Presentation material
Economy of the USSR after World War II
Economic recovery after World War II
After the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the surrender of Japan on September 3, 1945, a new period began in the life of the Soviet state. The first years after the war, in fact, were a continuation of the “mobilization socialism” of the 30s, but on a joyful note, with the mood of the victors.
The return to peaceful life presupposed, first of all, the restoration of the economy and its reorientation towards peaceful purposes. The Soviet people could only rely on their own strength. The energy of war was so great and had such inertia that it could only be “switched” to peaceful construction. In 1948, the country reached and surpassed pre-war levels of industrial production. And in 1952, the volume of industrial production was 2.5 times higher than the level of 1940.
But it was more difficult to make up for the losses of the village, since it suffered great losses in people, 70 thousand villages were burned, 17 million heads of cattle were stolen. Moreover, in 1946, a terrible drought in a large area of the European part of the USSR led to famine, which led to the death of people, as if “continuing the war.” There has not been such a drought in the country for more than 50 years. Really in public consciousness The transition “to peaceful lines” occurred at the end of 1947, with the abolition of cards and monetary reform. Very quickly after the war, the USSR restored a favorable demographic situation, which is an important indicator of the state of society.
The restoration of industry and cities was carried out at the expense of the countryside, from which resources were withdrawn until the mid-50s. Purchasing prices for agricultural products remained at pre-war levels, and prices for rural goods increased many times over. Collective farms handed over half of their products to government supplies. The war reduced the number of able-bodied peasants, especially those with education, by a third. To strengthen leadership in 1949-1950. Collective farms were consolidated.
Among a number of activities carried out by the Soviet government after the war, one of the largest was the demobilization of a significant contingent of military personnel. In industry, the 8-hour working day was restored, vacations for workers and employees were resumed, and overtime was abolished. Metal production was at the 1934 level, tractor production was at the 1930 level. Quite often in the post-war autumn, winter crops were sown by hand. The equipment of all enterprises needed updating, the production of consumer goods was 3/5 of the pre-war level. Total losses from direct destruction of socialist property by the enemy reached 679 billion rubles.
Already in August 1945, the State Planning Committee began to develop a draft of the fourth five-year plan - a plan for the restoration and further development of the country's economy. The main goal of the plan is to achieve pre-war production levels and then significantly exceed them. From a financial point of view, this required huge investments to improve living and working conditions. And investment is possible only with large savings, which are also created at a high rate. At the same time, it was necessary to strengthen money circulation, strengthen credit relations and increase the purchasing power of the ruble. The second group of events was resolved by the monetary reform of 1947, which I will talk about a little later. And the first group of events was an integral part of the five-year financial support program.
Of course, it was necessary to use methods of accumulation that had already proven themselves: self-financing, reducing production costs, mobilizing reserves, increasing profitability, increasing profits, strict economy, eliminating production losses, reducing unproductive costs. However, if we limited ourselves to only this, the funds would not be enough. Since, due to the alarming international situation and the beginning of the Cold War, defense spending was not reduced to the extent expected by the USSR Government. In addition, the rapid progress of military technology required significant funds. Enormous costs were required to restore what was destroyed. The transition of the economy to peaceful footing was not cheap. Costs for further development households, for social and cultural events and consumer services. In general, expenses not only did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased noticeably from year to year.
Meanwhile, some sources of income declined with the end of the war. The war tax was abolished. The practice of transferring money to savings banks for unused vacations has been stopped. Cash and clothing lotteries have ceased to be held. Payments by the population when signing up for a loan have decreased. The amount of agricultural tax has decreased. Interests Soviet citizens demanded a reduction in prices for all goods in cooperative and state trade.
To sell more, you need to have something to trade. The population was in dire need of clothing, shoes, and household items.
Consumer goods were not enough. Because, for example, the textile industry was provided with raw materials, but there was not enough fuel and work force. The ranks of textile workers decreased by approximately 500 thousand. and the coal mines are partly flooded, partly abandoned for want of miners. The Ministry of Finance sent its first post-war proposal to the Council of Ministers: urgently develop personnel training for the textile industry; demobilize everyone related to it; redistribute labor by removing surpluses from other industries and transferring them to wool, cotton, knitting and silk weaving mills.
The second proposal concerned the mobilization of fuel resources for textile factories and factories. Due to shortage production capacity light industry was transferred large reserves from heavy industry. The Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks (the central committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks) promptly managed the matter, promptly suggested the right decisions, involving all parties, administrative and economic levels from top to bottom in their implementation. The country was entering peaceful life on a broad front.
We achieved an increase in market funds: the rationed supply of the population improved, and a prerequisite arose for a reduction in prices in “commercial” trade.
The issues of improving industrial management methods, increasing the attention of business executives to every penny, and strengthening the finances of enterprises were again on the agenda. Until 1951, it was not allowed to write off at least 5 thousand rubles from the balance sheet of even Union-Republican enterprises and organizations.
These examples indicate the well-known cruelty of financial discipline of those years. There was an undoubted disadvantage here, which was reflected in some constraint of actions on the ground. But there was also an undoubted plus, which led to tangible financial gains. The savings were transferred to the lungs and food industry.
In order to expand sources of income, the ministry proposed increasing the volume of production of consumer goods, without which it would not have been possible to carry out a monetary reform and abolish the rationing system for supplying the population. There were enough textile raw materials, but wool had to be purchased abroad. There were enough foreign exchange resources, since gold only accumulated during the war.
At this stage, it was also proposed to further accelerate the restructuring of industry in a peaceful manner. Redistribute labor reserves, especially through the non-productive sphere, and direct more people in the light and food industries. Provide for an increasing supply of fuel and restore broad specialization. Then it was proposed to set more precise, increased targets for increasing labor productivity and profitability, reducing production costs, and making a profit in these industries.
The implementation of all these proposals has brought tangible benefits. The country received more income than planned. The financial basis for the 1947 reform was formed faster. By mid-1949, the amount of money in circulation was 1.35 times higher than before the war, and retail trade turnover was 1.65 times higher than before the war. This ratio of products and their commodity equivalent was justified. The structure of trade turnover has improved. It was possible to achieve a reduction in prices for goods. Such a reduction was carried out seven times in 1947-1954, and by the end of the fourth Five-Year Plan, state prices had decreased by 41 percent, and by 1954 they were on average 2.3 times lower than before the reform. The strength of the financial base was also evident in the fact that the state, relying on additional reserves, was able to increase planned tasks in the second (1947) and fourth (1949) years of the Five-Year Plan. And this, in turn, made it possible already during the fourth five-year plan for some industries to work towards the next one, increasing national income compared to 1940 by 64 percent, and planned capital investments by 22 percent.
Introduction
The purpose of writing the test is to characterize the international situation after the Second World War. Find out what the relationship of forces was between the countries of the “capitalist” and “socialist” blocs in the international arena. Identify the states that adopted the Soviet model of economic and political development. The meaning of the term “cold war” should be understood. Understand who initiated it. How did it affect the Korean War of 1950-1953? Reveal the essence of the “Marshal Plan” and the attitude of the Soviet leadership towards it. Reveal the content of plans for the restoration of the national economy after the Great Patriotic War. Formulate the main objectives of economic policy after the war. Understand what successes have been achieved in industrial development. Find out how the monetary reform of 1947 affected the standard of living Soviet people. Justify the reasons for the tightening of the political regime of I.V. Stalin in the post-war period. Pay attention to the “Leningrad case” and the “doctors’ case.” It is necessary to understand the meaning of the term “cosmopolitanism”. Determine how repressive policies affected the spheres of science and culture.
International situation. Cold War Politics
As a result of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War, the situation in the world radically changed. The countries of Germany and Japan were defeated and temporarily lost their role as great powers, and the positions of England and France were significantly weakened. At the same time, the share of the United States has increased immeasurably. During the war years, their industrial production not only did not decrease, but also increased by 47%. The United States controlled about 80% of the capitalist world's gold reserves and accounted for 46% of global industrial production.
The war marked the beginning of the collapse of the colonial system. Within a few years, such largest countries like India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon, Egypt. In total, 25 states gained independence in the post-war decade.
The most important feature The post-war period saw people's democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and a number of Asian countries. During the fight against fascism in these countries, a united front of democratic forces emerged, in which the communist parties played the leading role. After the overthrow of the fascist and collaborationist governments, governments were created that included representatives of all anti-fascist parties and movements. They carried out a number of democratic reforms. In the economic field, a multi-structured economy has developed - the coexistence of the state, state capitalist, cooperative and private sectors. In the political sphere, a multi-party parliamentary form of political power was created, in the presence of opposition parties, with a separation of powers. This was an attempt to transition to socialist transformations in our own way.
However, starting in 1947, the Stalinist model of the political system, borrowed from the USSR, was imposed on these countries. The Cominform Bureau, created in 1947 to replace the Comintern, played an extremely negative role in this. A one-party system was established, usually through the merger of communist and social democratic parties. Opposition political parties were banned and their leaders were repressed. Transformations similar to the Soviet ones began - mass nationalization of enterprises, forced collectivization.
There has been a shift to the left in the political spectrum of European countries. Fascist and right-wing parties left the scene. The influence of the communists grew sharply. In 1945 - 1947 they were part of the governments of France, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Finland. There has been a tendency towards rapprochement between communists and social democrats. The system of modern democracy began to take shape.
The role has grown immeasurably Soviet Union- a country that made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism. Not a single international problem was solved without his participation.
After the war, the foundations were laid for the split of the world into two opposing camps, which determined all world practice for many years. During the World War, an alliance of great powers was formed - the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France. The presence of a common enemy made it possible to overcome differences and find compromises. The decisions of the Tehran (1943), Crimean (1945), Potsdam (1945) conferences were of a general democratic nature and could become the basis for a post-war peace settlement. Great value The UN was also formed (1945), whose charter reflected the principles of peaceful existence, sovereignty and equality of all countries of the world. However, this unique chance to create lasting peace for many generations remained unused. The Second World War was replaced by the Cold War.
The term “Cold War” itself was coined by US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles. Its essence is a political, economic, ideological confrontation between two systems, balancing on the brink of war.
It makes no sense to argue about who started the Cold War; arguments are given by both sides. It is illogical and unwise to completely whitewash one side and place all the blame on the other. Already during the war with Germany, some circles in the United States and England seriously considered plans to start a war with Russia through Germany. The fact of negotiations that Germany conducted at the end of the war with the Western powers on a separate peace is widely known. Russia's impending entry into the war with Japan, “which would make it possible to save the lives of millions of American boys,” tipped the scales and prevented these plans from being realized.
The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945) was not so much a military operation as a political act aimed at putting pressure on the USSR.
The turn from cooperation with the Soviet Union to confrontation with it began after the death of President F. Roosevelt. The beginning of the Cold War is usually subsidized by W. Churchill’s speech in the American city of Fulton in March 1946, in which he called on the people of the United States to jointly fight against Soviet Russia and its agents - the communist parties.
The economic reasons for the change in US policy were that the US became immeasurably rich during the war. With the end of the war they were threatened with a crisis of overproduction. At the same time, the economies of European countries were destroyed, their markets were open to American goods, but there was nothing to pay for these goods. The United States was afraid to invest capital in the economies of these countries, since there was a strong influence of the leftists there, and the situation for investment was unstable. In the USA, a plan was developed, called the Marshall Plan. European countries were offered assistance to rebuild their devastated economies. Loans were given to purchase American goods. The proceeds were not exported, but were invested in the construction of enterprises in these countries. The Marshall Plan was adopted by 16 Western European states. The political condition for providing assistance was the removal of communists from governments. In 1947, the communists were removed from the governments of Western European countries. Help was also offered to Eastern European countries. Poland and Czechoslovakia began negotiations, but under pressure from the USSR they refused assistance. At the same time, the United States broke the Soviet-American loan agreement and adopted a law banning exports to the USSR.
The ideological basis for the Cold War was the Truman Doctrine, put forward by the US President in 1947. According to this doctrine, the conflict between Western democracy and communism is irreconcilable. The tasks of the USA are the fight against communism throughout the world, “containing communism”, “throwing back communism into the borders of the USSR.” American responsibility for the events taking place throughout the world was proclaimed; all these events were viewed through the prism of the confrontation between communism and Western democracy, the USSR and the USA.
Monopoly possession of the atomic bomb allowed the United States, as they believed, to dictate its will to the world. In 1945, plans began to develop plans for an atomic strike on the USSR. Plans for “Pincher” (1946), “Broiler” (1947), and “Dropshot” (1949) were consistently developed. American historians, without denying such plans, say that they were talking only about operational military plans that are drawn up in any country in case of war. But after atomic bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the presence of such plans could not but cause a sharp response from the Soviet Union.
In 1946, a strategic military command was created in the United States, which controlled aircraft carrying atomic weapons. In 1948, bombers with atomic weapons were stationed in Great Britain and West Germany. The Soviet Union was surrounded by a network of American military bases. In 1949 there were more than 300 of them.
The United States pursued a policy of creating military-political blocs against the USSR. In 1949, the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) was created. A course was taken to restore Germany's military potential. In 1949, in violation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the Federal Republic of Germany was created from three zones of occupation - British, American and French, which joined NATO in the same year.
The Soviet Union also pursued a policy of confrontation. The actions of the USSR in the international arena were by no means always thoughtful, and its policy cannot be called completely peace-loving. Thus, the beginning of the Cold War was to some extent provoked by the USSR’s policy towards Poland. The Soviet Union did not agree to the creation of general elections in Poland and refused to return the eastern Polish lands received under a pact with Germany. In his entire foreign policy, I. Stalin also proceeded from the concept of a split of the world into two camps - the camp of imperialism led by the USA and the camp of socialism led by the USSR - and viewed all events in the world through the prism of the confrontation between these two camps.
So, at a secret meeting in the Kremlin in January 1951. JV Stalin stated that it was possible to “establish socialism throughout Europe” within the “next four years” and that the foreign and domestic policies of communist-led “people’s democratic” countries should be subordinated to this goal. “We had our own hopes,” N.S. Khrushchev later recalled, “just as Russia emerged from the First World War, carried out a revolution and established Soviet power, Europe, too, having survived the catastrophe of the Second World War, may become Soviet. Everyone would then follow the path from capitalism to socialism. Stalin was convinced that post-war Germany would organize a revolution and create a proletarian state... We all believed in this. We had the same hopes for France and Italy."
Ministry of General and Vocational Education
Russian Federation
Ulyanovsk State Technical University
Department of National History and Culture
Topic: Economy of the USSR after World War II
Compiled by: Safronov V. A.
Head: Osipov S.V.
Manager's signature
abstract
Ulyanovsk 2003
Plan
Introduction
- The state of the USSR economy after the end of the war.
- Restoration of industry, rearmament of the army.
- Economic discussions 1945-1946
- Monetary reform of 1947 and the development of domestic trade.
- Problems and difficulties of the agricultural sector.
- Disadvantages of administrative-command methods of managing the national economy.
Conclusion
Bibliography.
Introduction
In the life of the Soviet state after the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the surrender of Japan on September 3, 1945, the new stage. In 1945, the Victory gave rise to people's hopes for a better life, weakening the pressure of the totalitarian state on the individual. The potential for changes in the political regime, economy, and culture opened up.
The “democratic impulse” of the war, however, was opposed by the entire power of the System created by Stalin. Its positions not only were not weakened during the war, but seemed to have become even stronger in the post-war period. Even the victory in the war itself was identified in the mass consciousness with victory totalitarian regime. Under these conditions, the struggle between democratic and totalitarian tendencies became the leitmotif of social development.
The Soviet Union was a victorious but completely destroyed country. In order to win the greatest war in history, it was necessary to suffer losses that exceeded the losses of the enemy and, in general, the losses of any nation in any war. Only through the efforts of millions could the destroyed cities and factories be raised from the ruins and the infrastructure restored. This period cannot but worry us citizens of today's Russia.
In the course of my work, I reviewed the material of various authors, not only the views of our historians, but also the work of foreign researchers.
Book by English historian Geoffrey Hosking History of the Soviet Union. 1917-1991 is an objective overview of the history of a once powerful state, a look beyond the barriers installed in our minds. The work focuses on the socio-political aspect of society. The post-war period (1945-1953), according to the author, is a period of established totalitarianism, a time of one-man Stalinist rule, when economics and politics were inseparable. This work is distinguished by simplicity of presentation and abundance of facts.
Textbook History of the USSR (written in 1990 under the leadership of V.P. Ostrovsky) - the first official tutorial the beginning of the perestroika era, in which little-known events of our history, primarily Soviet history, were openly covered.
Monogram of Sergei Kara-Murza History of the Soviet state and law a fresh look at the development of the Soviet state. The work takes a critical approach to examining the life of the Soviet state in the post-war period. S. Kara-Murza, not without reason, considers all these years to be an inextricable whole, during which the country and society overcame the legacy of the war.
The textbook by Timoshina T.M. Economic history of Russia reveals the economic consequences of the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet state, shows the development of the national economy of the USSR after the Great Patriotic War, the processes occurring in the state and society in the period from 1945 to 1953.
1. The state of the USSR economy after the end of the war.
The victory over fascism came at a high cost to the USSR. A military hurricane raged for several years over the main regions of the most developed part of the Soviet Union. Most industrial centers in the European part of the country were hit. All the main breadbaskets of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and a significant part of the Volga region were caught in the flames of war. So much was destroyed that restoration could take many years, even decades.
Ministry of General and Vocational Education
Russian Federation
Ulyanovsk State Technical University
Department of National History and Culture
ABSTRACT
Topic: “The Economy of the USSR after the Second World War”
Compiled by: Safronov V. A.
Head: Osipov S.V.
Manager's signature
abstract
Ulyanovsk 2003
Plan
Introduction
The state of the USSR economy after the end of the war.
Restoration of industry, rearmament of the army.
Economic discussions 1945-1946
Monetary reform of 1947 and the development of domestic trade.
Problems and difficulties of the agricultural sector.
Disadvantages of administrative-command methods of managing the national economy.
Conclusion
Bibliography.
Introduction
In the life of the Soviet state after the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the surrender of Japan on September 3, 1945, a completely new stage began. In 1945, the Victory gave rise to people's hopes for a better life, weakening the pressure of the totalitarian state on the individual. The potential for changes in the political regime, economy, and culture opened up.
The “democratic impulse” of the war, however, was opposed by the entire power of the System created by Stalin. Its positions not only were not weakened during the war, but seemed to have become even stronger in the post-war period. Even the victory in the war itself was identified in the mass consciousness with the victory of the totalitarian regime. Under these conditions, the struggle between democratic and totalitarian tendencies became the leitmotif of social development.
The Soviet Union was a victorious but completely destroyed country. In order to win the greatest war in history, it was necessary to suffer losses that exceeded the losses of the enemy and, in general, the losses of any nation in any war. Only through the efforts of millions could the destroyed cities and factories be raised from the ruins and the infrastructure restored. This period cannot but worry us - citizens of today's Russia.
In the course of my work, I reviewed material from various authors - not only the views of our historians, but also the works of foreign researchers.
The book of the English historian Geoffrey Hosking “History of the Soviet Union. 1917-1991" is an objective overview of the history of a once powerful state, a look beyond the barriers established in our minds. The work focuses on the socio-political aspect of society. The post-war period (1945-1953), according to the author, is a period of established totalitarianism, a time of one-man Stalinist rule, when economics and politics were inseparable. This work is distinguished by simplicity of presentation and abundance of facts.
The textbook “History of the USSR” (written in 1990 under the leadership of V.P. Ostrovsky) is the first official textbook of the beginning of the “perestroika” era, which openly covered little-known events of our history, primarily Soviet history.
Monogram by Sergei Kara-Murza “History of the Soviet State and Law” is a fresh look at the development of the Soviet state. The work takes a critical approach to examining the life of the Soviet state in the post-war period. S. Kara-Murza, not without reason, considers all these years to be an inextricable whole, during which the country and society overcame the legacy of the war.
The textbook by Timoshina T.M. “Economic History of Russia” reveals the economic consequences of the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet state, shows the development of the national economy of the USSR after the Great Patriotic War, the processes occurring in the state and society in the period from 1945 to 1953.
1. The state of the USSR economy after the end of the war.
The victory over fascism came at a high cost to the USSR. A military hurricane raged for several years over the main regions of the most developed part of the Soviet Union. Most industrial centers in the European part of the country were hit. All the main breadbaskets - Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and a significant part of the Volga region - were caught in the flames of war. So much was destroyed that restoration could take many years, even decades.
The war resulted in huge human and material losses for the USSR. It claimed almost 27 million human lives. 1,710 cities and towns were destroyed, 70 thousand villages were destroyed, 31,850 factories and factories, 1,135 mines, 65 thousand km of railways were blown up and disabled. Cultivated areas decreased by 36.8 million hectares. The country has lost approximately one third of its national wealth.
In the context of the transition from war to peace, questions arose about the ways of further development of the country's economy, about its structure and management system. It was not only about the conversion of military production, but also about the advisability of maintaining the existing economic model. In many ways, it was formed under the emergency conditions of the thirties. The war further strengthened this “extraordinary” nature of the economy and left its mark on its structure and system of organization. The years of war revealed the strong features of the existing economic model, and in particular, very high mobilization capabilities, the ability to quickly establish mass production of high-quality weapons and provide the army and military-industrial complex with the necessary resources by overstraining other sectors of the economy. But the war also strongly emphasized the weaknesses of the Soviet economy: the high proportion of manual labor, low productivity and the quality of non-military products. What was tolerable in peacetime, pre-war times, now required a radical solution.
The post-war period required a restructuring of the type of work of government bodies to solve two contradictory problems: the conversion of the huge military-industrial complex that emerged during the war, with the goal of quickly modernizing the economy; the creation of two fundamentally new weapons systems that guarantee the security of the country - nuclear weapons and invulnerable means of their delivery (ballistic missiles). Job large number departments began to unite into intersectoral target programs. This was a qualitatively new type of public administration, although it was not so much the structure of the bodies that changed, but rather the functions. These changes are less noticeable than structural ones, but the state is a system, and the process in it is no less important than the structure.
The conversion of the military industry was carried out quickly, increasing the technical level of civilian industries (and thereby allowing the transition to the creation of new military industries). The People's Commissariat of Ammunition was rebuilt into the People's Commissariat of Agricultural Engineering, etc. (in 1946 the people's commissariats began to be called ministries).
As a result of the mass evacuation of industry to the east and the destruction of 32 thousand industrial enterprises in the European part during the occupation and hostilities, the economic geography of the country changed greatly. Immediately after the war, a corresponding reorganization of the management system began - along with the sectoral principle, they began to introduce the territorial principle into it. The point was to bring management bodies closer to enterprises, for the sake of which the ministries were disaggregated: during the war there were 25, and in 1947 there were 34. For example, coal mining was now managed by the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry of the western regions and the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry of the eastern regions. The People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry was similarly divided.
On this wave, among economic managers and economists, aspirations began to appear to reorganize the economic management system, to soften those aspects of it that restrained the initiative and independence of enterprises, and in particular, to weaken the shackles of over-centralization.
An explanation for such sentiments can be sought in the situation that developed during the war. The country's economy during the war, the life of the population, and the organization of work of local authorities acquired unique features. With the transfer of the work of the main industries to meet the needs of the front, the output of peaceful products sharply decreased; ensuring the life of the population and supplying them with the most necessary goods and services began to be carried out primarily by local authorities, organizing small-scale production, attracting handicraftsmen and artisans to the production of necessary goods. As a result, handicraft industry developed, private trade revived, not only in food, but in industrial goods. Centralized supplies covered only a small part of the population.
The war taught many leaders at all levels to have a certain independence and initiative. After the war, local authorities made attempts to expand the production of goods for the population not only in small handicraft workshops, but also in large factories subordinated directly to central ministries. The Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, together with the leadership of the Leningrad region, organized a fair in the city in 1947, at which enterprises not only in Russia, but also in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other republics sold materials they did not need. The fair opened up the possibility of establishing independent economic ties between industrial enterprises bypassing the center. It contributed to a certain extent to expanding the scope of action market relations(a few years later, the organizers of this fair paid with their lives for their initiative).
Hopes for changes in economic management turned out to be unrealistic. From the late 40s, a course was taken to strengthen the previous administrative-command methods of leadership and to further develop the existing economic model.
Stalin's position became decisive - all attempts at change in this area ran into his imperial ambitions. As a result, the Soviet economy returned to the militaristic model with all its inherent shortcomings.
Also during this period, the question arose: what was the Soviet economic system (it was called socialism, but this is a purely conventional concept that does not answer the question). Before the end of the war, life posed such clear and urgent tasks that there was no great need for theory. Now it was necessary to understand the meaning of the plan, goods, money and market in the economy of the USSR.
The country began to restore the economy in the year of the war, when in 1943. a special party and government resolution was adopted “On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation.” With the colossal efforts of the Soviet people, by the end of the war in these areas it was possible to restore industrial production to a third of the 1940 level. The liberated areas in 1944 provided over half of the national grain procurements, a quarter of livestock and poultry, and about a third of dairy products.
However, the country faced the central task of reconstruction only after the end of the war.
At the end of May 1945, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer part of the defense enterprises to the production of goods for the population. Somewhat later, a law was passed on the demobilization of thirteen ages of army personnel. These decisions marked the beginning of the Soviet Union's transition to peaceful construction. In September 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished. All functions of governing the country were concentrated in the hands of the Council of People's Commissars (in March 1946, transformed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR).
Measures were taken aimed at resuming normal work in enterprises and institutions. Mandatory overtime work was abolished, the 8-hour working day and annual paid leave were restored. The budget for the third and fourth quarters of 1945 and for 1946 was reviewed. Appropriations for military needs were reduced and expenditures for the development of civilian sectors of the economy increased. The restructuring of the national economy and social life in relation to peacetime conditions was completed mainly in 1946. In March 1946, the Supreme Council of the USSR approved a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1946-1950. The main objective of the Five Year Plan was to restore the areas of the country that were subject to occupation, achieve pre-war levels of industrial and agricultural development, and then surpass them. The plan provided for the priority development of heavy and defense industries. Significant financial resources, material and labor resources were allocated here. It was planned to develop new coal regions and expand the metallurgical base in the east of the country. One of the conditions for fulfilling planned targets was the maximum use of scientific and technological progress.
1946 was the most difficult year in the post-war development of industry. To switch enterprises to the production of civilian products, production technology was changed, new equipment was created, and personnel retraining was carried out. In accordance with the five-year plan, restoration work began in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The coal industry of Donbass was revived. Zaporizhstal was restored, and the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant came into operation. At the same time, construction of new and reconstruction of existing plants and factories was carried out. Over the five-year period, over 6.2 thousand industrial enterprises were restored and rebuilt. 1 Particular attention was paid to the development of metallurgy, mechanical engineering, fuel and energy and military-industrial complexes. The foundations of nuclear energy and the radio-electronic industry were laid. New industry giants emerged in the Urals, Siberia, the republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia (Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead-Zinc Plant, Kutaisi Automobile Plant). The country's first long-distance gas pipeline, Saratov - Moscow, went into operation. The Rybinsk and Sukhumi hydroelectric power stations began to operate.
Enterprises were equipped with new technology. The mechanization of labor-intensive processes in the iron and steel and coal industries has increased. Electrification of production continued. By the end of the Five-Year Plan, the electrical output of labor in industry was one and a half times higher than the level of 1940.
Work to restore the industry was largely completed in 1948. But at some metallurgy enterprises it continued in the early 50s. The massive industrial heroism of the Soviet people, expressed in numerous labor initiatives (the introduction of high-speed work methods, the movement for saving metal and high quality products, the movement of multi-machine operators, etc.), contributed to the successful implementation of planned targets. By the end of the Five-Year Plan, the level of industrial production was 73% higher than the pre-war level. However, the priority development of heavy industry and the redistribution in its favor of funds from the light and food industries led to further deformation of the industrial structure towards an increase in the production of group “A” products.
The restoration of industry and transport, new industrial construction led to an increase in the number of the working class.
After the war, the country was in ruins, and the question of choosing the path of economic development became acute. An alternative could be market reforms, but the existing political system was not ready for this step. The directive economy still retained the mobilization character that was inherent in it during the first five-year plans and during the war. Millions of people were organized in an organized manner to restore the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant, metallurgical plants of Krivoy Rog, Donbass mines, as well as to build new factories, hydroelectric power stations, etc.
The development of the USSR economy rested on its excessive centralization. All economic issues, large and small, were resolved only in the center, and local economic authorities were strictly limited in resolving any matters. The main material and monetary resources necessary to fulfill planned targets were distributed through a large number of bureaucratic authorities. Departmental disunity, mismanagement and confusion led to constant downtime in production, storming, huge material costs, and absurd transportation from one end to another of the vast country.
The Soviet Union received reparations from Germany in the amount of $4.3 billion. As reparations, industrial equipment, including even entire factory complexes, was exported from Germany and other defeated countries to the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet economy was never able to properly manage this wealth due to general mismanagement, and valuable equipment, machines, etc. were gradually turned into scrap metal. 1.5 million German and 0.5 million Japanese prisoners of war worked in the USSR. In addition, the Gulag system during this period contained approximately 8-9 million prisoners, whose work was practically unpaid.
The division of the world into two hostile camps had negative consequences for the country's economy. From 1945 to 1950, foreign trade turnover with Western countries decreased by 35%, which significantly affected the Soviet economy, deprived new technology and advanced technologies. That's why in the mid-1950s. The Soviet Union faced the need for profound socio-economic and political changes. Since the path of progressive changes of a political nature was blocked, narrowed to possible (and even then not very serious) amendments to liberalization, the most constructive ideas that appeared in the first post-war years, concerned not politics, but the economic sphere. The Central Committee of the CPSU(b) considered various proposals from economists in this regard. Among them is the manuscript “Post-war Domestic Economy”, owned by S.D. Alexander. The essence of his proposals boiled down to the following:
transformation of state-owned enterprises into joint-stock or share partnerships, in which the workers and employees themselves are the shareholders, and are governed by an authorized elected board of shareholders;
decentralization of the supply of raw materials to enterprises by creating district and regional industrial supplies instead of supplies under the people's commissariats and central administrations;
abolition of the system of state procurement of agricultural products, granting collective and state farms the right to free sale on the market;
reform of the monetary system taking into account gold parity;
liquidation of state trade and transfer of its functions to trading cooperatives and share partnerships.
These ideas can be considered as the foundations of a new economic model, built on the principles of the market and partial denationalization of the economy, very bold and progressive for that time. True, the ideas of S.D. Alexander had to share the fate of other radical projects; they were classified as “harmful” and written off in the “archive”.
The Center, despite certain hesitations, remained staunchly committed to its previous course on fundamental issues concerning the fundamentals of constructing economic and political models of development. Therefore, the center was receptive only to those ideas that did not affect the fundamentals of the supporting structure, i.e. did not encroach on the exclusive role of the state in matters of management, financial support, control and did not contradict the main tenets of ideology.
Subject to these conditions, the nomenklatura was ready to agree to reforms within certain limits, beyond which it could not and did not want to go. During the reforms, it was necessary to reorganize or abolish the Gulag system, stimulate the development of the agricultural sector of the economy, carry out reforms in the social sphere, and reduce the tension of constant “mobilization” in solving economic problems and in the search for internal and external enemies.
Political changes in the USSR needed to be consolidated by changes in the economy. Speaking in August 1953 at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, G.M. Malenkov clearly formulated the main directions of economic policy: a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods, large investments in light industry. Such a radical turn, it would seem, should have forever changed the fundamental guidelines for the development of the Soviet economy, established in previous decades.
But this, as the history of the country’s development has shown, did not happen. After the war, various administrative reforms were carried out several times, but they did not make fundamental changes to the essence of the planning administrative system. In the mid-1950s, attempts were made to abandon the use of mobilization measures in solving economic problems. After a few years, it became clear that this task was insurmountable for the Soviet economy, since economic incentives for development were incompatible with the command system. It was still necessary to organize masses of people to carry out various projects. Examples include calls for young people to participate in the development of virgin lands, in the construction of grandiose “communist construction projects” in Siberia and the Far East.
An example of a not very well-thought-out reform is the attempt to restructure management along territorial lines (1957). During this reform, many sectoral union ministries were abolished, and territorial councils of the national economy (economic councils) appeared in their place. The only ministries in charge of military production, the Ministry of Defense, Foreign and Internal Affairs and some others were not affected by this restructuring. Thus, an attempt was made to decentralize control.
In total, 105 economic administrative regions were created in the country, including 70 in the RSFSR, 11 in Ukraine, 9 in Kazakhstan, 4 in Uzbekistan, and in the remaining republics - one economic council. The functions of the USSR State Planning Committee remained only general planning and coordination of territorial and sectoral plans, distribution of the most important funds among the union republics.
The first results of the management reform were quite successful. So, already in 1958, i.e. a year after it began, the increase in national income was 12.4% (compared to 7% in 1957). The scale of production specialization and intersectoral cooperation has increased, and the process of creating and introducing new technology into production has accelerated. But, according to experts, the resulting effect is not only a consequence of perestroika itself. The point is also that for some period the enterprises turned out to be “ownerless” (when the ministries actually no longer functioned and economic councils had not yet been formed), and it was during this period that they began to work noticeably more productively, without feeling any leadership “from above.” But as soon as the new management system took shape, the previous negative phenomena in the economy began to intensify. Moreover, new aspects have appeared: localism, stricter administration, an ever-growing “in-house” local bureaucracy.
All reorganizations ultimately did not lead to noticeable success. Moreover, if in 1951-1955. industrial production increased by 85%, agricultural production - by 20.5%, and in 1956-1960 by 64.3 and 30%, respectively (and the growth of agricultural production was mainly due to the development of new lands), then in 1961-1965 these figures began to decline and amounted to 51 and 11% 1 .
So, centrifugal forces noticeably weakened the country’s economic potential; many economic councils turned out to be incapable of solving major production problems. Already in 1959, the consolidation of economic councils began: weaker ones began to join more powerful ones (by analogy with the consolidation of collective farms). The centripetal tendency turned out to be stronger. Soon enough, the previous hierarchical structure in the country's economy was restored.
Traditionally, so-called grassroots planning has been weak, i.e. drawing up plans at the enterprise level. Basic plan targets were often adjusted, so the plan turned into a purely nominal document, directly related only to the process of calculating wages and bonus payments, which depended on the percentage of fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan.
Since, as noted above, the plans were constantly being adjusted, the plans that were carried out (or rather not carried out) were completely different from those that were adopted at the beginning of the planning period (year, five-year plan). The State Planning Committee “bargained” with the ministries, and the ministries with enterprises about what plan they could implement with the available resources. But the supply of resources for such a plan was still disrupted, and “bidding” began again on the figures of the plan, on the amount of supplies, etc.
All this confirms the conclusion that the Soviet economy depended to a greater extent not on competent economic developments, but on political decisions, constantly changing in directly opposite directions and most often leading to a dead end. Fruitless attempts were made in the country to improve the structure of the state apparatus, to vest ministers, heads of central administrations, and directors of enterprises with new rights or, conversely, to limit their powers, to divide existing planning bodies and create new ones, etc. There were many such “reforms” in the 1950s and 1960s, but none of them brought real improvements to the functioning of the command system.
Basically, when determining the priorities of post-war economic development, when developing the fourth five-year plan - the recovery plan - the country's leadership actually returned to the pre-war model of economic development and pre-war methods of conducting economic policy. This means that the development of industry, primarily heavy industry, had to be carried out not only to the detriment of the interests of the agricultural economy and the sphere of consumption (i.e., as a result of the appropriate distribution of budget funds).
2. Restoration of industry, rearmament of the army.
In the first post-war years, the work of Soviet people differed little from the military emergency. The constant shortage of food (the rationing system was abolished only in 1947), the most difficult working and living conditions, and the high level of morbidity and mortality were explained to the population by the fact that the long-awaited peace had just arrived and life was about to get better. However, this did not happen.
After the monetary reform of 1947, with an average salary of about 500 rubles per month, the cost of a kilogram of bread was 3-4 rubles, a kilogram of meat - 28-32 rubles, butter- over 60 rubles, a dozen eggs - about 11 rubles. To buy a wool suit, you had to pay three average monthly salaries. As before the war, from one to one and a half monthly salaries per year were spent on the purchase of bonds of forced government loans. Many working families still lived in dugouts and barracks, and sometimes worked in the open air or in unheated rooms, using old or worn-out equipment. However, some wartime restrictions were lifted: the 8-hour working day and annual leave were reintroduced, and forced overtime was abolished. The restoration took place in conditions of a sharp increase in migration processes. Caused by the demobilization of the army (its number decreased from 11.4 million people in 1945 to 2.9 million in 1948), the repatriation of Soviet citizens from Europe, the return of refugees and evacuees from the eastern regions of the country. Another difficulty in the development of industry was its conversion, which was largely completed by 1947.
Huge losses in the war resulted in a shortage of labor, which, in turn, led to an increase in turnover of personnel seeking more favorable working conditions. At some enterprises, attempts were made to introduce self-financing. But to consolidate these innovations, no material incentive measures were taken; on the contrary, as labor productivity increased, prices were lowered. The administrative-command system benefited from achieving high production results without additional investments.
For the first time in many years after the war, there was a tendency towards a wider use of scientific and technical developments in production, but it manifested itself mainly only at enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC), where, in the conditions of the outbreak of the Cold War, the process of developing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons was underway. , new missile systems, new models of tank and aircraft equipment.
Along with the priority development of the military-industrial complex, preference was also given to mechanical engineering, metallurgy, fuel, and energy industries, the development of which accounted for 88% of capital investments in industry. The light and food industries, as before, were financed on a residual basis (12%) and, naturally, did not satisfy even the minimum needs of the population.
In total, during the years of the 4th Five-Year Plan (1946-1950), 6,200 large enterprises were restored and rebuilt. In 1950, according to official data, industrial production exceeded pre-war levels by 73% (and in the new union republics - Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Moldova - 2-3 times). True, reparations and products of joint Soviet-East German enterprises were also included here.
The main creator of these undoubted successes was the Soviet people. Through his incredible efforts and sacrifices, as well as the high mobilization capabilities of the directive economic model, seemingly impossible economic results were achieved. At the same time, the traditional policy of redistributing funds from the light and food industries, agriculture and social sphere in favor of heavy industry also played a role. Significant assistance was also provided by reparations received from Germany ($4.3 billion), which provided up to half the volume of industrial equipment installed during these years. In addition, the labor of almost 9 million Soviet prisoners and about 2 million German and Japanese prisoners of war, who also contributed to the post-war reconstruction, was free, but very effective.
The economy quickly picked up the pace of its development. The volume of engineering products has increased significantly, and the production of oil, gas, coal and other raw materials has increased. The production of steel and non-ferrous metals has increased significantly, and production technology has made a step forward. Noticeable successes in economic restoration were achieved in the first years after the end of the war. In the shortest possible time, the DneproGES was restored, and the industrial centers of the South of Russia received electricity, the cement factories of Novorossiysk rose from the ruins and all their products were sent to the regions of the country liberated from the Nazis. Coal from the first restored mines of Donbass went quickly, and the restoration of large machine-building plants in Leningrad was of great importance.
Improving military equipment required the development and implementation of progressive technological techniques and scientific discoveries. Immediately after the end of the war, the technical re-equipment of the army took place, saturating it with the latest models of aviation, small arms, artillery, and tanks. The creation of jet aircraft and missile systems for all branches of the military required a lot of effort. In a short time, missile weapons for tactical, then strategic and air defense purposes were developed.
Huge funds were concentrated on the implementation of the atomic project, which was supervised by the all-powerful L.P. Beria. Thanks to the efforts of Soviet designers, and partly intelligence, which managed to steal important atomic secrets from the Americans, atomic weapons were created in the USSR in an unpredictably short time - in 1949. And in 1953, the Soviet Union created the world's first hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb.
Thus, in the post-war years, the Soviet Union managed to achieve considerable success in developing the economy and rearmament of the army. However, these achievements seemed insufficient to Stalin. He believed that it was necessary to “spur up” the pace of economic and military development. In 1949, the head of the State Planning Committee N.A. Voznesensky was accused of the fact that the plan drawn up in 1946 for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR for 1946-1950. contained underestimated figures. Voznesensky was convicted and executed. In 1949, at the direction of Stalin, without taking into account the real development possibilities of the country, new indicators were determined for the main industries. These voluntaristic decisions created extreme tension in the economy and slowed down the rise in the already very low living standards of the people. (A few years later this crisis was overcome and in 1952 the increase in industrial production exceeded 10%). However, the implementation of the nuclear project was not only a research and design task, but also an economic problem that required the creation of new industries and industries, and partly a general restructuring of the national economy. As a result, uranium mines were founded, and enriched uranium production plants began operating in the Urals. The instrument-making industry was practically created anew, which ensured the rapid pace of implementation of the nuclear project. Major steps have been made in the development of the electric power industry. Along with the restoration of power plants destroyed during the war, new energy capacities were introduced to meet the needs of civilian industries, household consumption and priority supply to industries related to the nuclear project and missile program.
In 1950, it was officially announced that the five-year plan had been completed ahead of schedule. However, it was not stated that the figures included reparations and the products of a number of joint Soviet-East German enterprises. We must not forget the free forced labor of millions of people in the Gulag system. The volume of work carried out by the camp system, where prisoners worked, increased several times after the war. The prisoner army expanded to include prisoners of war from the losing countries. It was their labor that built (but was never completed) the Baikal-Amur Railway from Lake Baikal to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the Northern Road along the shores of the Arctic Ocean from Salekhard to Norilsk, nuclear industry facilities, metallurgical enterprises, energy facilities were created, coal was mined and ore, timber, huge camp-state farms provided products.
Recognizing the undoubted economic successes, it should be noted that in the difficult conditions of restoring the economy destroyed by the war, a unilateral shift in favor of military industries, which essentially subjugated the rest of industry, created an imbalance in economic development. Military production placed a heavy burden on the country's economy and sharply limited the possibilities for increasing the material well-being of the people.
The previous model of economic management was implemented with even greater rigidity than was the case during the pre-war five-year plans. According to the Stalinist plan, society was finally formalized with the elimination of market relations and the complete subordination of man to political and administrative power. This holistic model covered the entire national economy.
3. Economic discussions 1945-1946
In August 1945, the government instructed the State Planning Committee to prepare a draft fourth five-year plan. During its discussion, proposals were made to somewhat soften the voluntaristic pressure in economic management and reorganize collective farms. The “democratic alternative” also emerged during the closed discussion of the draft new Constitution of the USSR prepared in 1946. In it, in particular, along with the recognition of the authority of state property, the existence of small private farms of peasants and artisans, based on personal labor and excluding the exploitation of other people's labor, was allowed. During the discussion of this project by nomenklatura workers in the center and locally, ideas were voiced about the need to decentralize economic life and provide greater rights to the regions and people's commissariats. “From below” there were increasingly frequent calls for the liquidation of collective farms due to their inefficiency. As a rule, two arguments were given to justify these positions: firstly, the relative weakening of state pressure over the manufacturer during the war years, which gave a positive result; secondly, a direct analogy was drawn with the recovery period after the civil war, when the revival of the economy began with the revival of the private sector, decentralization of management and the priority development of the light and food industries.
However, in these discussions, the point of view of Stalin prevailed, who announced at the beginning of 1946 the continuation of the course taken before the war to complete the construction of socialism and build communism. This meant a return to the pre-war model of over-centralization in economic planning and management, and at the same time to those contradictions and disproportions between sectors of the economy that developed in the 30s.
4. Currency reform and development of domestic trade.
Economic recovery required a healthier financial system. Frustrated finances and progressive inflation are problems that almost all countries at war, including the USSR, had to face.
The monetary reform was carried out in the difficult conditions of post-war devastation. Until the end of 1947, the USSR maintained a card system for food and industrial goods for the population. Its cancellation was planned for the end of 1946, but due to drought and crop failure this did not happen. The abolition was carried out only at the end of 1947. By the way, the Soviet Union was one of the first European countries to abolish card distribution.
Careful preparation for it began already in 1943, when Stalin set this task to the then Minister of Finance (the Minister of Finance at that time was A.G. Zverev, who held this position with short breaks from 1938 to 1960, in From February to December 1948 it was occupied by A. N. Kosygin). The monetary reform was built on the following principles:
old inferior money in circulation was exchanged for new, full-fledged money of the 1947 model. All cash available to the population, state, cooperative and public enterprises, organizations and institutions, collective farms was exchanged at the rate of 10 rubles. old money for 1 rub. new. The small change coin was not subject to exchange and remained in circulation at face value. In savings banks, deposits and current accounts of the population were revalued on the day of issue of new money according to the following principle: deposits in the amount of up to 3 thousand rubles. remained unchanged in the nominal amount, i.e., they were revalued ruble for ruble; for deposits exceeding the specified amount, the following were credited to the deposit: the first 3 thousand rubles; the next amount, not exceeding 10 thousand rubles, was determined at the rate of 3 rubles. old money - 2 rubles. new ones, and the remaining deposit amount exceeding 10 thousand rubles was revalued in the ratio of 2 rubles. old money for 1 rub. new. The funds in the settlement and current accounts of cooperative enterprises and organizations and collective farms were also revalued. Their funds were determined at the rate of 5 rubles. old money - 4 rubles. new. But before abolishing the cards, the government established uniform prices for food products to replace the previously existing card (ration) and commercial prices. As a result, the cost of basic food products for the urban population has increased. So, the price of 1 kg of black bread on cards was 1 ruble, but became 3 rubles. 40 kopecks; the price of 1 kg of meat increased from 14 to 30 rubles; sugar - from 5.5 to 15 rubles; butter - from 28 to 66 rubles; milk - from 2.5 to 8 rubles. At the same time, the minimum wage was 300 rubles, the average salary in 1946 was 475 rubles, in 1947 - 550 rubles. per month. True, for low- and medium-paid categories of workers and employees, at the same time as uniform prices, so-called “bread allowances” were established on average about 110 rubles. per month, but these allowances did not solve the general problem of income.
The need for monetary reform was determined by the complete imbalance of the monetary system during the war years, since the sharp increase in military spending required the constant release into circulation of a huge amount of money not backed by consumer goods. Due to a significant reduction in retail trade turnover, the population found itself with more money than was required for the normal functioning of the national economy, and therefore the purchasing power of money fell. As a result of the reform, the excess money supply was withdrawn, and the reform itself acquired a mainly confiscatory character. During the reform, it was mainly rural residents who suffered, who, as a rule, kept their savings at home, and speculators who profited during the war and did not have time to sell large sums of cash. On January 1, 1950, the government recognized the need to increase the official exchange rate of the ruble against foreign currencies, and determined it in accordance with the gold content of the ruble (0.222168 g of pure gold), although in those years this fact had no economic significance, i.e. To. the established official ruble exchange rate was not used in any calculations.
According to official statistics, the average nominal wage of workers increased from 1928 to 1954. more than 11 times. But if the general index of retail prices in state and cooperative trade in 1928 is taken as 1, then in 1932 it was 2.6; in 1940 - 6.4; in 1947 - 20.1; in 1950 - 11.9. Real wages for this period, excluding taxes and loan subscriptions, but including an increase in wages in the form of free medical care, education and other social services, changed as follows: if we take the wage level in 1928 as 1, then in 1937 year it was 0.86; in 1940 - 0.78; in 1944 - 0.64; in 1948 - 0.59; in 1952 - 0.94; in 1954 - 1.19. 2
From 1947 to 1954, seven reductions in retail prices were carried out (the first - together with monetary reform). So, retail prices the price for baked rye bread increased almost 19 times between 1928 and 1952; for beef - 17; for pork - 20.5; for sugar - 15; for sunflower oil at 34; for eggs - 19.3; for potatoes - 11 times 3 .
Therefore, an annual reduction in prices (by several percent) for basic food products (and even with a great propaganda effect) was not difficult to implement. In addition, this reduction in prices occurred due to the actual robbery of collective farmers, since, as mentioned above, the rate of increase in purchase prices for agricultural products was much lower than the increase in retail prices. And finally, the majority of the rural population almost did not feel this decrease in prices, because... government supplies in rural areas were very poor; basic food products were not delivered to stores for years.
The main long-term result of the reform was that for virtually 15 years (until the end of the 50s) it was possible to maintain commodity-money balance and generally ensure price stability. Monetary reform again acts as a preliminary stage in carrying out market-based reforms in the regime of maintaining sustainable and high economic growth.
5. Problems and difficulties of the agricultural sector.
One of the most important post-war tasks was to solve the food problem and bring agriculture out of a deep and protracted crisis. The country's agriculture emerged from the war even more weakened, whose gross output in 1945 did not exceed 60% of the pre-war level. It could not fully provide the population with food and raw materials for light industry. The terrible drought of 1946 struck Ukraine, Moldova, and southern Russia. People were dying. The main cause of high mortality was dystrophy. But the tragedy of the post-war famine, as often happened, was carefully hushed up. After a severe drought, a high grain harvest was obtained in the next two years. This to some extent contributed to the strengthening of agricultural production in general and some of its growth.
In agriculture, the affirmation of the previous order and the reluctance to undertake any reforms that would weaken strict control by the state had a particularly painful effect. In general, it was based not so much on the peasant’s personal interest in the results of his labor, but on non-economic coercion. Each peasant was required to perform a certain amount of work on the collective farm. Failure to comply with this norm was subject to prosecution, as a result of which the collective farmer could lose his freedom or, as a measure of punishment, his personal plot would be taken away from him. It should be taken into account that this particular plot was the main source of livelihood for the collective farmer; from this plot he received food for himself and his family; selling their surplus on the market was the only way to receive money. A collective farm member did not have the right to freely move around the country; he could not leave his place of residence without the consent of the collective farm leader.
Government decrees of 1946 established strict sizes of household plots, which expanded somewhat during the war years due to the development of empty lands. In the immediate post-war years, a strict campaign was carried out to confiscate all “surplus” private plots. This measure hit rural residents hard, sharply reducing their level of material well-being.
The announced fight against “violations of the charter of the agricultural artel” ultimately resulted in a sharp reduction in the area under household plots of rural residents. A course was taken to transform collective farms (formally “agricultural cooperatives) into state enterprises. At the end of the 40s, a campaign was launched to consolidate collective farms, which at first seemed like a justified and reasonable measure, but in fact resulted only in a stage on the path to transforming collective farms into state agricultural enterprises.
Of course, there were also prosperous collective farms. But usually this was a consequence of the support of higher authorities to create artificial “beacons”, or, in rare cases, they were led by uniquely enterprising and desperately courageous people.
The village required significant capital investments, but the state did not have the funds for this. However, it was possible to weaken the financial pressure, under the burden of which both personal and public economies were located. The tax on everything that a collective farmer maintained on his farmstead was so high that keeping livestock and growing fruit trees was simply unprofitable. Peasants cut down gardens to get rid of the tax burden. There was a theoretical justification for all this: the peasant must most time to devote to social production. Purchasing prices for the products of collective and state farms were so low that it was sometimes impossible to pay collective farmers for their labor.
Pre-war norms that limited the freedom of movement of collective farmers were preserved: they were actually deprived of the opportunity to have passports, and they were not covered by temporary disability payments or pensions. Organizational recruitment of the rural population to construction sites and factories increased the outflow of peasants to the city.
The terrible drought of 1946 was followed by good weather conditions in 1947 and 1948. The leadership became convinced that it was worth carrying out a set of works that would reduce the impact of natural and climatic conditions on harvests, and a significant part of the problems would be solved. Thus, in 1948, the widely advertised “Stalinist plan for the transformation of nature” arose. It was planned to carry out forest protection measures, develop irrigation systems, and build ponds and reservoirs. This plan was later supplemented by government decisions on the construction of large canals. In the early 50s. grandiose projects are being put forward for the construction of giant hydroelectric power stations on the Volga and Dnieper, canals in the Kara-Kum desert and between the Volga and Don, and a plan for the creation of forest protection plantations on many hundreds of thousands of hectares. These projects diverted enormous resources, depleting the already meager state treasury, introducing new stress into the life of society, and reducing the living standards of ordinary people. And at the same time, there was not enough money for the minimum capital investments required by midland agriculture. The Russian peasant tried by hook or by crook to leave the village, rushing to the cities for new buildings.
As before, the main burden of generating funds for heavy industry was borne by agriculture, which emerged from the war extremely weakened. In 1945, agricultural production decreased by almost 50% compared to 1940. The country's leadership tried not to notice the deep crisis in the agricultural sector of the economy, and even cautious recommendations to soften command pressure on the countryside were invariably rejected. Control over farms by MTS and their political departments has again increased. MTS again received the right to distribute planned tasks among collective farms. Higher organizations, through the MTS system, dictated to farms the timing of sowing, harvesting and other agricultural work. And collective farm chairmen who violated these deadlines, based, for example, on weather conditions, could receive severe punishment. MTS also carried out mandatory procurement of agricultural products, collected payment in kind from collective farms for performing mechanized work, etc. Moreover, in the early 1950s, collective farms were consolidated under the same pretext of strengthening the process of mechanization of agricultural production. In fact, the consolidation of collective farms simplified state control over farms through MTS. The number of collective farms in the country decreased from 237 thousand in 1950 to 93 thousand in 1953.
In the field of collective farm law, the most important post-war act was the September 1946 resolution “On measures to eliminate violations of the Charter of the agricultural artel on collective farms,” aimed at assigning the land masses allocated to collective farms and preventing the transfer of these lands to individual use. To monitor the implementation of the Charter of the agricultural artel, a Council for Collective Farm Affairs was created under the government. In April 1948, another government decree “On measures to improve organization, increase productivity and streamline wages on collective farms” was adopted, which abolished such a structural production unit of the collective farm as a link, and restored the production team as the main form of labor organization on the collective farm.
Agriculture developed very slowly. Even in the relatively favorable year of 1952, the gross grain harvest did not reach the level of 1940, and the yield in 1949-1953 was only 7.7 c/ha (in 1913 - 8.2 c/ha). In 1953, the number of cattle was less than in 1916, and the population over these years grew by 30-40 million people, i.e. the food problem remained very acute. The population of large cities was supplied intermittently.
Disadvantages of administrative-command methods of managing the national economy.
The administrative-command system is a way of organizing the economy and social life, characteristic of countries with belated industrialization that have gone through proletarian revolutions. Main features:
strictly centralized management based on state ownership;
the use in management of not so much economic as political and ideological regulators.
According to many economists, there was no alternative to the ACN during that historical period of our country’s development. The fact is that one of the factors is the predominant type of employee. The system itself adapts to the type of worker, shapes it, but at the same time, the type of worker largely determines the nature of the system. A worker under AKS is primarily a worker who is characterized by pre-commodity individualism. There is bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, commodity individualism, when a person wants to stand out from the collective in order to surpass others economically. With pre-commodity individualism, a person strives not to overwork more than others. In the 30s, the predominant type of worker were people who had left the village at one time; the NEP economy was not to their liking (ruined peasants, poor peasants, horseless peasants). AKS as a business model adapted the mass worker to itself, and the mass worker adapted to it. And commodity petty-bourgeois individualism was eventually replaced by primitive collectivism, the origins of which lay in the collapsed communal consciousness.
The periods of development of the ACN can be traced according to the economic development of Russia. 1861-1913 - the growth rate of GNP was, according to the American scientist Abram Bergson, 2.65% per year. During the transition period from a market to a centrally planned system, GNP fell to 0.5-0.7% per year. During the formation of the foundations of the administrative-command system (1928-1940), GNP increased to 5.1% per year. Western statistics differ from Soviet ones in that their data are cleared of inflationary components. During the heyday of the ACS, GNP was approximately 5% per year. During the period of decline in the ACS, GNP is 2% per year. During the period of liquidation of the ACN, GNP fell by 5% per year (i.e., the growth rate was negative). These data, of course, are lower than those of Soviet statistics. For example, according to Soviet statistics in 1928-55. GNP grew by 10.4% per year, and according to Western sources this figure was 4.6% per year, although this is still a very high growth rate of GDP for that time.
During the Stalin period, the rate of economic growth, according to Western statistics, turned out to be very high. The ACN could ensure a GNP growth rate of 6% per year, i.e. 1.8 times higher than the pre-revolutionary market economy. But based on these data, it cannot be said that the ACN is more efficient than the market system, because you need to take the growth rate of GNP for the entire period of existence, and according to these data, the growth rate of the ACN turns out to be lower. Ensuring the growth rate of GNP under the conditions of the ACN was not flawless (the Gulag, the tragedy of the Russian peasantry, etc.).
From an economic point of view, the ideal model of socialism, with certain variations, can be reduced to the following provisions:
all property rights belong to the state. This is the so-called “public property”. Private property is being liquidated;
the economy is managed from a single Center, which decides what, how and for whom to produce;
the market mechanism as a decentralized communication system based on price signals is destroyed.
It is assumed that such a system of economic structure is capable of eliminating all market defects associated with uncertainty, uneven distribution of income, cyclical downturns and, in general, inevitable deviations from the state of equilibrium. The market is not an ideal system, therefore, socialists believe, it is necessary to replace it with scientifically developed, rational planning.
The administrative-command system presupposes a single Center, which must concentrate a huge amount of information in order to lower planned targets. However, the very concentration of information in a single planning body turns out to be an insoluble task. Indeed, in conditions of limited resources of society, it is necessary to make numerous choices - What, How and For Whom to produce. In a market economy, the problem of choice is solved using the price mechanism. Changes in relative prices and marginal rates of substitution are the guidelines that tell producers what to produce and consumers what to buy. In conditions of administrative-command management, this mechanism does not work.
The management system of the Soviet national economy was reformed several times. For example, industrial management by the end of the 20s - beginning of the 30s was 4-level. As a result of the reform of 1934, a 3- and 2-tier management system arose in our country. Changes in the management scheme boiled down to changes in subordination. Enterprises were subordinate either through the trust to production-territorial departments, or directly to the center. Instead of Main Directorates, Production and Territorial Directorates were created. The functional management system was either eliminated or revived. Thus, since 1936, the process of fragmentation of the People's Commissariat has intensified. In general, the evolution of the Soviet industry management system continued on this basis until the end of the 50s, at least until the reform of 1957, when an attempt was made to transition to a sectoral management system on a regional basis.
But regardless of the reforms of management structures, industrial development proceeded due to extensive factors. As before, thousands of new enterprises were built, but administrative-command methods of managing the national economy did not contribute to increasing the efficiency of existing capacities. Gradually, due to imperfect planning, structural imbalances intensified.
Attempts to reform the management system in the 50s were more like hasty “shybacks” and most often did not give quick positive results, so government leaders returned to their previous management methods that were familiar to them. The Soviet directive economy, due to its over-centralization, lack of initiative and entrepreneurship in various economic structures, turned out to be incapable of widespread introduction of scientific and technical developments into production (except for the military-industrial complex) and began to rapidly lag behind countries with market economies. At the same time, no one wanted to admit that all the failures of the Soviet economy did not depend on specific performers, but were embedded within the command system itself. As a result, macroeconomic imbalance arose in the economy:
unevenness in the development of individual sectors and branches of the national economy. This was manifested, first of all, in the hypertrophied development of certain industries (military-industrial complex, heavy engineering), the share of which in the total social product at the end of the 80s was 68% - these industries absorbed the lion's share of investments, raw materials, skilled labor, thereby more "disadvantaging" other industries. The creation of a military-industrial complex of unprecedented scale, which annually absorbed at least 2/3 of the country’s economic potential, on the maintenance of which 18-20% of the national income was spent annually. This caused the lag of industries that did not work in the military-industrial complex, which led to a slowdown in economic growth, to a deficit, to imports;
unevenness in the technical and technological basis of various sectors and industries. This was expressed in the poor material equipment of many industries, in the extremely neglected state of infrastructure (transport, storage, energy, information, utilities, social - lagged behind in terms of technical equipment and development).
All this led to negative trends in Russia's economic development and a steady decline in the rate of economic development.
The dominance of administrative-command methods of managing the national economy in our country ultimately led to a logical result - a crisis of the entire system. Within the framework of the previous system, the pressing macroeconomic problems could no longer be solved; deep structural reforms were needed not only in the economy, but also in the socio-political life of the country. Reforms have become a vital necessity, because it was necessary to solve the problem of structural and investment restructuring on a modern technical and technological basis.
Conclusion
The sweet euphoria of victory did not require forced labor to rebuild a destroyed country. The energy of the war was so great and had such inertia that it had to be “switched” to peaceful construction. It was similar in intensity to war: in 1948, the country reached and surpassed pre-war levels of industrial production, which by normal standards is unthinkable. And in 1952, the volume of industrial production was 2.5 times higher than the level of 1940. A lot was done - destroyed cities were brought back to life, new enterprises were restored and built.
But we must not forget at what cost this growth was achieved. The war increased control over all areas of life. Price reductions in cities were carried out at the expense of worsening the lives of the rural population. Inadequate payment for intense productive work did not make it possible to raise the level of well-being of the people. In response, as if to reward the people for the overload of two decades, a constant, albeit modest, improvement in the life of the population was made a principle of state policy. It was then that specific stereotypes of Soviet mass consciousness, enshrined in state ideology (and strengthening the state), arose: confidence in the future and the conviction that life can only improve. The people, for their part, once again gave the state and the authorities a huge credit of trust - they put up with the adversities that marked their lives, their way of life, and believed in a “bright future.”
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Introduction
1.2 Korean conflict
2. Domestic policy of the USSR
1.2 Atomic weapons
1.3 Agriculture
Conclusion
Introduction
After the end of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War, the Soviet Union faced a number of important domestic and foreign policy tasks: restoration and development of the country’s economy; developing relationships with leading world powers; strengthening the political system of the USSR.
Of particular importance was the issue of restoring the country's economy. Initially, like other European states, the Soviet Union counted on receiving foreign economic assistance. But despite the extreme interest of the Soviet leadership in this, many international requirements, which accompanied the provision of loans and credits, looked unacceptable for the USSR. After the deterioration of relations with the United States, obtaining loans from the West was excluded.
Excellent success has been achieved in the industrial sector. According to the results of the 4th Five-Year Plan, it was possible to increase industrial output by 73% compared to 1940.
However, agriculture could not boast of such successes. Despite the plight of the village, the state continued to confiscate agricultural products from collective farms at prices that amounted to 5-10% of the cost level.
Also, the first post-war years were characterized by projects for the formation of a political course related to the correction of economic development priorities towards the production of consumer goods, and measures to strengthen the monetary system. However, the outbreak of the Cold War dashed such forecasts. A return to the methods of strictly ideological education of the population, used in the 30s, began.
In the first post-war years, the Soviet Union acquired the status of a “superpower”. This circumstance led to many changes in political course. The USSR, relying on the positions gained in the war, began to defend its geopolitical interests on equal terms, considering them much more broadly than the former allies expected.
soviet union world war
1. International situation and foreign policy of the USSR
Complication of the international situation. After World War II, profound changes occurred in the international arena. The influence and authority of the USSR, which made the greatest contribution to the defeat of fascism, grew significantly. If in 1941 the USSR had diplomatic relations with only 26 countries, then in 1945 with 52. The influence of the USSR extended to a number of states in Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) and Asia (China, Northern Korea, North Vietnam). These countries, together with the USSR and Mongolia, formed the socialist camp or the world system of socialism. In these countries, representatives of the communist and workers' parties came to power. They carried out nationalization of industry, agrarian reforms, and established democratic freedoms. A regime of people's democracy was established in these countries. Treaties of friendship and mutual assistance were concluded between the USSR and these states. These countries, together with the USSR and Mongolia, formed the socialist camp or the world system of socialism.
The USSR became a world power: not a single important issue in international life was resolved without its participation. The USSR, like the USA, began to strive to expand its sphere of influence. A new geopolitical situation has emerged in the world.
The growing influence of the USSR worried the leaders of the world's major powers. Their attitude towards the USSR, yesterday's ally in the anti-Hitler coalition, changed dramatically. They decided to limit the influence of the USSR, using, among other things, the nuclear factor. (The United States became the owner of atomic weapons in 1945. The American atomic bomb was tested on the opening day of the Potsdam Conference on July 17, 1945. US President G. Truman on July 24, 1945 informed I.V. Stalin about the presence of new super-powerful weapons in the United States).
1.1 Cold War. Truman Doctrine
Relations between the USSR and leading Western European countries have established " cold war" -a form of existence in the post-war world, the essence of which was the ideological confrontation of the pro-Soviet and pro-American blocs. The Cold War began on March 5, 1946 in " Fulton speech"former British Prime Minister W. Churchill. Speaking at the College of the American city of Fulton in the presence of US President G. Truman, W. Churchill first admitted that military victories promoted the Soviet Union to the composition of the "leading nations of the world", then noted that the USSR seeks "the limitless spread of its power and its doctrines." This situation, in his opinion, should cause concern, since it posed a danger to the great principles of freedom and human rights of the "Anglo-Saxon world." From now on, the USA and Great Britain should talk to the USSR with positions of power. A year later, in 1947, W. Churchill’s ideas regarding the USSR were developed in President G. Truman’s message to the US Congress (“ Truman Doctrine"). In them, 2 strategic tasks were identified in relation to the USSR: · the minimum is to prevent further expansion of the sphere of influence of the USSR and its communist ideology (“doctrine of containment of socialism”); · the maximum is to do everything to force the USSR to withdraw to its former borders (the “doctrine of rejecting socialism”). Specific economic, military, and ideological measures were identified to achieve these goals: · provide large-scale economic assistance to European countries, making their economies dependent on the United States (“Marshall Plan”); · create a military-political union of these countries led by the United States; · use its armed forces to directly interfere in the internal affairs of countries in the Soviet sphere of influence; · place a network of US bases (Greece, Türkiye) near the borders of the USSR; · support anti-socialist forces within the Soviet bloc countries. The United States immediately began to implement the Truman Doctrine. The United States insisted that West Germany be included in the Marshall Plan. Western countries began to strive for the economic stabilization of Germany and the creation of a German state based on the three western zones of occupation. Already in December 1946, the American and British occupation zones in Germany were united, and in 1948 they were joined by the French zone. On June 20, 1948, a monetary reform was carried out there: the devalued Reichsmark was replaced by the new German mark. This gave impetus to the restoration of the economy in these territories, but this was a clear violation of the agreements of the Allies with the USSR on the joint solution of German problems. The single German economic space was violated. The USSR responded by blocking the roads leading from Berlin to the west. The blockade of Berlin began - the first open confrontation between the USSR and its former allies, which lasted 324 days. During this time, the supply of the Allied troops in Berlin and the two million population of West Berlin was taken over by Allied aviation, which organized an air bridge. Soviet troops did not interfere with aircraft flights over the territory of East Germany. In May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formed in the western zones of influence. In 1949, the military-political bloc North Atlantic Alliance was created ( NATO), which included the USA, Canada, a number of Western European countries and Turkey. In 1951, the military-political bloc ANZUS was created consisting of the USA, Australia and New Zealand. The leadership of the USSR regarded the US course as a call to war. This immediately affected both the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR. The measures taken by the USSR in domestic and foreign policy were adequate, although less effective. The forces were unequal, since the USSR emerged from the war economically weakened, while the United States emerged stronger. The Cold War began in the world and lasted for about half a century (1946-1991). The USSR began to actively promote communist parties and movements in capitalist countries, contributed to the growth of the national liberation movement, and the collapse of the colonial system. 1.2 Korean conflict
The USSR began to pursue an active policy in Asia. Thus, the USSR contributed a lot to ensuring that a revolution took place in China and the People's Republic of China was created in 1949. In the early 50s. The USSR and the USA took part in the Korean conflict. At the end of World War II, Korea was divided into two states. In 1950, the leadership of North Korea tried to unite the country by force. The Korean War (1950-1953) broke out. At first, the war was successful for North Korea, but soon on the side South Korea The United States acted with the consent of the UN. Then the PRC sided with North Korea. The USSR transferred several divisions of fighter aircraft to China, transferred a large amount of military equipment, and provided assistance to the Chinese army with weapons, ammunition, transport, medicine, and food. Five Soviet divisions were prepared for direct deployment to North Korea. The war threatened to develop into a world war. The American military command intended to use atomic weapons, and only the fear that the USSR would take similar retaliatory measures kept it from doing so. In addition to the USSR, the PRC and other socialist countries provided assistance to the DPRK. With the establishment of the front line at the 38th parallel, the conflict lost its former severity and acquired a positional character. Started by the USA massive bombing The DPRK (including napalm bombs) did not bring them military success, but contributed to the growth of anti-American sentiment in Asia. In 1953, I.V. died. Stalin, the Korean War was ended. Peace negotiations began, as a result of which an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. Korea remained divided into two opposing states. Thus, international relations in the second half of the 40s - early 50s. were difficult and even crisis. 2. Domestic policy of the USSR
The war resulted in huge human and material losses for the USSR. It claimed almost 26.5 million human lives. 1,710 cities and towns were destroyed, 70 thousand villages were destroyed, 31,850 factories and factories, 1,135 mines, 65 thousand km of railways were blown up and disabled. Cultivated areas decreased by 36.8 million hectares. The country has lost approximately one third of its national one. Therefore, in the first post-war years, the main task was to restore the destroyed national economy. The United States, according to the Marshall Plan, provided European countries with enormous financial assistance in economic recovery: from 1948 to 1951. European countries received $12.4 billion from the United States. The United States also offered financial assistance to the Soviet Union, but subject to their control over the spending of the funds provided. The Soviet government rejected this assistance under such conditions. The Soviet Union restored its economy using its own resources. Already at the end of May 1945, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer part of the defense enterprises to the production of consumer goods. A law was passed on the demobilization of 13 ages of army personnel. Those demobilized were provided with a set of clothes and shoes, a one-time cash allowance, and local authorities had to find them jobs within a month. There have been changes in the structure government agencies. In 1945, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was abolished. Its functions were again distributed between the Council of People's Commissars, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In accordance with the law of March 15, 1946, the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariats were transformed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR and ministries. Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1946 - 1953. was still I.V. Stalin. The ministries were headed by members of the government; they carried out executive and administrative activities in the relevant sectors of the national economy and culture. Since 1943, management functions in the field of security state security and public order were carried out by the NKVD of the USSR (until 1946 - People's Commissar L.P. Beria, then - S.N. Kruglov) and the NKGB of the USSR (People's Commissar V.N. Merkulov, then - V.S. Abakumov). In 1946, the People's Commissariats were renamed respectively into the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. At enterprises and institutions, normal work was resumed: the 8-hour working day and annual paid leave were restored. The state budget was revised, and allocations for the development of civilian sectors of the economy increased. The State Planning Committee prepared a 4-year plan for the restoration of the national economy for 1946-1950. Restoration and development of industry. In the industrial field, three major problems had to be solved: · demilitarize the economy; · restore destroyed enterprises; · carry out new construction. The demilitarization of the economy was largely completed in 1946-1947. Some people's commissariats of the military industry (tank, mortar weapons, ammunition) were abolished. Instead, ministries of civil production (agricultural, transport engineering, etc.) were created. The construction of new industrial enterprises throughout the country has gained significant momentum. In total, during the years of the first post-war five-year plan, 6,200 large enterprises were built and those destroyed during the war were restored. 1.2 Atomic weapons
Since the Cold War began, the Soviet leadership in the post-war period Special attention focused on the development of the defense industry, primarily the creation of atomic weapons. Work on the creation of atomic weapons began in the USSR in 1943 under the leadership of the young physicist I.V. Kurchatova. After testing the US atomic bomb on July 16, 1945, I.V. Stalin ordered the acceleration of work on the creation of atomic weapons. On August 20, 1945, to manage the atomic project, the State Defense Committee created a Special Committee with emergency powers headed by L.P. Beria. On August 29, 1949, the first atomic bomb was exploded in the USSR. The United States has lost its monopoly on the possession of atomic weapons. It was an engineering and scientifically complex plutonium bomb. Soviet scientists continued their development and soon reached a higher level of scientific research, significantly ahead of the Americans in creating more advanced atomic weapons - hydrogen bomb. One of its creators was A.D. Sakharov. The hydrogen bomb was tested in the USSR on August 12, 1953. It was 20 times more powerful than the plutonium bomb. The next step of Soviet scientists was the use of the atom for peaceful purposes - in 1954 in Obninsk near Moscow under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatov, the world's first nuclear power plant was built. In general, industry was restored by 1947. The five-year plan for industrial output was fulfilled greatly in excess: instead of the planned growth of 48%, the volume of industrial output in 1950 exceeded the 1940 level by 73%. 1.3 Agriculture
The war caused particularly heavy damage to agriculture. Its gross output in 1945 did not exceed 60% of the pre-war level. Crop areas were greatly reduced, and the number of cattle was extremely low. The situation was complicated by a drought unprecedented in the last 50 years in 1946 in Ukraine, Moldova, the Lower Volga region, and the North Caucasus. In 1946, the average yield was 4.6 centners per hectare. The famine caused a massive exodus of population to the cities. In February 1947, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered the issue “On measures to boost agriculture in the post-war period.” It was decided to boost agriculture through the following measures: · provide villages with agricultural machinery; · improve the culture of agriculture. To implement the plan, the production of agricultural machinery was increased, and work was carried out to electrify the village. In order to strengthen collective farms in the early 1950s. the consolidation of farms was carried out through the voluntary merger of small collective farms into larger ones. Instead of 254 thousand small collective farms in 1950, 93 thousand enlarged farms were created. This contributed to the improvement of agricultural production and more efficient use of technology. But the measures taken did not change the difficult situation in agriculture. Collective farmers were forced to live off their personal plots. City residents planted gardens and vegetable gardens on collective farm lands. And in the fall of 1946, the state launched a broad campaign against gardening and vegetable farming under the banner of squandering public lands and collective farm property. Personal subsidiary plots were cut back and heavily taxed. It got to the point of absurdity: every fruit tree was taxed. Taxes on income from market sales were significantly increased. Market trade itself was allowed only to those peasants whose collective farms fulfilled state supplies. Each peasant farm was obliged to hand over meat, milk, eggs, and wool to the state as a tax for a plot of land. In 1948, collective farmers were “recommended” to sell small livestock to the state, which caused a massive slaughter of pigs, sheep, and goats throughout the country (up to 2 million heads). In the late 40s - early 50s. dispossession of personal farms and the creation of new collective farms were carried out in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic republics, and Right Bank Moldova, annexed in 1939-1940. to the USSR. Mass collectivization was carried out in these areas. Despite the measures taken, the situation in agriculture remained difficult. Agriculture could not meet the country's needs for food and agricultural raw materials. The socio-economic situation of the rural population also remained difficult. Payment for labor was purely symbolic, collective farmers were not entitled to pensions, they did not have passports, and they were not allowed to leave the village without permission from the authorities. The monetary reform of 1947 also hit the peasantry, who kept their savings at home, the hardest. The 4th Five-Year Plan for agricultural development was not fulfilled. The development of agriculture was negatively affected by the position of a group of scientists led by scientist biologist and agronomist T.D. Lysenko. In the early 30s. A conflict arose among scientists, geneticists and breeders. In the southern regions of the country there was a constant threat of famine. Under these conditions, I.V. Stalin decided to assign revolutionary tasks to agricultural science. In 1931, the Government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a decree “On selection in seed production”, according to which the country was to change varieties of cultivated plants from low-yielding to high-yielding ones within 2 years. Young scientist T.D. Lysenko and a small group of his supporters promised at various meetings and congresses of collective farmers that he would fulfill these tasks. This is what attracted the attention of I.V. Stalin. Monopoly T.D. Lysenko in biology led to the destruction of entire scientific schools, the death of many prominent scientists. T.D. Lysenko managed to achieve some results: to create high-yielding varieties of cereal plants, fruit trees, etc., but later it was proven that most of his ideas were nothing more than quackery, based on pseudoscientific research and falsification of experimental results. In 1950, the level of agricultural production reached the pre-war level, but feed, grain, and meat and dairy products remained constant problems in agriculture. In 1947, the card system for food and industrial goods was abolished, and a monetary reform was carried out. 3. Social, political and cultural life
In the post-war period, restoring the economy and establishing a peaceful life required enormous spiritual effort from the entire society. Meanwhile, the creative and scientific intelligentsia, by their nature gravitating towards expanding creative contacts, hoped for the liberalization of life, the weakening of strict party-state control, and pinned hopes on the development and strengthening of cultural contacts with the United States and Western countries. Comprehensive post-war cooperation was discussed at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. In 1948, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stated that every person has the right to freedom of creativity and movement, regardless of state borders. But the international situation changed dramatically immediately after the war. Instead of cooperation in the relations between the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, confrontation began. Politicians changed their ways quickly, but the intelligentsia could not change quickly. Some felt deceived and lost, which was reflected in their work. The leadership of the USSR set a course for “tightening the screws” in relation to the intelligentsia. Since the summer of 1946, the authorities launched a broad offensive against “Western influence” on the development of national culture. In August 1946, a new magazine, Party Life, was created to take control of the development of culture, which, according to party officials, “suffered from ideological lethargy, the emergence of new ideas and foreign influences that undermine the spirit of communism.” The campaign against “Westernism” was led by A.A., a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who was responsible for ideology. Zhdanov. In March 1946, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution “On the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad”. These publications were accused of promoting ideas “alien to the spirit of the party”, providing a literary platform for “ideologically harmful works”. The work of writers M. M. Zoshchenko and A. A. Akhmatova was criticized. In M. M. Zoshchenko’s story “The Adventures of a Monkey,” the authorities saw a deliberately ugly depiction of the life of Soviet people, as can be seen in the words put into the mouth of the monkey: “At the zoo to live better than in freedom, and that it is easier to breathe in a cage than among Soviet people." The resolution noted that Zoshchenko preaches "rotten lack of ideas, vulgarity and apoliticality" with the aim of disorienting Soviet youth, "depicts the Soviet order and Soviet people in an ugly caricature form,” and Akhmatova is a typical representative of “empty, unprincipled poetry, alien to our people,” imbued with “the spirit of pessimism and decadence. old salon poetry." As a result, the magazine "Leningrad" was closed, and the leadership of the magazine "Zvezda" was replaced. A. A. Akhmatova and M. M. Zoshchenko were expelled from the Writers' Union (See additional textbook material). Following literature, the party leadership was “strengthened” in theater and cinema. On August 26, 1946, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the repertoire of drama theaters and measures to improve it,” which condemned the predominance of the classical repertoire in the country’s theaters to the detriment of plays dedicated to the “pathos of the struggle for communism.” And the few plays on modern themes found in the repertoire were criticized as weak and unidealized, in which Soviet people appear “primitive and uncultured, with philistine tastes and morals.” On September 4, 1946, a new resolution of the Central Committee appeared, dedicated to criticism of the “unprincipled” nature of a number of films. In 1946, the authorities created a new weekly, Culture and Life, which soon launched a mass campaign against “decadent tendencies” in the theater and demanded the exclusion of all plays by foreign authors from the repertoire. The work of some composers was also criticized. The occasion was the performance in 1947 of three works created for the anniversary of the October Revolution: the Sixth Symphony by S.S. Prokofiev, "Poems" by A.I. Khachaturian and the opera "Great Friendship" by V.I. Muradeli. In February 1948, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) “On decadent tendencies in Soviet music” was issued, where V.I. Muradeli, S.S. Prokofiev, D.D. Shostakovich, A.I. Khachaturyan, N.Ya. Myaskovsky. After the release of this resolution, a purge began in the Union of Composers. Works criticized were banned and removed from the theater repertoire. The resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on cultural issues were, on the one hand, an example of gross administrative interference in culture, total suppression of the individual; on the other hand, it was a powerful lever for the regime’s self-preservation. In 1949, a broad campaign against cosmopolitanism and “adulation to the West” began in society. "Rootless cosmopolitans" were found in many cities. At the same time, the disclosure of literary pseudonyms of Jewish writers began in order to emphasize who was hiding behind them. Discussion on issues of linguistics. A notable phenomenon in the country's public life in 1950 was the “discussion on issues of linguistics.” Linguistics or linguistics was not considered one of the leading sciences in our country, but even in this science, starting from the 20s, a real struggle began, a hierarchy of power and influence was established. N.Ya. claimed the role of leader in this area. Marr. Ideas N.Ya. Marr's work in the field of linguistics has always been extremely paradoxical, but this is precisely what brought him fame. For example, N.Ya. Marr argued that the Georgian and Armenian languages are related, that languages can interbreed, giving birth to new languages, etc. At the end of the 20s. he announced that he was beginning an in-depth study of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. Soon he put forward a “new doctrine of language” (the Japhetic theory), which dealt with the problems of the connection between the development of language and society. Language, according to N.Ya. Marra must be viewed from the point of view of historical materialism, as a superstructure over the base: “There is no language that is not class, and, therefore, there is no thinking that is not class.” “There is no national, national language, but there is a class language.” The debate in linguistics flared up with renewed vigor after the war. The defeat of N.Ya.'s opponents Marra continued throughout the country. From all over the country to I.V. Stalin received thousands of complaints, memos and letters from scientists, but they all ended up in the secretariat. In 1950, the Georgian leadership ensured that I.V. Stalin received a report-complaint from the leading linguist of Georgia, Academician Arnold Chikobav, in which he simply and convincingly outlined the situation in linguistics. I.V. Stalin was surprised that major changes in science were taking place without his knowledge and decided to intervene in the discussion. He sat down to study books about language. On June 20, 1950, an article by I.V. was published in the Pravda newspaper. Stalin "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics", in which the author wrote that there is no bourgeois and proletarian language, language creates the people as a whole. Language is not a superstructure, but a means of communication for the entire people. “Do these comrades think that the English feudal lords communicated with the English people through translators, that they did not use the English language?” wrote I.V. Stalin. This concludes the discussion in linguistics. In March 1952, the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place, at which I.V. was last present. Stalin. The agenda of the congress included economic issues: summing up the restoration of the national economy destroyed by the war and approving directives for a new five-year plan for the development of the national economy. At the congress, it was decided to rename the CPSU (b) to the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). By this time, the number of party members had increased. If in 1939 there were about 1.6 million people in the CPSU (b), then in 1946 there were already about 6 million people in the CPSU (b), more than half of them were accepted into the party during and after the end of the Great Patriotic War. The role of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in society was quite high. By this time, the party had developed an extensive and well-functioning mechanism organizational structure, strict centralism was established, the party completely controlled and directed all spheres of public life. There was no political opposition in the country. The “statutory norms of party life” were not in effect. The highest body of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - the congress - has not met since March 1939, and the Central Committee also ceased to function (from 1945 to 1952, only two plenums were held). The Politburo has lost its importance. It turned from a permanent collegial body into a meeting of a narrow circle of I.V.’s close associates. Stalin, convened at his will. No minutes of the meetings were kept. Party bodies continued to permeate the entire structure of state power and administration. In recent years, I.V. Stalin was lonely: there was no one nearby loved one, children Vasily and Svetlana were not happy. On the night of March 2, 1953, at the dacha in Kuntsevo at I.V. Stalin suffered a cerebral hemorrhage with loss of consciousness, speech, paralysis right hand and legs. When on the morning of March 2 the head of personal security reported what had happened to his superiors, a call followed from the Minister of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria should not tell anyone anything. For more than 13 hours, I.V.’s comrades left. Stalin without medical assistance. March 5, 1953 at 21:50, without regaining consciousness, I.V. Stalin died. His death was a real grief for the Soviet people. Huge masses of people wishing to say goodbye to him poured into the Hall of Columns of the House of Unions, where the coffin was displayed. People walked in an endless stream, several thousand Muscovites and visitors died in the crush. Body I.V. Stalin was placed in the Mausoleum next to V.I. Lenin. With the death of this man, the complex, controversial, but undoubtedly heroic history of Soviet society ended. A few years later, remembering his front-line ally and political enemy, W. Churchill called I.V. Stalin was an eastern tyrant and a great politician who “took Russia” with bast shoes and left him with atomic weapons. Conclusion
So, we can draw the following conclusions: After World War II, the status and influence of the USSR grew to such an extent that the international community could not ignore it. Possession of a nuclear bomb made the position of the Soviet Union even stronger; In the territories of Eastern Europe it occupied, the USSR imposed on these countries its model of socialist orientation for the development of a communist-Stalin-type state; the confrontation of the USSR with the USA, England and France led to the division of Germany and the formation of political and military-political blocs - NATO, ANZUS, Cominformburo, the organization of the Warsaw Pact countries; the confrontation between two opposing socio-economic systems escalated into an armed confrontation and became the reason for the start of the Cold War; the demographic losses of the USSR in the war were monstrous; they constituted a sixth of the active population; the standard of living of the population became lower than in the pre-war years due to a significant increase in prices for food and household industrial goods, and the level of wages was raised slightly; there was a catastrophic shortage of housing; most government investments went into heavy industry, defense, and international aid; the scale of losses in industry and agriculture was monstrous; practically throughout the entire territory that was under occupation, the entire industrial base was destroyed and collective and state farms were ruined; however, the country's leadership set a course for the accelerated development of the country's military-industrial base and this led to a very slow pace of recovery in the post-war period; forced collectivization, restrictions on trade in their products and a reduction in the rights and freedoms of the rural population led to an outflow of peasants from rural areas to cities; the influx of unskilled labor from rural areas to enterprises led to a crisis, which resulted in very limited growth in labor productivity, problems of production discipline, work defects, and high staff turnover; the forced return of the territories of the Baltic countries and Western Ukraine to the USSR, the policies pursued there spoiled relations forever; The hatred and discontent towards Russia that arose in those days have remained to this day, and in present time great difficulties arise in relations with these countries; deportation and repression against many small peoples living in the USSR led to an aggravation of interethnic relations, to a problem that our country is still solving; the concentration camp system reached its apogee; thanks to the unlimited human resources of the Gulag, new inaccessible areas were developed, which are still being exploited; tightening control over art, science, and literature led to the fact that many creative figures ceased their activities; the ban in science on the development of new promising areas of knowledge has led to complete stagnation; foreign science has been many decades ahead of Russia in the study and application of scientific achievements; in the conditions of the administrative-command system, the cult of Stalin’s personality, a deep contradiction arose between the need for changes in the socio-political and economic spheres and the inability of the country’s leadership to realize and implement these changes.Similar works to - USSR after World War II (1946-1953)
