the Germans take Donbass, Voronezh and Rostov. The final stage was Stalingrad.
General Paulus, commander of the 6th Army, led his forces to the city, but on the approaches his movement was blocked by the Stalingrad Front in the person of General Timoshenko and his 62nd Army. Thus began fierce fighting that lasted about two months. It was during this period of the battle that order No. 227 was issued, known in history as “Not a step back!” And this played a role. No matter how hard the Germans tried and threw in more and more forces to penetrate the city, they only moved 60 kilometers from their starting point.
The Battle of Stalingrad became more desperate as General Paulus's army increased in numbers. The tank component doubled, and aviation quadrupled. To contain such an onslaught from our side, the South-Eastern Front was formed, led by General Eremenko. In addition to the fact that the ranks of the fascists were significantly replenished, they resorted to roundabout maneuvers. Thus, the enemy movement was actively carried out from the Caucasian direction, but due to the actions of our army, it was of no significant use.
Civilians
According to Stalin's cunning order, only children were evacuated from the city. The rest fell under the order “Not a step back.” In addition to this, before last day The people remained confident that everything would work out. However, an order was given to dig trenches near his house. This was the beginning of unrest among civilians. People without permission (and it was given only to the families of officials and other prominent figures) began to leave the city.
Nevertheless, many of the male component volunteered for the front. The rest worked in factories. And it was very useful, since there was a catastrophic lack of ammunition even in repelling the enemy on the approaches to the city. The machines did not stop day and night. Civilians did not indulge themselves in rest either. They did not spare themselves - everything for the front, everything for Victory!
Paulus's breakthrough into the city
The average person remembers August 23, 1942 as unexpected. solar eclipse. It was still early before sunset, but the sun was suddenly covered with a black curtain. Numerous aircraft released black smoke in order to confuse the Soviet artillery. The roar of hundreds of engines tore the sky, and the waves emanating from it crushed the windows of buildings and threw civilians to the ground.
With the first bombing, the German squadron razed most of the city to the ground. People were forced to leave their homes and hide in the trenches they had dug earlier. It was either unsafe to be in the building or, due to the bombs that had hit it, it was simply impossible. So the battle for Stalingrad continued in the second stage. The photos that the German pilots managed to take show the whole picture of what was happening from the air.
Fight for every meter
Army Group B, completely strengthened by arriving reinforcements, launched a major offensive. Thus, cutting off the 62nd Army from the main front. So the battle for Stalingrad moved to urban areas. No matter how hard the Red Army soldiers tried to neutralize the corridor for the Germans, nothing worked.
The Russian stronghold had no equal in its strength. The Germans simultaneously admired the heroism of the Red Army and hated it. But they were even more afraid. Paulus himself did not hide his fear of Soviet soldiers in his notes. As he claimed, several battalions were sent into battle every day and almost no one returned back. And this is not an isolated case. This happened every day. The Russians fought desperately and died desperately.
87th Division of the Red Army
An example of the courage and perseverance of the Russian soldiers who knew the Battle of Stalingrad is the 87th Division. Remaining with 33 people, the fighters continued to hold their positions, fortifying themselves at the height of Malye Rossoshki.
To break them, the German command threw 70 tanks and an entire battalion at them. As a result, the Nazis left 150 fallen soldiers and 27 damaged vehicles on the battlefield. But the 87th Division is only a small part of the city’s defense.
The fight continues
By the beginning of the second period of the battle, Army Group B had about 80 divisions. On our side, reinforcements were made up of the 66th Army, which was later joined by the 24th.
The breakthrough into the city center was carried out by two groups of German soldiers under the cover of 350 tanks. This stage, which included the Battle of Stalingrad, was the most terrible. The soldiers of the Red Army fought for every inch of land. There were battles everywhere. The roar of tank shots was heard in every point of the city. Aviation did not stop its raids. The planes stood in the sky as if they were never leaving.
There was no district, not even a house, where the battle for Stalingrad did not take place. The map of military operations covered the entire city with neighboring villages and hamlets.
Pavlov's House
The fighting took place both with the use of weapons and hand-to-hand. According to the recollections of surviving German soldiers, the Russians, wearing only tunics, ran into the attack, exposing the already exhausted enemy to horror.
The fighting took place both on the streets and in buildings. And it was even harder for the warriors. Every turn, every corner could hide the enemy. If the first floor was occupied by the Germans, then the Russians could gain a foothold on the second and third. While on the fourth the Germans were again based. Residential buildings could change hands several times. One of these houses holding the enemy was the Pavlovs' house. A group of scouts led by commander Pavlov entrenched themselves in a residential building and, having knocked out the enemy from all four floors, turned the house into an impregnable citadel.
Operation Ural
Most of the city was taken by the Germans. Only along its edges were the forces of the Red Army based, forming three fronts:
- Stalingradsky.
- Southwestern.
- Donskoy.
The total strength of all three fronts had a slight advantage over the Germans in technology and aviation. But this was not enough. And in order to defeat the Nazis, true military art was necessary. This is how Operation Ural was developed. An operation more successful than the Battle of Stalingrad had ever seen. Briefly, it consisted of all three fronts attacking the enemy, cutting him off from his main forces and encircling him. Which soon happened.
The Nazis took measures to free the army of General Paulus, who was encircled. But operations “Thunder” and “Thunderstorm” developed for this purpose did not bring any success.
Operation Ring
The final stage of the defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Stalingrad was Operation Ring. Its essence was to eliminate the encircled German troops. The latter were not going to give up. With about 350 thousand personnel (which was sharply reduced to 250 thousand), the Germans planned to hold out until reinforcements arrived. However, this was not allowed either by the rapidly attacking soldiers of the Red Army, smashing the enemy, or by the condition of the troops, which had significantly deteriorated during the time that the battle for Stalingrad lasted.
As a result of the final stage of Operation Ring, the Nazis were cut into two camps, which were soon forced to surrender due to the onslaught of the Russians. General Paulus himself was captured.
Consequences
Meaning Battle of Stalingrad colossal in the history of World War II. Having suffered such huge losses, the Nazis lost their advantage in the war. In addition, the success of the Red Army inspired the armies of other states fighting Hitler. As for the fascists themselves, to say that their fighting spirit has weakened is to say nothing.
Hitler himself emphasized the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad and the defeat of the German army in it. According to him, on February 1, 1943, the offensive in the East no longer made any sense.
Starting the war against the USSR, the German command planned to end fighting during one short-term campaign. However, during the winter battle of 1941-1942. The Wehrmacht was defeated and was forced to surrender part of the occupied territory. By the spring of 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive had in turn stopped, and the headquarters of both sides began developing plans for the summer battles.
Plans and powers
In 1942, the situation at the front was no longer as favorable for the Wehrmacht as in the summer of 1941. The surprise factor was lost, and the overall balance of forces changed in favor of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). An offensive along the entire front to great depth, similar to the 1941 campaign. became impossible. The Wehrmacht High Command was forced to limit the scope of operations: in the central sector of the front it was planned to go on the defensive, in the northern sector a strike was planned to bypass Leningrad with limited forces. The main direction of future operations became the south. On April 5, 1942, in Directive No. 41, Supreme Commander Adolf Hitler outlined the goals of the campaign: “To finally destroy the manpower still remaining with the Soviets, to deprive the Russians of as many of the most important military-economic centers as possible.” The immediate task of the main operation on the Eastern Front was the exit of German troops to Caucasus ridge and the capture of a number of economically important areas - primarily the oil fields of Maykop and Grozny, the lower reaches of the Volga, Voronezh and Stalingrad. The offensive plan was codenamed "Blau" ("Blue").
Army Group South played the main role in the offensive. It suffered less than others during the winter campaign. It was reinforced with reserves: fresh infantry and tank formations were transferred to the army group, some formations from other sectors of the front, some motorized divisions were reinforced with tank battalions seized from Army Group Center. In addition, the divisions involved in Operation Blau were the first to receive modernized armored vehicles - medium tanks Pz. IV and StuG III self-propelled guns with reinforced weapons, which made it possible to effectively fight against Soviet armored vehicles.
The army group had to operate on a very wide front, so contingents of Germany's allies were involved in the operation on an unprecedented scale. The 3rd Romanian, 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies took part in it. The Allies made it possible to hold a long front line, but they had to take into account their relatively low combat effectiveness: neither in terms of the level of training of soldiers and the competence of officers, nor in the quality and quantity of weapons, the Allied armies were on the same level with either the Wehrmacht or the Red Army. To make it easier to control this mass of troops, already during the offensive, Army Group South was divided into Group A, advancing on the Caucasus, and Group B, advancing on Stalingrad. The main striking force of Army Group B was the 6th Field Army under the command of Friedrich Paulus and the 4th Panzer Army of Hermann Hoth.
At the same time, the Red Army was planning defensive actions in the southwestern direction. However, the Southern, Southwestern and Bryansk Fronts in the direction of the first Blau attack had mobile formations for counterattacks. The spring of 1942 was the time of restoration of the tank forces of the Red Army, and before the 1942 campaign, tank and mechanized corps of a new wave were formed. They had fewer capabilities than German tank and motorized divisions, had a small artillery fleet and weak motorized rifle units. However, these formations could already influence the operational situation and provide serious assistance to rifle units.
Preparations for the defense of Stalingrad began in October 1941, when the command of the North Caucasus Military District received instructions from Headquarters to build defensive contours around Stalingrad - lines of field fortifications. However, by the summer of 1942 they were still not completed. Finally, supply problems seriously affected the capabilities of the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1942. The industry has not yet produced enough equipment and consumables to cover the needs of the army. Throughout 1942, the Red Army's ammunition consumption was significantly lower than that of the enemy. In practice, this meant that there were not enough shells to suppress the Wehrmacht’s defenses with artillery strikes or counter it in counter-battery warfare.
Battle in the Don Bend
On June 28, 1942, the main summer offensive of German troops began. Initially it developed successfully for the enemy. Soviet troops were thrown back from their positions in the Donbass to the Don. At the same time, at the front Soviet troops a wide gap appeared west of Stalingrad. In order to fill this gap, the Stalingrad Front was created on July 12 by a directive from Headquarters. Mainly reserve armies were used to defend the city. Among them was the former 7th Reserve, which, after entering the active army, received new number– 62. It was she who was to defend Stalingrad directly in the future. In the meantime, the newly formed front was moving to the line of defense west of the big bend of the Don.
The front initially had only small forces. The divisions that were already at the front managed to suffer heavy losses, and some of the reserve divisions were only moving to their designated lines. The front's mobile reserve was the 13th Tank Corps, which was not yet equipped with equipment.
The main forces of the front advanced from the depths and had no contact with the enemy. Therefore, one of the first tasks set by Headquarters to the first commander of the Stalingrad Front, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, consisted of sending forward detachments to meet the enemy 30-80 km from the front line of defense - for reconnaissance and, if possible, occupation of more advantageous lines. On July 17, the forward detachments first encountered the vanguards of the German troops. This day marked the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Front collided with the troops of the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht.
The fighting with front-line advanced detachments lasted until July 22. It is interesting that Paulus and Hoth were not yet aware of the presence of large forces of Soviet troops - they believed that only weak units were ahead. In reality, the Stalingrad Front numbered 386 thousand people, and was numerically little inferior to the advancing troops of the 6th Army (443 thousand people as of July 20). However, the front defended a wide zone, which allowed the enemy to concentrate superior forces in the breakthrough area. On July 23, when fighting for the main line of defense began, the Wehrmacht’s 6th Army quickly broke through the front of the Soviet 62nd Army, and a small “cauldron” formed on its right flank. The attackers were able to reach the Don north of the city of Kalach. The threat of encirclement hung over the entire 62nd Army. However, unlike the encirclements of the autumn of 1941, the Stalingrad Front had a maneuverable reserve at its disposal. To break through the encirclement, the 13th Tank Corps of T.S. was used. Tanaschishin, who managed to pave the way to freedom for the surrounded detachment. Soon, an even more powerful counterattack fell on the flanks of the German wedge that had broken through to the Don. To defeat the German units that had broken through, two tank armies were sent in - the 1st and 4th. However, each of them consisted of only two rifle divisions and one tank corps capable of participating in a counterattack.
Unfortunately, the battles of 1942 were characterized by the Wehrmacht's advantage in tactical level. German soldiers and officers had, on average, a better level of training, including in technical terms. Therefore, the counterattacks launched from both sides by tank armies in the last days of July crashed against the German defenses. The tanks advanced with very little support from infantry and artillery, and suffered unreasonably heavy losses. There was undoubtedly an effect from their actions: the forces of the 6th Field Army that entered the breakthrough could not build on their success and cross the Don. However, the stability of the front line could only be maintained until the forces of the attackers were exhausted. On August 6, the 1st Tank Army, having lost almost all its equipment, was disbanded. Within a day, Wehrmacht units, striking in converging directions, surrounded the large forces of the 62nd Army west of the Don.
The surrounded troops in several separate detachments managed to break out of the ring, but the battle in the Don bend was lost. Although German documents constantly emphasize the fierce resistance of the Red Army, the Wehrmacht managed to defeat the opposing Soviet units and cross the Don.
Fighting on the defensive lines of Stalingrad
At the moment when the battle in the great bend of the Don was developing, a threat loomed over the Stalingrad front. new threat. It came from the southern flank, occupied by weak units. Initially, Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army did not aim at Stalingrad, but stubborn resistance on the Don forced the Wehrmacht command to turn it from the Caucasus direction to the rear of the Stalingrad Front. The front's reserves were already drawn into the battle, so the tank army could quickly advance to the rear of the defenders of Stalingrad. On July 28, the Headquarters ordered the new commander of the Stalingrad Front, A.I. Eremenko take measures to protect the southwest outer defense circuit. However, this order was somewhat late. On August 2, Goth's tanks reached the Kotelnikovsky district . Due to the dominance of German aviation in the air, Soviet reserves were crushed on the approaches, and entered the battle already seriously battered. On August 3, the Germans, having easily broken through the front, rushed to the northeast and deeply bypassed the positions of the defenders of Stalingrad. They were stopped only in the Abganerovo area - geographically this is already south, and not west of Stalingrad. Abganerovo was held for a long time thanks to the timely arrival of reserves, including the 13th Tank Corps. T.I. building Tanaschishina became the “fire brigade” of the front: the tankers eliminated the consequences of a serious failure for the second time.
While the fighting was going on south of Stalingrad, Paulus was planning a new encirclement, already on the eastern bank of the Don. On August 21, on the northern flank, the 6th Army crossed the river and began an offensive east to the Volga. The 62nd Army, already battered in the “cauldron,” was unable to contain the blow, and the vanguards of the Wehrmacht rushed towards Stalingrad from the north-west. If German plans were implemented, Soviet troops were to be surrounded west of Stalingrad and die in the flat steppe. So far this plan has been carried out.
At this time, the evacuation of Stalingrad was underway. Before the war, this city with a population of more than 400 thousand people was one of the most important industrial centers of the USSR. Now Headquarters was faced with the question of evacuating people and industrial facilities. However, by the time the fighting for the city began, no more than 100 thousand Stalingrad residents had been transported across the Volga. There was no talk of banning the export of people, but a huge amount of cargo and people awaiting crossing had accumulated on the western bank - from refugees from other areas to food and equipment. The capacity of the crossings did not allow everyone to be taken out, and the command believed that they still had time left. Meanwhile, events developed rapidly. Already on August 23, the first German tanks reached the northern outskirts. On the same day, Stalingrad was subjected to a devastating air strike.
Back on July 23, Hitler pointed out the need for the “early” destruction of Stalingrad. On August 23, the Fuhrer's order was carried out. The Luftwaffe carried out attacks in groups of 30-40 aircraft, in total they made more than two thousand sorties. A significant part of the city consisted of wooden buildings; they were quickly destroyed by fire. The water supply was destroyed, so fire crews could not fight the fire. In addition, oil storage facilities caught fire as a result of the bombing. (On this day?) In Stalingrad, about 40 thousand people died, mostly civilians, and the city was almost completely destroyed.
Since Wehrmacht units reached the city with a quick dash, the defense of Stalingrad was disorganized. The German command considered it necessary to quickly unite the 6th Field Army, advancing from the north-west, and the 4th Tank Army from the south. Therefore, the main task of the Germans was to close the flanks of the two armies. However, the new environment did not materialize. Tank brigades and front corps launched counterattacks against the northern strike group. They did not stop the enemy, but allowed the main forces of the 62nd Army to be withdrawn to the city. The 64th Army defended to the south. It was they who became the main participants in the subsequent battle in Stalingrad. By the time the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht united, the main forces of the Red Army had already escaped from the trap.
Defense of Stalingrad
On September 12, 1942, a major personnel change took place: the 62nd Army was headed by General Vasily Chuikov. The army retreated to the city seriously battered, but it still had more than 50 thousand people, and now it had to hold a bridgehead before the Volga on a narrow front. Moreover, the German advance was inevitably slowed by the obvious difficulties of street fighting.
However, the Wehrmacht had no intention of getting involved in two months of street fighting. From Paulus's point of view, the task of capturing Stalingrad was solved within ten days. From the standpoint of post-knowledge, the Wehrmacht’s persistence in destroying the 62nd Army seems difficult to explain. However, at that particular moment, Paulus and his staff believed that the city could be occupied within a reasonable time with moderate losses.
The first assault began almost immediately. During September 14-15, the Germans took the dominant height - Mamayev Kurgan, combined the forces of their two armies and cut off the 62nd Army from the 64th Army operating to the south. However, in addition to the stubborn resistance of the city garrison, two factors influenced the attackers. Firstly, reinforcements regularly arrived across the Volga. The course of the September assault was turned by the 13th Guards Division of Major General A.I. Rodimtseva, who managed to regain some of the lost positions with counterattacks and stabilized the situation. On the other hand, Paulus did not have the opportunity to recklessly throw all his available forces into capturing Stalingrad. The positions of the 6th Army north of the city were subject to constant attacks by Soviet troops, who were trying to pave a land corridor to their own. A series of offensive operations in the steppe northwest of Stalingrad resulted in heavy losses for the Red Army with minimal progress. The tactical preparation of the attacking troops turned out to be poor, and the superiority of the Germans in firepower made it possible to effectively disrupt the attacks. However, pressure on Paulus's army from the north did not allow him to concentrate on completing the main task.
In October, the left flank of the 6th Army, stretched far to the west, was covered by Romanian troops, which made it possible to use two additional divisions in a new assault on Stalingrad. This time, an industrial zone in the north of the city was attacked. As during the first assault, the Wehrmacht was faced with reserves approaching from other sectors of the front. The headquarters closely monitored the situation in Stalingrad and gradually transferred fresh units to the city. Transportation took place in an extremely difficult situation: the watercraft were attacked by Wehrmacht artillery and aircraft. However, the Germans failed to completely block traffic along the river.
The advancing German troops suffered high casualties in the city and advanced very slowly. The extremely stubborn battles made Paulus's headquarters nervous: he began to make openly controversial decisions. Weakening the positions across the Don and handing them over to Romanian troops was the first risky step. Next is the use of tank divisions, the 14th and 24th, for street fighting. Armored vehicles did not have a significant impact on the course of the battle in the city, and the divisions suffered heavy losses and got involved in a hopeless confrontation.
It should be noted that in October 1942, Hitler already considered the goals of the campaign as a whole achieved. The order of October 14 stated that “the summer and autumn campaigns of this year, with the exception of certain ongoing operations and planned offensive actions of a local nature, are completed.”
In reality, the German forces had not so much completed the campaign as lost the initiative. In November, freeze-up began on the Volga, which greatly worsened the situation of the 62nd Army: due to the situation on the river, the delivery of reinforcements and ammunition to the city was difficult. The defense line in many places narrowed to hundreds of meters. However, stubborn defense in the city allowed Headquarters to prepare the decisive counter-offensive of the Great Patriotic War.
To be continued...
Seventy-one years ago, the Battle of Stalingrad ended - the battle that finally changed the course of World War II. On February 2, 1943, German troops surrounded on the banks of the Volga capitulated. This significant event I dedicate this photo album.
1. A Soviet pilot stands next to a personalized Yak-1B fighter, donated to the 291st Fighter Aviation Regiment by collective farmers of the Saratov region. The inscription on the fuselage of the fighter: “To the unit of the Hero of the Soviet Union Shishkin V.I. from the collective farm Signal of the Revolution, Voroshilovsky district, Saratov region." Winter 1942 - 1943
2. A Soviet pilot stands next to a personalized Yak-1B fighter, donated to the 291st Fighter Aviation Regiment by collective farmers of the Saratov region.
3. A Soviet soldier demonstrates to his comrades German guard boats, captured among other German property at Stalingrad. 1943
4. German 75-mm RaK 40 cannon on the outskirts of a village near Stalingrad.
5. A dog sits in the snow against the backdrop of a column of Italian troops retreating from Stalingrad. December 1942
7. Soviet soldiers walk past the corpses of German soldiers in Stalingrad. 1943
8. Soviet soldiers listen to an accordion player play near Stalingrad. 1943
9. Red Army soldiers go on the attack against the enemy near Stalingrad. 1942
10. Soviet infantry attacks the enemy near Stalingrad. 1943
11. Soviet field hospital near Stalingrad. 1942
12. A medical instructor bandages the head of a wounded soldier before sending him to a rear hospital on a dog sled. Stalingrad region. 1943
13. A captured German soldier in ersatz felt boots in a field near Stalingrad. 1943
14. Soviet soldiers in battle in the destroyed workshop of the Red October plant in Stalingrad. January 1943
15. Infantrymen of the 4th Romanian Army on vacation at the self-propelled gun StuG III Ausf. F on the road near Stalingrad. November-December 1942
16. The bodies of German soldiers on the road southwest of Stalingrad near an abandoned Renault AHS truck. February-April 1943
17. Captured German soldiers in the destroyed Stalingrad. 1943
18. Romanian soldiers with a 7.92 mm ZB-30 machine gun in a trench near Stalingrad.
19. Infantryman takes aim with a submachine gun the one lying on the armor of the American-made Soviet tank M3 “Stuart” with the proper name “Suvorov”. Don Front. Stalingrad region. November 1942
20. Commander of the XI Army Corps of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General to Karl Strecker (Karl Strecker, 1884-1973, standing with his back in the center left) surrenders to representatives of the Soviet command in Stalingrad. 02/02/1943
21. A group of German infantry during an attack in the Stalingrad area. 1942
22. Civilians at the construction of anti-tank ditches. Stalingrad. 1942
23. One of the Red Army units in the Stalingrad area. 1942
24. Colonel General to the Wehrmacht Friedrich Paulus (Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus, 1890-1957, right) with officers at the command post near Stalingrad. Second from the right is Paulus' adjutant, Colonel Wilhelm Adam (1893-1978). December 1942
25. At the crossing of the Volga to Stalingrad. 1942
26. Refugees from Stalingrad during a halt. September 1942
27. Guardsmen of Lieutenant Levchenko's reconnaissance company during reconnaissance on the outskirts of Stalingrad. 1942
28. The fighters take their starting positions. Stalingrad front. 1942
29. Evacuation of the plant beyond the Volga. Stalingrad. 1942
30. Burning Stalingrad. Anti-aircraft artillery fires at German planes. Stalingrad, "Fallen Fighters" Square. 1942
31. Meeting of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front: from left to right - N.S. Khrushchev, A.I. Kirichenko, Secretary of the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) A.S. Chuyanovand front commander Colonel General to Eremenko A.I. Stalingrad. 1942
32. A group of machine gunners of the 120th (308th) Guards Rifle Division, under the command of A. Sergeev,conducts reconnaissance during street fighting in Stalingrad. 1942
33. Red Navy men of the Volga military flotilla during the landing operation in the Stalingrad area. 1942
34. Military Council of the 62nd Army: from left to right - Chief of Army Staff N.I. Krylov, Army Commander V.I. Chuikov, member of the Military Council K.A. Gurov.and commander of the 13th Guards Rifle Division A.I. Rodimtsev. Stalingrad district. 1942
35. Soldiers of the 64th Army are fighting for a house in one of the districts of Stalingrad. 1942
36. Commander of the Don Front troops, Lieutenant General t Rokossovsky K.K. at a combat position in the region of Stalingrad. 1942
37. Battle in the Stalingrad area. 1942
38. Fight for a house on Gogol Street. 1943
39. Baking your own bread. Stalingrad front. 1942
40. Fights in the city center. 1943
41. Assault on the railway station. 1943
42. Soldiers of the long-range gun of junior lieutenant I. Snegirev are firing from the left bank of the Volga. 1943
43. A military orderly carries a wounded Red Army soldier. Stalingrad. 1942
44. Soldiers of the Don Front are moving to a new firing line in the area of the encircled Stalingrad German group. 1943
45. Soviet sappers walk through the destroyed snow-covered Stalingrad. 1943
46. Captured Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus (1890-1957) gets out of a GAZ-M1 car at the headquarters of the 64th Army in Beketovka, Stalingrad region. 01/31/1943
47. Soviet soldiers climb the stairs of a destroyed house in Stalingrad. January 1943
48. Soviet troops in battle in Stalingrad. January 1943
49. Soviet soldiers in battle among destroyed buildings in Stalingrad. 1942
50. Soviet soldiers attack enemy positions in the Stalingrad area. January 1943
51. Italian and German prisoners leave Stalingrad after the surrender. February 1943
52. Soviet soldiers move through a destroyed factory workshop in Stalingrad during the battle.
53. Soviet light tank T-70 with armored troops on the Stalingrad front. November 1942
54. German artillerymen fire on the approaches to Stalingrad. In the foreground is a killed Red Army soldier in cover. 1942
55. Conducting political information in the 434th Fighter Wing. In the first row from left to right: Heroes of the Soviet Union, Senior Lieutenant I.F. Golubin, captain V.P. Babkov, Lieutenant N.A. Karnachenok (posthumously), standing regiment commissar, battalion commissar V.G. Strelmashchuk. In the background is a Yak-7B fighter with the inscription on the fuselage “Death for death!” July 1942
56. Wehrmacht infantry near the destroyed Barricades factory in Stalingrad.
57. Red Army soldiers with an accordion celebrate victory in the Battle of Stalingrad on the Square of Fallen Fighters in liberated Stalingrad. January
1943
58. Soviet mechanized unit during the offensive at Stalingrad. November 1942
59. Soldiers of the 45th Infantry Division of Colonel Vasily Sokolov at the Red October plant in the destroyed Stalingrad. December 1942
60. Soviet T-34/76 tanks near the Square of Fallen Fighters in Stalingrad. January 1943
61. German infantry takes cover behind stacks of steel blanks (blooms) at the Red October plant during the battle for Stalingrad. 1942
62. Sniper Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Zaitsev explains the upcoming task to the newcomers. Stalingrad. December 1942
63. Soviet snipers go to a firing position in the destroyed Stalingrad. The legendary sniper of the 284th Infantry Division Vasily Grigorievich Zaitsev and his students go into an ambush. December 1942.
64. Italian driver killed on the road near Stalingrad. Nearby is a FIAT SPA CL39 truck. February 1943
65. An unknown Soviet machine gunner with a PPSh-41 during the battles for Stalingrad. 1942
66. Red Army soldiers are fighting among the ruins of a destroyed workshop in Stalingrad. November 1942
67. Red Army soldiers are fighting among the ruins of a destroyed workshop in Stalingrad. 1942
68. German prisoners of war captured by the Red Army at Stalingrad. January 1943
69. Crew of the Soviet 76-mm divisional gun ZiS-3 at a position near the Red October plant in Stalingrad. 12/10/1942
70. An unknown Soviet machine gunner with a DP-27 in one of the destroyed houses in Stalingrad. 12/10/1942
71. Soviet artillery fires at surrounded German troops in Stalingrad. Presumably , in the foreground is a 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model. January 1943
72. Soviet attack aircraft Il-2 aircraft fly out on a combat mission near Stalingrad. January 1943
73. exterminator pilot l 237th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 220th Fighter Aviation Division of the 16th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front, Sergeant Ilya Mikhailovich Chumbaryov at the wreckage of a German reconnaissance aircraft he shot down with a ram ika Focke-Wulf Fw 189. 1942
74. Soviet artillerymen fire at German positions in Stalingrad from a 152-mm ML-20 howitzer gun, model 1937. January 1943
75. The crew of the Soviet 76.2 mm ZiS-3 cannon fires in Stalingrad. November 1942
76. Soviet soldiers sit by the fire during a moment of calm in Stalingrad. The second soldier from the left has a captured German MP-40 submachine gun. 01/07/1943
77. Cinematographer Valentin Ivanovich Orlyankin (1906-1999) in Stalingrad. 1943
78. Commander of the Marine assault group P. Golberg in one of the workshops of the destroyed Barricades plant. 1943
79. Red Army soldiers fight on the ruins of a building in Stalingrad. 1942
80. Portrait of Hauptmann Friedrich Winkler in the area of the Barricades plant in Stalingrad.
81. Residents of a Soviet village, previously occupied by the Germans, meet the crew of a T-60 light tank from the Soviet troops - liberate lei. Stalingrad area. February 1943
82. Soviet troops on the offensive near Stalingrad, in the foreground are the famous Katyusha rocket launchers, behind are T-34 tanks.
86. Soviet T-34 tanks with armored soldiers on the march in the snowy steppe during the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation. November 1942
87. Soviet T-34 tanks with armored soldiers on the march in the snowy steppe during the Middle Don offensive operation. December 1942
88. Tankers of the 24th Soviet Tank Corps (from December 26, 1942 - 2nd Guards) on the armor of a T-34 tank during the liquidation of a group of German troops surrounded near Stalingrad. December 1942 she and the major general) are talking with soldiers near a German Pz.Kpfw tank captured near Stalingrad. III Ausf. L. 1942
92. The German Pz.Kpfw tank captured near Stalingrad. III Ausf. L. 1942
93. Captured Red Army soldiers who died from hunger and cold. The prisoner of war camp was located in the village of Bolshaya Rossoshka near Stalingrad. January 1943
94. German Heinkel He-177A-5 bombers from I./KG 50 at the airfield in Zaporozhye. These bombers were used to supply German troops surrounded at Stalingrad. January 1943
96. Romanian prisoners of war captured near the village of Raspopinskaya near the city of Kalach. November-December 1942
97. Romanian prisoners of war captured near the village of Raspopinskaya near the city of Kalach. November-December 1942
98. GAZ-MM trucks, used as fuel tankers, during refueling at one of the stations near Stalingrad. The engine hoods are covered with covers, and instead of doors there are canvas flaps. Don Front, winter 1942-1943.
99. The position of a German machine gun crew in one of the houses in Stalingrad. September-November 1942
100. Member of the Military Council for Logistics of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front, Colonel Viktor Matveevich Lebedev in a dugout near Stalingrad. 1942
Losses of the parties in the Battle of Stalingrad
In order to determine the losses of the parties during the Battle of Stalingrad, it is necessary first of all to determine the total amount of losses of the parties during the Second World War.
Since the official estimate of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War at 8,668,400 dead is clearly understated, for an alternative estimate we used higher figures for the irretrievable losses of the Red Army than those named in the collection “The Classification of Secrecy has been Removed.”
Meanwhile, a significantly higher value of irretrievable losses of the Red Army for 1942 is given by D. A. Volkogonov - 5,888,236 people, according to him - “the result of long calculations based on documents.”
This figure is 2.04 times higher than the figure given in the book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” and, apparently, it does not include non-combat losses, but also those who died from wounds. With a similar monthly accounting of irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht, those who died from wounds are included.
Most likely, the calculation of irretrievable losses for 1942 was made at the beginning of 1943. D. A. Volkogonov provides a breakdown of losses by month.
For comparison, we have the monthly dynamics of the Red Army's losses in battles for the period from July 1941 to April 1945 inclusive. The corresponding schedule is reproduced in the book of the former head of the Main Military Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army, E. I. Smirnov, “War and Military Medicine.
Monthly data for 1942 on losses of the Soviet Armed Forces are given in the table:
Table. Red Army losses in 1942
It should be noted here that the “battle-injured” indicator includes the wounded, shell-shocked, burned and frostbitten. And the “wounded” indicator, most often used in statistics, usually includes only the wounded and shell-shocked. The share of wounded and shell-shocked among those killed in battles for the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War was 96.9 percent. Therefore, without a large error, it is possible to relate the indicators for the wounded to all those injured in battles and vice versa.
Even before the publication of these data, D. A. Volkogonov tried to estimate Soviet losses in the Great Patriotic War, and then he most likely already had the above data on the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1942. According to Volkogonov, “the number of dead military personnel, partisans, underground fighters, and civilians during the Great Patriotic War apparently fluctuates between 26–27 million people, of which more than 10 million fell on the battlefield and died in captivity. The fate of those who were part of the first strategic echelon (and the bulk of the strategic reserves), who bore the main hardships of the war in 1941, is especially tragic. The main, primarily personnel, part of the personnel of formations and associations of this echelon laid down their heads, and about 3 million military personnel were captured. Our losses were slightly lower in 1942.”
Probably, Volkogonov also had before him data on the number of Soviet prisoners by year, published by the American historian Alexander Dallin (more on them below). There, the number of prisoners in 1941 is determined to be 3,355 thousand people. Probably Volkogonov rounded this figure to 3 million. In 1942, the number of prisoners, according to A. Dallin, who used OKW materials, amounted to 1,653 thousand people. It is likely that Volkogonov subtracted this value from his data on irretrievable losses in 1942, obtaining the number of killed and dead at 4,235 thousand. It is possible that he considered that in 1941 the average monthly level of casualties was approximately the same as in 1942 , and then the losses of 1941 in killed were estimated at approximately half of the losses of 1942, i.e., 2.1 million people. It is possible that Volkogonov decided that starting in 1943, the Red Army began to fight better, the average monthly casualty losses were halved compared to the 1942 level. Then, in 1943 and 1944, he could estimate the annual losses at 2.1 million people killed and died, and in 1945 - at approximately 700 thousand people. Then Volkogonov could estimate the total losses of the Red Army in killed and dead, without those who died in captivity, at 11.2 million people, and A. Dallin estimated the number of dead prisoners at 3.3 million people. Then Volkogonov could estimate the total losses of the Red Army in killed and dead at 14.5 million people, which was more than 10 million, but less than 15 million. The researcher was probably not sure of the accuracy of this figure, so he wrote carefully: “more 10 million." (but not more than 15 million, and when they write “more than 10 million,” it is implied that this value is still less than 15 million).
Comparison of the table data allows us to conclude that D. A. Volkogonov’s data significantly underestimates the true size of irrecoverable losses. Thus, in May 1942, the irretrievable losses of Soviet troops allegedly amounted to only 422 thousand and even decreased by 13 thousand people compared to April. Meanwhile, it was in May that German troops captured about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers on the Kerch Peninsula and about 240 thousand in the Kharkov region. In April, Soviet losses in prisoners were insignificant (the largest number, about 5 thousand people, were taken during the liquidation of the group of General M. G. Efremov in the Vyazma region). It turns out that in May the losses in those killed and those who died from wounds, illnesses and accidents did not exceed 32 thousand people, and in April they reached almost 430 thousand, and this despite the fact that the number of casualties in battles from April to May fell by only three points, or less than 4 percent. It is clear that the whole point is a colossal underestimation of irretrievable losses during the general retreat of Soviet troops from May to September inclusive. After all, it was then that the vast majority of the 1,653 thousand Soviet prisoners of 1942 were captured by the Germans. According to D. A. Volkogonov, during this time irrecoverable losses reached 2,129 thousand compared to 2,211 thousand in the four previous months, when the losses of prisoners were insignificant. It is no coincidence that in October the irretrievable losses of the Red Army suddenly increased by 346 thousand compared to September, with a sharp drop in the rate of casualties in battles by as much as 29 points and the absence of any large encirclements of Soviet troops at that time. It is likely that the October losses partially included the underaccounted losses of the previous months.
The most reliable data seems to us about irretrievable losses for November, when the Red Army suffered almost no losses in prisoners, and the front line was stable until the 19th, when Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Therefore, we can assume that the losses in killed were taken into account more fully this month than in the previous and subsequent months, when the rapid movement of the front and headquarters made it difficult to account for, and that irretrievable losses in November accounted almost exclusively for the killed, since the Soviet troops suffered almost no losses in prisoners. Then, for 413 thousand killed and died, there will be an indicator of 83 percent of those killed in battles, i.e., 1 percent on average month date Those affected in the battles accounted for approximately 5 thousand killed and died from wounds. If we take January, February, March or April as the basic indicators, then the ratio there, after excluding the approximate number of prisoners, will be even greater - from 5.1 to 5.5 thousand dead per 1 percent of the average monthly number of those killed in battles. The December indicators clearly suffer from a large underestimation of irretrievable losses due to the rapid movement of the front line.
The ratio established for November 1942 between the number of those killed in battles and the number of those killed seems to us close to the average for the war as a whole. Then the irretrievable losses of the Red Army (without prisoners, those who died from wounds and non-combat losses) in the war with Germany can be estimated by multiplying 5 thousand people by 4,656 (4,600 is the amount (in percent) of losses suffered in battles for the period since July 1941 to April 1945, 17 – casualties in battles for June 1941, 39 – casualties in battles for May 1945, which we took as one third of the losses in July 1941 and April 1945, respectively). As a result, we arrive at a figure of 23.28 million dead. From this number should be subtracted 939,700 military personnel who were listed as missing in action, but after the liberation of the corresponding territories, they were again drafted into the army. Most of them were not captured, some escaped from captivity. Thus, the total death toll will be reduced to 22.34 million people. According to the latest estimate by the authors of the book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” the non-combat losses of the Red Army amounted to 555.5 thousand people, including at least 157 thousand people who were shot by the verdicts of the tribunals. Then the total irretrievable losses of the Soviet armed forces (without those who died in captivity) can be estimated at 22.9 million people, and together with those who died in captivity - at 26.9 million people.
I. I. Ivlev, using the loss records of privates and officers of the Ministry of Defense, believes that the losses of the Soviet armed forces in killed and killed could not have been less than 15.5 million people, but they could have been 16.5 million or even 20 –21 million people. The last figure is obtained as follows. The total number of notifications from military registration and enlistment offices about the dead and missing to families in the Arkhangelsk region exceeds 150 thousand. According to Ivlev, approximately 25 percent of these notifications did not reach the military registration and enlistment offices. At the same time, in the military registration and enlistment offices Russian Federation there are 12,400,900 notifications, including 61,400 for dead and missing in the border troops and 97,700 in the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR. Thus, 12,241,800 notifications came from the NPO and NK Navy units. Of this number, according to Ivlev, about 200 thousand are repetitions, survivors, as well as persons who served in civilian departments. Subtracting them will result in at least 12,041,800 unique notifications. If the proportion of notices that did not reach the military registration and enlistment offices for the whole of Russia is approximately the same as was determined for the Arkhangelsk region, then the total number of unique notices within the Russian Federation can be estimated at no less than 15,042 thousand. To estimate the number of unique notices that should located in the remaining former Soviet republics, Ivlev suggests that the share of dead Russian residents among all irretrievable losses of the Red Army and Navy is approximately equal to the share of Russians in irretrievable losses given in the books of G. F. Krivosheev’s group - 72 percent. Then the remaining republics account for approximately 5,854 thousand notifications, and their total number within the USSR can be estimated at 20,905,900 people. Taking into account the losses of the border and internal troops of the NKVD, the total number of unique notifications, according to Ivlev, exceeds 21 million people.
However, it seems to us incorrect to estimate the share of notices located outside the Russian Federation based on an estimate of the share of the non-Russian population among irretrievable losses. Firstly, not only Russians live and have lived in Russia. Secondly, Russians lived not only in the RSFSR, but also in all other union republics. Thirdly, Krivosheev estimates the share of Russians in the number of dead and deceased military personnel not at 72 percent, but at 66.4 percent, and it was not taken from a document on irretrievable losses, but was calculated based on data on the national composition in payroll Red Army in 1943–1945. If we add here an assessment of the losses of the peoples who lived mainly in the RSFSR within today's borders - Tatars, Mordvins, Chuvash, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Mari, Buryats, Komi, peoples of Dagestan, Ossetians, Kabardians, Karelians, Finns, Balkars, Chechens, Ingush and Kalmyks - then the share of losses of the Russian Federation will increase by another 5.274 percent. It is possible that Ivlev added here half the losses of the Jews - 0.822 percent, then the losses of the peoples of the RSFSR will increase to 72.5 percent. Probably, by rounding this number, Ivlev received 72 percent. Therefore, in our opinion, to estimate the number of unique notices outside the Russian Federation, it is more correct to use data on the share of the population of the RSFSR in the population of the USSR as of January 1, 1941. It was 56.2 percent, and minus the population of Crimea, transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and with the addition of the population of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, included in the RSFSR in 1956, it was 55.8 percent. Then the total number of unique notifications can be estimated at 26.96 million, and taking into account notifications from the border and internal troops - at 27.24 million, and excluding those who remained in exile - 26.99 million people.
This figure practically coincides with our estimate of the losses of the Soviet armed forces in killed and killed at 26.9 million people.
As Russian historian Nikita P. Sokolov notes, “according to the testimony of Colonel Fedor Setin, who worked in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense in the mid-1960s, the first group estimated the irretrievable losses of the Red Army at 30 million people, but these figures “were not accepted at the top.” N.P. Sokolov also notes that G.F. Krivosheev and his comrades do not take into account “the mobilization carried out directly by units of the active army on the territory of the regions occupied by the Germans after their liberation, the so-called unorganized marching replenishment. Krivosheev indirectly admits this when he writes that “during the war years, the following were taken from the population: in Russia... 22.2 percent of able-bodied citizens..., in Belarus - 11.7 percent, in Ukraine - 12.2 percent.” Of course, in Belarus and Ukraine no less “able-bodied population” was conscripted than in Russia as a whole, only here a smaller part was conscripted through military registration and enlistment offices, and a larger part was conscripted directly to the unit.”
The fact that the volume of Soviet irretrievable losses was enormous is evidenced by those few surviving veterans who personally had the opportunity to go into attacks. Thus, Guard Captain A.I. Shumilin, the former commander of a rifle company, recalled: “More than one hundred thousand soldiers and thousands of junior officers passed through the division. Of these thousands, only a few survived.” And he recalls one of the battles of his 119th Infantry Division on the Kalinin Front during the counteroffensive near Moscow: “On the night of December 11, 1941, we went out near Maryino and lay down at the starting point in front of the village in the snow. We were told that after two shots from the forty-five, we should get up and go to the village. It's already dawn. No shots were fired. I asked on the phone what was going on and was told to wait. The German rolled out anti-aircraft batteries for direct fire and began shooting soldiers lying in the snow. Everyone who ran was torn to pieces at the same moment. The snowy field was covered with bloody corpses, pieces of meat, blood and splashes of intestines. Of the 800 people, only two managed to get out by evening. I wonder if there is a list of personnel for December 11, 41? After all, no one from the headquarters saw this massacre. With the first anti-aircraft shot, all these participants fled in all directions. They didn’t even know that they were firing at the soldiers from anti-aircraft guns.”
The Red Army's losses of 26.9 million dead are approximately 10.3 times higher than the Wehrmacht's losses on the Eastern Front (2.6 million dead). The Hungarian army, which fought on the side of Hitler, lost about 160 thousand killed and died, including about 55 thousand who died in captivity. The losses of another German ally, Finland, in the fight against the USSR amounted to about 56.6 thousand killed and died, and about 1 thousand more people died in battles against the Wehrmacht. The Romanian army lost about 165 thousand killed and died in battles against the Red Army, including 71,585 killed, 309,533 missing, 243,622 wounded and 54,612 died in captivity. 217,385 Romanians and Moldovans returned from captivity. Thus, of the missing people, 37,536 people must be classified as killed. If we assume that approximately 10 percent of the wounded died, then the total losses of the Romanian army in battles with the Red Army will be about 188.1 thousand dead. In the battles against Germany and its allies, the Romanian army lost 21,735 killed, 58,443 missing and 90,344 wounded. Assuming that the mortality rate among the wounded was 10 percent, the number of deaths from wounds can be estimated at 9 thousand people. 36,621 Romanian soldiers and officers returned from German and Hungarian captivity. Therefore, the total number of killed and died in captivity among the missing Romanian military personnel can be estimated at 21,824 people. Thus, in the fight against Germany and Hungary, the Romanian army lost about 52.6 thousand dead. The Italian army lost about 72 thousand people in battles against the Red Army, of which about 28 thousand died in Soviet captivity - more than half of the approximately 49 thousand prisoners. Finally, the Slovak army lost 1.9 thousand dead in battles against the Red Army and Soviet partisans, of which about 300 people died in captivity. On the side of the USSR, the Bulgarian army fought against Germany, losing about 10 thousand dead. The two armies of the Polish Army, formed in the USSR, lost 27.5 thousand dead and missing, and the Czechoslovak corps, which also fought on the side of the Red Army, lost 4 thousand dead. The total loss of life on the Soviet side, taking into account the losses of the allies fighting on the Soviet-German front, can be estimated at 27.1 million military personnel, and on the German side - at 2.9 million people, which gives a ratio of 9.3:1.
Here is the dynamics of Soviet losses of prisoners on the Eastern Front in 1942:
January – 29,126;
February – 24,773;
March – 41,972;
April – 54,082;
May - 409,295 (including Army Group South - 392,384, Army Group Center - 10,462, Army Group North - 6,449);
June - 103,228, including Army Group South - 55,568, Army Group Center - 16,074, Army Group North - 31,586);
July - 467,191 (including Army Group A - 271,828, Army Group B -128,267, Army Group Center - 62,679, Army Group North - 4,417);
August - 220,225 (including Army Group A - 77,141, Army Group B -103,792, Army Group Center - 34,202, Army Group North - 5,090);
September - 54,625 (including Army Group "A" - 29,756, Army Group "Center" - 10,438, Army Group "North" - 14,431, Army Group "B" did not provide data);
October - 40,948 (including Army Group "A" - 29,166, Army Group "Center" - 4,963, Army Group "North" - 6,819, Army Group "B" did not provide data);
November - 22,241 - the minimum monthly number of prisoners in 1942 (including Army Group "A" - 14,902, Army Group "Center" - 5,986, Army Group "North" -1,353; Army Group "B" no data submitted);
December - 29,549 (including Army Group "A" - 13,951, Army Group "B" - 1,676, Army Group "Center" - 12,556, Army Group "North" - 1,366, Army Group "Don" data did not submit).
It is easy to see that a significant decrease in the number of prisoners occurs already in August - by 2.1 times. In September, the loss of prisoners decreased even more sharply - four times. True, the prisoners taken by Army Group B are not taken into account here, but given the absence of significant encirclements and the fierce nature of the fighting in Stalingrad, it is unlikely to be significant and in any case did not exceed the number of prisoners captured by Army Group B. By the way, the fact that no casualties were reported from Army Group B may reflect the ferocity of the fighting in Stalingrad, where almost no prisoners were taken.
To complete the picture, we note that in January 1943, the last month of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Germans captured only 10,839 prisoners (8,687 for Army Group Center, 2,324 for Army Group North). There is no data on prisoners taken by army groups “A”, “B” and “Don”, but if there were any, they were in negligible numbers, since all three army groups were just retreating in January.
The losses of German ground forces in 1942 varied month by month as follows.
January - 18,074 killed, 61,933 wounded, 7,075 missing;
February - 18,776 killed, 64,520 wounded, 4,355 missing;
March – 21,808 killed, 75,169 wounded, 5,217 missing;
April - 12,680 killed, 44,752 wounded, 2,573 missing;
May - 14,530 killed, 61,623 wounded, 3,521 missing;
June - 14,644 killed, 66,967 wounded, 3,059 missing;
July - 17,782 killed, 75,239 wounded, 3,290 missing;
August - 35,349 killed, 121,138 wounded, 7,843 missing;
September - 25,772 killed, 101,246 wounded, 5,031 missing;
October - 14,084 killed, 53,591 wounded, 1,887 missing;
November – 9,968 killed, 35,967 wounded, 1,993 missing;
December - 18,233 killed, 61,605 wounded, 4,837 missing.
Monthly and very incomplete data on the losses of the German allies, both in the ground forces and in the air force, on the Eastern Front in 1942 are available only for November and December.
For the period from June 22, 1941 to October 31, 1942, the total losses of the German allies were:
19,650 killed, 76,972 wounded, 9,099 missing.
The Italians suffered 4,539 killed, 18,313 wounded and 2,867 missing.
The Hungarians suffered 5,523 killed, 23,860 wounded and 2,889 missing.
The Romanians suffered 8,974 killed, 33,012 wounded and 3,242 missing.
The Slovaks suffered 663 killed, 2,039 wounded and 103 missing.
Here it is necessary to make a reservation that the Romanian losses here are greatly understated, since in 1941 a significant part of the Romanian troops acted not as part of the German armies, but independently. In particular, the Romanian 4th Army independently besieged Odessa, and during the siege from August 8 to October 16, 1941, its losses amounted to 17,729 killed, 63,345 wounded and 11,471 missing. The German allies suffered the bulk of their losses as part of the German army in 1942.
In November 1942, Germany's allies suffered 1,563 killed, 5,084 wounded and 249 missing.
The Italians suffered 83 killed, 481 wounded and 10 missing in November.
The Hungarians lost 269 killed, 643 wounded and 58 missing in November.
The Romanians lost 1,162 killed, 3,708 wounded and 179 missing in November.
The Slovaks lost 49 killed, 252 wounded and two missing.
In December 1942, Germany's allies suffered 1,427 killed, 5,876 wounded and 731 missing.
The Italians suffered 164 killed, 727 wounded and 244 missing in December.
The Hungarians lost 375 killed and 69 missing.
The Romanians lost 867 killed, 3,805 wounded and 408 missing.
The Slovaks lost 21 killed, 34 wounded and 10 missing.
In January 1943, the German Allies suffered 474 killed, 2,465 wounded and 366 missing.
The Italians suffered 59 killed, 361 wounded and 11 missing.
The Hungarians lost 114 killed, 955 wounded and 70 missing.
The Romanians lost 267 killed, 1,062 wounded and 269 missing.
The Slovaks lost 34 killed, 87 wounded and 16 missing.
The losses of the German allies in November and December 1942 and in January 1943, during the Soviet counteroffensive, are significantly undercounted, primarily due to prisoners and missing killed. And in February, only the Romanians continued to participate in hostilities, losing 392 killed, 1,048 wounded and 188 missing.
The monthly ratio of Soviet and German irretrievable losses on the Eastern Front in 1942 changed as follows, remaining all the time in favor of the Wehrmacht:
January – 25.1:1;
February – 22.7:1;
March – 23.1:1;
April – 29.0:1;
May – 23.4:1;
June – 28.8:1;
July – 15.7:1;
August – 9.0:1;
September – 15.3:1;
October – 51.2:1;
November – 34.4:1;
December – 13.8:1.
The picture is distorted by a significant underestimation of Soviet losses in May–September, as well as in December, and, conversely, by a significant exaggeration of them in October due to the underestimation of previous months (in October, during the period of stabilization of the front, many of those who were not taken into account during the May encirclement and summer retreat. In addition, from August until the end of the year, the German allies suffered significant losses. According to Soviet data, in the period from January 1 to November 18, 1942, 10,635 Germans and their allies were captured by the Soviets , and in the period from November 19, 1942 to February 3, 1943 - 151,246. At the same time, the Stalingrad Front captured 19,979 prisoners before March 1, 1943, and the Don Front captured 72,553 prisoners. All these prisoners were captured before February 3 1943, since before this date these fronts were disbanded. Almost all the prisoners were from the encircled Stalingrad group and the overwhelming majority were Germans. In addition, among them there were prisoners from two Romanian divisions and one Croatian regiment, surrounded in Stalingrad. In total, the two fronts took 92,532 prisoners, which is very close to the traditional figure of 91 thousand German prisoners in Stalingrad, as well as 91,545 - the number of prisoners registered by the NKVD in the Stalingrad area. It is interesting that by April 15, this number increased by 545 people due to the NKVD in assembly points. Of this number, 55,218 people had died by that time, including 13,149 in field hospitals of the 6th German Army, 5,849 on the way to assembly points, 24,346 at NKVD assembly points and 11,884 in Soviet hospitals. In addition, six prisoners managed to escape. By the end of May 1943, 56,810 prisoners out of 91,545 had already died. In addition, before May 1, 1943, another 14,502 Stalingrad prisoners died during transportation to rear camps and shortly after arrival there.
It is likely that the remaining 48,714 prisoners captured by the Red Army from November 19, 1942 to February 3, 1943 were mainly from among the German allies. We will distribute these prisoners equally between November, December and January. And we will estimate the Soviet losses in killed for May - October and December by multiplying the monthly indicators of the number of wounded as a percentage of the monthly average for the war by a coefficient of 5 thousand killed.
Then the adjusted deadweight loss ratio will look like this:
January – 25.1:1 (or 23.6:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);
February – 22.7:1 (or 22.4:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);
March – 23.1:1 (or 23.8:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);
April – 29.0:1 (or 30.6:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);
May – 44.4:1;
June – 22.7:1;
July – 42.0:1;
August – 20.2:1;
September – 19.4:1;
October – 27.6:1;
November - 13.8:1 (or 14.6:1 based on the monthly number of wounded and taking into account allied losses);
December – 15.7:1.
Thus, the turning point in the ratio of irrecoverable losses begins in August. This month this ratio becomes the smallest in favor of the Germans in the first eight months of 1942 and decreases by 2.1 times compared to the previous month. And this despite the fact that in August, Soviet losses in killed and wounded reached their maximum in 1942. So sharp drop This indicator also occurs in June, but then this is a consequence of a sharp decrease in the number of prisoners after the catastrophic May battles for the Soviet troops in the Crimea and near Kharkov. But then this figure in July almost returned to May due to a significant number of prisoners taken at the front of Operation Blau and in Sevastopol. But after the August fall, the ratio of irretrievable losses was never again as favorable for the Germans as in May and July 1942. Even in July and August 1943, when Soviet losses in killed and wounded, thanks Battle of Kursk, reached their maximum during the war, the loss ratio was 20.0:1 and 16.6:1, respectively.
In January 1943, German troops in the East suffered 17,470 killed, 58,043 wounded and 6,599 missing. Of this number, the 6th Army accounted for 907 killed, 2,254 wounded and 305 missing. However, over the last ten days of January, there were no reports of losses from the headquarters of the 6th Army. According to the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, on November 1, 1942, the number of units and formations of the 6th Army caught in the “cauldron” was 242,583 people. Most likely, this figure includes two Romanian divisions and a Croatian regiment encircled in Stalingrad, since it certainly includes the encircled Soviet He-Vs from the 6th Army. Sixth Army losses between 1 and 22 November were 1,329 killed, 4,392 wounded and 333 missing. From November 23, 1942 to January 20, 1943, 27 thousand people were evacuated. There were 209,529 people left in the “cauldron”. Of this number, in the period from November 23, 1942 to January 12, 1943, according to ten-day reports, 6,870 people were killed, 21,011 were wounded, and 3,143 people were missing. The 178,505 people remaining in the “cauldron” were listed as missing. Obviously, this number includes both killed and captured. Strictly speaking, some of them were killed or captured on February 1 and 2. But we conditionally attribute all these losses to January 1943. Then, taking into account approximately another 6 thousand losses of prisoners of the German allies outside Stalingrad, the total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht and its allies on the Eastern Front will amount to about 210 thousand killed and captured.
The ratio of irretrievable losses in January 1943 can be estimated at 3.1:1 in favor of the Wehrmacht, which is many times less than in any month of 1942. The Germans did not have such an unfavorable ratio of losses on the Eastern Front until July 1944, when, after the Allied landings in Normandy, they suffered disasters in Belarus and then in Romania.
Hitler, of course, did not have an accurate idea of Soviet losses. However, in August he probably became alarmed - German losses almost doubled, and the number of Soviet prisoners decreased fourfold. In September, the situation did not improve, and the Fuhrer removed the commander of Army Group A, Field Marshal List (September 10) and the Chief of the General Staff, General Halder (September 24), from their posts. But a turning point in favor of the USSR has already occurred. The push to the Caucasus and Stalingrad essentially failed. The right decision there would be not just a transition to the defensive, as Hitler ordered in September, but also, at a minimum, a withdrawal of German troops from the Volga to the Don line. However, Hitler, believing that the Red Army did not have enough strength for a large-scale counteroffensive, decided to completely capture Stalingrad as a kind of “consolation prize” to increase the prestige of Germany and ordered the continuation of offensive operations in the city itself.
According to the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, the strength of the 6th Army by October 15, 1942 was 339,009 people, including 9,207 officers and 2,247 military officials. Of this number, by the time of the encirclement, 7,384 people were killed, including 209 officers and 10 officials, and 3,177 people were missing, including 33 officers and four officials. In addition, 145,708 people were outside the encirclement, including 3,276 officers and 1,157 officials. Thus, there were 182,740 German military personnel in the “cauldron,” including 5,689 officers and 1,076 officials. Of this number, 15,911 named wounded and sick military personnel were evacuated, including 832 officers and 33 officials, and another 434 healthy military personnel, including 94 officers and 15 officials, were evacuated from the “cauldron” as specialists. According to this estimate, 11,036 German military personnel, including 465 officers and 20 officials, were reliably killed in the “cauldron,” and another 147,594, including 4,251 officers and 1,000 officials, were missing. The fate of 7,765 people, including 47 officers and eight officials, remained unclear. Most likely, most of them were evacuated from the “cauldron” as wounded, sick and specialists, but did not report this to the commission to determine the fate of the 6th Army soldiers. Then the total number of evacuated German military personnel can be estimated at 24 thousand people. About 3 thousand more evacuees could be Romanians, Croats and wounded Soviet Hi-Vis. The difference between the number of eaters remaining in the “cauldron” - 236,529 people and the number of German military personnel remaining there - 182,740 people is 53,789 people, obviously formed at the expense of the Romanians, Croats and “Hi-Wee”, as well as Luftwaffe officials. There were no more than 300 Croats within the ring. Romanian divisions could number 10–20 thousand people, and “hi-vi”, respectively, 15–20 thousand people. The Luftwaffe ranks could number 14 thousand people from the 9th Air Defense Division and airfield service units, many of them, if not most, could have been evacuated and were not included in the given figure of 16,335 evacuated military personnel, since it refers only to ground forces. According to indications former first quartermaster of the 6th Army headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Werner von Kunowski, the 9th Air Defense Division numbered about 7 thousand people, and the airfield service units also numbered about 7 thousand people. He also determined the number of “hi-vi” that ended up in the “cauldron” at 20 thousand people. In addition to the 91,545 German, Romanian and Croatian prisoners, several thousand Hee-Vis were probably captured. If the proportion of prisoners among the Hee-Wee was approximately the same as among the Germans, Romanians and Croats, then 15–20 thousand Hee-Wee could have been captured. According to German historians, only 5–6 thousand Germans captured in Stalingrad returned to their homeland. Taking this into account, up to 1 thousand Romanians, several dozen Croats and 1–1.5 thousand Hi-Vis could return from captivity.
According to other sources, 24,910 wounded and sick were taken out of the “cauldron,” as well as 5,150 various specialists, couriers, etc. There is also information that a total of 42 thousand people left the “cauldron”. It is possible that the difference of 12 thousand people is accounted for by military personnel and civilian personnel of the Luftwaffe. But it is more likely that the number of Luftwaffe evacuees was between 30,060 and 24,100 if we include all those whose fate is unclear as evacuees. Then the number of evacuated Luftwaffe officials can be estimated at 6 thousand people. Then the irretrievable losses of German Luftwaffe soldiers as part of the encircled group can be estimated at 8 thousand people. Let us note that there have always been many Hi-Vis serving in the air defense forces.
According to official data, Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction in the period from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943 lost 1,347,214 people, of which 674,990 were irrevocable. This does not include the troops of the NKVD and the people's militia, whose irretrievable losses were especially great. During the 200 days and nights of the Battle of Stalingrad, 1,027 battalion commanders, 207 regiment commanders, 96 brigade commanders, 18 division commanders died. The irretrievable losses of weapons and equipment amounted to: 524,800 small arms, 15,052 guns and mortars, 4,341 tanks and 5,654 combat aircraft.
The number of small arms lost suggests that the records are incomplete. It turns out that the small arms of almost all the wounded were safely taken from the battlefield, which is unlikely. Most likely, the irretrievable losses in people were greater than indicated in the reports, and the weapons of the unaccounted for dead and missing were not indicated as lost.
The former director of the Tsaritsyn-Stalingrad Defense Museum, Andrei Mikhailovich Borodin, recalled: “The first and last attempt to establish the scale of our losses in the Battle of Stalingrad was made in the early 1960s. Evgeniy Vuchetich wanted the names of all the soldiers and officers who died in the Battle of Stalingrad to be engraved on Mamayev Kurgan. He thought that this was, in principle, possible, and asked me to make a complete list. I willingly undertook to help, and the regional committee relieved me of all other work. He rushed to the Podolsk archive, to the Loss Bureau of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. The Major General who then headed this Bureau said that the Secretary of the Central Committee Kozlov had already set such a task for them.
After a year of work, he called the general and asked about the results. When I learned that they had already counted 2 million dead, and there was still many months of work left, he said: “Enough!” And the work stopped.
Then I asked this general: “So how much did we lose at Stalingrad, at least approximately?” - “I won’t tell you.”
It is likely that the figure of more than 2 million Soviet servicemen killed and missing during the Battle of Stalingrad, between July 17, 1942 and February 2, 1943, is closer to the truth than the official figures, which we have found to be generally underestimated irrecoverable losses approximately tripled.
There are no reliable data on the number of civilians killed in Stalingrad as a result of bombing, shelling and starvation, but it most likely exceeded 100 thousand people.
The irretrievable losses of the 6th Army, mainly prisoners, in the period from October 15, 1942 to February 2, 1943, including Luftwaffe losses, amounted to about 177 thousand people. In addition, there were at least 16 thousand wounded Germans who found themselves outside the “cauldron”.
Sixth Army losses between 11 July and 10 October were 14,371 killed, 2,450 missing and 50,453 wounded.
The losses of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht in the period from July 11, 1942 to February 10, 1943 amounted to 6,350 killed, 860 missing and 23,653 wounded.
It is also known that during the operation of the “air bridge” the Luftwaffe lost about 1000 people, mostly irrevocably. It can be assumed that outside the "cauldron" and the airfields serving Stalingrad, Luftwaffe losses could have been twice as high, especially among the ground battle groups defending the Chir Front. Then the total losses of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Stalingrad, but excluding those who were in Paulus’s army, can be estimated at no less than 3 thousand people, including at least 2 thousand irrevocably. In addition, the losses of the 15th Air Field Division could amount to up to 2 thousand killed, wounded and missing.
The total irrevocable losses of the Germans during the Stalingrad campaign can be estimated at 297 thousand people, of which about 204 thousand were irreversible.
Between July 1 and October 31, 1942, the Romanian army lost 39,089 people, including 9,252 killed and 1,588 missing. These losses occurred both during the offensive towards Stalingrad and during the battles in the Caucasus. Between November 1 and December 31, 1942, the Romanians suffered 109,342 casualties, including 7,236 killed and 70,355 missing. These losses occurred entirely during the Battle of Stalingrad. Finally, between January 1 and October 31, 1943, Romanian casualties stood at 39,848, including 5,840 killed and 13,636 missing. These losses were suffered in the final phase of the Battle of Stalingrad and in the struggle for the Kuban bridgehead. It is likely that those missing in action during this period were mainly Romanian soldiers killed and captured in Stalingrad. The total losses of the Romanian army during the Battle of Stalingrad from July 1942 to early February 1943 are estimated by Romanian historians at 140 thousand killed, wounded and missing, of which 110 thousand - in the period starting from November 19, 1942. Of this number, about 100 thousand people died or went missing. The Romanians lost half of their soldiers and officers fighting at the front in the Battle of Stalingrad, while the Germans lost only 10 percent. The Romanian army never recovered from this blow.
The total losses of the Axis countries in the Battle of Stalingrad can be estimated at 437 thousand people, including 304 thousand irrevocably. If we accept that Soviet losses in the Battle of Stalingrad amounted to about 2 million killed and missing and at least 672 thousand wounded, then the ratio of total losses will be 6.1: 1, and irretrievable losses - 6.6: 1, in all cases - in favor of the Germans. However, this ratio was much less favorable for the German side than the ratio of losses for 1942 as a whole. In the fight directly with the group surrounded in Stalingrad, Soviet losses were significantly less than the German-Romanian ones, but the exact number of Red Army losses in this fight is unknown.
Of the Soviet troops that participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, it is possible to more or less accurately calculate the losses of the 2nd Guards Army, the Guards Army formed in Tambov on the basis of the 1st Reserve Army. By November 2, it had the following composition: 1st Guards Rifle Corps, 13th Guards Rifle Corps, 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps.
By December 1, the 17th Guards Corps Artillery Regiment, the 54th Guards Separate Anti-Tank Fighter Artillery Division, the 408th Separate Guards Mortar Division and the 355th Separate Engineer Battalion were added.
By January 1, 1943, the 4th Cavalry Corps, 300th Infantry Division, 648th Army Artillery Regiment, 506th Cannon Artillery Regiment, 1095th Cannon Artillery Regiment, 1100th Cannon Artillery Regiment, 1101st Cannon Artillery Regiment joined the army. Regiment, 435th fighter-fraud-tank artillery regiment, 535th fighter-fraud-tank artillery regiment, 1250th fighter-fraud artillery regiment, 23rd Guards Mortar Regiment, 48th Guards Minometing Regiment, 88th Guards Mortar Regiment, 90-90 1st Guards Mortar Regiment (without the 373rd Division), 15th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, 3rd Guards Tank Corps, 6th Mechanized Corps (became the 5th Guards Corps by February 1), 52nd Separate Tank Regiment, 128 1st separate tank regiment, 223rd separate tank regiment and 742nd separate mine-sapper battalion.
By February 1, 1943, the 4th Cavalry Corps and the 90th Guards Mortar Regiment were withdrawn from the 2nd Guards. Instead, the 488th Mortar Regiment and the 4th Guards Mortar Regiment were added to the army, as well as the 136th Separate Tank Regiment and the 1st Pontoon-Bridge Brigade.
The 2nd Guards Army on December 20, 1942 consisted of 80,779 personnel, and on January 20, 1943 - only 39,110 people. Consequently, even without taking into account possible reinforcements, the army's losses amounted to at least 41,669 people. However, in fact, the losses of the 2nd Guards Army were much greater.
“A brief military-historical summary of the 2nd Guards Army on December 20, 1943” states that by November 25, the six rifle divisions of the 1st and 13th Guards Rifle Corps totaled 21,077 combat personnel. By December 3, when the order to load the army was received, “the number of combat personnel was 80,779 people. The transportation was carried out in 165 trains.” However, it is completely incomprehensible how the combat strength of the 2nd Guards Army almost quadrupled in a week. Indeed, during this time, the composition of the army increased by the 2nd Mechanized Corps, which numbered 13,559 people, as well as by the 17th Guards Corps Artillery Regiment, the 54th Guards Separate Anti-Tank Fighter Artillery Division, and the 408th Separate Guards Mortar Division and the 355th separate engineer battalion, which in total hardly numbered more than 3 thousand people. Most likely, in this case, 80,779 people are not combat, but the total strength of the army, especially since, as you can understand, exactly 80,779 people were transported by 165 echelons.
The leadership of the parties participating in the Battle of Stalingrad (counteroffensive stage, external front of encirclement) Stalingrad Front Commander Colonel General A. I. Eremenko Member of the Military Council N. S. Khrushchev Chief of Staff Major General I. S. Varennikov 8th
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From the book Soviet Airborne Forces: Military Historical Essay author Margelov Vasily FilippovichTHEY COMMANDED FRONTS AND ARMIES IN THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD BATOV Pavel IvanovichArmy General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the 65th Army. Born on June 1, 1897 in the village of Filisovo (Yaroslavl region). In the Red Army since 1918.
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From the book “Washed in Blood”? Lies and truths about losses in the Great Patriotic War author Zemskov Viktor Nikolaevich1. In the Battle of Stalingrad In the summer of 1942, the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front became extremely complicated. In April and early June, the Soviet Army carried out a number of operations in the Kharkov region, in the Crimea and in other areas to consolidate the successes of the past winter campaign,
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From the book Secrets of World War II author Sokolov Boris VadimovichThe role of the ideological factor in the Battle of Stalingrad The study of wars and military conflicts proves the importance of achieving superiority over the enemy not only in the material and technical equipment of the army and navy, but also in the moral and psychological awareness of the importance of defeat
From the book Battle of Borodino author Yulin Boris VitalievichCivilian losses and general losses of the German population in World War II It is very difficult to determine the losses of the German civilian population. For example, the death toll from the Allied bombing of Dresden in February 1945
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From the author's bookChapter 6. Losses of the parties According to official data, the losses of the Volkhov, Leningrad fronts and the Ladoga military flotilla were: Killed: 40,085 people; Wounded: 73,589 people; Total: 113,674 people. The headquarters of the Volkhov Front presented the following figures in their reporting documents
The Battle of Stalingrad is a battle of the Second World War, an important episode of the Great Patriotic War between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht with its allies. Occurred on the territory of modern Voronezh, Rostov, Volgograd regions and the Republic of Kalmykia of the Russian Federation from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943. The German offensive lasted from July 17 to November 18, 1942, its goal was to capture the Great Bend of the Don, the Volgodonsk Isthmus and Stalingrad (modern Volgograd). The implementation of this plan would block transport links between the central regions of the USSR and the Caucasus, creating a springboard for a further offensive to seize the Caucasian oil fields. During July-November, the Soviet army managed to force the Germans to get bogged down in defensive battles, during November-January they encircled a group of German troops as a result of Operation Uranus, repelled the unblocking German strike "Wintergewitter" and tightened the encirclement ring to the ruins of Stalingrad. Those surrounded capitulated on February 2, 1943, including 24 generals and Field Marshal Paulus.
This victory, after a series of defeats in 1941-1942, became a turning point in the war. In terms of the number of total irretrievable losses (killed, died from wounds in hospitals, missing) of the warring parties, the Battle of Stalingrad became one of the bloodiest in the history of mankind: Soviet soldiers - 478,741 (323,856 in the defensive phase of the battle and 154,885 in the offensive phase), German - about 300,000, German allies (Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Croats) - about 200,000 people, the number of dead citizens cannot be determined even approximately, but the count is no less than tens of thousands. The military significance of the victory was the removal of the threat of the Wehrmacht seizing the Lower Volga region and the Caucasus, especially oil from the Baku fields. The political significance was the sobering of Germany's allies and their understanding of the fact that the war could not be won. Turkey abandoned the invasion of the USSR in the spring of 1943, Japan did not begin the planned Siberian Campaign, Romania (Mihai I), Italy (Badoglio), Hungary (Kallai) began to look for opportunities to exit the war and conclude a separate peace with Great Britain and the USA.
Previous Events
On June 22, 1941, Germany and its allies invaded the Soviet Union, quickly moving inland. Having been defeated during the battles in the summer and autumn of 1941, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive during the Battle of Moscow in December 1941. German troops, exhausted by the stubborn resistance of the defenders of Moscow, not ready to wage a winter campaign, having an extensive and not completely controlled rear, were stopped on the approaches to the city and, during the counter-offensive of the Red Army, were thrown back 150-300 km to the west.
In the winter of 1941-1942, the Soviet-German front stabilized. Plans for a new offensive on Moscow were rejected by Adolf Hitler, despite the fact that German generals insisted on this option. However, Hitler believed that an attack on Moscow would be too predictable. For these reasons, the German command was considering plans for new operations in the north and south. An offensive to the south of the USSR would ensure control over the oil fields of the Caucasus (the area of Grozny and Baku), as well as over the Volga River, the main artery connecting the European part of the country with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. A German victory in the south of the Soviet Union could seriously undermine Soviet industry.
The Soviet leadership, encouraged by the successes near Moscow, tried to seize the strategic initiative and in May 1942 sent large forces to attack the Kharkov region. The offensive began from the Barvenkovsky ledge south of the city, which was formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Southwestern Front. A feature of this offensive was the use of a new Soviet mobile formation - a tank corps, which in terms of the number of tanks and artillery was approximately equivalent to a German tank division, but was significantly inferior to it in terms of the number of motorized infantry. Meanwhile, the Axis forces were planning an operation to encircle the Barvenkovo salient.
The Red Army's offensive was so unexpected for the Wehrmacht that it almost ended in disaster for Army Group South. However, they decided not to change their plans and, thanks to the concentration of troops on the flanks of the ledge, broke through the defenses of the enemy troops. Most of the Southwestern Front was surrounded. In the subsequent three-week battles, better known as the “second battle of Kharkov,” the advancing units of the Red Army suffered a heavy defeat. According to German data, more than 240 thousand people were captured alone; according to Soviet archival data, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amounted to 170,958 people; a large number of heavy weapons. After the defeat near Kharkov, the front south of Voronezh was practically open. As a result, the way to Rostov-on-Don and the lands of the Caucasus was opened for German troops. The city itself was held by the Red Army in November 1941 with heavy losses, but now it was lost.
After the Red Army's Kharkov disaster in May 1942, Hitler intervened in strategic planning by ordering Army Group South to split into two. Army Group A was to continue the offensive into the North Caucasus. Army Group B, including the 6th Army of Friedrich Paulus and the 4th Panzer Army of G. Hoth, was supposed to move east towards the Volga and Stalingrad.
The capture of Stalingrad was very important for Hitler for several reasons. One of the main ones was that Stalingrad was a large industrial city on the banks of the Volga, along which and along which strategically important routes ran, connecting the Center of Russia with the southern regions of the USSR, including the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Thus, the capture of Stalingrad would allow Germany to cut off water and land communications vital for the USSR, reliably cover the left flank of the forces advancing in the Caucasus and create serious problems with supplies for the Red Army units opposing them. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin - Hitler's main enemy - made the capture of the city a victory in terms of ideology and the inspiration of the soldiers, as well as the population of the Reich.
All major Wehrmacht operations were usually given a color code: Fall Rot (red version) - the operation to capture France, Fall Gelb (yellow version) - the operation to capture Belgium and the Netherlands, Fall Grün (green version) - Czechoslovakia, etc. Summer offensive The Wehrmacht in the USSR was given the code name “Fall Blau” - the blue version.
Operation Blue Option began with the offensive of Army Group South against the troops of the Bryansk Front to the north and the troops of the Southwestern Front to the south of Voronezh. The 6th and 17th armies of the Wehrmacht, as well as the 1st and 4th tank armies, took part in it.
It is worth noting that despite a two-month break in active hostilities, for the troops of the Bryansk Front the result was no less catastrophic than for the troops of the Southwestern Front, battered by the May battles. On the very first day of the operation, both Soviet fronts were broken through tens of kilometers in depth, and the enemy rushed to the Don. The Red Army in the vast desert steppes could oppose only small forces, and then a chaotic withdrawal of forces to the east began. Attempts to re-form the defense also ended in complete failure when German units entered the Soviet defensive positions from the flank. In mid-July, several divisions of the Red Army fell into a pocket in the south of the Voronezh region, near the city of Millerovo in the north of the Rostov region.
One of the important factors that thwarted the German plans was the failure of the offensive operation on Voronezh. Having easily captured the right bank part of the city, the Wehrmacht was unable to build on its success, and the front line aligned with the Voronezh River. The left bank remained with the Soviet troops, and repeated attempts by the Germans to dislodge the Red Army from the left bank were unsuccessful. The Axis forces ran out of resources to continue offensive operations, and the battle for Voronezh entered the positional phase. Due to the fact that the main forces were sent to Stalingrad, the offensive on Voronezh was suspended, and the most combat-ready units from the front were removed and transferred to the 6th Army of Paulus. Subsequently, this factor played an important role in the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad.
After the capture of Rostov-on-Don, Hitler transferred the 4th Panzer Army from Group A (attacking the Caucasus) to Group B, aimed east towards the Volga and Stalingrad. The 6th Army's initial offensive was so successful that Hitler intervened again, ordering the 4th Panzer Army to join Army Group South (A). As a result, a huge traffic jam developed when the 4th and 6th armies needed several roads in the area of operation. Both armies were stuck tightly, and the delay turned out to be quite long and slowed down the German advance by one week. With the advance slowing, Hitler changed his mind and reassigned the 4th Panzer Army's objective back to the Caucasus.
Disposition of forces before battle
Germany
Army Group B. The 6th Army (commander - F. Paulus) was allocated for the attack on Stalingrad. It included 14 divisions, which numbered about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 tanks. Intelligence activities in the interests of the 6th Army were carried out by Abwehrgruppe 104.
The army was supported by the 4th Air Fleet (commanded by Colonel General Wolfram von Richthofen), which had up to 1,200 aircraft (the fighter aircraft aimed at Stalingrad, in the initial stage of the battle for this city, consisted of about 120 Messerschmitt Bf.109F- fighter aircraft 4/G-2 (Soviet and Russian sources give figures ranging from 100 to 150), plus about 40 obsolete Romanian Bf.109E-3).
USSR
Stalingrad Front (commander - S.K. Timoshenko, from July 23 - V.N. Gordov, from August 13 - Colonel General A.I. Eremenko). It included the Stalingrad garrison (10th division of the NKVD), the 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 21st, 28th, 38th and 57th combined arms armies, the 8th air army (Soviet fighter aviation at the beginning of the battle here consisted of 230-240 fighters, mainly Yak-1) and the Volga military flotilla - 37 divisions, 3 tank corps, 22 brigades, which numbered 547 thousand people, 2200 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks, 454 aircraft, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 air defense fighters.
On July 12, the Stalingrad Front was created, the commander was Marshal Timoshenko, and from July 23, Lieutenant General Gordov. It included the 62nd Army, promoted from the reserve under the command of Major General Kolpakchi, the 63rd, 64th Armies, as well as the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th Combined Arms and 8th Air Armies of the former Southwestern Front, and with July 30 - 51st Army of the North Caucasus Front. The Stalingrad Front received the task of defending in a zone 530 km wide (along the Don River from Babka 250 km northwest of the city of Serafimovich to Kletskaya and further along the line Kletskaya, Surovikino, Suvorovsky, Verkhnekurmoyarskaya), to stop the further advance of the enemy and prevent him from reaching the Volga . The first stage of the defensive battle in the North Caucasus began on July 25, 1942 at the turn of the lower reaches of the Don in the strip from the village of Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the Don. The border of the junction - the closure of the Stalingrad and North Caucasus military fronts ran along the line Verkhne-Kurmanyarskaya - Gremyachaya station - Ketchenery, crossing the northern and eastern part of the Kotelnikovsky district of the Volgograd region. By July 17, the Stalingrad Front had 12 divisions (a total of 160 thousand people), 2,200 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks and over 450 aircraft. In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and up to 60 fighters of the 102nd Air Defense Aviation Division (Colonel I. I. Krasnoyurchenko) operated in its zone. Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, the enemy had a superiority over the Soviet troops in tanks and artillery - by 1.3 times and in airplanes - by more than 2 times, and in people they were inferior by 2 times.
Start of the battle
In July, when German intentions became completely clear to the Soviet command, it developed plans for the defense of Stalingrad. To create a new defense front, Soviet troops, after advancing from the depths, had to immediately take positions on terrain where there were no pre-prepared defensive lines. Most of the formations of the Stalingrad Front were new formations that had not yet been properly put together and, as a rule, did not have combat experience. There was an acute shortage of fighter aircraft, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. Many divisions lacked ammunition and vehicles.
The generally accepted date for the start of the battle is July 17. However, Alexey Isaev discovered in the combat log of the 62nd Army information about the first two clashes that occurred on July 16. The advance detachment of the 147th Infantry Division at 17:40 was fired upon by enemy anti-tank guns near the Morozov farm and destroyed them with return fire. Soon a more serious collision occurred:
“At 20:00, four German tanks secretly approached the Zolotoy village and opened fire on the detachment. The first battle of the Battle of Stalingrad lasted 20-30 minutes. Tankers of the 645th Tank Battalion stated that 2 German tanks were destroyed, 1 anti-tank gun and 1 more tank was knocked out. Apparently, the Germans did not expect to face two companies of tanks at once and sent only four vehicles forward. The detachment's losses were one T-34 burned out and two T-34s shot down. The first battle of the bloody months-long battle was not marked by anyone's death - the casualties of two tank companies amounted to 11 people wounded. Dragging two damaged tanks behind them, the detachment returned.” - Isaev A.V. Stalingrad. There is no land for us beyond the Volga. - Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. - 448 p. - ISBN 978–5–699–26236–6.
On July 17, at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with the vanguards of the 6th German Army. Interacting with the aviation of the 8th Air Army (Major General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin), they put up stubborn resistance to the enemy, who, in order to break their resistance, had to deploy 5 divisions out of 13 and spend 5 days fighting them. In the end, German troops knocked down the advanced detachments from their positions and approached the main defense line of the troops of the Stalingrad Front. The resistance of the Soviet troops forced the Nazi command to strengthen the 6th Army. By July 22, it already had 18 divisions, numbering 250 thousand combat personnel, about 740 tanks, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. The troops of the 6th Army supported up to 1,200 aircraft. As a result, the balance of forces increased even more in favor of the enemy. For example, in tanks he now had a twofold superiority. By July 22, the troops of the Stalingrad Front had 16 divisions (187 thousand people, 360 tanks, 7.9 thousand guns and mortars, about 340 aircraft).
At dawn on July 23, the enemy’s northern and, on July 25, southern strike groups went on the offensive. Using superiority in forces and air supremacy, the Germans broke through the defenses on the right flank of the 62nd Army and by the end of the day on July 24 reached the Don in the Golubinsky area. As a result, up to three Soviet divisions were surrounded. The enemy also managed to push back the troops of the right flank of the 64th Army. A critical situation developed for the troops of the Stalingrad Front. Both flanks of the 62nd Army were deeply engulfed by the enemy, and his exit to the Don created real threat the breakthrough of Nazi troops to Stalingrad.
By the end of July, the Germans pushed the Soviet troops behind the Don. The defense line stretched for hundreds of kilometers from north to south along the Don. To break through the defenses along the river, the Germans had to use, in addition to their 2nd Army, the armies of their Italian, Hungarian and Romanian allies. The 6th Army was only a few dozen kilometers from Stalingrad, and the 4th Panzer, located south of it, turned north to help take the city. To the south, Army Group South (A) continued to push further into the Caucasus, but its advance slowed. Army Group South A was too far to the south to provide support to Army Group South B in the north.
On July 28, 1942, People's Commissar of Defense J.V. Stalin addressed the Red Army with order No. 227, in which he demanded to strengthen resistance and stop the enemy's advance at all costs. The strictest measures were envisaged against those who showed cowardice and cowardice in battle. Practical measures were outlined to strengthen morale and discipline among the troops. “It’s time to end the retreat,” the order noted. - No step back!" This slogan embodied the essence of order No. 227. Commanders and political workers were given the task of bringing to the consciousness of every soldier the requirements of this order.
The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops forced the Nazi command on July 31 to turn the 4th Tank Army (Colonel General G. Hoth) from the Caucasus direction to Stalingrad. On August 2, its advanced units approached Kotelnikovsky. In this regard, there was a direct threat of an enemy breakthrough to the city from the southwest. Fighting broke out on the southwestern approaches to it. To strengthen the defense of Stalingrad, by decision of the front commander, the 57th Army was deployed on the southern front of the outer defensive perimeter. The 51st Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front (Major General T.K. Kolomiets, from October 7 - Major General N.I. Trufanov).
The situation in the 62nd Army zone was difficult. On August 7-9, the enemy pushed her troops beyond the Don River, and surrounded four divisions west of Kalach. Soviet soldiers fought in encirclement until August 14, and then in small groups they began to fight their way out of encirclement. Three divisions of the 1st Guards Army (Major General K. S. Moskalenko, from September 28 - Major General I. M. Chistyakov) arrived from the Headquarters Reserve and launched a counterattack on the enemy troops and stopped their further advance.
Thus, the German plan - to break through to Stalingrad with a swift blow on the move - was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don and their active defense on the southwestern approaches to the city. During the three weeks of the offensive, the enemy was able to advance only 60-80 km. Based on an assessment of the situation, the Nazi command made significant adjustments to its plan.
On August 19, Nazi troops resumed their offensive, striking in the general direction of Stalingrad. On August 22, the 6th German Army crossed the Don and captured a 45 km wide bridgehead on its eastern bank, in the Peskovatka area, on which six divisions were concentrated. On August 23, the enemy's 14th Tank Corps broke through to the Volga north of Stalingrad, in the area of the village of Rynok, and cut off the 62nd Army from the rest of the forces of the Stalingrad Front. The day before, enemy aircraft launched a massive air strike on Stalingrad, carrying out about 2 thousand sorties. As a result, the city suffered terrible destruction - entire neighborhoods were turned into ruins or simply wiped off the face of the earth.
On September 13, the enemy went on the offensive along the entire front, trying to capture Stalingrad by storm. Soviet troops failed to contain his powerful onslaught. They were forced to retreat to the city, where fierce fighting broke out on the streets.
At the end of August and September, Soviet troops carried out a series of counterattacks in the southwestern direction to cut off the formations of the enemy's 14th Tank Corps, which had broken through to the Volga. When launching counterattacks, Soviet troops had to close the German breakthrough in the Kotluban and Rossoshka station area and eliminate the so-called “land bridge”. At the cost of enormous losses, Soviet troops managed to advance only a few kilometers.
“In the tank formations of the 1st Guards Army, out of 340 tanks that were available at the start of the offensive on September 18, by September 20 only 183 serviceable tanks remained, taking into account replenishment.” - Zharkoy F.M.
Battle in the city
By August 23, 1942, out of 400 thousand residents of Stalingrad, about 100 thousand were evacuated. On August 24, the Stalingrad City Defense Committee adopted a belated resolution on the evacuation of women, children and the wounded to the left bank of the Volga. All citizens, including women and children, worked to build trenches and other fortifications.
On August 23, the 4th Air Fleet carried out its longest and most destructive bombardment of the city. German aircraft destroyed the city, killed more than 90 thousand people, destroyed more than half of the housing stock of pre-war Stalingrad, thereby turning the city into a huge territory covered with burning ruins. The situation was aggravated by the fact that after the high-explosive bombs, German bombers dropped incendiary bombs. A huge fire whirlwind formed, which burned the central part of the city and all its inhabitants to the ground. The fire spread to other areas of Stalingrad, since most of the buildings in the city were built of wood or had wooden elements. Temperatures in many parts of the city, especially in its center, reached 1000 C. This would later be repeated in Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo.
At 16:00 on August 23, 1942, the strike force of the 6th German Army broke through to the Volga near the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, in the area of the villages of Latoshinka, Akatovka, and Rynok.
In the northern part of the city, near the village of Gumrak, the German 14th Tank Corps met resistance from Soviet anti-aircraft batteries of the 1077th regiment of Lieutenant Colonel V.S. German, whose gun crews included girls. The battle continued until the evening of August 23. By the evening of August 23, 1942, German tanks appeared in the area of the tractor plant, 1-1.5 km from the factory workshops, and began shelling it. At this stage, Soviet defense relied heavily on the 10th Infantry Division of the NKVD and the people's militia, recruited from workers, firefighters, and policemen. The tractor plant continued to build tanks, which were manned by crews consisting of plant workers and immediately sent off the assembly lines into battle. A. S. Chuyanov told members of the film crew documentary film“Pages of the Battle of Stalingrad” that when the enemy reached Mokraya Mechetka before organizing the defense line of Stalingrad, he was scared off by Soviet tanks that drove out of the gates of the tractor plant, and only the drivers of this plant sat in them without ammunition and crew. On August 23, the tank brigade named after the Stalingrad Proletariat advanced to the defense line north of the tractor plant in the area of the Sukhaya Mechetka River. For about a week, the militia actively participated in defensive battles in the north of Stalingrad. Then gradually they began to be replaced by personnel units.
By September 1, 1942, the Soviet command could only provide its troops in Stalingrad with risky crossings across the Volga. In the midst of the ruins of the already destroyed city, the Soviet 62nd Army built defensive positions with firing points located in buildings and factories. Snipers and assault groups detained the enemy as best they could. The Germans, moving deeper into Stalingrad, suffered heavy losses. Soviet reinforcements were transported across the Volga from the eastern bank under constant bombardment and artillery fire.
From September 13 to 26, Wehrmacht units pushed back the troops of the 62nd Army and broke into the city center, and at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies they broke through to the Volga. The river was completely under fire from German troops. Every ship and even a boat was hunted. Despite this, during the battle for the city, over 82 thousand soldiers and officers, a large amount of military equipment, food and other military cargo were transported from the left bank to the right bank, and about 52 thousand wounded and civilians were evacuated to the left bank.
The struggle for bridgeheads near the Volga, especially on Mamayev Kurgan and at factories in the northern part of the city, lasted more than two months. The battles for the Red October plant, the tractor plant and the Barrikady artillery plant became known throughout the world. While Soviet soldiers continued to defend their positions by firing at the Germans, factory workers repaired damaged Soviet tanks and weapons in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield, and sometimes on the battlefield itself. The specificity of battles at enterprises was the limited use of firearms due to the danger of ricocheting: battles were fought with the help of piercing, cutting and crushing objects, as well as hand-to-hand combat.
German military doctrine was based on the interaction of military branches in general and especially close interaction between infantry, sappers, artillery and dive bombers. In response, Soviet soldiers tried to position themselves tens of meters from enemy positions, in which case German artillery and aviation could not operate without the risk of hitting their own. Often the opponents were separated by a wall, floor or landing. In this case, the German infantry had to fight on equal terms with the Soviet infantry - rifles, grenades, bayonets and knives. The fight was for every street, every factory, every house, basement or stairwell. Even individual buildings were included on the maps and given names: Pavlov's House, the Mill, the Department Store, the prison, the Zabolotny House, the Dairy House, the House of Specialists, the L-shaped House and others. The Red Army constantly carried out counterattacks, trying to recapture previously lost positions. Mamaev Kurgan and the railway station changed hands several times. The assault groups of both sides tried to use any passages to the enemy - sewers, basements, tunnels.
Street fighting in Stalingrad.
On both sides, the combatants were supported by a large number of artillery batteries (Soviet large-caliber artillery operated from the eastern bank of the Volga), up to 600-mm mortars.
Soviet snipers, using the ruins as cover, also inflicted heavy losses on the Germans. Sniper Vasily Grigorievich Zaitsev during the battle destroyed 225 enemy soldiers and officers (including 11 snipers).
For both Stalin and Hitler, the battle for Stalingrad became a matter of prestige in addition to the strategic importance of the city. The Soviet command moved Red Army reserves from Moscow to the Volga, and also transferred air forces from almost the entire country to the Stalingrad area.
On the morning of October 14, the German 6th Army launched a decisive offensive against the Soviet bridgeheads near the Volga. It was supported by more than a thousand aircraft of the 4th Luftwaffe Air Fleet. The concentration of German troops was unprecedented - on a front of only about 4 km, three infantry and two tank divisions were advancing on the tractor plant and the Barricades plant. Soviet units stubbornly defended themselves, supported by artillery fire from the eastern bank of the Volga and from the ships of the Volga military flotilla. However, the artillery on the left bank of the Volga began to experience a shortage of ammunition in connection with the preparation of the Soviet counteroffensive. On November 9, the cold weather began, the air temperature dropped to minus 18 degrees. Crossing the Volga became extremely difficult due to ice floes floating on the river, and the troops of the 62nd Army experienced an acute shortage of ammunition and food. By the end of the day on November 11, German troops managed to capture southern part plant "Barricades" and in a 500 m wide area to break through to the Volga, the 62nd Army now held three small bridgeheads isolated from each other (the smallest of which was Lyudnikov Island). The divisions of the 62nd Army, after suffering losses, numbered only 500-700 people. But the German divisions also suffered huge losses, in many units more than 40% of their personnel were killed in battle.
Preparing Soviet troops for a counteroffensive
The Don Front was formed on September 30, 1942. It included: 1st Guards, 21st, 24th, 63rd and 66th Armies, 4th Tank Army, 16th Air Army. Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, who took command, actively began to fulfill the “old dream” of the right flank of the Stalingrad Front - to encircle the German 14th Tank Corps and connect with units of the 62nd Army.
Having taken command, Rokossovsky found the newly formed front on the offensive - following the order of the Headquarters, on September 30 at 5:00, after artillery preparation, units of the 1st Guards, 24th and 65th armies went on the offensive. Heavy fighting raged for two days. But, as noted in the TsAMO document, parts of the armies did not advance, and moreover, as a result of German counterattacks, several heights were abandoned. By October 2, the offensive had run out of steam.
But here, from the reserve of the Headquarters, the Don Front receives seven fully equipped rifle divisions (277, 62, 252, 212, 262, 331, 293 infantry divisions). The command of the Don Front decides to use fresh forces for a new offensive. On October 4, Rokossovsky ordered the development of a plan for an offensive operation, and on October 6 the plan was ready. The date of the operation was set for October 10. But by this time several events occur.
On October 5, 1942, Stalin, in a telephone conversation with A.I. Eremenko, sharply criticized the leadership of the Stalingrad Front and demanded that immediate measures be taken to stabilize the front and subsequently defeat the enemy. In response to this, on October 6, Eremenko made a report to Stalin about the situation and considerations for further actions of the front. The first part of this document is justification and blaming the Don Front (“they had high hopes for help from the north,” etc.). In the second part of the report, Eremenko proposes to conduct an operation to encircle and destroy German units near Stalingrad. There, for the first time, it was proposed to encircle the 6th Army with flank attacks on Romanian units and, after breaking through the fronts, to unite in the Kalach-on-Don area.
Headquarters considered Eremenko's plan, but then considered it impracticable (the depth of the operation was too great, etc.). In fact, the idea of launching a counteroffensive was discussed as early as September 12 by Stalin, Zhukov and Vasilevsky, and by September 13 preliminary outlines of a plan were prepared and presented to Stalin, which included the creation of the Don Front. And Zhukov’s command of the 1st Guards, 24th and 66th armies was accepted on August 27, simultaneously with his appointment as Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The 1st Guards Army was part of the Southwestern Front at that time, and the 24th and 66th armies, specifically for the operation entrusted to Zhukov to push the enemy away from the northern regions of Stalingrad, were withdrawn from the Headquarters reserve. After the creation of the front, its command was entrusted to Rokossovsky, and Zhukov was tasked with preparing the offensive of the Kalinin and Western Fronts in order to tie down the German forces so that they could not transfer them to support Army Group South.
As a result, the Headquarters proposed the following option for encircling and defeating German troops at Stalingrad: the Don Front was proposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kotluban, break through the front and reach the Gumrak region. At the same time, the Stalingrad Front is launching an offensive from the Gornaya Polyana area to Elshanka, and after breaking through the front, units move to the Gumrak area, where they join forces with units of the Don Front. In this operation, the front command was allowed to use fresh units: Don Front - 7 rifle divisions (277, 62, 252, 212, 262, 331, 293), Stalingrad Front - 7th Rifle Corps, 4th Cavalry Corps). On October 7, General Staff Directive No. 170644 was issued on conducting an offensive operation on two fronts to encircle the 6th Army; the start of the operation was scheduled for October 20.
Thus, it was planned to encircle and destroy only the German troops fighting directly in Stalingrad (14th Tank Corps, 51st and 4th Infantry Corps, about 12 divisions in total).
The command of the Don Front was dissatisfied with this directive. On October 9, Rokossovsky presented his plan for the offensive operation. He referred to the impossibility of breaking through the front in the Kotluban area. According to his calculations, 4 divisions were required for a breakthrough, 3 divisions to develop a breakthrough, and 3 more to cover from enemy attacks; thus, seven fresh divisions were clearly not enough. Rokossovsky proposed delivering the main blow in the Kuzmichi area (height 139.7), that is, according to the same old scheme: encircle units of the 14th Tank Corps, connect with the 62nd Army and only after that move to Gumrak to link up with units of 64 th army. The headquarters of the Don Front planned 4 days for this: from October 20 to 24. The “Oryol salient” of the Germans had haunted Rokossovsky since August 23, so he decided to first deal with this “callus” and then complete the complete encirclement of the enemy.
The Stavka did not accept Rokossovsky's proposal and recommended that he prepare the operation according to the Stavka plan; however, he was allowed to conduct a private operation against the Oryol group of Germans on October 10, without attracting fresh forces.
On October 9, units of the 1st Guards Army, as well as the 24th and 66th armies began an offensive in the direction of Orlovka. The advancing group was supported by 42 Il-2 attack aircraft, covered by 50 fighters of the 16th Air Army. The first day of the offensive ended in vain. The 1st Guards Army (298, 258, 207) had no advance, but the 24th Army advanced 300 meters. The 299th Infantry Division (66th Army), advancing to height 127.7, having suffered heavy losses, made no progress. On October 10, the offensive attempts continued, but by the evening they finally weakened and stopped. The next “operation to eliminate the Oryol group” failed. As a result of this offensive, the 1st Guards Army was disbanded due to losses incurred. Having transferred the remaining units of the 24th Army, the command was transferred to the reserve of Headquarters.
Soviet offensive (Operation Uranus)
On November 19, 1942, the Red Army began its offensive as part of Operation Uranus. On November 23, in the Kalach area, an encirclement ring closed around the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. It was not possible to completely implement the Uranus plan, since it was not possible to split the 6th Army into two parts from the very beginning (with the attack of the 24th Army between the Volga and Don rivers). Attempts to liquidate those surrounded on the move under these conditions also failed, despite a significant superiority in forces - the superior tactical training of the Germans was telling. However, the 6th Army was isolated and its fuel, ammunition and food supplies were progressively dwindling, despite attempts to supply it by air by the 4th Air Fleet under the command of Wolfram von Richthofen.
Operation Wintergewitter
The newly formed Wehrmacht Army Group Don, under the command of Field Marshal Manstein, attempted to break through the blockade of the encircled troops (Operation Wintergewitter (German: Wintergewitter, Winter Storm). It was originally planned to begin on December 10, but the offensive actions of the Red Army on the outer front of the encirclement forced the start to be postponed operations on December 12. By this date, the Germans managed to present only one full-fledged tank formation - the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht and (from the infantry formations) the remnants of the defeated 4th Romanian Army.These units were subordinate to the control of the 4th Panzer Army under the command of G. Gotha During the offensive, the group was reinforced by the very battered 11th and 17th tank divisions and three air field divisions.
By December 19, units of the 4th Tank Army, which had actually broken through the defensive formations of the Soviet troops, encountered the 2nd Guards Army, which had just been transferred from the Headquarters reserve, under the command of R. Ya. Malinovsky, which included two rifle and one mechanized corps.
Operation Little Saturn
According to the plan of the Soviet command, after the defeat of the 6th Army, the forces involved in Operation Uranus turned west and advanced towards Rostov-on-Don as part of Operation Saturn. At the same time, the southern wing of the Voronezh Front attacked the Italian 8th Army north of Stalingrad and advanced directly west (towards the Donets) with an auxiliary attack to the southwest (towards Rostov-on-Don), covering the northern flank of the Southwestern front during a hypothetical offensive. However, due to the incomplete implementation of “Uranus”, “Saturn” was replaced by “Little Saturn”.
A breakthrough to Rostov-on-Don (due to Zhukov’s diversion of the bulk of the Red Army troops to carry out the unsuccessful offensive operation “Mars” near Rzhev, as well as due to the lack of seven armies pinned down by the 6th Army at Stalingrad) was no longer planned.
The Voronezh Front, together with the Southwestern Front and part of the forces of the Stalingrad Front, had the goal of pushing the enemy 100-150 km west of the encircled 6th Army and defeating the 8th Italian Army (Voronezh Front). The offensive was planned to begin on December 10, but problems associated with the delivery of new units necessary for the operation (those available on the site were tied up at Stalingrad) led to the fact that A. M. Vasilevsky authorized (with the knowledge of I. V. Stalin) a postponement of the start operations on December 16. On December 16-17, the German front on Chira and on the positions of the 8th Italian Army was broken through, and Soviet tank corps rushed into the operational depths. Manstein reports that of the Italian divisions, only one light and one or two infantry divisions offered any serious resistance; the headquarters of the 1st Romanian Corps fled in panic from their command post. By the end of December 24, Soviet troops reached the Millerovo, Tatsinskaya, Morozovsk line. In eight days of fighting, the front's mobile troops advanced 100-200 km. However, in the mid-20s of December, operational reserves (four well-equipped German tank divisions), initially intended to strike during Operation Wintergewitter, began to approach Army Group Don, which later became, according to Manstein himself, the reason for it failure.
By December 25, these reserves launched counterattacks, during which they cut off V. M. Badanov’s 24th Tank Corps, which had just broken into the airfield in Tatsinskaya (about 300 German aircraft were destroyed at the airfield and in trains at the station). By December 30, the corps broke out of the encirclement, refueling the tanks with a mixture of aviation gasoline captured at the airfield and motor oil. By the end of December, the advancing troops of the Southwestern Front reached the line of Novaya Kalitva, Markovka, Millerovo, Chernyshevskaya. As a result of the Middle Don operation, the main forces of the 8th Italian Army were defeated (with the exception of the Alpine Corps, which was not hit), the defeat of the 3rd Romanian Army was completed, and great damage was inflicted on the Hollidt task force. 17 divisions and three brigades of the fascist bloc were destroyed or suffered heavy damage. 60,000 enemy soldiers and officers were captured. The defeat of the Italian and Romanian troops created the preconditions for the Red Army to launch an offensive in the Kotelnikovsky direction, where the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies reached the Tormosin, Zhukovskaya, Kommisarovsky line by December 31, having advanced 100-150 km and completed the defeat of the 4th th Romanian Army and pushed back units of the newly formed 4th Tank Army 200 km from Stalingrad. After this, the front line temporarily stabilized, since neither the Soviet nor the German troops had enough forces to break through the enemy’s tactical defense zone.
Combat during Operation Ring
The commander of the 62nd Army V.I. Chuikov presents the guards banner to the commander of the 39th Guards. SD S.S. Guryev. Stalingrad, Red October plant, January 3, 1943
On December 27, N.N. Voronov sent the first version of the “Ring” plan to the Supreme Command Headquarters. Headquarters, in Directive No. 170718 of December 28, 1942 (signed by Stalin and Zhukov), demanded changes to the plan so that it would provide for the dismemberment of the 6th Army into two parts before its destruction. Corresponding changes have been made to the plan. On January 10, the offensive of the Soviet troops began, the main blow was delivered in the zone of the 65th Army of General Batov. However, German resistance turned out to be so serious that the offensive had to be temporarily stopped. From January 17 to 22, the offensive was suspended for regrouping, new attacks on January 22-26 led to the dismemberment of the 6th Army into two groups (Soviet troops united in the Mamayev Kurgan area), by January 31 the southern group was eliminated (the command and headquarters of the 6th was captured 1st Army led by Paulus), by February 2 the northern group of those surrounded under the command of the commander of the 11th Army Corps, Colonel General Karl Strecker, capitulated. Shooting in the city continued until February 3 - the Hiwis resisted even after the German surrender on February 2, 1943, since they were not in danger of being captured. The liquidation of the 6th Army, according to the “Ring” plan, was supposed to be completed in a week, but in reality it lasted 23 days. (The 24th Army withdrew from the front on January 26 and was sent to the General Headquarters reserve).
In total, more than 2,500 officers and 24 generals of the 6th Army were captured during Operation Ring. In total, over 91 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were captured, of which no more than 20% returned to Germany at the end of the war - the majority died of exhaustion, dysentery and other diseases. According to the Don Front headquarters, the trophies of the Soviet troops from January 10 to February 2, 1943 were 5,762 guns, 1,312 mortars, 12,701 machine guns, 156,987 rifles, 10,722 machine guns, 744 aircraft, 166 tanks, 261 armored vehicles, 80,438 cars, 10,679 motorcycles ov , 240 tractors, 571 tractors, 3 armored trains and other military equipment.
A total of twenty German divisions capitulated: 14th, 16th and 24th Panzer, 3rd, 29th and 60th Motorized Infantry, 100th Jäger, 44th, 71st, 76th I, 79th, 94th, 113th, 295th, 297th, 305th, 371st, 376th, 384th, 389th infantry divisions. In addition, the Romanian 1st Cavalry and 20th Infantry Divisions surrendered. The Croatian regiment surrendered as part of the 100th Jaeger. The 91st air defense regiment, the 243rd and 245th separate assault gun battalions, and the 2nd and 51st rocket mortar regiments also capitulated.
Air supply to the encircled group
Hitler, after consulting with the leadership of the Luftwaffe, decided to arrange air transport for the encircled troops. A similar operation had already been carried out by German aviators who supplied troops in the Demyansk cauldron. To maintain acceptable combat effectiveness of the encircled units, daily deliveries of 700 tons of cargo were required. The Luftwaffe promised to provide daily supplies of 300 tons. Cargo was delivered to the airfields: Bolshaya Rossoshka, Basargino, Gumrak, Voroponovo and Pitomnik - the largest in the ring. The seriously wounded were taken out on return flights. Under successful circumstances, the Germans managed to make more than 100 flights per day to the encircled troops. The main bases for supplying the blocked troops were Tatsinskaya, Morozovsk, Tormosin and Bogoyavlenskaya. But as the Soviet troops advanced westward, the Germans had to move their supply bases further and further from Paulus’s troops: to Zverevo, Shakhty, Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Novocherkassk, Mechetinskaya and Salsk. At the last stage, airfields in Artyomovsk, Gorlovka, Makeevka and Stalino were used.
Soviet troops actively fought against air traffic. Both supply airfields and others located in the surrounded territory were subjected to bombing and attack. To combat enemy aircraft, Soviet aviation used patrolling, airfield duty, and free hunting. At the beginning of December, the system of combating enemy air transport organized by Soviet troops was based on division into zones of responsibility. The first zone included the territories from which the encircled group was supplied; units of the 17th and 8th VA operated here. The second zone was located around Paulus' troops over territory controlled by the Red Army. Two belts of guidance radio stations were created in it; the zone itself was divided into 5 sectors, one fighter air division in each (102 IAD air defense and divisions of the 8th and 16th VA). The third zone, where anti-aircraft artillery was located, also surrounded the blocked group. It was 15-30 km deep, and at the end of December it contained 235 small and medium caliber guns and 241 anti-aircraft machine guns. The area occupied by the encircled group belonged to the fourth zone, where units of the 8th, 16th VA and the night regiment of the air defense division operated. To counter night flights near Stalingrad, one of the first Soviet aircraft with an airborne radar was used, which was subsequently put into mass production.
Due to increasing opposition from the Soviet Air Force, the Germans had to switch from flying during the day to flying in difficult conditions. meteorological conditions and at night, when there was a greater chance of making the flight undetected. On January 10, 1943, an operation began to destroy the encircled group, as a result of which on January 14, the defenders abandoned the main airfield of Pitomnik, and on the 21st and last airfield - Gumrak, after which the cargo was dropped by parachute. A landing site near the village of Stalingradsky operated for a few more days, but it was accessible only to small aircraft; On the 26th, landing on it became impossible. During the period of air supply to the encircled troops, an average of 94 tons of cargo was delivered per day. On the most successful days, the value reached 150 tons of cargo. Hans Doerr estimates the Luftwaffe's losses in this operation at 488 aircraft and 1,000 flight personnel and believes that these were the largest losses since the air operation against England.
Results of the battle
The victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad is the largest military-political event during the Second World War. The Great Battle, which ended in the encirclement, defeat and capture of a selected enemy group, made a huge contribution to achieving a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War and had a serious impact on the further course of the entire Second World War.
In the Battle of Stalingrad, new features of military art emerged with all their might. Armed Forces THE USSR. Soviet operational art was enriched by the experience of encircling and destroying the enemy.
An important component of the success of the Red Army was the set of measures for the military-economic support of the troops.
The victory at Stalingrad had a decisive influence on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the battle, the Red Army firmly seized the strategic initiative and now dictated its will to the enemy. This changed the nature of the actions of German troops in the Caucasus, in the areas of Rzhev and Demyansk. The attacks of the Soviet troops forced the Wehrmacht to give the order to prepare the Eastern Wall, which was supposed to stop the advance of the Soviet Army.
During the Battle of Stalingrad, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies (22 divisions), the 8th Italian army and the Italian Alpine Corps (10 divisions), the 2nd Hungarian army (10 divisions), and the Croatian regiment were defeated. The 6th and 7th Romanian Army Corps, part of the 4th Panzer Army, which were not destroyed, were completely demoralized. As Manstein notes: “Dimitrescu was powerless alone to fight the demoralization of his troops. There was nothing left to do but take them off and send them to the rear, to their homeland.” In the future, Germany could not count on new conscription contingents from Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. She had to use the remaining Allied divisions only for rear service, fighting partisans and in some secondary sectors of the front.
The following were destroyed in the Stalingrad cauldron:
As part of the 6th German Army: the headquarters of the 8th, 11th, 51st Army and 14th Tank Corps; 44, 71, 76, 113, 295, 305, 376, 384, 389, 394 infantry divisions, 100th mountain rifle, 14, 16 and 24 tank, 3rd and 60th motorized, 1st Romanian cavalry, 9 1st Air Defense Division.
As part of the 4th Tank Army, the headquarters of the 4th Army Corps; 297 and 371 infantry, 29 motorized, 1st and 20th Romanian infantry divisions. Most of the artillery of the RGK, units of the Todt organization, large forces of the engineering units of the RGK.
Also the 48th Tank Corps (first composition) - 22nd Tank, Romanian tank division.
Outside the cauldron, 5 divisions of the 2nd Army and the 24th Tank Corps were destroyed (lost 50-70% of their strength). The 57th Tank Corps from Army Group A, the 48th Tank Corps (second-strength), and the divisions of the Gollidt, Kempff, and Fretter-Picot groups suffered enormous losses. Several airfield divisions were destroyed, a large number individual parts and connections.
In March 1943, in Army Group South, in a sector of 700 km from Rostov-on-Don to Kharkov, taking into account the reinforcements received, only 32 divisions remained.
As a result of actions to supply the troops encircled at Stalingrad and several smaller pockets, German aviation was greatly weakened.
The outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad caused confusion and confusion in the Axis countries. A crisis began in the pro-fascist regimes in Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. Germany's influence on its allies sharply weakened, and disagreements between them noticeably worsened. The desire to maintain neutrality has intensified in Turkish political circles. Elements of restraint and alienation began to prevail in the relations of neutral countries towards Germany.
As a result of the defeat, Germany faced the problem of restoring the losses incurred in equipment and people. The head of the economic department of the OKW, General G. Thomas, stated that the losses in equipment were equivalent to the amount of military equipment of 45 divisions from all branches of the military and were equal to the losses for the entire previous period of fighting on the Soviet-German front. Goebbels declared at the end of January 1943, “Germany will be able to withstand Russian attacks only if it manages to mobilize its last human reserves.” Losses in tanks and vehicles amounted to six months of the country's production, in artillery - three months, in small arms and mortars - two months.
The Soviet Union established the medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad”; as of January 1, 1995, it had been awarded to 759,561 people. In Germany, after the defeat in Stalingrad, three days of mourning were declared.
German general Kurt von Tipelskirch in his book “History of the Second World War” assesses the defeat at Stalingrad as follows:
“The result of the offensive was stunning: one German and three allied armies were destroyed, three others German armies suffered heavy losses. At least fifty German and Allied divisions no longer existed. The remaining losses amounted to a total of another twenty-five divisions. A large amount of equipment was lost - tanks, self-propelled guns, light and heavy artillery and heavy infantry weapons. Losses in equipment were, of course, significantly greater than those of the enemy. The losses in personnel should have been considered very heavy, especially since the enemy, even if he suffered serious losses, still had significantly larger human reserves. Germany's prestige in the eyes of its allies was greatly shaken. Since an irreparable defeat was inflicted at the same time in North Africa, the hope for a general victory collapsed. The morale of the Russians has risen high."
Reaction in the world
Many government and politicians praised the victory of the Soviet troops. In a message to J.V. Stalin (February 5, 1943), F. Roosevelt called the Battle of Stalingrad an epic struggle, the decisive result of which is celebrated by all Americans. On May 17, 1944, Roosevelt sent Stalingrad a letter:
“On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I present this certificate to the city of Stalingrad to commemorate our admiration for its valiant defenders, whose courage, fortitude and selflessness during the siege from September 13, 1942 to January 31, 1943 will forever inspire the hearts of all free people. Their glorious victory stopped the tide of invasion and became a turning point in the war of the allied nations against the forces of aggression.”
British Prime Minister W. Churchill, in a message to J.V. Stalin on February 1, 1943, called the victory of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad amazing. King George VI of Great Britain sent Stalingrad a dedicatory sword, on the blade of which in Russian and English languages engraved inscription:
"To the citizens of Stalingrad, strong as steel, from King George VI as a sign of the deep admiration of the British people."
At a conference in Tehran, Churchill presented the Sword of Stalingrad to the Soviet delegation. The blade was engraved with the inscription: "A gift from King George VI to the staunch defenders of Stalingrad as a sign of respect from the British people." Presenting the gift, Churchill made a heartfelt speech. Stalin took the sword with both hands, raised it to his lips and kissed the scabbard. When the Soviet leader handed over the relic to Marshal Voroshilov, the sword fell out of its sheath and fell to the floor with a crash. This unfortunate incident somewhat overshadowed the triumph of the moment.
During the battle, and especially after its end, the activity of public organizations in the USA, England, and Canada intensified, advocating more effective assistance to the Soviet Union. For example, New York union members raised $250,000 to build a hospital in Stalingrad. The Chairman of the United Garment Workers Union stated:
“We are proud that the workers of New York will establish a connection with Stalingrad, which will live in history as a symbol of the immortal courage of a great people and whose defense was a turning point in the struggle of mankind against oppression ... Every Red Army soldier who defends his Soviet land by killing a Nazi saves the lives of American soldiers. We will remember this when calculating our debt to the Soviet ally.”
American astronaut Donald Slayton, a participant in World War II, recalled:
“When the Nazis surrendered, our jubilation knew no bounds. Everyone understood that this was a turning point in the war, this was the beginning of the end of fascism.”
The victory at Stalingrad had a significant impact on the lives of the occupied peoples and instilled hope for liberation. A drawing appeared on the walls of many Warsaw houses - a heart pierced by a large dagger. On the heart is the inscription “Great Germany”, and on the blade is “Stalingrad”.
Speaking on February 9, 1943, the famous French anti-fascist writer Jean-Richard Bloch said:
“...listen, Parisians! The first three divisions that invaded Paris in June 1940, the three divisions that, at the invitation of the French General Denz, desecrated our capital, these three divisions - the hundredth, one hundred and thirteenth and two hundred and ninety-fifth - no longer exist! They were destroyed at Stalingrad: the Russians avenged Paris. The Russians are taking revenge for France!
The victory of the Soviet Army highly raised the political and military prestige of the Soviet Union. Former Nazi generals in their memoirs recognized the enormous military-political significance of this victory. G. Doerr wrote:
“For Germany, the battle of Stalingrad was the worst defeat in its history, for Russia - its greatest victory. At Poltava (1709), Russia achieved the right to be called a great European power; Stalingrad was the beginning of its transformation into one of the two greatest world powers.”
Prisoners
Soviet: Total number captured Soviet soldiers for the period July 1942 - February 1943 is unknown, but due to the difficult retreat after the lost battles in the bend of the Don and on the Volgodonsk isthmus, the count is no less than tens of thousands. The fate of these soldiers is different depending on whether they found themselves outside or inside the Stalingrad “cauldron”. The prisoners who were inside the cauldron were kept in the Rossoshki, Pitomnik, and Dulag-205 camps. After the encirclement of the Wehrmacht, due to a lack of food, on December 5, 1942, the prisoners were no longer fed and almost all of them died within three months from hunger and cold. During the liberation of the territory, the Soviet army managed to save only a few hundred people who were in a dying state of exhaustion.
Wehrmacht and allies: The total number of captured soldiers of the Wehrmacht and their allies for the period July 1942 - February 1943 is unknown, so the prisoners were taken on different fronts and were held according to different accounting documents. The exact number of those captured at the final stage of the battle in the city of Stalingrad from January 10 to February 22, 1943 is known - 91,545 people, of which about 2,500 officers, 24 generals and Field Marshal Paulus. This figure includes military personnel from European countries and labor organizations of Todt who took part in the battle on the side of Germany. Citizens of the USSR who went over to serve the enemy and served the Wehrmacht as “hiwis” are not included in this figure, as they were considered criminals. The number of captured Hiwis out of 20,880 who were in the 6th Army on October 24, 1942 is unknown.
To hold prisoners, Camp No. 108 was urgently created with its center in the Stalingrad workers' village of Beketovka. Almost all the prisoners were in an extremely exhausted state; they had been receiving rations on the verge of starvation for 3 months, since the November encirclement. Therefore, the mortality rate among them was extremely high - by June 1943, 27,078 of them had died, 35,099 were being treated in Stalingrad camp hospitals, and 28,098 people were sent to hospitals in other camps. Only about 20 thousand people were able to work in construction due to health reasons; these people were divided into construction teams and distributed among construction sites. After the peak of the first 3 months, mortality returned to normal, and 1,777 people died between July 10, 1943 and January 1, 1949. The prisoners worked a regular working day and received a salary for their work (until 1949, 8,976,304 man-days were worked, a salary of 10,797,011 rubles was issued), for which they bought food and household essentials in camp stores. The last prisoners of war were released to Germany in 1949, except for those who received criminal sentences for personally committed war crimes.
Memory
The Battle of Stalingrad, as a turning point in World War II, had a great influence on world history. In cinema, literature, and music, the theme of Stalingrad is constantly addressed; the word “Stalingrad” itself has acquired numerous meanings. In many cities around the world there are streets, avenues, and squares associated with the memory of the battle. Stalingrad and Coventry became the first sister cities in 1943, giving birth to this international movement. One of the elements of the linkage of sister cities is the name of the streets with the name of the city, therefore in the sister cities of Volgograd there are Stalingradskaya streets (some of them were renamed Volgogradskaya as part of de-Stalinization). Names associated with Stalingrad were given to: the Parisian metro station "Stalingrad", the asteroid "Stalingrad", the type of cruiser Stalingrad.
Most of the monuments to the Battle of Stalingrad are located in Volgograd, the most famous of them are part of the Battle of Stalingrad Museum-Reserve: “The Motherland Calls!” on Mamayev Kurgan, panorama “The defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad”, Gerhardt’s mill. In 1995, in the Gorodishchensky district of the Volgograd region, the Rossoshki soldiers’ cemetery was created, where there is a German section with a memorial sign and the graves of German soldiers.
The Battle of Stalingrad left a significant number of documentary literary works. On the Soviet side, there are memoirs of the First Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zhukov, the commander of the 62nd Army Chuikov, the head of the Stalingrad region Chuyanov, the commander of the 13th Guards Rifle Division Rodimtsev. “Soldier's” memories are presented by Afanasyev, Pavlov, Nekrasov. Stalingrad resident Yuri Panchenko, who survived the battle as a teenager, wrote the book “163 days on the streets of Stalingrad.” On the German side, the memories of the commanders are presented in the memoirs of the commander of the 6th Army, Paulus, and the head of the personnel department of the 6th Army, Adam; the soldier’s vision of the battle is presented in the books of Wehrmacht fighters Edelbert Holl and Hans Doerr. After the war, historians different countries They published documentary literature on the study of the battle, among Russian writers the topic was studied by Alexey Isaev, Alexander Samsonov, and in foreign literature they often refer to the writer-historian Beevor.
