In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, Winter War, long years was virtually forgotten. This was facilitated by its not very successful results and the peculiar “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more afraid than fire to offend any of its “friends,” and Finland after the Great Patriotic War was considered an ally of the USSR.
Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unfamous war,” today this war is very “famous.” One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention many articles in various magazines and collections. But this “celebrity” is very peculiar. The authors who have made denouncing the Soviet “evil empire” their profession cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied...
By the end of the 1930s near the northwestern borders Soviet Union there was a state that was clearly unfriendly to us. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces was a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who pushed Finland into Hitler’s camp through his actions prefer not to remember this. As well as why peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish ones had. air force. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in an alliance with England and France.
Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy explored the question of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but Helsinki responded with a categorical refusal.
Those who denounce the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that manages its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to the exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began being deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis introduce a naval blockade of Liberty Island, and even more so, launch a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries; the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and was fully consistent with international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start the 3rd world war, if the missiles are not removed. There is such a thing as a “sphere of vital interests”. For our country in 1939, a similar area included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Even the former leader of the Cadet Party, P. N. Milyukov, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet regime, in a letter to I. P. Demidov, expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”
On November 26, a famous incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish claims that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Maynila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. November 30th started fighting.
I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive line on December 4-10. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the sides switched to positional warfare.
What are the reasons for failure? initial period war? First of all, underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the number of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to conduct full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.
Soviet intelligence was also not up to the task, unable to identify complete and reliable information about Finnish fortifications.
Finally, the Soviet leadership had unreasonable hopes for “class solidarity of the Finnish working people.” There was a widespread belief that the population of countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately “rise up and go over to the side of the Red Army,” that workers and peasants would come out to greet Soviet soldiers with flowers.
As a result, the required number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. Thus, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important section of the front, in December 1939 the Finnish side had 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 crew battalions. On the Soviet side they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle-machine-gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 infantry battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet troops - 169 thousand people. In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel.
Defeat or victory?
So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, a war is considered won if it leaves the winner in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?
As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and was ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this respect the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unruly bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was created there. Despite persecution by the Finnish authorities, by the time of its ban in December of the same year it had 40 thousand members. Such massive numbers indicate that not only communist supporters joined the Society, but also simply sensible people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with their great neighbor.
According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
It should be noted that if at the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km and even in exchange for double large territory, then as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.
It should also be taken into account that at the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the cost of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which they agreed to cede to us, we were talking about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would already run into many billions.
But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers under the Treaty of Nystadt, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.".
Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland was also supposed to transfer 350 sea and river Vehicle, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages, a significant number of cars.
Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded.
Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times greater than Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Let's take for example Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, the Russians often lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the Port Arthur fortress, Japanese losses far exceeded Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation arose during the Soviet-Finnish War, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.
As a result, Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army had reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and about urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.
Speaking in Parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. This is a great victory for Russia.". However, one should not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.
1. Units of the Red Army cross the bridge into Finnish territory. 1939
2. A Soviet soldier guarding a minefield in the area of the former Finnish border outpost. 1939
3. Artillery crew at their gun in a firing position. 1939
4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain I.V. Kapustin, who landed with troops on the island of Seiskaari to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939
5. Soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
6. Border guard outfit on patrol. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the Finnish outpost of Beloostrov. 1939
8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border post of Japinen. 1939
9. Soldiers deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
10. Soldiers of the 7th Army fire at the enemy with rifles. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
11. A reconnaissance group of skiers receives instructions from the commander before going on reconnaissance. 1939
12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborg district. 1939
13. Fighter skiers on a hike. 1940
14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the area of combat operations with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940
15. Fighters cooking food in the forest over a fire during a break between battles. 1939
16. Cooking lunch in field conditions at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940
17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940
18. Signalmen restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
19. Signal soldiers are restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns in Terijoki. 1939
20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terijoki station. 1939
21. Soldiers and commanders talk with residents of Terijoki. 1939
22. Signalmen on the front line negotiations near the Kemyarya station. 1940
23. Rest of the Red Army soldiers after the battle in the Kemyar area. 1940
24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army listens to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terijoki. 1939
25. View of Suojarva station, taken by Red Army soldiers. 1939
26. Red Army soldiers guard a gasoline pump in the town of Raivola. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
27. General form the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
28. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940
30. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
31. Sappers repairing a bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939
32. A Red Army soldier puts a letter in a field mail box. 1939
33. A group of Soviet commanders and soldiers inspects the Shyutskor banner captured from the Finns. 1939
34. B-4 howitzer on the front line. 1939
35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at height 65.5. 1940
36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by Red Army units. 1939
37. View of a destroyed bridge near the city of Koivisto, taken by units of the Red Army. 1939
38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940
39. Red Army soldiers at a captured gun left behind after the battles with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940
40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940
41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.
42. Soviet soldiers at a captured pillbox on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940
43. Units of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940
44. Red Army soldiers at fortifications in Vyborg. 1940
45. Ruins of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940
46. Red Army soldiers clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940
47. Icebreaking steamer "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940
48. Soviet skiers are moving to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.
49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis for takeoff before a combat mission during the Soviet-Finnish war.
50. Finnish Foreign Minister Vaine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940
51. Crossing the Finnish border by Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939
52. Finnish prisoners talk with a Soviet political worker. The photo was taken in the Gryazovets NKVD camp. 1939-1940
53. Soviet soldiers talk with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939
54. Finnish Fokker C.X aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939
55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, junior lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) discharges a mine.
56. The crew of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at Finnish fortifications. 12/02/1939
57. Red Army commanders examine the captured Finnish Vickers Mk.E tank. March 1940
58. Hero of the Soviet Union, senior lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) with the I-16 fighter. 1940
________________________________________ ______
In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, was virtually forgotten for many years. This was facilitated by its not very successful results and the peculiar “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more afraid than fire to offend any of the “friends,” and Finland after the Great Patriotic War was considered an ally of the USSR.
Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unfamous war,” today this war is very “famous.” One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention many articles in various magazines and collections. But this “celebrity” is very peculiar. The authors who have made denouncing the Soviet “evil empire” their profession cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied...
By the end of the 1930s, near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union there was a state that was clearly unfriendly to us. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces was a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who pushed Finland into Hitler’s camp through his actions prefer not to remember this. As well as why peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in an alliance with England and France.
Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy explored the question of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but Helsinki responded with a categorical refusal.
Those who denounce the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that manages its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to the exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis for imposing a naval blockade of Liberty Island, much less launching a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries; the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and was fully consistent with international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start World War 3 if the missiles were not removed. There is such a thing as a “sphere of vital interests”. For our country in 1939, a similar area included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Even the former leader of the Cadet Party, P. N. Milyukov, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet regime, in a letter to I. P. Demidov, expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”
On November 26, a famous incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish claims that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Maynila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began.
I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive line on December 4-10. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the sides switched to positional warfare.
What were the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the number of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to conduct full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.
Soviet intelligence was also not up to the task, unable to identify complete and reliable information about Finnish fortifications.
Finally, the Soviet leadership had unreasonable hopes for “class solidarity of the Finnish working people.” There was a widespread belief that the population of countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately “rise up and go over to the side of the Red Army,” that workers and peasants would come out to greet Soviet soldiers with flowers.
As a result, the required number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. Thus, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important section of the front, in December 1939 the Finnish side had 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 crew battalions. On the Soviet side they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle-machine-gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 rifle battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet troops - 169 thousand people. In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel.
Defeat or victory?
So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, a war is considered won if it leaves the winner in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?
As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and was ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this respect the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unruly bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was created there. Despite persecution by the Finnish authorities, by the time of its ban in December of the same year it had 40 thousand members. Such massive numbers indicate that not only communist supporters joined the Society, but also simply sensible people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with their great neighbor.
According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
It should be noted that if at the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km and in exchange for twice the territory, as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.
It should also be taken into account that at the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the cost of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which they agreed to cede to us, we were talking about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would already run into many billions.
But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers under the Treaty of Nystadt, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.".
Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages, and a significant number of cars to the USSR.
Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops, according to official data, were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure for Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded.
Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times greater than Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Take, for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, the Russians often lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the Port Arthur fortress, Japanese losses far exceeded Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation arose during the Soviet-Finnish War, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.
As a result, Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army had reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and about urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.
Speaking in Parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. This is a great victory for Russia.". However, one should not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.
_____________________________
1. Units of the Red Army cross the bridge into Finnish territory. 1939
2. A Soviet soldier guarding a minefield in the area of the former Finnish border outpost. 1939
3. Artillery crew at their gun in a firing position. 1939
4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain I.V. Kapustin, who landed with troops on the island of Seiskaari to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939
5. Soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
6. Border guard outfit on patrol. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the Finnish outpost of Beloostrov. 1939
8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border post of Japinen. 1939
9. Soldiers deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
10. Soldiers of the 7th Army fire at the enemy with rifles. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
11. A reconnaissance group of skiers receives instructions from the commander before going on reconnaissance. 1939
12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborg district. 1939
13. Fighter skiers on a hike. 1940
14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the area of combat operations with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940
15. Fighters cooking food in the forest over a fire during a break between battles. 1939
16. Cooking lunch in the field at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940
17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940
18. Signalmen restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
19. Signal soldiers are restoring the telegraph line destroyed by the Finns in Terijoki. 1939
20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terijoki station. 1939
21. Soldiers and commanders talk with residents of Terijoki. 1939
22. Signalmen on the front line negotiations near the Kemyarya station. 1940
23. Rest of the Red Army soldiers after the battle in the Kemyar area. 1940
24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army listens to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terijoki. 1939
25. View of Suojarva station, taken by Red Army soldiers. 1939
26. Red Army soldiers guard a gasoline pump in the town of Raivola. Karelian Isthmus. 1939
27. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
28. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940
30. General view of the destroyed “Mannerheim Fortification Line”. 1939
31. Sappers repairing a bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939
32. A Red Army soldier puts a letter in a field mail box. 1939
33. A group of Soviet commanders and soldiers inspects the Shyutskor banner captured from the Finns. 1939
34. B-4 howitzer on the front line. 1939
35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at height 65.5. 1940
36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by Red Army units. 1939
37. View of a destroyed bridge near the city of Koivisto, taken by units of the Red Army. 1939
38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940
39. Red Army soldiers at a captured gun left behind after the battles with the Finns. Vyborg district. 1940
40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940
41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.
42. Soviet soldiers at a captured pillbox on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940
43. Units of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940
44. Red Army soldiers at fortifications in Vyborg. 1940
45. Ruins of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940
46. Red Army soldiers clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940
47. Icebreaking steamer "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940
48. Soviet skiers are moving to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.
49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis for takeoff before a combat mission during the Soviet-Finnish war.
50. Finnish Foreign Minister Vaine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940
51. Crossing the Finnish border by Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939
52. Finnish prisoners talk with a Soviet political worker. The photo was taken in the Gryazovets NKVD camp. 1939-1940
53. Soviet soldiers talk with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939
54. Finnish Fokker C.X aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939
55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, junior lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) discharges a mine.
56. The crew of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at Finnish fortifications. 12/02/1939
57. Red Army commanders examine the captured Finnish Vickers Mk.E tank. March 1940
58. Hero of the Soviet Union, senior lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) with the I-16 fighter. 1940
Soviet- Finnish war 1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.
The Finnish government believed that accepting Soviet demands would weaken the state's strategic position and lead to Finland's loss of neutrality and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.
The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) ran just 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.
The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.
The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was impossible to fulfill, because then Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.
On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30 at 8 a.m., troops of the Leningrad Front received orders to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyusti Kallio declared war on the USSR.
During “perestroika” several versions of the Maynila incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret unit of the NKVD. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.
From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.
The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered separate directions from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The “Mannerheim Line” had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields.
All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.
On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational barriers and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.
At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.
The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.
On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.
Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured for the most part Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the north-west, cut the highway to Helsinki.
The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government asking for peace.
On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.
In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, it got worse international situation The Soviet Union: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.
Losses Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.
WINTER WAR. AS IT WAS
1. Evacuation in October 1939 of residents of border areas deep into Finland.
2. The Finnish delegation at the negotiations in Moscow. October 1939 “We will not make any concessions to the USSR and will fight at all costs, since England, America and Sweden promised to support us” - Errko, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. The engineering part of the White Finns is sent to install the dowels. Karelian Isthmus. Autumn 1939.
4. Junior sergeant of the Finnish army. October - November 1939. Karelian Isthmus. The countdown to the last days of the world has begun.
5. Tank BT-5 on one of the streets of Leningrad. Finlyandsky Station area
6. Official announcement of the start of hostilities.
6. First day of the war: the 20th heavy tank brigade receives a combat mission.
8. American volunteers sail from New York on December 12, 1939 to fight the Russians in Finland.
9. Submachine gun "Suomi" - the Finnish miracle weapon of Aimo Lahti, a self-taught engineer. one of the best gunsmiths of his time. Trophy Suomis were highly valued.
10. Rally of conscripts in Naryan-Mar.
11. Getmanenko Mikhail Nikitich. Captain. Died of wounds on December 13, 1939, Karelian Isthmus
12. The Mannerheim Line began to be built in 1918, with Finland gaining independence.
13. The Mannerheim Line crossed the entire Karelian Isthmus.
14. View of the Mannerheim Line bunker from the advancing Soviet troops.
15. The losses of the dashing Finnish tank destroyers reached 70%, but they also burned a lot of tanks.
16. Demolition anti-tank charge and Molotov cocktail.
Meeting at the front.
19. Soviet armored cars on the march. Karelian Isthmus.
13. White Finns near a captured flamethrower tank. January 1940
14. Karelian Isthmus. January 1940 Red Army units are moving towards the front.
Intelligence service. Three left, two returned. Artist Aukusti Tuhka.
15. The spruce trees spread out wide, standing in the snow as if in robes.
A detachment of white Finns sat down at the edge of the forest, deep in the snow.
Finnish pilots and aircraft technicians at the French fighter Morand-Saulnier MS.406. During December 1939 - April 1940, the Finnish Air Force received: from England - 22 of the most modern twin-engine Bristol-Blenheim bombers, 42 Gloucester-Gladiators and 10 Hurricanes; from the USA - 38 Brewster-B-239; from France - 30 Morand-Saulnier; from Italy - 32 Fiats. The newest Soviet fighter of that period, the I-16, was inferior to them in speed by about 100 km, and they easily caught up with the main SB bomber and burned it.
Lunch for Red Army soldiers at the front.
View from the bunker of wire fences and minefields, 1940.
White Finnish air defense acoustic locator.
Snowmobile of the White Finns. They have used the swastika to designate military equipment since 1918.
From a letter found on a killed Red Army soldier. “...You write to me if I need any parcel or remittance. I’ll tell you straight, money is of no use here, it can’t buy anything here, and parcels are arriving too slowly. We live here in snow and cold, with only swamps and lakes around. You also wrote that you started selling my things - by for obvious reasons. But it still affected me, as if I no longer existed. You probably have the feeling that we are never destined to see each other again, or you will only see me as a cripple...”
In total, during the 105 days of the war, “poor” white Finland issued more than two hundred (!) different leaflets. There were leaflets addressed specifically to Ukrainians and the peoples of the Caucasus.
Leaflet addressed to Soviet pilots.
English volunteers came to fight the Russians.
The feat of the head of the outpost Shmagrin, December 27, 1939. Artist V.A. Tokarev.
Heroic defense of the garrison. Artist V.E. Pamfilov.
The battle of thirteen border guards with a sabotage detachment of White Finns on the night of January 24-25 on the border in the Murmansk region. The last message from signalman Alexander Spekov, who blew himself up with a grenade along with his enemies: “I’m fighting alone, ammo is running out.”
The tank fires at a long-term firing point.
Road to Raate. January 1940
Frozen Red Army soldiers. Road to Raate. December 1939
White Finns pose with a frozen Red Army soldier.
Downed DB-2 bomber. The war in the air, having dispelled blissful illusions, was extremely difficult for the Red Army Air Force. Short daylight hours, difficult weather conditions, and poor training of the bulk of the flight personnel reduced the number of Soviet aircraft.
Finnish wolves from Russian bears. Stalin's sledgehammer "B-4" against the Mannerheim Line.
View of height 38.2 taken from the Finns, on which the bunker was located. Photo by Petrov RGAKFD
The White Finns fought hard, stubbornly and skillfully. In conditions of complete hopelessness until the last bullet. Breaking such an army is COSTLY.
Red Army soldiers inspect the armored dome on the taken bunker.
Red Army soldiers inspect the taken bunker.
The commander of the 20th heavy tank brigade Borzilov (left) congratulates the soldiers and commanders awarded orders and medals. January 1940.
Attack of a White Finnish sabotage detachment on a rear warehouse of the Red Army.
"Bombing of the Belofinsky station." Artist Alexander Mizin, 1940
The only tank battle took place on February 26 when the White Finns tried to recapture the Honkaniemi stop. Despite the presence of brand new British Vickers tanks and numerical superiority, they eventually lost 14 vehicles and retreated. There were no losses on the Soviet side.
Ski squad of the Red Army.
Ski cavalry. Horseback skiers.
“We let Finnish bunkers go to hell!” Soldiers of the special purpose engineering detachment on the roof of the Ink6 bunker.
“The Capture of Vyborg by the Red Army”, A.A. Blinkov
“Storm of Vyborg”, P.P. Sokolov-Skalya
Kuhmo. March 13. The first hours of the world. Meeting recent enemies. In Kuhmo the White Finns are last days and even hours of fighting tried to destroy the encircled Soviet units.
Kuhmo.Saunajärvi. Venäl.motti. (3)
12. Residents of Helsinki near a map of the territories ceded to the Soviet Union.
There were from 5546 to 6116 people in Finnish captivity in 4 camps. The conditions of their detention were extremely cruel. 39,369 missing persons indicates the scale of executions by the White Finns of seriously wounded, sick and frostbitten Red Army soldiers.
Kh. Akhmetov: “... I personally saw five cases when in a hospital seriously wounded people were taken out into the corridor behind a screen and given a lethal injection. One of the wounded shouted: “Don’t carry me, I don’t want to die.” The hospital repeatedly used the killing of wounded Red Army soldiers by infusion of morphine; this is how prisoners of war Terentyev and Blinov were killed. The Finns especially hated Soviet pilots and mocked them; the seriously wounded were kept without any medical care, which is why many died.”- “Soviet-Finnish captivity”, Frolov, p.48.
March 1940 Gryazovets camp of the NKVD (Vologda region). A political instructor talks with a group of Finnish prisoners of war. The camp held the vast majority of Finnish prisoners of war (according to different sources from 883 to 1100). “We would like work and bread, but it doesn’t matter who will run the country. Since the government orders war, that’s why we fight.”, - this was the mood of the majority. And yet twenty people wished to voluntarily remain in the USSR.
April 20, 1940 Leningraders greet the Soviet soldiers who defeated the Finnish White Guard.
A group of soldiers and commanders of the 210th separate chemical tank battalion awarded orders and medals, March 1940.
There were such people in that war. Technicians and pilots of the 13th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force. Kingisepp, Kotly airfield, 1939-1940.
They died so that we could live...
"WINTER WAR"
Having signed mutual assistance agreements with the Baltic states, the USSR turned to Finland with a proposal to conclude a similar agreement. Finland refused. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, E. Erkko, stated that “Finland will never make a decision similar to those made by the Baltic states. If this happens, it will only be in the worst case scenario.” The origins of the Soviet-Finnish confrontation are largely explained by the extremely hostile, aggressive position of the ruling circles of Finland towards the USSR. Ex-president Finland P. Svinhuvud, under whom Soviet Russia voluntarily recognized the independence of its northern neighbor, said that “any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.” In the mid-30s. M. M. Litvinov, in a conversation with the Finnish envoy, stated that “in no neighboring country is there such open propaganda for an attack on the USSR and the seizure of its territory as in Finland.”
After the Munich Agreement Western countries The Soviet leadership began to show particular persistence towards Finland. During 1938-1939 Negotiations were held during which Moscow sought to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus. In exchange, Finland was offered territories of Karelia, much larger in size than the lands that were supposed to be transferred to the USSR. In addition, the Soviet government promised to allocate a certain amount for the resettlement of residents. However, the Finnish side stated that the territory ceded to the USSR was insufficient compensation. The Karelian Isthmus had a well-developed infrastructure: a network of railways and highways, buildings, warehouses and other structures. The territory transferred by the Soviet Union to Finland was an area covered with forests and swamps. In order to transform this territory into an area suitable for living and economic needs, it was necessary to invest considerable funds.
Moscow did not give up hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and offered various options conclusion of the contract. At the same time, he firmly stated: “Since we cannot move Leningrad, we will move the border to secure it.” At the same time, he referred to Ribbentrop, who explained the German attack on Poland by the need to secure Berlin. Large-scale military construction began on both sides of the border. The Soviet Union was preparing for offensive operations, and Finland for defensive operations. Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko, expressing the mood of the government, confirmed: “Everything has its limits. Finland cannot agree to the proposal of the Soviet Union and will defend its territory, its inviolability and independence by any means.”
The Soviet Union and Finland did not follow the path of finding a compromise acceptable to them. Stalin's imperial ambitions made themselves felt this time too. In the second half of November 1939, diplomatic methods gave way to threats and saber-rattling. The Red Army hastily prepared for military operations. On November 27, 1939, V. M. Molotov issued a statement in which he said that “yesterday, November 26, the Finnish White Guards undertook a new vile provocation by firing artillery fire at a military unit of the Red Army located in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus.” Disputes are still ongoing as to from whose side these shots were fired. The Finns already in 1939 tried to prove that the shelling could not have been carried out from their territory, and the whole story with the “Maynila incident” was nothing more than a provocation by Moscow.
On November 29, taking advantage of the shelling of its border positions, the USSR terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland. On November 30, hostilities began. On December 1, on Finnish territory, in the city of Terijoki (Zelenogorsk), where Soviet troops entered, on the initiative of Moscow, a new “people's government” of Finland was formed, headed by the Finnish communist O. Kuusinen. The next day, an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship was concluded between the USSR and the Kuusinen government, called the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic.
Events, however, did not develop as well as the Kremlin had hoped. The first stage of the war (November 30, 1939 - February 10, 1940) was particularly unsuccessful for the Red Army. To a large extent, this was due to an underestimation of the combat capability of the Finnish troops. Break through the Mannerheim Line on the move - a complex of defensive fortifications built in 1927-1939. and stretching along the front for 135 km, and in depth up to 95 km, it was not possible. During the fighting, the Red Army suffered huge losses.
In December 1939, the command stopped unsuccessful attempts to advance deep into Finnish territory. Careful preparations for the breakthrough began. The North-Western Front was formed, led by S.K. Timoshenko and member of the Military Council A.A. Zhdanov. The front included two armies, led by K. A. Meretskov and V. D. Grendal (replaced in early March 1940 by F. A. Parusinov). The total number of Soviet troops was increased by 1.4 times and brought to 760 thousand people.
Finland also strengthened its army by receiving military equipment and equipment from abroad. 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived from Scandinavia, the USA and other countries to fight the Soviets. England and France developed their plans for military action, intending to enter the war on the side of Finland. In London and Paris they did not hide their hostile plans towards the USSR.
February 11, 1940 began The final stage war. Soviet troops went on the offensive and broke through the Mannerheim Line. The main forces of the Karelian Army of Finland were defeated. On March 12, a peace treaty was concluded in the Kremlin after short negotiations. Military operations along the entire front ceased from 12 o'clock on March 13. In accordance with the signed agreement, the Karelian Isthmus, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were included in the USSR. The Soviet Union received a 30-year lease on the Hanko Peninsula to create a naval base on it “capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland from aggression.”
The cost of victory in the “winter war” turned out to be extremely high. In addition to the fact that the Soviet Union as an “aggressor state” was expelled from the League of Nations, during the 105 days of the war the Red Army lost at least 127 thousand people killed, died from wounds and went missing. About 250 thousand military personnel were wounded, frostbitten, and shell-shocked.
The "Winter War" demonstrated major miscalculations in the organization and training of the Red Army troops. Hitler, who closely followed the course of events in Finland, formulated the conclusion that the Red Army was a “colossus with feet of clay” that the Wehrmacht could easily cope with. Certain conclusions from the military campaign of 1939-1940. They did it in the Kremlin too. Thus, K.E. Voroshilov was replaced as People's Commissar of Defense by S.M. Timoshenko. The implementation of a set of measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the USSR began.
However, during the “winter war” and after its end, no significant strengthening of security in the north-west was achieved. Although the border was moved away from Leningrad and Murmansk railway, this did not prevent the fact that during the Great Patriotic War Leningrad fell into the siege ring. In addition, Finland did not become a friendly or at least neutral country to the USSR - revanchist elements prevailed in its leadership, who relied on supporting Nazi Germany.
I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia
POET'S VIEW
From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter,
What happened in the forties
Killed on ice in Finland.
It lay somehow awkwardly
Childishly small body.
The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew far away.
It seemed that the boy was not lying down,
And he was still running
Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...
Among the great cruel war,
I can’t imagine why,
I feel sorry for that distant fate
Like dead, alone,
It's like I'm lying there
Frozen, small, killed
In that unknown war,
Forgotten, small, lying.
A.T. Tvardovsky. Two lines.
NO, MOLOTOV!
Ivan goes to war with a cheerful song,
but, running into the Mannerheim line,
he starts singing a sad song,
as we hear it now:
Finland, Finland,
Ivan is heading there again.
Since Molotov promised that everything would be fine
and tomorrow in Helsinki they will be eating ice cream.
No, Molotov! No, Molotov!
Finland, Finland,
The Mannerheim Line is a serious obstacle,
and when terrible artillery fire began from Karelia
he silenced many Ivans.
No, Molotov! No, Molotov!
You lie even more than Bobrikov!
Finland, Finland,
The invincible Red Army is afraid.
Molotov already said to look for a dacha,
otherwise the Chukhons are threatening to capture us.
No, Molotov! No, Molotov!
You lie even more than Bobrikov!
Go beyond the Urals, go beyond the Urals,
there is a lot of space for a Molotov dacha.
We will send the Stalins and their henchmen there,
political instructors, commissars and Petrozavodsk swindlers.
No, Molotov! No, Molotov!
You lie even more than Bobrikov!
MANNERHEIM LINE: MYTH OR REALITY?
It is good form for supporters of the theory of a strong Red Army that broke through an impregnable defense line, always quoting General Badu, who built the “Mannerheim Line.” He wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. The famous “Mannerheim Line” was built from wood and granite, and where necessary from concrete. The anti-tank obstacles made in granite give the Mannerheim Line its greatest strength. Even twenty-five ton tanks cannot overcome them. Using explosions, the Finns built machine-gun and artillery nests in the granite, which were resistant to the most powerful bombs. Where there was a shortage of granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.”
In general, reading these lines, a person imagining the real “Mannerheim Line” will be terribly surprised. In Badu’s description, one sees before one’s eyes some gloomy granite cliffs with firing points carved into them at a dizzying height, over which vultures circle in anticipation of mountains of corpses of the attackers. Badu's description actually fits more closely to the Czech fortifications on the border with Germany. The Karelian Isthmus is a relatively flat area, and there is no need to cut down in the rocks simply due to the absence of the rocks themselves. But one way or another, the image of an impregnable castle was created in the mass consciousness and became firmly entrenched in it.
In reality, the Mannerheim Line was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of long-term Finnish structures were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete structures in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three bunkers of the “million-dollar” type had two levels, another three bunkers had three levels. Let me emphasize, precisely the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, slightly buried casemates with embrasures in the ground and completely buried galleries connecting them with the barracks. There were negligibly few buildings with what could be called floors. Below each other - such placement - small casemates directly above the premises of the lower tier were only in two bunkers (Sk-10 and Sj-5) and the gun casemate in Patoniemi. This is, to put it mildly, unimpressive. Even if you do not take into account the impressive structures of the Maginot Line, you can find many examples of much more advanced bunkers...
The survivability of the gouges was designed for Renault-type tanks in service in Finland, and did not meet modern requirements. Contrary to Badu's assertions, Finnish anti-tank guns showed during the war their low resistance to attacks from T-28 medium tanks. But it wasn’t even a matter of the quality of the “Mannerheim Line” structures. Any defensive line is characterized by the number of long-term fire structures (DOS) per kilometer. In total, on the “Mannerheim Line” there were 214 permanent structures for 140 km, of which 134 were machine gun or artillery DOS. Directly on the front line in the zone of combat contact in the period from mid-December 1939 to mid-February 1940 there were 55 bunkers, 14 shelters and 3 infantry positions, about half of which were obsolete structures from the first period of construction. For comparison, the Maginot Line had about 5,800 DOS in 300 defense nodes and a length of 400 km (density 14 DOS/km), the Siegfried Line had 16,000 fortifications (weaker than the French ones) on a front of 500 km (density - 32 structures per km) ... And the “Mannerheim Line” is 214 DOS (of which only 8 artillery) on a front of 140 km ( average density 1.5 DOS/km, in some areas - up to 3-6 DOS/km).
1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.
The Finnish government believed that accepting Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state and lead to Finland losing its neutrality and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.
The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) ran just 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.
The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.
The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was impossible to fulfill, because then Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.
On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30 at 8 a.m., troops of the Leningrad Front received orders to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyusti Kallio declared war on the USSR.
During "perestroika" several versions of the Maynila incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret unit of the NKVD. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.
From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.
The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered separate directions from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The "Mannerheim Line" had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite obstacles up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.
All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.
On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational obstacles and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.
At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.
The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.
On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.
Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing an offensive, enveloped the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, and cut the highway to Helsinki.
The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government asking for peace.
On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.
In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.
The losses of Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.
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