Heroes are not born. They become. The truth is as old as the world. But in the entire history of the world, there are not so many examples that confirm this maxim. Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev can be safely attributed to these few.
He went through many wars, but he was not destined to die on the battlefield. His death was experienced as a national grief. On the wreath from the Academy of the General Staff, the inscription was silvered: "To Hero Mikhail Dmitrievich SKOBELEV - equal to commander SUVOROV." Peasants of 20 versts on their hands carried the coffin of Mikhail Dmitrievich to Spassky, the family estate of the Skobelevs. There he was buried in the church next to his father and mother. In 1912, in Moscow on Tverskaya Square, a beautiful monument was erected to Skobelev at the expense of the people, but in 1918 it was demolished in accordance with the decree “On the removal of monuments to tsars and their servants and the development of projects for monuments to the Russian socialist revolution.”
July 4, 1882, 130 years ago, the great Russian commander Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev tragically died
In recent centuries, Russia has experienced two black streaks in its history: after the 1917 revolution and the democratization that “started” in 1991. But both of them were marked by the rejection of their history, the disgrace of their heroes. The mass demolition of monuments, the change of names of streets, squares and cities, the endless rewriting of history lead to the creation of chaos in the minds of people, to the multiplication of seeds of discord in society, and the loss of guidelines for the civic education of the younger generations.
Russia's eternal opponents gloat looking at how Russians (or rather, today's Russians) recklessly mutilate their ancestry, throw their yesterday's heroes from the graves. Their homegrown singers willingly blaspheme their past. For them, Kutuzov is "a gray military leader who has not won a single significant battle", G. Zhukov "a cruel commander who paved the way to victory with corpses." The deheroization of Russian history is the cherished dream of all our adversaries, external and internal. A prime example to illustrate this statement are the life and exploits of Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev - an outstanding commander of the nineteenth century, who, like A.V. Suvorov, did not lose a single battle, won the immense love of the army and the whole people, and now is almost unknown to the younger generation.
Mikhail Skobelev was born in 1843 in the family estate of Spasskoe, Ryazan province, in a family of hereditary military men. His grandfather was a general during the Patriotic War of 1812 and adjutant of M. Kutuzov, his father, with the rank of lieutenant general, participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. along with his famous son. Mikhail Dmitrievich himself conscious life spent in the ranks of the Russian army. His military career was fast-paced. By the end of his life, at the age of 38, he was already an infantry general, a holder of the Order of St. George the Victorious of three degrees, an idol of the Russian army, and a prominent political figure. Seldom to whom the national rumor appropriates own, unique ranks. M. Skobelev received such a great honor and went down in Russian history as the "White General", because, as a rule, he appeared before the troops before the battle on a white horse and in a white uniform. Some condemned this behavior of the general: he seemed to be turning into a desired target for enemy fire, but M. Skobelev had his own reasons. He recalled that once, while performing a task to clarify maps in the area of the Finnish border, he lost his way in dead swampy places. It seemed to him that he should keep to one side, but the white horse stubbornly pulled him in the opposite direction. Finally, he humbled himself, relied on the will of God, and soon returned safely to the base, where everyone was already pretty worried about his life. Since then, he made a vow: to ride only on white horses.
Something similar influenced the color of the combat uniform he chose. The father-general presented M. Skobelev during the Russian-Turkish war with a black tanned sheepskin coat to save him from the fierce cold in the Carpathians in the Shipka region. A month later, M. Skobelev wrote a letter to his father, in which he informed him that he was returning a donated sheepskin coat, because he twice came under fire from Turkish batteries in it and received serious contusions, while White color made him invulnerable to enemy bullets and shrapnel.
The white color of the general's horse and uniform became a powerful mobilizing moral and psychological factor for the soldiers and officers of the Russian army. The appearance of the invincible M. Skobelev in front of the regiments in his usual form was perceived as a guarantee of indispensable success.
At the heart of the brilliant victories of the troops under the command of M. Skobelev lay the general's amazing military talent and his inextricable paternal connection with the soldiers, who paid him love and incredible stamina in battle. He had to fight twice in Central Asia and once in the Balkans, freeing Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke. In all three campaigns, he relied on the speed of maneuver, the decisiveness of the strike. He was annoyed by slowness, unjustified caution, lethargy in the actions of the high command, which often became the reason for hostility towards M. Skobelev. When the Russian army was trampling on the left bank of the Danube for a long time at the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war in anticipation of building bridges, M. Skobelev proposed to swim cavalry formations to the Turkish coast to quickly capture bridgeheads. Senior commanders objected: they say, this is an unheard of thing. Then the young general took the first horse that came across, unsaddled it, took off his outer clothing and rushed into the Danube on horseback, safely swam across it and returned back.
The units subordinate to him could make marches of 40-45 km for three days in a row and surprise the Turkish troops, who did not expect such a speed of movement of the Russian infantry. The detachment of Mikhail Dmitrievich ultimately decided the outcome of the months-long battle on Shipka. Having crossed the mountain passes of the Carpathians in winter, he bypassed the Turkish positions and ended up in their rear near the village of Sheinovo.
The famous painting by the artist Vereshchagin captures the moment when the triumphant M. Skobelev congratulates the troops on a wonderful victory.
By the end of the war, the detachments of M. Skobelev came closest to the gates of Istanbul and at that moment received an order from the command to stop. Mikhail Dmitrievich was frankly outraged by the cowardice of the chiefs, who seemed to be afraid of a sudden attack by Austria-Hungary on the Russian army. He even told his immediate commanders: “Give me the opportunity to take Constantinople under my responsibility, and then you can put me on trial and even shoot me if it is deemed necessary, but Russia will not have such an opportunity!” At this time, under his command there were 40 thousand battle-hardened fighters.
Political and diplomatic considerations took over. All of Europe bristled against Russia, forced her to retreat at the Berlin Congress. Orders and new military ranks did not console Mikhail Dmitrievich. He acutely felt that the German Empire, which was gaining strength under the leadership of Bismarck, and its ally Austria-Hungary would be the main enemies of Russia in the foreseeable future, which happened in the First and Second World Wars.
As a counterbalance to the German threat, he advocated the idea of pan-Slavic unity. One of his close friends is the writer Vasily Ivanovich Nemirovich-Danchenko ( brother famous theatrical figure) noted that the ideal of M. Skobelev was a mighty indivisible Russia, surrounded by Slavic allied countries, free and independent, but soldered by one blood, one faith. He repeatedly expressed this idea publicly during speeches in Europe, which caused him the hatred of the European authorities and the press. Only in Paris was he accepted with understanding, where they remembered the monstrous defeat that the Prussians inflicted on the French in the war of 1871.
In 1880, he was sent to Central Asia, where he was supposed to strike at the growing ambitions of England, which sought to turn the feudal princelings of the Akhal-Teke region (now Turkmenistan) into its vassals. The campaign, designed for 2 years, was brilliantly completed by M. Skobelev in 9 months. In a waterless desert region, he had to solve an atypical task: to take by storm the fortress of Geok-Tepe, in which 25 thousand desperate Tekin warriors settled. Having applied all engineering innovations, including rocket artillery, mine-explosive devices, the Russian army captured Geok-Tepe with minimal losses in January 1881. This was the last military victory of M. Skobelev.
He returned to Russia, took command of the 4th Army Corps, stationed in Minsk, and began to improve his military skills. At this time, he became close to the famous Slavophile I.S. Aksakov. In one of his letters to him, Skobelev wrote: “Our common holy cause for me, as, I believe, for you, is closely connected with the revival of the Russian self-consciousness that is now knocked down ... I had reason to be convinced that even the seditious party in its majority will hear the voice of the fatherland and the government when Russia speaks Russian, which hasn’t happened for so long.” The patriotism of M. Skobelev created enemies around him. The general's relations with the new emperor Alexander III were excellent, in March and April 1882 he was received by him twice and, after lengthy conversations with the monarch, left in a good mood. But outside the royal palace, the situation was different. On March 23, 1882, he wrote to I.S. Aksakov: “I received several challenges (to a duel. - N.L.), which I did not answer. Obviously, it is very desirable for the enemies of the Russian folk revival to get rid of me in this way. It is both cheap and cheerful, You know me so well that, of course, you are sure of my calm attitude to any accident. It is only important, if the inevitable happens, to extract the greatest benefit from the fact for our holy national cause. He was haunted by a premonition of an imminent death, and he even left a package with important documents for storage by I.S. Aksakov "just in case."
Such an incident occurred on July 7, 1882. Going on vacation to his estate, he stopped in Moscow and, after dinner with the officers of his corps, visited the England Hotel, located at the corner of Stoleshnikov Lane and st. Petrovka. Charlotte Altenrose, a well-known courtesan in Moscow, an Austrian Jewess who called herself either Eleonora, or Rose, or Wanda, lived in a luxurious room there. She ran out into the yard at night and told the janitor that a Russian officer had suddenly died in her room. And immediately disappeared from Moscow, nothing is known about her fate.
Pathologists determined that the young Skobelev had paralysis of the heart and lungs, although he had never complained of heart problems before and was generally in the prime of life. All contemporaries agreed that a crime had taken place. M. Skobelev was poisoned, as evidenced by the unusual yellowness of his face and quickly emerging blue spots on it - these are signs of a potent poison. All of Russia, from the emperor to the ordinary soldier and peasant, mourned. The country has not seen such a powerful wave of nationwide grief for a long time. The body of M.D. Skobelev was sent by special train to his estate, where the peasants carried the coffin in their arms for 20 km to the family burial vault.
In 1912, in Moscow, an equestrian monument was erected in his honor on the square in front of the building of the Governor-General's Palace (now the Moscow Mayor's Office) using public voluntary donations. The area was named Skobelevskaya. But the political upheavals that soon began in Russia tried to erase the name of the great commander from the memory of people. After the revolution of 1917, on the direct instructions of V. Lenin, the monument to Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was one of the first to be demolished in Moscow, and the square was renamed Sovietskaya (now Tverskaya). The family nest of the Skobelevs was destroyed. The Church of the Transfiguration, where he was buried, was closed, church utensils were confiscated, and a granary was placed in the altar. The marble crypt with the body of Skobelev was opened by security officers in search of orders and jewelry. Nothing was found, but the body of Mikhail Dmitrievich in a general's uniform was as if alive, according to eyewitnesses.
New times have come, the return of the old names of streets, squares, a revision of the role of heroic personalities in our history has begun. In 1996, a group of Russian patriots created the Skobelev Committee, headed by cosmonaut Alexei Arkhipovich Leonov. Until now, the committee has been unsuccessfully trying to draw the attention of the current Russian authorities and, first of all, the Moscow mayor's office, to the need to revive the memory of M.D. Skobelev, restore the destroyed monument, or at least install a memorial plaque on the building in which the outstanding Russian commander died. The committee sent at least half a dozen letters personally to the then mayor Yu. Luzhkov, but the mayor never deigned to respond to the appeals. In 1999, the current Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill (then Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad) addressed a personal letter on this issue to Luzhkov. The answer is silence.
Once, however, in the Moscow City Duma (in the commission on monumental art) the question of creating a monument to General Skobelev was considered. We talked more about its location. They seemed to agree that the monument should be erected in Ilyinsky Square, located at the corner of Lubyansky Proyezd and Staraya Square, not far from the monument-chapel dedicated to the heroes of Plevna. We talked and talked and forgot. Russkiy Dom magazine considers it necessary to remind the capital and federal authorities of their unfulfilled debt to the Russian people and the Fatherland. In addition, it would not be a sin to restore historical justice in its entirety: return the monument to General M.D. Skobelev to its original place and return the square to its historical name.
The real place for the statue of the founder of Moscow, Prince Yuri Dolgoruky, is not where it was placed in 1954, but on the top of the Kremlin Hill, in the center of the square, where V.I. Lenin once sat in a marble chair.
Before the revolution in the territory Russian Empire there were 6 monuments to M. Skobelev. Of these, only one bust was preserved in Ryazan, all other monuments were destroyed. Some restoration work was carried out after 1991 only in the small homeland of the famous general. None of the destroyed monuments has been restored. Be ashamed, Russia! More than 200 monuments to the famous liberator Skobelev have been erected in Bulgaria, hundreds of streets and squares are named after him, and we only chat about the importance of patriotic education of young generations, about uniting the nation around glorious historical values.
Everyone who hates everything Russian is trying to eradicate the memory of Skobelev. The best characterization of the general is his following public statements: “The experience of recent years has convinced us that if a Russian person accidentally remembers that, thanks to his history, he belongs to a great and strong people, if, God forbid, the same Russian person accidentally remembers that the Russian people are one family with the Slavic tribe, now tormented and trampled, then among the home-grown and foreign foreigners, cries of indignation are raised.
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“Convince the soldiers in practice that you are paternally caring about them outside the battle,
that in battle there is strength, and nothing will be impossible for you.
(M. D. Skobelev)
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev (1843-1882) was born 170 years ago - an outstanding Russian military leader and strategist, infantry general, adjutant general, participant in the Central Asian conquests of the Russian Empire and the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, liberator of Bulgaria.
For Ryazan, his name has a special meaning, because Skobelev was buried on Ryazan land, in his family estate.
There are not many famous military leaders in history about whom one can confidently say: "He did not lose a single battle." These are Alexander Nevsky, Alexander Suvorov, Fedor Ushakov. In the 19th century, such an invincible commander was Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev. Strongly built, tall, handsome, always in a white uniform and on a white horse, prancing under the furious whistle of bullets. "White General" (Ak-Pasha) - as his contemporaries called him, and not only because he participated in the battles in a white uniform and on a white horse ...
Battles and victories
Why was he called the "white general"?
By different reasons. The simplest is a uniform and a white horse. But after all, he was not the only one who wore a white general's coat. military uniform. So something else. Probably, the desire to be on the side of good, not to impoverish the soul, not to reconcile with the need for murder.
I came to the conclusion that everything in the world is a lie, a lie and a lie ... All this - and glory, and all this brilliance is a lie ... Is this true happiness? .. Does humanity really need this? .. But what, what is this lie worth , this glory? How many dead, wounded, sufferers, devastated!.. Explain to me: will you and I be responsible to God for the mass of people whom we killed in battle?- these words of Skobelev V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko discovers a lot in the general's character.
“An amazing life, the amazing speed of its events: Kokand, Khiva, Alay, Shipka, Lovcha, Plevna on July 18, Plevna on August 30, Green Mountains, crossing the Balkans, a trip to Adrianople, fabulous in its speed, Geok-Tepe and unexpected, mysterious death - follow one after another, without respite, without rest. ( IN AND. Nemirovich-Danchenko "Skobelev").
His name made the Central Asian khans and Turkish Janissaries tremble. And ordinary Russian soldiers treated him with respect. The staff officers, jealous of his successes, gossiped that he was a poseur who flaunted courage and contempt for death. But who personally knew General V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko (brother of the founder of the Art Theater) wrote: “He knew that he was leading to death, and without hesitation did not send, but led. The first bullet - to him, the first meeting with the enemy was his. The cause requires sacrifice, and having resolved the need for this cause, he would not back down from any sacrifice.
At the same time, Skobelev was not a simple "martinet" - brilliantly educated, knowing 8 languages, smart, ironic, cheerful, intellectual and reveler. But the main cause of his life - the service of the Fatherland, he gave himself without a trace. He was an amazing commander and an unusual person who became a true legend during his lifetime.
Early biography and military education
Skobelev as a cadet
A hereditary military man, he was born in St. Petersburg on September 17 (29) September 1843 in the family of Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Skobelev and his wife Olga Nikolaevna, nee Poltavtseva. Having inherited the "subtlety of nature" from his mother, he retained his spiritual intimacy with her for the rest of his life. In his opinion, only in the family a person has the opportunity to be himself.
“Too graceful for a real military man,” he nevertheless chose this path from his youth and already on November 22, 1861, he entered military service in the Cavalier Guard Regiment. After passing the exam, on September 8, 1862, he was promoted to the junker belt, and on March 31, 1863 - to the cornets. August 30, 1864 Skobelev was promoted to lieutenant.
Skobelev with the rank of lieutenant
In the autumn of 1866 he entered the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. At the end of the course of the academy in 1868, he became the 13th of 26 officers assigned to the general staff.
Khiva campaign
In the spring of 1873, Skobelev took part in the Khiva campaign, as an officer of the general staff at the Mangishlak detachment of Colonel Lomakin. The purpose of the campaign is, firstly, to strengthen the Russian borders, which were subjected to targeted attacks by local feudal lords equipped with English weapons, and secondly, to protect those who came under Russian protection. They left on April 16, Skobelev, like other officers, walked. Severity and exactingness in the conditions of a military campaign, and first of all to himself, distinguished this person. Then, in peaceful life, there could be weaknesses and doubts, during military operations - maximum composure, responsibility and courage.
Scheme of the fortifications of Khiva
So on May 5, near the Itybay well, Skobelev with a detachment of 10 horsemen met a caravan of Kazakhs who had gone over to the side of Khiva and, despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, rushed into battle, in which he received 7 wounds with pikes and checkers and until May 20 could not sit on a horse. Returning to service, on May 22, with 3 companies and 2 guns, he covered the wheeled convoy, and repulsed a number of enemy attacks. On May 24, when the Russian troops were at Chinakchik (8 versts from Khiva), the Khiva attacked the camel convoy. Skobelev quickly orientated himself, and moved with two hundred hidden, gardens, to the rear of the Khivans he overturned their approaching cavalry, then attacked the Khiva infantry, put it to flight and returned 400 camels beaten off by the enemy. On May 29, Mikhail Skobelev with two companies stormed the Shakhabat Gates, was the first to get inside the fortress and, although he was attacked by the enemy, he kept the gate and the rampart behind him. Khiva subdued.
Khiva campaign in 1873.
The transition of the Turkestan detachment through the dead sands - Karazin
Military Governor
In 1875-76, Mikhail Dmitrievich led an expedition against the rebellion of the feudal lords of the Kokand Khanate, directed against nomadic robbers who ravaged the Russian border lands. After that, with the rank of major general, he was appointed governor and commander of the troops of the Fergana region, formed on the territory of the abolished Kokand Khanate. As the military governor of Fergana and the head of all the troops operating in the former Kokand Khanate, he took part and led the battles at Kara-Chukul, Makhram, Minch-Tube, Andijan, Tyura-Kurgan, Namangan, Tash-Bala, Balykchi, etc. He also organized and without much loss he made an amazing expedition, known as the "Alai".
In a white uniform, on a white horse - Skobelev remained safe and sound after the most heated fights with the enemy, and then there was a legend that he was charmed by bullets ...
Becoming the head of the Fergana region, Skobelev found mutual language with conquered tribes. The Sarts reacted well to the arrival of the Russians, but nevertheless their weapons were taken away. The militant Kipchaks, once subjugated, kept their word and did not revolt. Mikhail Dmitrievich treated them "firmly, but with heart."
Thus, for the first time, his stern gift as a military leader was manifested:
... War is war, - he said during the discussion of the operation, - and there cannot be no losses ... and these losses can be large.
Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878
The peak of the career of commander D.M. Skobelev fell on the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the purpose of which was the liberation of the Orthodox peoples from the oppression of the Ottoman Empire. On June 15, 1877, Russian troops crossed the Danube and launched an offensive. The Bulgarians enthusiastically met the Russian army and poured into it.
Skobelev near Shipka - Vereshchagin
On the battlefield, Skobelev appeared as a major general, already with the St. George Cross, and, despite the incredulous remarks of many of his associates, he quickly gained fame as a talented and fearless commander. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. he actually commanded (being the chief of staff of the Consolidated Cossack division) the Caucasian Cossack brigade during the 2nd assault on Plevna in July 1877 and a separate detachment during the capture of Lovchi in August 1877.
During the 3rd assault on Plevna (August 1877), he successfully led the actions of the left-flank detachment, which broke through to Plevna, but did not receive timely support from the command. Commanding the 16th Infantry Division, Mikhail Dmitrievich participated in the blockade of Plevna and the winter crossing through the Balkans (through the Imitlisky Pass), playing a decisive role in the battle of Sheinovo.
At the last stage of the war, while pursuing the retreating Turkish troops, Skobelev, commanding the vanguard of the Russian troops, occupied Adrianople and in February 1878 San Stefano in the vicinity of Constantinople. Skobelev's successful actions made him very popular in Russia and Bulgaria, where streets, squares and parks in many cities were named after him.
Siege of Plevna
Prudent people reproached Skobelev for his reckless courage; they said that “he behaves like a boy”, that “he rushes forward like an ensign”, which, finally, risking “necessarily”, exposes the soldiers to the danger of being left without high command, etc. However, there was no more commander attentive to the needs of his soldiers and more careful about their lives than the "white general". During preparations for the upcoming crossing through the Balkans, Skobelev, who foresaw such a development of events in advance, and therefore did not waste time in vain, developed a vigorous activity. He, as the head of the column, understood: regardless of the conditions of the transition, everything must be done to save the detachment from unjustified losses along the way, to maintain its combat effectiveness.
Convince the soldiers in practice that you are paternally caring about them outside the battle, that in battle there is strength, and nothing will be impossible for you
Skobelev said.
The personal example of the chief, his training requirements became a measure for the officers and soldiers of the detachment. Throughout the district, Skobelev sent teams to purchase boots, sheepskin coats, sweatshirts, food and fodder. Pack saddles and packs were purchased in the villages. On the route of the detachment, in Toplesh, Skobelev created a base with an eight-day supply of food and a large number of pack horses. And all this Skobelev carried out with the forces of his detachment, not relying on the help of the commissariat and partnership, who were engaged in supplying the army.
Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878
The time of intense fighting clearly showed that the Russian army was inferior to the Turkish in terms of the quality of weapons, and therefore Skobelev supplied one battalion of the Uglitsky regiment with guns recaptured from the Turks. Another innovation was introduced by Skobelev. As soon as the soldiers did not curse, every time they put heavy satchels on their backs! Neither sit down with such a burden, nor lie down, and in battle it hindered movement. Skobelev got a canvas somewhere and ordered the bags to be sewn. And the soldier became easy and comfortable! After the war, the entire Russian army switched to canvas bags. They laughed at Skobelev: they say, the military general turned into an agent of the commissariat, and the laughter intensified even more when it became known about Skobelev's order for each soldier to have a log of dry firewood.
Skobelev continued to prepare the detachment. As subsequent events showed, firewood was very useful. At a halt, the soldiers quickly kindled fires and rested in the warmth. During the transition, there was not a single frostbite in the detachment. In other detachments, especially in the left column, a large number of soldiers were out of action due to frostbite.
All of the above made General Skobelev an idol among the soldiers and an object of envy among the highest military officials, endlessly blaming him for too “light” awards, unjustified, from their point of view, courage, undeserved glory. However, those who saw him in action could not fail to note completely different qualities. “It is impossible not to note the skill with which Skobelev fought. At that moment, when he achieved decisive success, 9 fresh battalions were still intact in his hands, the mere sight of which forced the Turks to capitulate.
Akhal-Teke expedition
After the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The “white general” commanded the corps, but was soon sent back to Central Asia, where in 1880-1881. led the so-called Akhal-Teke military expedition, during which he carefully and comprehensively organized campaigns of subordinate troops and successfully stormed the Den-gil-Tepe fortress (near Geok-Tepe). Following this, Ashgabat was occupied by Skobelev's troops.
As Juliette Lambert recalled:
If General Skobelev risked the life of his soldiers as easily as his own, then after the battle he treated them with the greatest care. For the sick and wounded, he always arranged comfortable rooms, preventing them from congregating in hospitals, which, according to him, poses a twofold danger: epidemics and demoralization of the troops. He demanded that the officers think (as far as possible) of the well-being of their soldiers before their own, and in this respect he personally set an example for them. General Dukhonin, chief of staff of the 4th Corps, wrote about him:
"Our glorious generals Radetsky and Gurko were able to perfectly guess the special abilities of officers and use them, but only Skobelev was able to extract from each decisively everything that he was capable of, and, moreover, with his personal example and advice, encouraged, improved them ".
He treated the Asians who were in the Russian service in exactly the same way as with his soldiers. "That, he said, is the main guarantee of our strength. We try to make people out of slaves; this is more important than all our victories."
During the battle there was no man more cruel than Skobelev. The Tekkins called him Guents-Kanly, "Bloody Eyes," and he inspired them with superstitious fear.
In conversations with Mr. Marvin, General Skobelev unceremoniously expressed how he understood the conquest of Central Asia.
- "You see, Mr. Marvin - but don't print this, otherwise I will be known in the eyes of the League of Peace as a wild barbarian - my principle is that the tranquility in Asia is in direct relation to the mass of people massacred there. the stronger the blow, the longer the unyariyar remains calm. We killed 20,000 Turkmen at Geok-Tepe. The survivors will not forget this lesson for a long time.
“I hope that you will allow me to state your view in print, since in your official report you say that after the attack and during the pursuit of the enemy you killed 8,000 people of both sexes.
- That's right: they were counted and, indeed, it turned out to be 8,000 people.
“This fact has aroused a lot of talk in England, since you admit that your troops killed women as well as men.
On this occasion, I must note that, in a conversation with me, Skobelev said frankly: "Many women were killed. The troops cut with sabers everything that came to hand". Skobelev gave his division an order to spare women and children, and in his presence they were not killed; but the other divisions spared no one: the soldiers worked like machines and cut down the people with their sabers. Captain Maslov confessed this with complete frankness. As an eyewitness, he claims in his essay "The Conquest of Akhal-Tekke" that in the morning, on the day of the attack, an order was given not to take anyone prisoner.
“That is absolutely true,” said Skobelev, women were found among the dead. It is not in my nature to hide anything. That is why I wrote in my report: both sexes.
When I remarked to him that our main mistake, in the last Afghan war, was that, having entered this country, we did not put into practice his principle (and Wellington), that is, we did not deal the enemy perhaps more cruel blows, - he answered: "The executions in Kabul, carried out on the orders of General Roberts, were a big mistake. I would never order the execution of an Asian with the aim of terrorizing the country, because this measure never produces the desired effect. Whatever execution you come up with, it still always will be less terrible than those invented by some Masrulah or other Asiatic despot. The population is so accustomed to such cruelties that all your punishments seem insignificant to them. It is also important that the execution of a Muslim by infidels causes hatred. I prefer to see revolt of an entire country than to execute one man. When you take a city by storm and deal the most severe blow at the same time, they say: "This is the will of the Most High," and submit to this sentence of fate, not keeping in their hearts a trace of the hatred that infects in Here is my system: strike strong and cruel blows until the resistance is destroyed, and then stop all slaughter, be kind and catchy with a lying enemy. After the declaration of humility, the strictest discipline must be observed in the troops: not a single enemy should be touched.
Skobelev near Geok-Tepe
An ardent supporter of the liberation of the Slavic peoples, Skobelev was tireless, reaching almost to Constantinople, and was very worried about the impossibility of completing the job. IN AND. Nemirovich-Danchenko, who accompanied the general, wrote: “Strange as it may seem, I can testify that I saw Skobelev burst into tears, speaking of Constantinople, that we are fruitlessly wasting time and the results of an entire war without occupying it ...
Indeed, when even the Turks erected masses of new fortifications around Constantinople, Skobelev several times made exemplary attacks and maneuvers, occupied these fortifications, showing the full possibility of capturing them without great losses. Once in this way he burst in and took the key of the enemy positions, from which the askers looked at him, doing nothing.
Skobelev M.D.:
I directly suggested to the Grand Duke: to arbitrarily occupy Constantinople with my detachment, and the next day let them put me on trial and shoot me, so long as they don’t give him up ... I wanted to do this without warning, but who knows what types and assumptions there are. ..
But Russia turned out to be unprepared for that brilliant victory, which was ensured by the courage of its soldiers and the valor of such commanders as Skobelev. The barely nascent capitalism was not ready to take on England and France, to whom Russia lost the Crimean War about 20 years ago. If the victims of recklessness in war are soldiers, then the victims of reckless politicians are entire nations and states. The “pan-Slavic unity” that the general hoped for was not born in either the First or Second World Wars.
Skobelev - General of Infantry
Nevertheless, even then, in the late 70s - early 80s of the XIX century, Skobelev was able to discern the future Russian-German front of the First World War and assess the main forms of armed struggle in the future.
Having received a month's leave on June 22 (July 4), 1882, M.D. Skobelev left Minsk, where the headquarters of the 4th Corps was located, for Moscow, and already on June 25, 1882, the general was gone. It was a completely unexpected death. Unexpected for others, but not for him ...
He repeatedly expressed forebodings of imminent death to his friends:
Every day of my life is a respite given to me by fate. I know that I will not be allowed to live. It's not for me to finish everything that I have in mind. You know that I am not afraid of death. Well, I'll tell you: fate or people will soon lie in wait for me. Someone called me a fatal person, and fatal people always end up in a fatal way ... God spared me in battle ... And people ... Well, maybe this is redemption. Who knows, maybe we are wrong in everything and others paid for our mistakes? ..
This quote reveals to us the character of a difficult, ambiguous, even unexpected for a military man.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was primarily Russian. And how almost every Russian person "carried in himself" the internal discord that is seen in people who think. Outside of battles, he was tormented by doubts. He did not have the calm, "with which the commanders of other countries and peoples send tens of thousands of people to their deaths, without experiencing the slightest pangs of conscience, commanders for whom the dead and wounded are only a more or less unpleasant detail of a brilliant report." However, there was no tearful sentimentality either. Before the battle, Skobelev was calm, resolute and energetic, he himself went to his death and did not spare others, but after the battle, according to his contemporaries, “he had hard days, hard nights. His conscience did not rest on the consciousness of the necessity of sacrifices. On the contrary, she spoke loudly and menacingly. A martyr woke up in triumph. The rapture of victory could not kill the heavy doubts in his sensitive soul. In sleepless nights, in moments of loneliness, the commander stepped back and a man came to the fore with a mass of unresolved issues, with repentance ... The recent winner was tormented and executed as a criminal from all this mass of blood shed by himself.
Such was the price of his military success. And the "white general" M.D. Skobelev paid it honestly and selflessly, just as honestly and selflessly as he fought for the good of his Fatherland.
There are names of outstanding people in our history who were true patriots of their country and served it faithfully. Not out of fear, but out of conscience, and for the prosperity of Russia, they did not spare their lives. Their activities were not fully appreciated during their lifetime, but it is a shame to realize that we turn out to be ungrateful descendants and honor their memory even less. The bright, heroic and tragic life of Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev - an infantry general, a fearless commander, a hero of many wars, a participant in seventy battles - is a true example of sincere patriotism and faithful service to the Fatherland.
By association with the nickname that Skobelev bore in Russian society "White General", many who are not familiar with history classify him as a member of the white movement, although Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev is a hero of Russian history of the 19th century.
Biography of General Skobelev briefly
He was born in 1843 into a military family. In his family, men have always served the Fatherland. His grandfather was an orderly himself, his father fought in the Caucasus and successfully participated in the Turkish company. Mikhail Skobelev was a very gifted young man who was destined for a career as a scientist, not a military one. Few people know, but Skobelev spoke eight European languages.
Born in St. Petersburg, he spent his teenage years in the boarding house Girardet. Returning home at the age of 18, he entered St. Petersburg University in 1861, but soon left his studies, and he was enrolled as a cadet in the Cavalier Guard Regiment, and in 1863 he was promoted to cornet. In 1864, the young cornet Skobelev takes a baptism of fire during the Polish uprising. The battle in the Radkovitsky forest and the miracles of courage shown allow him to receive his first order - St. Anna 4th degree.
Skobelev is transferred from the cavalry guards to the hussar regiment. He graduated very successfully from the Academy of the General Staff and served for some time in the Moscow Military District. But boring staff life is not for him, and he goes to the Caucasus and Turkestan. In 1873, Mikhail Dmitrievich distinguished himself in the capture of Khiva, it was from that time that he began to wear an exclusively white uniform. He also rode only on white horses, so his opponent called him Ak-pasha, that is, "white commander."
For participation in the Kokand expedition, where Skobelev showed not only courage and courage, but expressed the prudent foresight of a diplomat, organizational talent and excellent knowledge of local customs when communicating with the Asian population, he was awarded two orders of St. George III and IV degrees, the Order of St. Vladimir and a golden sword with a diamond hilt and the inscription "For Courage". Having received the rank of colonel, in 1877 he became the governor of New Margelan, and at the same time, commander of the troops in the Fergana district. But, almost immediately, Skobelev received a new appointment and served at the disposal of the commander in chief army to participate in the European coalition against Turkey.
At first, the new colleagues looked at the young general as an upstart who received a high rank and awards for the victory over the "wild Asians." But the successful operations of the Russian detachments under the command of Skobelev during the capture of Lovcha and in the battles near Plevna, the victorious breakthrough of the Skobelev detachments through the Imetli pass in the Balkans, the famous Battle of Sheinovo, when Russian troops captured the ancient Shipka and delivered the final blow to the Turkish troops - all these operations were among the victories of Russian weapons under the command of General Skobelev. They brought him fame, fame, admiration and worship.
Skobelev returned to Russia as a corps commander with the rank of lieutenant general. And the last military feat of Skobelev is the capture of the Akhal-Tepe fortress in Turkestan in 1881. For this victory, he received the Order of St. George II degree and the rank of general from infantry. Returning from the expedition, Skobelev goes abroad. He does not hesitate to speak aloud about the oppression of the brothers - the Slavs from the civilized European countries - Germany, Austria and receives another nickname "Slavic Garibaldi". .
- They spoke of him as a charmed hero, whom the Mother of God takes care of - he came out of any battles without a single scratch. The same applied to his soldiers - the losses in his units were the smallest.
- Yakov Polonsky wrote on Skobelev's death:
Why is there a crowd of people?
What is he waiting for in silence?
What is grief, what is confusion?
Not a fortress fell, not a battle
Lost, - fell Skobelev! gone
The strength that was more terrible
A dozen fortresses for the enemy...
The strength that the heroes
Reminded us of fairy tales. ...
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev - short biography
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev - a large detailed article from the XVIII volume of the Russian Biographical Dictionary of A.A. Polovtsov
The future hero of Russia and a favorite of the army, Mikhail Skobelev, was born on September 17, 1843 into a military family: he was the first-born of a lieutenant of the Cavalier Guard regiment, later a participant in the Crimean War, a holder of an honorary golden sword. Mikhail's grandfather, Ivan Nikitich, during the Patriotic War of 1812 was an adjutant at Kutuzov himself, rose to the rank of infantry general, was the commandant of the Peter and Paul Fortress and at the same time an original military writer and playwright. The grandfather was the main figure in the home education of his grandson. After his death, the mother of the young Skobelev decided to send her son to France, where he studied at a boarding school, mastered a large amount of knowledge and several languages. Returning to his homeland, Mikhail entered St. Petersburg University in 1861, but soon family traditions took over, and he petitioned the tsar to enroll him as a cadet in the Cavalier Guard regiment. Thus began his military service.
On November 22, 1861, 18-year-old Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev, in the ranks of the cavalry guards, took an oath of allegiance to the Sovereign and the Fatherland and with zeal began to comprehend the basics of military affairs. In March 1863 he became an officer, the following year he was transferred to the Life Guards Grodno Hussars, named after the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812 Ya. Kulnev, and promoted to lieutenant. In the memoirs of the officers of the Grodno regiment, he remained "a true gentleman and a dashing cavalry officer."
In 1866, Mikhail Skobelev, having brilliantly passed the entrance exams, entered the Academy of the General Staff. This was the heyday of the academy, in which such prominent military scientists as G. Leer, M. Dragomirov, A. Puzyrevsky taught. But it was not easy for the temperamental officer to study, he either worked hard, admiring the teachers with his knowledge, or quit going to lectures, indulging in bachelor parties. Probably, he would not have been able to complete the course of the academy if it were not for Professor Leer, who, with his true instinct, guessed exceptional military talents in him and took care of him. At the request of Leer, Staff Captain Skobelev, upon graduation from the academy, was enrolled in the staff of officers of the General Staff.
In the next four years, Mikhail Dmitrievich, as a representative of the General Staff, visited the border with the Bukhara Khanate, traveled to the Caucasus, and under the leadership of N. Stoletov participated in an expedition to the southeastern shores of the Caspian Sea. In 1872 Skobelev became a lieutenant colonel. In 1873, he participated in the Khiva campaign of Russian troops under the command of General K. Kaufman, whose goal was to force the Khiva khan to peaceful relations with Russia.
Skobelev led the vanguard of the Mangyshlak detachment, in skirmishes with the enemy he received several minor checker wounds, but remained in the ranks, took part in the capture of Khiva. His courage and courage were noticed by everyone. The brave officer received his first military award - the Order of St. George 4th class.
In 1874, Mikhail Dmitrievich was promoted to colonel and adjutant wing, married the maid of honor of the Empress, Princess M. Gagarina, but a cozy family life was not for him. The following year, he again seeks to send him to Turkestan, where the Kokand uprising broke out (in 1876 his marriage was annulled). As part of the Kaufman detachment, Skobelev commanded the Cossack cavalry, and his decisive actions contributed to the defeat of the enemy near Makhram. Then he was instructed to act at the head of a separate detachment against the Kara-Kyrgyz participating in the uprising; Skobelev's victories near Andijan and Asaka put an end to the uprising. Dressed in a white uniform, on a white horse, Skobelev remained safe and sound after the most heated fights with the enemy (he himself, paying tribute to superstition, inspired himself and others that he would never be killed in white clothes). Already at that time there was a legend that he was charmed by bullets. For his exploits in the Kokand campaign, Skobelev was awarded the rank of major general, the Order of St. George 3rd class. and St. Vladimir of the 3rd class, as well as a golden saber with the inscription: "For courage." The first fame came to him.
In April 1877, the Russian-Turkish war began, in which Russia came to the aid of the fraternal Slavic peoples, and Skobelev decided to take part in it without fail. But in St. Petersburg, by that time, an unfriendly opinion had developed about the young general: envious people accused him of excessive ambition, an “intemperate” lifestyle, and even embezzlement of state money. With difficulty, Skobelev was appointed to the Danube army as chief of staff of the Cossack division (his father commanded it), but soon he was sent to be at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. When the days of preparing the Russian army for forcing the Danube came, Mikhail Dmitrievich achieved secondment of his assistant to the head of the 14th division M. Dragomirov. The division was instructed to be the first to cross the Danube, and the arrival of Skobelev turned out to be just in time. Dragomirov and the soldiers greeted him as "their own", and he was actively involved in the preparation of the crossing at Zimnitsa. Skillfully organized, on June 15 it was successful, despite the strong resistance of the Turks.
After forcing the Danube army, forward to the Balkans, advanced detachment of General I. Gurko moved, and on behalf of the commander-in-chief, Skobelev helped the detachment in mastering the Shipka Pass. By this time, large Turkish forces under the command of Osman Pasha launched a counteroffensive against the main forces of the Russian army and organized a strong defense of Plevna, a strategically important fortress and city. Mikhail Dmitrievich happened to become one of the active participants in the epic struggle for Plevna. The first two assaults on the city (July 8 and 18), which ended in failure for the Russian troops, revealed serious flaws in the organization of their actions. Skobelev was given little consolation by the fact that during the assault on July 18, the consolidated Cossack division, which he commanded, moved forward further than its neighbors, and during the general retreat, retreated back in perfect order. In the interval between the second and third assaults, he proposed to capture Lovcha, an important road junction leading to Plevna. The “White General” actually led the actions of the Russian detachment that took Lovcha, since the head of the detachment, Prince Imeretinsky, completely entrusted him with the attack.
Before the third assault on Plevna at the end of August, Skobelev was entrusted with the command of a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 3rd Infantry Brigade. Showing great energy and putting everyone on their feet, he and his chief of staff A. Kuropatkin brought their troops to the maximum combat readiness. On the day of the assault, Skobelev, as always on a white horse and in white clothes, led the actions of his detachment on the left flank of the advancing troops. His detachment went into battle with music and drumming. After fierce battles with the enemy, he captured two Turkish redoubts and broke through to Plevna. But it was not possible to break the enemy in the center and on the right flank, and the Russian troops received a command to withdraw. This failure at Plevna brought Skobelev more fame and made his name more famous throughout Russia than all his previous successes. Alexander II, who was near Plevna, awarded the 34-year-old commander with the rank of lieutenant general and the Order of St. Stanislav, 1st class.
The sharp increase in Skobelev's popularity was largely due to the originality of his personality and the ability to win the hearts of soldiers. He considered it his sacred duty to take care of his subordinates, whom he provided with hot food in any combat situation. With sincere and emotional patriotic slogans and a lively appeal to the troops, the fearless general influenced them like no other. His associate and permanent chief of staff Kuropatkin recalled: “On the day of the battle, Skobelev seemed to the troops especially joyful, cheerful, handsome ...; The soldiers and officers looked with confidence at his martial handsome figure, admired him, joyfully greeted him and from the bottom of their hearts answered him “glad to try” to his wishes, so that they would be great in the upcoming business.
In October 1877, Mikhail Dmitrievich took command of the 16th Infantry Division near Plevna. Three regiments of this division were already under his command: Kazan - near Lovcha, Vladimir and Suzdal - during the assaults on Plevna. During the period of complete encirclement and blockade of the city, he put his division in order, upset by heavy losses in previous battles. After the capitulation of Plevna, which could not withstand the blockade, Skobelev took part in the winter passage of Russian troops through the Balkans. His order, before setting out into the mountains, said: “We have a difficult feat worthy of the experienced glory of the Russian banners: today we are starting to cross the Balkans with artillery, without roads, punching our way, in the sight of the enemy, through deep snowdrifts. Do not forget, brothers, that we have been entrusted with the honor of the Fatherland. Our holy cause!
As part of the Central Detachment of General F. Radetsky, Skobelev, with his division and the Seeds attached to it, overcame the Imetlisky Pass, to the right of Shipka, and on the morning of December 28 came to the aid of the column of N. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, who bypassed Shipka on the left and entered the battle with the Turks at Sheinovo . The attack of the Skobelev column, carried out almost on the move, without preparation, but in accordance with all the rules of military art, ended with the encirclement of the Turkish corps of Wessel Pasha. The Turkish commander surrendered his saber to the Russian general. For this victory, Skobelev was awarded a second golden sword with the inscription: "For courage", although, according to many, he deserved more.
At the beginning of 1878, Mikhail Dmitrievich was subordinate to the head of the Western Detachment, General I. Gurko, and, having led the avant-garde corps, ensured the occupation of Adrianople (Edirne). After a short rest, his corps marched on Istanbul (Constantinople), on January 17 broke into Chorla, which is 80 kilometers from the Turkish capital. An exhausted Turkey asked for peace. The peace treaty signed in San Stefano was quite beneficial for Russia and the Balkan peoples, but six months later, under pressure from the European powers, it was revised in Berlin, which caused a sharply negative reaction from Skobelev.
By the end of the 70s. the struggle between Russia and England for influence in Central Asia intensified, and in 1880 Alexander II instructed Skobelev to lead an expedition of Russian troops to the Akhal-Teke oasis of Turkmenistan. The main goal of the campaign was the capture of the Geok-Tepe fortress (45 kilometers northwest of Askhabad) - the main stronghold of the Tekins. After a five-month struggle with the sands and the courageous Tekins, the 13,000-strong detachment of Skobelev approached Geok-Tepe, and on January 12, after the assault, the fortress fell. Then Askhabad was occupied, and other regions of Turkmenistan were annexed to Russia. On the occasion of the successful completion of the expedition, Alexander II promoted Skobelev to the generals of the infantry and awarded the Order of St. George 2nd class.
Alexander III, who ascended the throne in March 1881, was wary of the loud glory of the “white general”. In turn, Skobelev did not seek to win the trust of the new tsar and allowed himself to say everything he thought about the reigning house, about the policy of Russia and its relationship with the Western powers. Fascinated by the ideas of Slavism, Orthodoxy and the rise of national consciousness, he repeatedly and publicly declared the danger threatening Russia from the west, which caused a stir in Europe. The general spoke especially sharply about Germany, the "Teutons". In March and April 1882, Skobelev had two audiences with the tsar, and although the content of their conversations remained unknown, according to eyewitnesses, Alexander III began to treat the general more tolerantly. Skobelev wrote to his friend General Kuropatkin: “If they scold you, don’t really believe it, I stand for the truth and for the Army and I’m not afraid of anyone.”
On June 22, 1882, Mikhail Dmitrievich left Minsk, where he commanded a corps, for Moscow, on the 25th he had dinner at the England Hotel (on the corner of Stoleshnikov Lane and Petrovka), then went down to visit a certain girl Altenroe, and at night she came running to the janitor and said that an officer had died in her room. Arriving physician stated the death of Skobelev from paralysis of the heart and lungs. Suspicions that he fell victim to a political assassination remained suspicions.
A memorial service on June 26 gathered a huge number of military and people, people went to say goodbye to Skobelev all day, the church was buried in flowers, wreaths and mourning ribbons. On the wreath from the Academy of the General Staff, the inscription was silvered: "To Hero Skobelev, equal to Suvorov." Peasants in their arms carried the coffin of Mikhail Dmitrievich for 20 versts to Spassky, the family estate of the Skobelevs. There he was buried in the church next to his father and mother.
In 1912, a beautiful monument was erected to the great Skobelev in Moscow on Tverskaya Square at the expense of the people.
In 1918, the monument was demolished in accordance with the Bolshevik decree "On the removal of monuments to tsars and their servants and the development of projects for monuments to the Russian socialist revolution."
Used materials of the book: Kovalevsky N.F. History of Russian Goverment. Biographies of famous military figures of the 18th - early 20th centuries. M. 1997
Source: www.hrono.ru
Photo: www.el-soft.com/panorama/en/
Skobelev Mikhail Dmitrievich (09/17/1843 - 06/25/1882) - the son of Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Skobelev and his wife Olga Nikolaevna, nee Poltavtseva, was born in St. Petersburg. As a child, the future warrior already showed in him: he was very brave, proud and persistent, but at the same time, extremely impressionable and quick-tempered. The influence of parents on the upbringing of their son was exactly the opposite: the father stood for extreme severity, while his mother spoiled him greatly. Initially, the aspirations of the father triumphed.
Unfortunately, Dmitry Ivanovich assigned an unsuccessfully chosen German tutor to his son and gave him unlimited power over the boy. The cruel tutor whipped the pupil with rods for the slightest mistake in memorizing German vocabulary, as well as for any childish prank. Relations between the tutor and the pupil became more and more aggravated. It happened once that the tutor scolded a boy who answered something. The governor hit him in the face. Mikhail could not bear the insult, spat in the German's face and answered him with a slap in the face. Then the father calculated the tutor and gave the boy to be raised by the Frenchman Desiderius Girardet, who had a boarding house in Paris.
In the person of Girardet, Mikhail met an educated, honest and kind teacher, who, moreover, sincerely fell in love with his pet. It is possible that the French influence, having fallen on Slavic soil, the susceptibility of which was further strengthened by the negative activity of the German tutor, prepared the later national sympathies and antipathies of Mikhail Dmitrievich. For his part, the young man fell in love with his teacher, who tried to develop in him a sense of duty and responsibility. Ebullient nature M.D. Skobeleva could not, of course, immediately accept and digest all this; nevertheless, the pet was aware of the beneficial influence of the mentor, who later was his best friend. Girardet followed Skobelev to Russia; it happened that he was not separated from him even during military operations; Mikhail Dmitrievich, in all important cases of his life, consulted with his former tutor.
After graduating from Girardet, Mikhail Skobelev, at the request of his parents, returned to Russia to continue his education. At that time, he represented a young man who was still unsteady, to a certain extent approaching the type of “golden youth”. However, already at that time he showed extraordinary abilities and a remarkable originality of mind and feelings, inherent only in selected natures. Not everything that was taught to him interested him, but what he focused on, he grasped quickly and mastered excellently. So it was in the field of knowledge, so it was in the field of feelings and concepts.
In 1858-1860. M.D. Skobelev was preparing to enter St. Petersburg University. These classes were conducted under the general supervision of Academician A.V. Nikitenko were so successful that Mikhail Dmitrievich even passed the home, preliminary exam in the presence of a trustee and some professors. In 1861 M.D. Skobelev was supposed to enter the university, but, apparently, he was least of all attracted by the subjects of university teaching, the study of which he was to study. Already at that time he read books of various content, mainly historical, and, feeling in himself a vocation and love for military affairs, looked with envy at his peers who put on officer epaulettes. Meanwhile, student riots began, leading to the temporary closure of the university. Dmitry Ivanovich Skobelev now himself was busy with accepting his son into military service, in the Cavalry Guards Regiment, which took place on November 22, 1861.
After passing the established exam M.D. Skobelev was renamed into a harness-junker on September 8, 1862, and on March 31, 1863 he was promoted to cornet in his own regiment. Having quickly experienced all aspects of the life of a brilliant officer of the guards, accepted in the highest metropolitan society, moving with feverish impulsiveness from pleasures to military history and, in general, to reading books, M.D. Skobelev was not satisfied with this peaceful activity and was looking for a field that would be more in line with the energy and passionate love for activity and glory hidden in him.
In February 1864 M.D. Skobelev accompanied, as an orderly, Adjutant General Count Baranov, who was sent to Warsaw to publish a manifesto on the liberation of the peasants and on the allocation of land to them. At this time, Mikhail Dmitrievich was seduced by the combat situation in which the L.-Guards was. The Grodno Hussar Regiment, which took part in hostilities against the Polish rebels, asked to be transferred to this regiment, which took place on March 19 of the same year. But even before this transfer, having gone on vacation to his father, M.D. Skobelev accidentally met on the way one of the guards regiments pursuing Shpak's gang, immediately joined this regiment and spent almost the entire vacation in pursuit of the rebels purely out of love for the cause, as a "volunteer".
M.D. Skobelev appeared in the regiment on March 31 and participated in all the expeditions that took place with him; although the gangs were already ending their activities at that time, Mikhail Dmitrievich still managed to take part in one successful search in the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Zankisov, which ended in battle and the destruction of Shemiot's gang in the Radkovitsky forest. For the difference in this case, M.D. Skobelev was awarded the Order of St. Anna, 4th degree, with the inscription "for bravery".
The peculiar conditions of the situation largely made up for the modesty of these operations. M.D. Skobelev here already understood the full importance of reconnaissance in the matter of orienting commanders, as well as the whole difficulty of carrying out reconnaissance in a wooded area, with a doubtful, and sometimes hostile, attitude of a more or less significant part of the population. Here he realized that against such an enemy as the rebels, he should act as decisively as possible and with full energy, trying to "beat him by imagination" and undermining his moral strength.
Out of service M.D. Skobelev indulged in his favorite occupation of military history, and carefully studied various campaigns with a compass and a pencil in his hands, sitting at the table or even lying on the floor over the plans, which often occupied half the room; it happened that he locked himself with a key so that his comrades would not interfere with these activities. In conversations, he often talked about a campaign in Asia, but even then he studied the military systems of Western European states.
In 1864 M.D. Skobelev went on vacation abroad, and although he was not in time for the military operations of the Danes against the Germans, he nevertheless examined this theater of military operations. Nevertheless, Mikhail Dmitrievich did not shy away from his comrades and was even the first to come up with various desperately bold inventions during the various adventures of the hussar company. So, he, together with one comrade, risking his life, swam across the Vistula River during the ice drift, jumped out of the second floor window into the park on a bet, etc. It was hardly a drawing. Or rather, to admit that it was just a tribute to the ebullient nature, longing for activity and strong sensations.
August 30, 1864 M.D. Skobelev was promoted to lieutenant. The narrow confines of peacetime military service did not satisfy him and he began to prepare for admission to the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, with the goal of obtaining a higher military education and achieving the opportunity to act in a broader field, corresponding to the vocation that he felt in himself. In the autumn of 1866, having passed the entrance exam quite satisfactorily, he was admitted to the academy, leaving a good memory among Grodno residents as "a true gentleman and a dashing cavalry officer."
At the academy M.D. Skobelev, like many wonderful people, hardly fit the standard for all. Often he did not pay due attention to what was required by the school routine, and at the same time he was happy to do what attracted him, mainly the same military history. Mikhail Dmitrievich gathered his comrades, read his notes to them or made messages of a military-historical content. These messages caused lively disputes and arguments. At the same time, Skobelev did not have to refuse to communicate with the circle to which he belonged by birth and by virtue of family relations; he himself did not refuse various pleasures and entertainments in the company of comrades and friends, and the academic student was not inferior to the former hussar cornet in relation to various tricks and manifestations of dashing, from dressing in a Scottish suit to swimming in bad boats in the Gulf of Finland. Under such conditions, despite his excellent abilities, M.D. Skobelev could not always answer equally well in academic exams, and the authorities considered him, although very capable, but lazy.
At the end of the course of the Academy M.D. Skobelev was placed 13th out of 26 officers who were awarded reckoning to the general staff; at the same time, he was released in the 2nd category, which is explained by his relatively unbrilliant successes in military statistics and surveys, and especially in geodesy; however, this was abundantly rewarded by the fact that, in subjects of military art, M.D. Skobelev was second, and first in military history in the entire issue, not to mention the fact that in foreign and Russian languages, in political history and in general in subjects of general education, he was also among the first. The academic authorities, releasing him to the general staff, could be sure that he was opening a wide road for a real military man, whose shortcomings are so pale in comparison with his strengths that the former have to be forgotten because of the latter.
In view of the petition of the commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district, Adjutant General von Kaufmann 1st, M.D. Skobelev, promoted shortly before (May 20) to staff captain along the line, in November 1868 was appointed to serve in the Turkestan district and arrived at a new place of service at the beginning of 1869. Upon arrival in Tashkent, Mikhail Dmitrievich was first at the headquarters districts. Here he did not waste time, studied the methods of action of the Asian peoples in battle and in general in the war, carried out reconnaissance and took part in petty affairs on the Bukhara border, and showed personal courage.
The modest nature of these cases could not, of course, satisfy M.D. Skobelev, who longed for broad activity and already now felt able to put his name on the pages of the very history that until now he had only to study. However, the first steps in this direction were made by him under very unfavorable conditions, for which, however, he himself was to blame. At that time he was regarded as a Petersburg upstart who allows himself to teach old and experienced people. M.D. Skobelev needed to show proper restraint, tact and modesty; these same qualities he then, if he possessed, then only to a small extent. This was the root of the main source of those hardships that M.D. Skobelev had to endure before being transferred to the General Staff.
During a reconnaissance on the Bukhara border, he turned against himself the Cossack who accompanied him and who then, upon returning to Tashkent, began to distribute unfavorable for M.D. Skobelev information about his actions. Many took the side of the Cossack; Skobelev sharply condemned them and was called to a duel by two representatives of the Tashkent golden youth. From these duels, he came out with honor. Nevertheless, General Kaufman, whom the enemies of Mikhail Dmitrievich convinced of his guilt, called the officers of the garrison and, in their presence, severely scolded M.D. Skobelev.
It is quite possible that the reason for the aggravation of this matter, apart from M.D. Skobeleva, there was envy, etc. feelings that some of his enemies had towards him. There is not the slightest reason to believe the accusation leveled against him. Nevertheless, this incident greatly contributed to the emergence of a rumor that was unprofitable for Mikhail Dmitrievich, which spread far beyond the borders of Turkestan and which he had to reckon with many years later.
At the end of 1870 M.D. Skobelev was sent to the disposal of E.I.V. commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army (Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich - approx. the author of the site), and in March 1871 he went to the Krasnovodsk detachment, in which he commanded the cavalry. At that time, the Khiva people were so hostile towards us that it was impossible to endure it for a long time. Khiva, sooner or later, was to become the subject of our actions. It was necessary to reconnoiter the routes to Khiva.
At this time M.D. Skobelev and reconnoitered the path to the Sarykamysh well, and he went along the road, partly rocky, partly sandy, with a lack of water and its poor quality, during the scorching heat, from Mullakari to Uzunkuyu, 410 miles in 9 days, and back to Kum-Sebshen , 126 versts in 16 1/2 hours, with an average speed of 45 versts per day; with him were only three Cossacks and three Turkmens. M.D. Skobelev presented a detailed description of this path and an excellent sketch? (French croquis, detailed image - note by the author of the site), collecting, in addition, information about the paths extending in different directions from the passed wells. However, at the same time, he went too far and discovered a plan for the proposed operation. This caused the displeasure of the higher authorities and was the reason for the dismissal of M.D. Skobelev on an 11-month vacation in the summer of 1871 and his deductions to the regiment.
However, in April 1872, he was again assigned to the general staff with a secondment to the main headquarters "for writing classes", or rather for testing. Here Skobelev participated in the preparatory work for the field trip of the officers of the main headquarters and the St. Petersburg military district, and then in the trip itself in the Kovno and Courland provinces. They say that while M.D. Skobelev was once instructed to reconnoiter a section of the river in order to find the most convenient point for crossing a significant cavalry detachment. When the persons who were checking and evaluating these activities appeared, Skobelev, instead of the usual answer, jumped on his horse, encouraged him with a whip and safely swam the river both ways. The person on whom the assessment of these studies mainly depended was delighted with this decision of the task given to him and insisted that Mikhail Dmitrievich be awarded a transfer to the general staff.
Whether this incident happened or not, there is no doubt that M.D. Skobelev withstood this new test quite successfully, after which on July 5 he was transferred to the general staff as a captain with the appointment of senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 22nd Infantry Division, to Novgorod, and on August 30, 1872 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel with the appointment of a staff officer for assignments at headquarters of the Moscow military district. In Moscow, he did not stay long, as he was soon seconded to the 74th Stavropol Infantry Regiment to command a battalion. He fulfilled the requirements of the service here regularly and demanded the same from his subordinates, but outside the service he treated them comradely and M.D. Skobelev was loved here. Classes in military history and reading continued as before, and in exactly the same way as before M.D. Skobelev moved from them to the most varied amusements, such as bivouacking a whole merry company on a square in the middle of the city, with cooking burnt, illumination, etc.
It didn't take long for M.D. Skobelev languish in inaction in peacetime, since in the spring of 1873 he managed to take part in the Khiva campaign, as an officer of the general staff at the Mangyshlak detachment of Colonel Lomakin. Khiva was supposed to be the subject of action and the point of connection of our detachments, Turkestan, Krasnovodsk, Mangyshlak and Orenburg. The path of the Mangyshlak detachment, although it was neither the longest nor the most difficult, was nevertheless fraught with enormous difficulties, which increased even more due to the fact that this detachment was supplied with camels in a smaller proportion than other detachments (1,500 camels for 2,140 people ), and had very little water with him (up to 1/2 bucket per person).
At first, we had to make a very difficult, waterless transition of 70 versts from Lake Kaundy to the Senek well, at 37 ° (and 42 ° in the sand) and with a very hot wind. In the echelon in which M.D. Skobelev, I had to pack all the combatant horses, since the camels could not lift everything that was supposed to be carried on them, and fell; April 16 Skobelev, like other officers, walked; On April 17, halfway to the Senek well, the taken water was drunk. Only on April 18, the troops concentrated at the Senek well, having many sick people in their ranks and leaving 6,000 poods of various allowances and 340 camels on the way. This movement was made randomly.
M.D. Skobelev had to exert all his strength to rescue the troops from a critical situation. He took part in the discussion of appropriate measures and orders, in finding means to eliminate the observed difficulties for the future, and so on. All this did not disappear without a trace and brought M.D. Skobelev is of great benefit, having clarified to him in the shortest possible time the whole essence of the organization and technique of performing marching movements in the steppes. He himself acquired the already well-known tact and ability to behave towards both juniors and equals, and seniors. The chiefs at every step use him as an officer of the general staff, and are generally pleased with him.
When speaking on April 20 from Bish-akta, Skobelev already commanded an echelon and, moreover, an advanced one (2nd, later 3 companies, 30-25 Cossacks, 2 guns and a sapper team). During this march, he informed the chief of the second echelon about the features of the path traveled and tried to warn the following echelons of everything that could facilitate their movement. At halts and lodging for the night, the troops made wineskins from goat skins and thus increased their water-lifting means. The movement was ordered.
April 28, on the way to the Cherkezly well, M.D. Skobelev noticed that one company began to stretch. He led her under the drum, with guns on his shoulder, several miles and put in order and generally did not lose sight of anything that could lead to maintaining proper internal order in the echelon entrusted to him, while at the same time showing remarkable concern for the needs of the troops. Under such conditions, the troops traveled 200 miles from Bish-akty to Iltedzhe quite easily, having almost no patients at all, and arrived in Iltedzhe on April 29/30. As with this, and with further movement, M.D. Skobelev made reconnaissance in order to inspect the paths to the wells and the wells themselves.
Near the borders of Khiva, the most difficult transition was from Kyzyl-akhyr to Baichagir, 62 versts with only one well. Fearing for the integrity of this well, on which the fate of the detachment depended, M.D. On May 2, Skobelev was ahead of a train with 22 horsemen, arrived at the well after 8 hours of non-stop movement, and immediately set about building a trench with two embankments to provide shooters from the front and rear. This is one of the proofs of his usual foresight and caution in such cases.
On May 5, the troops approached the Itybay well. M.D. Skobelev again outstripped the echelon with only 10 horsemen, collided with the caravan of the Kirghiz-Adaevites who had betrayed us and demanded that they surrender; when some of them discovered hostile intentions, he rushed into checkers with cash people and cut down several Kirghiz, but he himself received 7 wounds with lances and checkers. After the approach of the infantry M.D. Skobelev was laid on a cart and until May 20 he could not mount a horse. Perhaps he should not have rushed with a handful of people into an armed crowd; however, this is due partly to his youth, partly to his conscious self-education in the spirit of unceasing movement towards whatever dangers.
Upon retirement, M.D. Skobelev out of order, the Mangyshlak and Orenburg detachments united in Kungrad and, under the command of Major General Verevkin, continued to move towards Khiva (250 versts) over very rugged terrain, cut by many canals, overgrown with reeds and bushes, covered with arable land, fences and gardens. Khivans (6,000 people) tried to stop our detachment at Khodjeyli, Mangyt and other points, but to no avail.
M.D. Skobelev returned to duty as soon as possible. On May 21, he, with two hundred and a rocket team, moved to Mount Kobetau and along the Karauz ditch to destroy and destroy the Turkmen villages in order to punish the Turkmen for hostile actions against the Russians; This order he carried out exactly. On May 22, with 3 companies, 2 hundreds and 2 guns, he covered a wheeled convoy, and repulsed a number of enemy attacks, and from May 24 he commanded the vanguard almost all the time and had a number of skirmishes with the enemy.
On May 27, when our detachment was stationed at Chinakchik (8 versts from Khiva), the Khiva attacked the camel convoy with special energy. M.D. Skobelev, having heard a firefight in his rear, quickly realized what was the matter, moved with two hundred secretly, gardens, to the rear of the Khiva people, stumbled upon a large crowd of 1,000 people, knocked them over on the approaching cavalry, then attacked the Khiva infantry, and turned it fled and returned 400 camels repulsed by the enemy.
On May 28, the main forces of General Verevkin reconnoitered the city wall and captured the enemy blockage and a three-gun battery, and, due to the wound of General Verevkin, the command passed to Colonel Saranchov. M.D. Skobelev was at first in the rear, but then moved forward and took over the troops retreating after the reconnaissance. In the evening a deputation arrived from Khiva with an expression of humility and for negotiations. She was sent to General Kaufman, who at that time was in a semi-transition south of Khiva. General Kaufman informed the head of the Orenburg-Mangishlak detachment that he would enter Khiva on the 29th and ordered not to open fire. However, due to the anarchy prevailing in Khiva, part of the population was preparing to fight back, which caused precisely the 29th offensive of the Orenburg-Mangishlak detachment and the assault on the northern part of the wall. M.D. Skobelev with two companies stormed the Shakhabat gates, the first made his way into the inside of the fortress and although he was attacked by the enemy, he kept the gate and the rampart behind him. This case was terminated by order of General Kaufman, who at the same time peacefully entered the city from the opposite side. Accusations again rained down on Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev, which, however, cannot be considered fair, since he only carried out the order of his superior.
Khiva subdued. The goal of the campaign was achieved, despite the fact that one of our detachments, Krasnovodsky, did not reach Khiva. It was important to find out the reason for his failure. M.D. Skobelev reported to General Kaufman about his readiness to reconnoiter the section of the Zmukshir-Ortakuyu road (340 versts) that had not been passed by Colonel Markozov and received permission to carry out this task, fraught with great risk and danger, because at every well he could stumble upon an embittered enemy, not to mention about the difficulty of movement. Skobelev, taking with him five horsemen (including 3 Turkmens), set out from Zmukshir on August 4 and at 4 pm on August 6 arrived at the Daudur well (258 miles at 50-60 hours). Loose sands made movement extremely difficult; at the end of the transition, the horses had to be led; there was no water here.
Moving on, M.D. By the morning of August 7, Skobelev turned to the Nefes-kuli well (another 42 versts of a waterless path); having reached the last, he ran into the Turkmens and escaped with difficulty. There were still 15-25 versts to Ortakuyu. There was no need to break through there, and therefore M.D. Skobelev set off on his way back and returned to his starting point on August 11, having traveled more than 600 miles in 7 days, and then presented a proper report to General Kaufman. This reconnaissance found out that for the success of the further movement of the Krasnovodsk detachment to Zmukshir, with a waterless transition of 156 versts, it was necessary to take appropriate measures in a timely manner; under the given conditions, this movement could lead to the death of the named detachment. For this intelligence, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree (August 30, 1873).
Winter 1873-1874 M.D. Skobelev spent for the most part in southern France, where he went for the purpose of recreation and entertainment. But here he became interested in the internecine Spanish war, made his way to the location of the Carlists in Spain and was an eyewitness to several battles. February 22 M.D. Skobelev was promoted to colonel, and on April 17 he was appointed adjutant wing with deduction to His Imperial Majesty's retinue.
On September 17, 1874, M.D. Skobelev was sent to the Perm province to participate in the introduction of the statute on military service. Meanwhile, they started talking about him not only in Russia, but also in England, which vigilantly followed our successes in Central Asia. It was natural to continue the combat activities he had begun there.
In April 1875 M.D. Skobelev was sent at the disposal of the Turkestan Governor-General and, upon arrival in Tashkent, was appointed head of the military unit of our embassy sent to Kashgar. He had to appreciate in every respect the military importance of Kashgar. This embassy went to Kashgar through Kokan, whose ruler Khudoyar Khan was under our influence. However, the latter, with his cruelty and greed, provoked an uprising against him and was deposed in July 1875, after which he fled to the Russian borders, to the city of Khujand. Our embassy followed him, covered by Skobelev with 22 Cossacks. Thanks to his firmness and caution, this team, without even using weapons, brought the khan to Khojent without loss.
Fanatics soon triumphed in Kokand, led by the talented leader of the Kipchaks, Abdurrahman-avtobachi; Khudoyar's son Nasr-eddin was elevated to the khan's throne; "ghazavat" was proclaimed; in early August, the Kokan gangs invaded our borders, laid siege to Khojent and agitated our native population. M.D. Skobelev was sent with two hundred to clear the surroundings of Tashkent from enemy gangs, and after concentrating, by August 18, the main forces of General Kaufman (16 companies and 8 hundred with 20 guns) to Khujand, he was appointed head of the cavalry. Meanwhile, the Kokand people concentrated up to 50,000 people near Mahram. with 40 guns. During the movement of General Kaufman to Makhram, between the Syr Darya and the spurs of the Alai Range, the enemy cavalry masses disturbed the Russians. When the enemy threatened to attack, the cavalry lined up the front to the side of the threatened flank, and the batteries opened fire. The enemy quickly crumbled and disappeared into the nearest gorges, after which the movement continued. Similar attacks were repeated, and each time one maneuver of the cavalry and fire forced the enemy to retreat. The number and dashing of the enemy, not accustomed to a friendly onslaught, M.D. Skobelev contrasted close formation and order, combined with fire not only from artillery, but also from riders and advanced chains, and this gave success.
On August 22, General Kaufman's troops took Mahram. M.D. Skobelev with a part of the cavalry quickly attacked numerous enemy crowds, on foot and horseback, put to flight and pursued more than 10 miles, timely using the support of a rocket battery. Our troops won a brilliant victory. Mikhail Dmitrievich was lightly wounded in the leg. On August 21 and 22, Skobelev's brilliant abilities as a cavalry commander were outlined: either restrained and cold-blooded, he meets the enemy with fire, then, choosing a minute surprisingly well, he makes a furious attack, and in both cases brilliantly applied to the situation.
Having occupied Kokand on August 29, our detachment moved to Margelan on September 5; Abdurrahman fled. M.D. was dispatched to pursue him. Skobelev with 6 hundreds, a rocket battery and 2 companies planted on carts. This persecution is a pattern of this kind of action. At the same time, Skobelev was forced to change the direction of movement several times, but he followed Abdurrahman relentlessly and this destroyed his detachment; the autobachi abandoned artillery, horses, weapons, and even his "Mecca badge" and only fled.
Meanwhile, an agreement was concluded with Nasr-eddin, according to which we acquired the territory to the north of the Syr Darya, which formed the Namangan department. However, the Kipchak population of the khanate did not want to admit defeat and was preparing to resume the struggle. Abdurrahman deposed Nasr-eddin and elevated Pulat-bek to the khan's throne. Andijan was the center of the movement. Major General Trotsky, with 5 1/2 companies, 3 1/2 hundreds, 6 guns and 4 rocket launchers, moved from Namangan and took Andijan by storm on October 1, with M.D. Skobelev made a brilliant attack. Then this detachment was to return to Namangan and on the way back had heated affairs with the enemy. At the same time, on the night of October 5, Skobelev, with 2 hundred and a battalion, made such a swift attack on the Kipchak camp that they fled.
October 18 M.D. Skobelev was promoted to major general for military distinctions and appointed to E.I. Majesty. In the same month, he was left in the Namangan department, as his chief, with 3 battalions, 5 1/2 hundreds and 12 guns. Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was ordered to "act strategically and defensively," i.e. without leaving our domain. But the force of circumstances forced him to act differently. The restless elements in the country continued to be agitated; in the Namangan department, an almost continuous small war began; uprisings broke out in Tyurya-Kurgan, then in Namangan, etc.
M.D. Skobelev vigilantly followed all this and made excellent use of the benefits of a central position; upon receiving news of the appearance of the enemy on our coast, or of his concentration in the coastal points of the Kokand side, he quickly moved against the enemy, tried to take the enemy by surprise and inflicted defeats on him. So on October 23 he defeated the gang of Batyr-tyur near Tyur-Kurgan, then hurried to the rescue to the garrison of Namangan, and on November 12 he defeated up to 20,000 enemy crowds near Balykchi. After all the successes in general, he had to return to Namangan every time.
Under such conditions, the offensive enterprises of the Kokand people could not be stopped. We felt the need to put an end to this in order to maintain the charm of the Russian name and to give the population subject to us the opportunity for a peaceful and secure life. General Kaufman recognized the forces of M.D. Skobelev are insufficient to keep in our hands at least the greater part of the khanate; in the meantime, Skobelev was ordered to make a movement in the winter to Ike-su-arasy, part of the khanate on the right bank of the Darya (up to the Naryn river) and limit himself to a pogrom of the Kipchaks roaming there.
M.D. Skobelev left Namangan on December 25 with 2,800 people. with 12 guns and a rocket battery and with a convoy of 528 carts. The equipment of the detachment was thought out to the last detail. In general, the preparation for this campaign was an example of concern for the troops and application to local conditions. M.D. Skobelev was already in this case a worthy student of General Kaufman and the best representative of the Turkestan system of military education, based on constant and comprehensive care for the soldier.
Skobelev's detachment entered Ike-su-arasy on December 26 and in 8 days passed through this part of the khanate in different directions, marking their way with the destruction of villages. The Kipchaks shied away from the fight and sometimes even asked for mercy. One way or another, there was no subject of action worthy of this name in Ike-su-arasa. This could most likely be Andijan, where Abdurrahman gathered up to 37,000 people.
M.D. On January 1, 1876, Skobelev crossed to the left bank of the Kara-Darya, then moved to Andijan, on the 4th and 6th he made a thorough reconnaissance of the outskirts of the city and on the 8th captured Andijan by assault. On the 10th, the people of Andijan expressed their obedience after Abdurrahman fled to Assak, and Pulat Khan to Margelan. On the 18th, Skobelev moved to Assaka and defeated Abdurrahman, who wandered for several more days and finally surrendered on January 26th. On the 27th, the detachment of Baron Meller-Zakomelsky, sent by Skobelev, captured the village of Uch-Kurgan by assault, which M.D. Skobelev in his report recognized "a truly valiant feat." Pulat Khan barely escaped. On February 19, the Kokand Khanate was annexed to Russia and formed the Fergana region, and on March 2, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was appointed military governor of this region and commander of the troops in it.
The actions of M.D. Skobelev in the Kokand campaign can withstand the most severe criticism: everything is exemplary, from studying the situation and setting goals to the details of preparing and executing the planned action plans. The troops have to make long transitions under extremely unfavorable conditions, and yet their condition is generally excellent, and their spirit is excellent; they have to storm fortified points and participate in many battles; there are no failures, and the losses are small; arms and parts of the detachment act in the spirit of the most real mutual assistance; private bosses are managerial and have the initiative; officers of the general staff rush everywhere not only to fulfill their direct task, but also to set an example for others, teach them and even lead them in battle. With all this, proper internal order is maintained in the detachment all the time.
Of course, the Turkestan troops were excellent, the officers and private commanders knew their job, but in order for the entire detachment to act in this way, such a wonderful detachment leader was needed, which already in this case was 32-year-old Major General Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev. In addition to the above awards, he also received for this campaign the Order of St. Vladimir of the 3rd degree with swords and St. George of the 3rd degree, a golden saber and a golden sword decorated with diamonds, with the inscription "for courage".
Having become the head of the region, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev sought to pacify the region, and he carried out and recommended wonderful receptions in relation to the conquered tribes. The Sarts greeted the Russians sympathetically, they should have been given only time to get used to the new order of things; however, the weapons were taken away. The militant Kipchaks, once subjugated, honestly keep their word - they should be treated "firmly, but with heart." Finally, the Karakirghiz (who inhabited the Alai ranges and the valley of the Kizyl-su river) continue to persist, despite the fact that the whole country has calmed down; it is necessary to go through their wild mountains and gorges with weapons in their hands and severely punish them.
M.D. Skobelev defeated one gang of Karakirghiz in March and occupied ur. Gulcha, and on April 25 defeated the rebels at Yangi-aryk. Not limited to this, in July and August he made a search with reconnaissance of the Alay ranges with three columns from Uch-Kurgan, Osh and Gulcha; with the last column were Skobelev and a scientific expedition that explored this country scientifically. On August 16, the detachment, having gathered at Archi-Bulak, moved to Doraut-Kurgan. From August 31, they began to appear to M.D. Skobelev foremen with an expression of humility. Having reached the borders of Karategin and leaving the garrison here, Mikhail Dmitrievich turned back, since the above goal was achieved. Not limited to this, he outlined more measures in the form of a final cessation of the robberies, which, however, he no longer had to carry out.
As head of the region, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev fought with particular energy against the abuses of those who, in one way or another, were involved in spending state money. This created many enemies for him, and soon a denunciation was received in St. Petersburg, which cocked M.D. Skobelev the most serious accusations. Upon learning of this, he asked for leave, went to St. Petersburg and submitted a report with supporting documents in order to prove the injustice of the accusation. But this took time, and meanwhile, on March 17, 1877, he was expelled from the post of military governor and commander of the region's troops, leaving E.I.V. and in the general staff.
For 8 years M.D. Skobelev had to participate in campaigns, and in the end, to independently direct military operations in Central Asia. It was an excellent military school that prepared him for the Akhal-Teke expedition of 1880-1881. During these campaigns, he discovered not only the diligence, private initiative and courage of a junior commander, but also the remarkable talent of an independent leader.
Then it should be noted: careful study and knowledge of the enemy and the situation in general, the ability to choose important targets, excellent preparation for campaigns, excellent supply of troops, reconnaissance and general orientation during operations; an amazing ability to extract from each type of weapon everything that it can give (a fairly long fire of artillery and infantry, the formation of a cavalry rifle division, cavalry fire in some cases, speed and onslaught in others); skillful occupation of the conquered area and securing it from the side where danger could threaten; finally, personal indefatigability, energy and valor, thanks to which M.D. Skobelev was an example for others.
It is impossible not to admit that Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was already an excellent administrator at that time, but the unfair accusation of abuses brought against him, in connection with the previous sins of the still fledgling hussar staff captain, destroyed in the minds of many of his merits not only civil, but even the military, and the latter seemed to others simply "inflated." Our society was then distrustful and even unfriendly towards those who advanced in battles and campaigns against the "halatniks". Mikhail Dmitrievich had to experience this attitude, and the fruits of his former sins, and all the poison of slander and injustice, and on his return to Europe, he almost began all over again what he had already done so brilliantly in Asia.
Meanwhile, in the Balkan Peninsula, since 1875, the struggle of the Slavs against the Turks took place. Russia was also involved in this struggle. M.D. Skobelev, even before this war, was interested in the Slavic question, but in 1875 and 1876. he could only confine himself to platonic sympathy for the fighters for the liberation and independence of the Slavs. In 1877, he himself went to the active army in order to personally take part in the struggle, and at the same time correct and restore his shaken position, restore lost confidence with new merits.
In the active army for Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev at first there was no corresponding place. However, he was allowed to be at the main apartment. He himself tried to settle down somewhere and participated, as a volunteer, in various small affairs before crossing the Danube. At that time, it was considered possible to appoint him only and. D. Chief of Staff of the consolidated Cossack division, commanded by his father.
On June 14/15, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev participated in the crossing of the detachment of General Dragomirov across the Danube near Zimnitsa. Here, having taken command of 4 companies of the 4th Infantry Brigade, he hit the Turks on the flank, which forced them to retreat. Here, due to the absence of orderlies, Mikhail Dmitrievich himself volunteered and gave the order of General Dragomirov under heavy enemy fire, as the report of the head of the detachment says: "I cannot but testify to the great help provided to me by the Retinue E.V. Major General Skobelev. .. and about the beneficial influence that he had on young people with his brilliant, unfailingly clear calmness. After that, they started talking about him; for this crossing, Major General Skobelev was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav 1st degree with swords.
After the crossing, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev participated: on June 25 in reconnaissance and occupation of the city of Bela; On July 3, in repelling the attack of the Turks on Selvi, and on July 7, with the troops of the Gabrovsky detachment, in the occupation of the Shipka Pass. On July 16, with three Cossack regiments and a battery, he reconnoitered Lovcha; found out that it was occupied by 6 camps with 6 guns, and reported to those who should, about the need to take Lovcha before the second assault on Plevna, but at that time it was already decided to go back. On 17 (July - approx.) he moved to Bogota and participated in the second attack on Plevna on 18 June. Having reconnoitered the southern approaches to the enemy position, M.D. Skobelev found out that its strategic key was on the right flank of the Turks and that this flank was not fortified. His report on this issue only caused the strengthening of the Cossack brigade entrusted to him with an infantry battalion and 4 guns. According to the disposition, Skobelev was supposed to stop communications between Plevna and Lovcheya and guard the left flank of our troops attacking the location of Osman Pasha.
Scattered attacks by the columns of Generals Velyaminov and Prince Shakhovsky, whose common leader was General Baron Kridener, ended for us in failure and a "chaotic" retreat. M.D. Skobelev with part of his forces reached the 3rd ridge of the Green Mountains, from where he saw the enemy camp and reserve (up to 20,000 people) near Plevna. The Turks sent part of their forces against him and tried to push him back.
The actions of Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev with small forces against an excellent enemy were exemplary and showed what our cavalry could be capable of in skillful hands even on the most unfavorable terrain for its actions, and in general under the most unfavorable conditions. Skobelev dragged out the fight as long as necessary, and withdrew when it was impossible to hold out any longer and when there was no longer any need for it. Despite the heavy losses and the generally difficult situation of his detachment, he took measures to ensure that all the wounded were picked up in a timely manner.
Chaining the enemy to the place, M.D. Skobelev best solved the problem of "suppressing" communications with Lovchai. His actions eased the position of Prince Shakhovsky, who also had to retreat under the pressure of the Turks. Skobelev immediately achieved what others had not been able to do for a long time on the battlefields in this campaign: he had cavalry, infantry and artillery skillfully and heroically supporting each other. July 22 M.D. Skobelev, with 5 battalions, 19 squadrons and hundreds with 12 guns, was ordered to cover the Selvi to the side of Lovcha, tie up the detachments stationed in Selvi and against Plevna, and find out the forces of the Turks in Lovcha. Skobelev carried out this reconnaissance very skillfully from July 23 to 26 (with a fight) and found out the following: a) Lovcha was occupied by 8-10 battalions; b) the mountains surrounding it are natural positions, moreover, strongly fortified; c) an attack from the north is almost impossible, and from the east it is possible only with thorough artillery preparation; d) changes in the position and importance of Lovcha took place after July 16, why we can expect its further strengthening, if we allow it.
In late July and early August (1877 - approx.), Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was again at the main apartment. In view of Suleiman's attacks on Shipka and the possibility of Osman Pasha moving towards Gabrov to assist Suleiman, a detachment of 4 battalions, 12 hundreds and 14 guns was allocated under the command of Skobelev, which was supposed to cover the right flank and counteract Osman. Having concentrated this detachment on August 12 at the position near Kakrin, M.D. Skobelev made reconnaissance of the mountain passes to Imetli, Kalofer and Troyan, which convinced him that the offensive to Gabrov was unfeasible for the Turks. Moreover, he believed that the movement of 9 battalions from Selvi and Kakrin to the rear of Suleiman through the Imetli Pass "may be of decisive importance" and that we should have "maneuvered." Unfortunately, his views and considerations did not find a proper assessment at that time.
By August 18, it became clear that there was nothing to fear on Shipka; it was decided to take Lovcha, and then Plevna. M.D. Skobelev, first of all, strengthened the position and improved the bivouac disposition, because, even if he had to attack, he considered it necessary to be ready for defense, and no matter what he had to do, worries about the troops never left his thoughts. For the capture of Lovcha, a detachment of General Prince Imeretinsky was assigned (22 battalions, 21 squadrons and a hundred, 88 foot and 12 horse guns). This detachment also included units that were under the command of Skobelev, to whom Prince Imeretinsky offered to make an assumption for the attack.
On the 19th, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev presented a well-known note in which, having clarified the essence of the task and the situation, he established the principles that should be followed in this case: a) a thorough acquaintance with the terrain and the location of the enemy; b) extensive artillery preparation; c) gradual attack; d) promotion of engineering; e) strong reserves and their economical spending; g) timely capture of the enemy's retreat route, and h) illumination of the directions along which reinforcements can approach the Turks. The order in which the task is performed is then outlined. This note is rightly recognized as a model of preparatory orders for battle.
Naturally, the author of the note played an outstanding role in the very attack of Lovcha on August 22. Here M.D. Skobelev with 10 battalions, 56 guns and 3 squadrons captured the Red Mountain, having suffered only small losses, and then began to descend into the city. Prince Imeretinsky reinforced him with 2 battalions with a battery. 80 guns acted against the Turks from the right bank of the Osma, which prepared the occupation of Lovcha and the attack of the river redoubt. The city was occupied without difficulty.
M.D. Skobelev made a reconnaissance, which confirmed the correctness of the assumption to direct the main attack on the right flank of the Turks. By an attack of 10 battalions, all the forces of the Turks were drawn to their left flank, after which Skobelev withdrew from the city a reserve hidden until that time (7 battalions with a convoy squadron on the flank) and rushed with drumming and unfurled banners, like an unstoppable, capable of breaking everything stream , on the right flank and against the retreat path of the Turks and put them to flight. The cavalry immediately settled on them. The losses of the Turks exceeded 2,000, and ours 1,500 people. Success was not cheap, but its moral significance was important, not to mention the acquisition of the mentioned strategic benefits.
In this case, Prince Imeretinsky makes excellent use of his talented subordinate, both for drawing up a battle plan and for conducting the main attack, and, for his part, makes this matter easier for him in every possible way. The actions of M.D. Skobelev are exemplary and represent a wonderful combination of determination and caution. If it is possible to note shortcomings, then they are few and they are of (relatively) secondary importance: for example, no general command of artillery was established.
After the Plevna setbacks, a brilliant victory was won near Lovchaya, and M.D. Skobelev showed his outstanding talent in battle against the enemy, well-armed and, in terms of stamina, able to compete with the best European troops. The new merits of Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev began to break through the ice, which seemed impenetrable: for difference in cases against the Turks, mainly for the battle of Lovcha, M.D. Skobelev was promoted to lieutenant general (September 1 of the same year). Soon after the capture of Lovcha, the detachment of Prince Imeretinsky was drawn to Bogota, and with him moved to the vicinity of Plevna and Skobelev.
At the end of August (1877 - approx.), with the arrival of reinforcements, it was decided to make a third assault on the Plevna fortified camp, for which 107 battalions (including 42 Romanian) and 90 squadrons and hundreds (including 36 Romanian) were assigned or 82,000 bayonets and 11,000 sabers with 444 guns (including 188 Romanian ones). At the head of the western detachment were: his nominal head and the actual head of the Romanian troops, Prince Karl and his assistant, the chief of staff and the actual head of the Russian troops, General Zotov, i.e. there was no consolidation of power.
General Zotov determined the strength of the Turks at 80,000 people with 120 guns, i.e. twice as opposed to reality, apparently did not believe in the success of the attack and put all his hopes on preparing it with artillery fire. This preparation was carried out from August 26 to the start of the assault on August 30 and benefited not us, but the Turks, convincing them of the impotence of our artillery against their earthen fortifications.
The troops of our right flank, the Romanian infantry and 6 Russian battalions, stormed the Grivitsky redoubt No. 1 on the least important left flank of the Turks. This redoubt was taken only thanks to the participation of our troops. The troops of the right flank lost 3,500 people, after which it was decided not to advance further here, despite the fact that there were still 24 fresh (Romanian) battalions.
In the center, behind which was the "main reserve" (9 battalions), 6 attacks were made on the regiments and these attacks were repulsed with the loss of 4,500 people. In total, 18 attacked and 17 more battalions remained; of the latter, 14 received special appointments. Here it was also decided (at dusk) to stop the fight.
On our left flank M.D. Skobelev, supported by the troops of Prince Imeretinsky, with 16 battalions captured the Skobelev redoubts No. 1 and 2, and these battalions were very upset. For defense and protection of the rear and flanks, there were still 6 battalions, but 3 of them were also very upset. There was nothing to develop success with. It remained to fortify and hold out in the redoubts until reinforcements were sent, but none were sent: true, 1 regiment from the center was sent to Skobelev at the initiative of a private commander, but he also arrived late.
M.D. Skobelev, having only 1/5 of all our forces, pulled over 2/3 of all the forces of Osman Pasha (up to 35 camps). On August 31, Osman, who was already preparing to retreat, seeing that 4/5 of our forces were inactive and Skobelev was not being supported, captured him with superior forces from both flanks and shot him. Skobelev lost 6,000 men, repelled four Turkish counterattacks, and, in view of the fifth counterattack, retreated step by step, in sufficient order. The assault ended in complete failure.
The reasons for the failure were rooted in the incorrect organization of the management of the allied detachment, in the personal qualities of the two chief commanders of this detachment, in their errors and the consequences resulting from this. Military talent M.D. Skobelev showed himself in all his splendor in this battle: the troops entrusted to him are doing incomparably more than in other areas, and especially the infantry, sent by him personally and his valiant associates, performs such deeds that would be considered impossible if they had not happened in reality; Skobelev himself shows an amazing ability to direct troops forward, and looks at himself as the last reserve, which he puts into action at a decisive moment, and this gives success; when it is necessary to retreat from the redoubts, then this retreat is carried out in such an order, the mere presence of which, despite the most difficult conditions, makes it necessary to recognize this retreat as a model rare in military history in terms of its instructiveness in the positive sense.
During the taxation of Plevna, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was at the head of the Plevno-Lovchinsky detachment and the IV section of the taxation on the same terrain on which he acted during the 3rd attack of Plevna. Skobelev did not sympathize with the idea of a blockade, which delayed for a long time the solution of the question of Plevna, which slowed down our military operations; every day of fringing cost the army and especially the state a lot; what were the months worth? M.D. Skobelev was right in disagreeing with Totleben in this regard, since the combination of an attack with a close blockade, i.e., would be most appropriate. turning the blockade into an accelerated gradual attack. So he tried to act, but had to abandon it, in view of the categorical order of Totleben, and limit himself only to more active behavior towards the enemy than in other sectors, which had a huge positive effect in terms of raising the spirit of the troops.
At this time M.D. Skobelev was entrusted with the command of the 16th Infantry Division, in which 133 officers and 5.065 lower ranks were out of order, the former 116 officers and 4.642 lower ranks remained, and the staffing that arrived was insufficient both in numerical and qualitative terms; the former company commanders remained 14, battalion - 10, brigade - 1; regimental commanders and chief of staff were reappointed.
The position of the new head of the division was very difficult. It was necessary to turn this division into a tightly knit, completely healthy organism that could not be shaken. And Skobelev did it as quickly as no one else could do in this campaign. With him, all troops are imbued with a true military spirit, all arms are rallied into one whole, and special branches of service perform their duties exemplarily or, in the worst case, more successfully than in other areas.
Among the junior commanders, the spirit of private initiative comes to life, the soldier "understands his maneuver" and is proud of the name of "Skobelev". At Skobelev, some of the people are armed with beaten off Turkish guns, which surpassed the Krnk rifles in terms of flatness, accuracy and actuality of shooting; With regard to supplying the troops with everything necessary, rare commanders showed such care as M.D. Skobelev and his associates.
November 28 (1877 - approx.) Osman Pasha made an attempt to break through and attacked the grenadier; the resulting battle ended with the surrender of Osman's army. M.D. Skobelev was the head of the reserve of units of the 3rd Guards and 16th Infantry Divisions, who rushed to the aid of the grenadiers. He was accused of delaying the guards brigade in order to allow his brigade to distinguish itself, but this is unfair, since if he allowed an immediate reinforcement of the combat unit by this brigade, then the only general reserve would be prematurely used up.
After the fall of Plevna, the Grand Duke, the commander-in-chief, decided to cross the Balkans in winter and advance towards Constantinople. Division M.D. Skobeleva was sent to join the detachment of General Radetzky, who was reinforced to 45,000 and had 35,000 Wessel Pasha's Turks against him. General Radetsky left 15 1/2 battalions with artillery at the Shipka position against the Turkish front and himself remained with them, and at the same time sent: a) the right column of M.D. Skobelev (15 battalions, 7 squads, 17 squadrons and hundreds and 14 guns) from Toplish through the Imetli pass, bypassing the left flank of the Turks and b) the left column of Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky (25 battalions, 1 squad, 4 hundreds and 24 guns) through Travna , Gusovo and Maglish, bypassing the right flank of the main forces of Wessel Pasha, who were in fortified camps near dd. Shipka and Sheinova.
On December 27, Prince Mirsky acted alone against the main forces of the Turks and met stubborn resistance; Skobelev, having managed to cross with only part of his forces, did not attack that day. On the 28th, all three units of the detachment of General Radetzky attacked the enemy, and the entire army of Wessel Pasha surrendered to surrender (30,000 people with 103 guns); our losses reached 5,600 men. A brilliant victory was won; M.D. Skobelev played an outstanding role in this: Wessel Pasha surrendered to him. Nevertheless, Skobelev was accused of not supporting Prince Mirsky, that he promised to support him and did not keep his word, that he was playing some kind of game here, etc.
These accusations are hardly justified. M.D. Skobelev experienced at this time a difficult internal struggle. The bitter experience of the Plevna battles left a deep mark on his soul. He became more and more careful. Personal conversation with F.F. Radetsky, who suggested the possibility of a "blockade of Imetlia", etc., further confirmed him in his decision to be extremely cautious. This can be seen from his notes addressed to the chief of staff. So on December 22, at 3 1/4 o'clock in the afternoon (on his return from Radetzky), he wrote: "Where are our priests... I saw something of the sort. Not reaching the Senek well on April 18, 1873, 20 versts away, people were dying from the heat , thirst and exhaustion. The regimental priests of the Shirvan and Absheron regiments were of great benefit. In the Russian army, in difficult times, a priest ... with a cross leads where they forgot both the voice of the commanders and even the banner. We will have to endure a lot of difficult; we should not neglect this moral string ... "Then instructions are given how to apply it in this case.
The internal state of M.D. Skobelev's situation has been deteriorating, especially since the chief of staff was out of action. At the most difficult moment, he is alone. Dark thoughts take over. Skobelev recalls that he was repeatedly confirmed that he should rely only on his own strength. The one who left earlier must wait for the one who leaves later, i.e. Prince Mirsky must conform to Skobelev. In the worst case, no danger threatens Prince Mirsky, since he is strong enough. If he, Skobelev, attacks now (on the 27th) with half of his forces and is repulsed, then the whole operation may be upset. Therefore, the attack must be postponed until the concentration of all forces. In view of these considerations, Skobelev did not attack until he had concentrated forces, which he recognized as sufficient for an attack.
After crossing the Balkans, Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was appointed head of the vanguard of the army (32 battalions and 25 squadrons and hundreds with artillery and 1 battalion of sappers) and moved through Adrianople to the outskirts of Constantinople. At the beginning of this march, on January 5 (1878 - approx.), he pulled the vanguard to Trnov, making 82 versts at 40 hours. Upon the cessation of hostilities, on May 1, he was appointed head of the "left detachment" of the army, and then was part of the army when it was located within Turkey and during the gradual cleansing of parts of the territory of Turkey itself, as well as the newly created Russia Bulgaria.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev is a very young general in the Balkan theater of operations, although he has rendered great merits, but has fallen into the position of semi-disgraced. There is no place for him and he himself tries to find a job for himself, not shunning the smallest. Gradually, the prejudice against him gives way to respect for his military talent, and he is given more and more serious and responsible assignments. On July 18 (1877 - approx.), during the second attack of Plevna, and on August 22 (1877 - approx.) near Lovcha, he gives outstanding examples of art, as far as he could show them as a private boss; in the latter case, he was entrusted with the most difficult and main part of the case, which he decided the success of the whole case, and the losses were small compared to the Plevna battles.
During the third attack of Plevna, during its taxation and when crossing the Balkans, M.D. Skobelev also shows remarkable skill, despite some shadowy aspects in the performance of these operations. In this campaign, he completes his self-education as a military leader. If he has not yet declared himself as a commander, then he is already close to becoming one. And his concern for the soldier and for his subordinates in general, the organization of the food section and his military administrative activities in general, and finally, his understanding of the significance of the moral element and the ability to influence the troops in this sense are so exemplary that it is not easy to find a repetition of the combination of all these virtues in the same campaign. .
It is not surprising that M.D. Skobelev, it was during this war that he gained almost worldwide fame. Nevertheless, his position at the end of the war and for the first time after it was unbearable, since the accusations leveled against him had not yet lost their force. On January 6, 1878, he was granted a golden sword, adorned with diamonds, with the inscription "for crossing the Balkans", but the attitude of some commanders and comrades towards him was unfavorable, and his enemies used it.
In a letter to a relative on August 7, 1878, M.D. Skobelev wrote: "... The more time passes, the more the consciousness of my perfect innocence before the Sovereign grows in me, and therefore the feeling of deep sorrow cannot leave me ... only the duties of a loyal subject and a soldier could make me temporarily come to terms with an unbearable burden my position since March 1877. I had the misfortune to lose confidence, this was said to me and it takes away from me all the power to continue the service for the benefit of the cause. .. for spare troops..."
But at this time the horizon for M.D. Skobeleva began to clear up. He managed to refute the accusations finally cocked against him. As early as July 7, 1878, he was appointed temporary commander of the 4th Corps, on August 22 he was enlisted in the lists of the 64th Infantry Kazan E.I.V. Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich of the regiment, and on August 30 he was appointed adjutant general to His Imperial Majesty. This high Royal mercy, which testified to the return of trust, appeared to M.D. Skobeleva with triumph over enemies and rewarded him for the moral suffering he endured.
At the end of hostilities, M.D. Skobelev directed the education, training and combat training of the troops entrusted to him in a purely Suvorov spirit. The difference, if any, was only due to differences in the situation. He was approved as corps commander on February 4, 1879.
M.D. Skobelev at that time performed various assignments for the service, both in Russia and abroad, and presented remarkable reports. Particularly noteworthy are his thoughts concerning the assessment of certain aspects of the military system of Germany, which he considered the most dangerous of our opponents and which since then he has been constantly studying. This was in connection with the study of the Slavic question, the importance of which for Russia Skobelev understood even before the war of 1877-1878.
After the war M.D. Skobelev reads many books, pamphlets, periodicals, etc., and becomes close to the Slavophiles. He follows the conferences of diplomats at the Berlin Congress, and any reduction in the remuneration received by Russia and the Slavs resonates painfully in his heart. Meanwhile, the specter of a new war is already hovering. Skobelev is ready to fly against a new enemy, but there is no war, no matter how. Skobelev is languishing. Most opportunely, his appointment as head of the expedition against the Tekins arrives in time, for which Skobelev has been participating in meetings at the main headquarters since January 1880.
In the western part of Central Asia, M.D. Skobelev least of all knew the Akhal-Teke oasis and the 80-90,000 Akhal-Teke people living there, who could be supported by 110,000 Merv-Teke people living along the Murgab. They were natural, terrible warriors. One of their main livelihoods was the alamans, i.e. robberies. It was impossible to tolerate such neighbors. However, our expeditions, up to and including 1879, were unsuccessful. The peoples we conquered raised their heads. It was urgently necessary to repeat the expedition and put an end to the Tekins. But for this it was necessary to go with the troops through a desolate desert, devoid of vegetation and water, unsuitable even for the life of the Turkmen, in a hot climate and other difficult conditions. Only camel caravans and troops with camel carts could move along the routes of Turkmenistan, relying on at least one camel for each person.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev drew up a plan, which was approved and should be recognized as exemplary: goal it was to deal a decisive blow to the Akhalteke Tekins; he decided to go to the goal systematically and carefully; concentrate as many reserves as necessary to bring the matter to an end; to use all possible ways and means given by art and science; to the extent that everything necessary is accumulated, move forward and, when everything is ready, put an end to the Tekins in a decisive battle. For their part, the Tekins, having learned about the appointment of M.D. Skobelev, in April 1880 they decided to move everyone to the Dengil-Tepe fortress and limit themselves to desperate defense of this one point only.
M.D. Skobelev arrived in Chekishlyar on May 7 and, above all, ordered the withdrawal of part of the troops to the Caucasus in order to reduce the number of mouths and speed up the accumulation of supplies. The hard work began. We had to transport 2,000,000 pounds of various supplies. Two supply lines were arranged; one of them was a railroad. It was decided to purchase 16,000 camels to transport everything necessary for 11,000 people. with 3,000 horses and 97 guns.
May 10 (1880 - approx.) M.D. Skobelev occupied Bami and began to establish a solid foundation for operations at this point, for which 800,000 poods of various supplies were transported here within five months; the harvest was gathered on the Tekin arable lands; fortifications were erected. In early July, Skobelev, with 655 people. with 10 guns and 8 rocket launchers, he makes reconnaissance, approaches two versts to Dengil-Tepe and fires at this fortress. Masses of Tekins surround him, but Skobelev beats them off and, having finished reconnaissance, slowly retreats. By this, he makes a strong impression on the Tekins, and most importantly, raises the spirit of the troops entrusted to him, which ensures the success of the operation.
From Bami, the necessary supplies are transported to the Samur fortification (12 versts from Dengil-Tepe). By December 20, 7,100 people were concentrated here (with non-combatants) and reserves for 8,000 people until the beginning of March 1881. Not limited to this, M.D. Skobelev sends Colonel Grodekov to Persia, who prepares 146,000 poods of necessary supplies on Persian territory, just a single passage from Dengil-Tepe. This side base ensured the allowance of the troops after the capture of the fortress. This shows how great Skobelev's foresight was in supplying the troops with everything they needed.
On December 15 (1880 - approx.), Colonel Kuropatkin's detachment of 884 people with 900 camels arrived in Samurskoe (due to the petition of M.D. Skobelev) from Turkestan, overcoming extreme difficulties in moving through the desert and strengthening Skobelev's troops not only in numbers, how much morally. Soon after, the approaches begin and the gradual approach to the fortress, and the troops prepare in every possible way for the assault: the transformation of Samursky into a stronghold ends, which must be defended by an insignificant garrison when all our forces are under the fortress; exercises are carried out, during which and after which it is necessary to open fire in order to drive away the Tekins; the troops are exercising in the escalade of the walls and in the storming of the breach; compiled by M.D. is sent to the troops. Skobelev highly instructive "instruction for officers of the detachment", etc.
In the fortress (Dengil-Tepe - approx.) There were 45,000 people, of which 20,000-25,000 were defenders; they had 5,000 guns, many pistols, 1 gun and 2 zembureks (pack gun - approx.). The Tekins made sorties, mainly at night; taking advantage of the superiority of forces and their courage, they inflicted considerable damage on us, even once captured a banner and two guns, but were always repulsed. Meanwhile, in the rear, the Yomuds were ready to revolt without exception, and rumors began to spread in the detachment about the impossibility of continuing the siege with available forces, etc.
Skobelev immediately put an end to this. "Forward, forward and forward. God is with us. No literature, but the battle ... The siege will in no case be lifted; the assaults will be repeated to the last extreme. There will be no retreat from Geok-tepe in any case" . Those were his words, and his actions matched them perfectly. The ridiculous talk has stopped. The troops were imbued with a willingness to fulfill the will of their leader at all costs.
On January 6, 1881, at the tip of the 2nd parallel, 200 fathoms from the corner of the fortress, a breach-battery was built, armed on January 8 with 12 guns. M.D. Skobelev was preparing for an assault on the 10th, but, due to a collapse in the mine gallery and damage to the fan, he postponed it to January 12, promising the miners with success 3,000 rubles and 4 insignia of a military order for 30 people. By midnight on the 10-11th, the mine gallery approached under the ditch 2 sazhens below the horizon, and on the night of the 12th, the mine chambers were driven. On the surface of the earth, the saps are connected by an epolement 5 fathoms from the moat; moreover, armored glanders were led into the same ditch.
By January 12 M.D. Skobelev concentrated 4,788 infantrymen, 1,043 cavalrymen, and 1,068 artillerymen, for a total of 6,899 men, with 58 cannons, 5 canisters and 16 mortars. 280 tours, 380 fascines, 1,800 earthen bags, 47 assault ladders and 16 wattle ladders were collected. Before the assault, a mine explosion was to be carried out in order to produce a collapse, and 22 guns were to widen and make the gap pierced by artillery easy to climb and, if possible, break through another.
According to Skobelev's disposition, three columns were assigned for the assault: a) Colonel Kuropatkin (11 1/2 companies, 1 team, 6 guns, 2 rocket machines and 1 heliograph) should take possession of the collapse from a mine explosion, firmly establish itself on it and strengthen in the south east corner of the fortress; b) Colonel Kozelkov (8 1/4 companies, 2 teams, 3 guns, 2 rocket machines and 1 heliograph machine) should take possession of the artillery gap and firmly establish itself on it; 1 and 2 columns (performing the main attack) must enter into communication with each other; c) Lieutenant Colonel Gaidarov (4 1/2 companies, 2 teams, 1 1/2 hundreds, 4 guns, 5 rocket launchers and 1 heliograph, making a demonstrative attack) should actively assist the first two columns, for which, having mastered Melnichnaya kala and the nearest retrenchments , to operate with reinforced rifle and artillery fire on the internal space of the fortress and in the rear of the enemy, concentrated against the main attack.
The assault was carried out on January 12, 1881. At 11:20 a.m., a mine exploded. A dull underground shock followed, the soil trembled and a huge column of earth and pieces of the wall rose high above the ground and slowly fell, filling the nearest trenches. The eastern wall fell 9 soots. and formed an easily accessible landslide. The Tekins who were here died. The explosion had not yet had time to settle down, as parts of the column of Colonel Kuropatkin came out from behind a nearby dam and rushed to the collapse with a shout of "Hurrah."
The column of Colonel Kozelkov was supported by a battalion from the reserve and captured the gap. Another battalion from the reserve formed the link between the two columns. Skobelev also had a reserve of 13 companies, 5 squadrons and hundreds, and 18 guns. He promptly put forward 8 companies to replace the stormers to the breach. 4 guns were placed on the landslide. Lieutenant Colonel Gaidarov, having mastered a section of the western wall, moved north and entered into communication with Colonel Kuropatkin, parts of whose column were guiding and followed in front of the others, along with two companies from the left column. Our troops pressed the enemy, who, however, offered desperate resistance.
For a long time a fierce battle was in full swing in the fortress, but the skill of the leaders with Skobelev at the head and the courage of the soldiers finally broke the Tekins, who fled through the northern passages, with the exception of a small part that remained in the fortress and died fighting. Our troops pursued the retreating enemy partly with fire, partly following on his heels; Mikhail Dmitrievich himself at the same time outstripped the infantry with 4 squadrons and hundreds with 2 guns; pursuit and felling continued for 15 miles.
Our losses for the entire siege with the assault reached 1.104 people, and during the assault they amounted to 398 people (including 34 officers). Inside the fortress were taken: up to 5,000 women and children, 500 Persian slaves and booty valued at 6,000,000 rubles.
Soon after the capture of Dengil-Tepe, detachments were sent by Skobelev under the command of Colonel Kuropatkin; one of them occupied Askhabad, and the other went more than 100 miles to the north from Dengil-Tepe, disarming the population, returning it to the oasis and spreading appeals in order to pacify the region as soon as possible. In these types of M.D. Skobelev took a whole series of skillfully considered measures, thanks to which a peaceful situation was soon established in our Trans-Caspian possessions. At the same time, Skobelev had to take part in resolving the following issues: a) maintaining friendly relations with Persia, provided that he did not concede to her in anything, b) delimitation with Persia, c) the relationship of the occupied territory and the administration to the Persian regions, and d) the actual distribution our power in the oasis and attitude towards Merv.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev's relations on all these issues, his considerations and actions reveal in him an extremely broad outlook, the ability to understand not only military, but also state issues, and to skillfully coordinate military interests with those of the state. The bloodless annexation of Merv that followed some time later showed what a thunderous blow was inflicted on the Turkmens in Dengil-Tepe and how great Skobelev's foresight was.
Akhal-Teke expedition 1880-1881 represents a first-class piece of art. The center of gravity of operations is in the sphere of military administrative issues. Everything is exemplary, starting with the painstaking, slow, systematic preparation and ending with a decisive, all amazing blow; however, one can note the excessive abundance and variety of artillery weapons and the almost complete absence of fodder supplies. The iron energy with which M.D. Skobelev, at the most difficult time, forces the troops to increase the tension of their forces for the speediest rapprochement with the enemy chest to chest, the moral impact on the troops, whose spirit rises to the extreme limit, the remarkable ability to rally the entire detachment into one harmonious organism, which is one with its leader - all this shows that Skobelev possessed an extraordinary gift, inherent only in a few leaders, the ability to seize people and lead them towards all the horrors of war and battle. In short, in this campaign M.D. Skobelev is a commander in the full sense of the word.
January 14 (1881 - approx.) Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was promoted to general of infantry, and on January 19 he was awarded the Order of St. George, 2nd degree; On April 27, he left Krasnovodsk back to the 4th Corps, in Minsk. Here he directed the education and combat training of the troops entrusted to him as before, in the spirit of Suvorov's ideas, as can be seen from his orders, etc., and especially from the maneuvers, exercises and inspections of the troops he carried out, in which everything was evaluated exclusively from the point of view from the point of view of the requirements of combat, and not parade grounds, and all departments of indoctrination and education of troops were placed in proper relations with each other. And here the troops believed in their leader and were ready to follow him anywhere.
According to the times of M.D. Skobelev traveled to his estates, mainly to the village of Spasskoye in the Ryazan province, and even declared his desire to take up farming seriously. He treated the peasants very well, who called him none other than "our hero" and "father". Mikhail Dmitrievich especially loved children who studied at schools, seeing them as future defenders of Russia. He spoiled them with gifts.
At this time, the mood of Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was for the most part oppressed. The previous life could not but affect his body. During the Akhal-Teke expedition, a terrible grief befell him: his mother was killed by a man whom he did good. It is impossible to describe the impression that the news of this atrocity made on Skobelev. Then another blow followed: the martyrdom of the Emperor Alexander II, whom he adored. Mikhail Dmitrievich was not happy in family life either. He was married to Princess Maria Nikolaevna Gagarina, who was educated abroad. The couple soon separated, and then divorced.
Upon completion of the Akhal-Teke expedition and return to European Russia, M.D. Skobelev began again to study Slavic and other related issues.
M.D. Skobelev paid special attention to the question of Russia's alleged war with its western neighbors, which was intensively discussed in the Austrian and German press after the war of 1870-1871. and especially after the Berlin Congress. Skobelev could not fail to notice that a new trend had emerged in Austrian literature, by virtue of which Austria-Hungary should go hand in hand with Germany, spread German culture in the southeast of Europe, paralyze Russia's influence on the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula and subjugate these peoples to its own. influence.
At the same time, Austrian military writers, not limited, as before, to the defense of Galicia, argued the need to seize the Kingdom of Poland and even the Little Russian provinces. German writers went even further and proved the necessity of "taking Finland, Poland, the Baltic provinces, the Caucasus and Russian Armenia from Russia" and "destroying Russia in the sense of a great European power." The indignation that engulfed M.D. Skobelev when reading such writings, defies description.
Meanwhile, M.D. Skobelev had to perform various official assignments, among which the most important was a business trip to maneuvers in Germany. Skobelev's reports on the execution of these orders are remarkable, like everything that came out from under his pen. Particularly noteworthy are his thoughts concerning certain aspects of the German military system, which he highly appreciated, but was not a supporter of slavish worship and blind imitation and considered it necessary to improve, as much as possible, our military system, preparing to deflect our weak and substitute strong side.
Stay in Germany led M.D. Skobelev to the conclusion that if not today, then tomorrow our Western neighbors will declare war on us and that Russia's main enemy was a strong Germany. Diplomats feared this too, but disagreed with Skobelev regarding the best way to counteract this evil. Their tendency to extreme compliance and passivity M.D. Skobelev contrasted a program based on firmness and a highly active mode of action. This explains his further activities, starting with rapprochement with the French, supporters of the Franco-Russian alliance, and ending with speeches addressed to Slavic students, etc.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was a real loyal subject, a real Russian warrior who only rushed forward in order to serve the Sovereign and Russia as soon as possible in the way he knew how; he rushed in the very direction that led to the formation of a dual alliance that put off the war. He was more diligent than required and was not restrained enough. Skobelev did not take care of his health and thus shortened his life. Shortly before his death, he had a premonition of it and spoke about it to his friends. Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev died in Moscow on June 25, 1882.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev achieved high distinctions and the highest military rank at an age when his peers commanded regiments, and even companies in the army. M.D. Skobelev achieved this due to the fact that he was a real military man, a warrior by vocation, who loved military affairs with all his heart. In the service, Skobelev set maximum demands not only for others, but above all for himself, serving as another example. His energy was amazing, and yet the source of real strength is rooted in energy.
The value of the moral element, the spirit of the troops, M.D. Skobelev fully understood and wielded it artistically, no worse than all the great commanders, and yet this is the main key to success in military affairs. Therefore, the charm of Skobelev, as a leader, was enormous. He combined with amazing harmony a remarkable understanding of the essence of theory and knowledge of all its necessary details with the desire for a practical study of military affairs and for the most practical implementation of the provisions of the theory. Theorists and practitioners can agree among themselves and find in him both deeply calculated considerations, and caution in actions in an appropriate combination with decisiveness, and in general everything for which Suvorov was called a "naturalist."
M.D. Skobelev had a thorough general and military education and constantly continued to study; with particular love, he indulged in military history, the significance of which he fully understood even at school. Over time, his horizons expand, and at the same time, the cycle of knowledge that he tries to assimilate also expands. And in this respect, his successes are amazingly fast.
Skobelev perfectly understood the importance of knowing "the mistress in war, the situation." He constantly studies it in all ways and means and achieves remarkable results: he begins to fluently read the book that is accessible only to the great masters of military art. Knowing and understanding the situation as well as possible, he sets the right goal, after which nothing can deviate him from acting in the spirit of the decision once made.
Always and everywhere, Skobelev sacrifices the secondary in favor of the main, both in the theater of operations and on the battlefield. He does not recognize half-measures, he does not even want to hear about a template: under Sheinov he has developed a European-style battle formation, but in battles in Central Asia it is completely different, and even in Asia he acts differently against the Tekins than against the Kokans, etc. .
As a private chief, especially at the head of the cavalry, M.D. Skobelev combines selfless courage with an amazing ability to quickly assess the state of affairs, quickly make decisions and quickly implement them. Although he is studying at the head of large detachments, he gives a number of positive examples of art, before which some shady aspects of his military operations pale in comparison.
By the end of his activity, M.D. Skobelev has fully formed: he is already a ready-made commander. At this time, he gives exemplary solutions to all the problems of strategic and tactical art. Skobelev just did not find a chance to prove in such a way that it was obvious to everyone that his place was among the great generals, of whom he himself was most fond of Napoleon, but more and more took the path of Suvorov.
As a statesman in wartime, as a representative of strategy, obliged to take into account the interests of higher politics, or as a representative of the combined authorities, civil and military in the region, which is a theater of military operations, M.D. Skobelev would have been at the height of the most difficult positions and combinations both in Asia and in Europe.
In peacetime, M.D. In some cases, in Europe, Skobelev did not show the balance necessary for a statesman, but again in Asia he was impeccable in this respect too. This is due to the complexity of the European situation, Skobelev's fiery temperament, and his ardent patriotism. In all likelihood, over time, Skobelev would have become the same in Europe as he was in Asia. Russia lost in him a future leader in case of serious clashes with other peoples, whose name alone would raise the spirit of our troops and increase the chances of success.
Grief engulfed all of Russia and all her friends with the news of the untimely death of M.D. Skobelev, and even his enemies had to be silent when the following words were inscribed in the name of his sister from the height of the Throne: “I am terribly shocked and saddened by the death of your brother. The loss for the Russian army is difficult to replace and, of course, greatly mourned by all truly military men. Sad, It is very sad to lose such a useful and dedicated figure. Alexander".
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was buried in his family estate, the village of Spassky-Zaborovsky, Ranenburg district, Ryazan province, in the left aisle of the local church of St. Michael, next to his parents, where he prepared a place for himself during his lifetime, anticipating death.
Sources
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— New Stories. SPb., 1900
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— Greene, "Russian Army and its campaigns in Turkey 1877-1878" 1879-1880 His own, "Sketches of Army life in Rusisa". 1879
- Demurov, "Fight with the Tekins". Military Collection of 1882, No. 3.
- Dukmasov, "Memories of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and M.D. Skobelev." 1889
- Zaionchkovsky, "Offensive battle according to the experience of General Skobelev in the battles near Lovcha, Plevna and Sheinovo." SPb. 1893
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— Kuropatkin A. N., Turkmenistan and Turkmens. SPb. 1879, "Lovcha and Plevna" vols. I and II. SPb. 1885
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— Mayer, A Year in the Sands. "Essays on the Akhal-Teke Expedition". Kronstadt, 1886
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Russian biographical dictionary: Sabaneev-Smyslov. - Ed. under the supervision of the chairman of the Imperial Russian Historical Society A. A. Polovtsova. - St. Petersburg: type. V. Demakova, 1904. - T. 18. - ss. 564-584
Alexander Alexandrovich Polovtsov (May 31, 1832 - September 24, 1909) - statesman and public figure of the Russian Empire, philanthropist, industrialist. At the expense of his personal funds, since 1896, the Russian Biographical Dictionary has been published.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev is a famous Russian general. Skobelev was born in St. Petersburg on September 17 (29), 1843. His father Dmitry Ivanovich was a military man with the rank of lieutenant general. Mother Olga Nikolaevna was a highly educated and virtuous woman.
Skobelev's grandfather Ivan Nikitich was also a military man, went from a soldier to a general, was the commandant of the Peter and Paul Fortress, participated in and even reached Paris.
The Skobelev family was military, loyal to the royal throne and the Russian people. Mikhail Dmitrievich continued the good reputation of his family. From childhood he was brought up in a patriotic manner, he knew about the price of civic duty and work, self-sacrifice for the good of the people.
From childhood, Skobelev showed a craving for science. Mikhail Dmitrievich knew 8 foreign languages, subtly felt music, studied Russian history. In his youth, he studied at St. Petersburg University. After studying, Mikhail goes to military service, because having such roots, Skobelev could not do otherwise.
Soon Mikhail Skobelev became a cadet of the Cavalry Guards Regiment. Five years later, having passed the exams, he was enrolled in the Academy of the General Staff, where he showed great success in training. Mikhail learned a lot about military art and political history, he also had success in literature. After successful exams, he was enrolled in the General Staff, with the assignment of the next military rank.
Skobelev's service was held in responsible positions. The future general took part in the fighting in Turkestan and the Transcaspian region. In one of the military operations, Skobelev received seven wounds and miraculously survived. For courage in combat operations in Central Asia, Mikhail Dmitrievich was presented to the Order of St. George, 4th degree.
In 1874, Skobelev received the rank of adjutant wing. In 1876, he led an expedition sent beyond the Altai Range to southern Kyrgyzstan. The result of the expedition was the recognition of the Fergana Tien Shan as Russian land. Before the next Russian-Turkish war, he asks to be sent to the Danube army. Mikhail Dmitrievich was enrolled in the 14th division with the rank of major general.
Skobelev was an orderly of the famous military theorist Dragomirov. Dragomirov's division was the first echelon, which was to ensure the crossing of Russian troops across the Danube. For the operation to cross the Russian troops, Mikhail Dmitrievich was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav, 1st degree. He also participated in the siege of Plevna.
Plevna was a well-fortified city that occupied important strategic positions. Skobelev led a detachment that was part of the Caucasian Cossack Brigade. The task of his brigade was to cover the shock group of Russian troops from the south. The first assault on the city was unsuccessful. Then Skobelev at the military council proposed to cut off the road leading to the city and capture Lovcha. Skobelev's plan did not find proper understanding among the generals, and soon a second assault on Plevna was scheduled, which ended in failure.
The Russian army was unable to take the city and lost 7,000 soldiers. Mikhail Skobelev was able to save the main forces of the Russian army from complete defeat. Skobelev was highly appreciated by the commander-in-chief, who wrote in a report: "... In hellfire, with his heroic personal example, he inspired the troops and made them capable of miracles of courage ...".
Two days later, Mikhail Skobelev led a cavalry detachment that was supposed to advance on Lovcha. Much depended on Skobelev's success. At that time, the famous, fierce battles were going on at the Shipka Pass. The Turks began to press. Skobelev led the troops on the offensive against Lovcha. The battle began on the morning of September 3rd, Russian troops showered the enemy with artillery fire, the battle lasted about 12 hours. Thanks to Skobelev's maneuvers, the Turks were confused, and the Russian troops took Lovcha. The victory at Lovcha was of great importance for the Russian army, whose morale was undermined due to failures at Plevna.
The third assault on the city was again unsuccessful, although Skobelev's detachment managed to capture the advanced fortifications. After the 3rd assault, Plevna was surrounded by Russian troops from all sides. Mikhail Dmitrievich was ordered to lead a division, the number of which was 16 thousand people. The division, after some time, became known as the Skobelevskaya. He had to do a lot during the long months of the siege of Plevna.
Skobelev supported the morale of the soldiers, taught them military affairs. Soon the Turks tried to break through the blockade, but were driven back by Russian troops, as a result, the Turkish garrison surrendered. Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was appointed the new military governor of the city. Further, the Russian army had to move through the Balkans.
The transition promised to be very dangerous and difficult. The Russian army nevertheless made it, writing another glorious page in Russian history. Sheinovo was taken, several Turkish detachments surrendered. The road to Istanbul was opened...
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev died in Moscow in 1882 under very mysterious circumstances. Some historians believe that he was killed for political reasons. Skobelev's death shook all of Russia and Bulgaria. Countries plunged into mourning. In 30 years, a monument to the Russian Hero will be opened on Tverskaya. The opening was attended by representatives of Bulgaria and Central Asia. However, the monument lasted only 6 years, and was demolished by decree of the USSR government.
The biography of Skobelev is fanned by a feat, a feat for the good of the Fatherland. Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev - an outstanding Russian commander, folk hero who will forever live in the memory of not only the Russian people, but also the Bulgarian people.
