Back in the fall of 1943, the territory of Italy was divided in two. Its southern part was occupied by US-British troops, and the German occupation of the northern and part of the central regions dragged on for two years. In southern Italy, the government formed by Badoglio from "specialists" did not have any support among the people and did not enjoy the authority of the Anglo-American authorities.
The anti-fascist parties were not united on the issue of their attitude to the monarchy, since the party of action and the socialists demanded the immediate abdication of the king. This made it possible for the occupying powers to sabotage the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and England on the need to include in the government "representatives of those strata of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism." In March, direct diplomatic relations were restored between the Soviet Union and Italy.
On April 24, 1944, a new government was formed under the chairmanship of Badoglio, which included anti-fascist parties. After the liberation of Rome, the government was reorganized: the leader of the Labor Democracy Party I. Bonomi became the chairman of the council of ministers, and the anti-fascist parties gained predominant influence in the government.
The most important events took place during this period in Northern Italy, where the Germans became the true masters, who established strict control over all activities of the Italian administration. They carried out a systematic export of industrial raw materials and equipment, food, various values \u200b\u200bfrom Northern Italy. Skilled workers and captured Italian soldiers were sent to Germany forcibly. Without even notifying Mussolini, Hitler seized the area of \u200b\u200bVenice from Italy, together with Trieste, and included it in the Reich. After his return to power in northern Italy, Mussolini publicly declared the "anti-capitalism" of the neo-fascist party he had created. In November 1943, the "Verona Manifesto" of the neo-fascist party was published, which contained a number of promises, including the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, the "socialization" of enterprises through the participation of workers in their management, freedom of criticism, etc.
At the same time, a wide network of repressive organs emerged. "Special tribunals" were established in all provinces, and special police units were created everywhere to help the Gestapo.
By disbanding the royal army, Mussolini tried to create an armed force to continue the war on the side of Germany. However, numerous recruits for this army did not give results, since most of the mobilized people preferred to go to the mountains. The four Italian fascist divisions, as well as various paramilitary organizations like the "black brigades," "Mussolini's battalions," etc., were wholly occupied with actions against the partisans.
On the day the German occupation began, September 9, 1943, the anti-fascist parties in Rome formed the Committee for National Liberation. It includes representatives of six parties: the Communist, Socialist, Action Party, Labor Democracy Party, Christian Democratic and Liberal. This event was the beginning of the Resistance movement.
By the summer of 1944, partisan detachments in northern and central Italy numbered 50-60 thousand people and were a formidable force. More than half of them were detachments named after Garibaldi.
The general strike in March served as a powerful stimulus for the expansion of the anti-fascist struggle in the occupied territory. In the history of Italy, there have been no such unanimous actions of the working people. The preparation of this strike was reminiscent of the open declaration of war on fascism by the working people of Northern Italy. It was led by a specially created committee, which included representatives of the largest enterprises. In contrast to the March 1943 strikes, when enterprises were gradually drawn into the struggle, in March 1944 about a million people simultaneously stopped working. The Italian fascists were so scared that almost nowhere they dared to openly oppose the workers and preferred to hide behind the back of the German military administration. Just as the March 1943 strikes served as a prelude to the fall of the Mussolini dictatorship, the movement in March 1944 opened the way for the national liberation war. In the summer months of 1944, the partisan army inflicted continuous strikes against the German troops. From June 1944 to March 30, 1945, partisans killed 16,380 Nazis and Italian fascists in Italy, wounded 10,536 people, carried out 6449 operations and 5571 acts of sabotage, destroyed 230 steam locomotives and 760 carriages, blew up 276 bridges, destroyed or rendered unusable 237 aircraft. As a result of the partisan offensive in a number of regions, the power of the fascist administration remained only nominally.
The number of liberated areas fully controlled by the partisans grew. The German commander-in-chief in Italy Kesselring admitted in his memoirs: "After the abandonment of Rome (June 1944), there was an increase in partisan activity on a completely unexpected scale for us ... From that moment, the partisan movement turned into a real danger for the German command, and its elimination became a task of paramount importance. " Despite the fact that all the forces of the Mussolini government and a significant part of the German army were thrown against the partisans, the Italian patriots, acting with broad popular support, firmly held the initiative in their hands. Only the sudden cessation of the offensive by the Anglo-American forces in October 1944 and the winter cold forced the partisan army to reduce the scale of operations and temporarily go on the defensive. However, it was clear that the German occupation of Italy was coming to an end and the days of Italian neo-fascism were numbered. In December 1944, Mussolini, after a long silence, delivered a long speech in Milan. This turned out to be his last political speech, and it kind of summed up the history of neo-fascism in Northern Italy.
Mussolini was forced to admit that many promises, starting with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, were not fulfilled, and justified this by the need to direct all efforts to the creation of the armed forces. Moreover, in fact, he said that neo-fascism failed to create states in the full sense of the word, he limited himself practically to the creation of an army, which was almost entirely absorbed in the conduct of the civil war. This was a recognition of the strength of the anti-fascist movement and the failure of attempts to revive Italian fascism. In January 1945, the Italian patriots began preparations for a decisive offensive. During February and March, the number of the partisan army grew rapidly and reached 130 thousand. The difficult situation in Italy attracted close attention of the British Special Operations Directorate and the American Strategic Intelligence Directorate. Despite some differences between the British and Americans over the attitude towards the forces of the Italian Resistance, both of these organizations were of the same opinion about the need to limit the scope of the partisan movement. The supply of weapons to the guerrillas was used as one of the means to make the Resistance dependent on US-British policy, in particular to support anti-communist forces.
Even the Minister of War in the government of Badoglio and the military leader of the Italian Resistance, General Cadorna, were forced to declare that the "anti-revolutionary detachments" of the Resistance enjoy the special disposition of the Western allies and receive the largest amount of weapons and ammunition. When they failed to contain and limit the scope of the national liberation movement, the US-British command officially banned the increase in the number of partisan formations and sent orders to their liaison officers to stop the "indiscriminate" distribution of weapons among the guerrillas.
RESISTANCE. END OF DICTATOR
Where is the history of the Popular Front? Where is the union of anti-fascist forces? Why did the Italian political parties fail to stop Mussolini? Why didn't they come together?
Several reasons are obvious.
First, those who tried to unite different forces against fascism were persecuted and repressed. The repressions were primarily directed against the Italian communists.
Second, it is not easy for all parliamentary parties to unite in principle, because the very essence of representation in parliament requires a struggle for votes, and therefore with each other.
Thirdly, the parties - potential allies in the fight against fascism had disagreements on important fundamental issues, which, as it turned out later, were not the most important. But who knew it then?
Communists (the leaders of the Communist Party were A. Bordiga until his arrest in 1923, then P. Togliatti and U. Terracini, from 1924 - A. Gramshi)) called for a decisive revolutionary struggle, denounced the fascists, socialists, and "popolari". The Communist Party was a member of the Comintern, which in the early 1920s aimed the fraternal Communist Parties at an early world revolution and promoted the tactics of a "united workers 'front", the creation of "workers' governments" and the fight against enemies of any kind. And Lenin assessed the situation in Italy as pre-revolutionary.
One of the founders of the Communist Party, Amedeo Bordiga, was a supporter of radical action, who believed that the path of parliamentary struggle was not for the communists. He regarded the bourgeoisie as the main enemy and probably underestimated the potential of the emerging fascist movement. In addition, he did not consider it necessary to go to the creation of tactical coalitions with the socialists, since any coalition requires concessions from both sides, and the rebuff to the fascist terror could only be forceful, which was rejected by the socialists (and many communists too).
Antonio Gramsci, who headed the IKP in absentia in 1924, was no less sympathetic to the Russian revolution than others, but he understood better than others both the essence and the danger of the emerging fascism, which was not only a consequence of poverty, remnant, demagogy, but also an instrument of struggle against the ideas of socialism and communism. In Italy, there was hardly a truly revolutionary situation, the signs of which Lenin saw, but the crisis was severe. And fascism in Italy, which Gramsci later noted, was supported by the ruling classes as an instrument of counter-revolution, as a means to prevent either revolution or radical reforms in the economy and social sphere (the seizures of enterprises, the creation of workers' councils were just manifestations of the impatience of the "lower classes", to which the "top" were able to find the answer and begin to manage "in a new way").
Probably, the situation in the leadership of the IKP can be characterized as internally conflict - due to the need to follow the guidelines of the Comintern and the need to look for an adequate response to the fascist threat in a unique situation. It was unique, because in no other European country there was anything similar to fascism, and there was no experience of opposing it.
Socialists - a party that rejected violence, both revolutionary and fascist, advocated the path of negotiations in solving economic and social problems. In addition, the socialists, despite the split that resulted in the formation of the Communist Party, had a powerful parliamentary faction and could really influence government policy. Did the socialist leaders see a threat in the fascist movement? Of course they did. But they probably believed that the state should first of all fight against extremism, and their task is to induce the state to do this. In particular, through parliament, but there were not enough Socialist deputies for this.
Both parties relied on the working class and partly on the peasantry. But there were more socialists.
Weakened the forces of the left and the very fact of the formation of the Communist Party. In 1919, the Socialist Party welcomed the creation of the Comintern and even practically joined it, but the persistent demands of the leaders of the Comintern to get rid of the reformists led to a split. At the same time, one of the leaders of the Socialist Party suggested to Lenin that each national section of the Comintern should be given more freedom of action - after all, a "purge" of moderates, reformists, centrists would lead to a weakening of the party's positions, loss of influence in both trade unions and local authorities. But Ilyich was adamant.
The consignment "Popolari" (The People's Party), like the socialists, advocated the search for compromises, agreement and against fascist terror. However, the "popolari" united many zealous Catholics, while the socialists were the party of the "materialists", mostly anti-clerical. The founder of the Popolari party, priest Luigi Sturzo, saw the revolution as evil, so they were not on their way with the communists. Moreover, the communists were even more anti-clerical than the socialists. And for the leadership of the Vatican, Mussolini seemed more acceptable than the communists, socialists, and in the end the leader of the Popolari.
The occupation of enterprises by workers was, of course, also a point of disagreement. The communists welcomed these actions and participated in their organization. Gramsci saw in workers' self-management of enterprises a new form of power that could solve economic and social problems in the interests of the working people. The "Popolari" and the socialists considered such actions unjustified. At the same time, both the communists and especially the socialists controlled a certain part of the trade unions.
The leaders of the parties that could agree to unite against fascism - the socialists and the "popolari" tried to "come to terms in an amicable way" with Mussolini. This treaty was not fulfilled by the fascists. The policy of "appeasement" of arrogant fanatics often turns out to be useless.
It was as if all the parties “did not notice” the huge army of people who returned from the war and found themselves poor and unemployed. And it was to these people that Mussolini's rhetoric and demagoguery was addressed, it was they who joined his party (although, of course, not only them).
It is worth remembering that in Russia a significant part of the soldiers and sailors supported the Bolsheviks and became their support in the revolution. But the Bolsheviks spent more than one month working in the army. In addition, the composition of the Russian army is predominantly peasants, for whom the revolutionary slogans "land to the peasants!" and "peace to the peoples!" did not require special explanations.
The fascists very quickly came to power (already in 1922) and, having received power, took measures not only to weaken and eliminate any opposition, but also to legitimize its political elimination.
And, of course, the position of the king, the position of the army and police leadership, the position of industrialists, the demagogic propaganda of the Italian fascists and the position of the Catholic Church - all this also affected.
Could the assassination of MP Matteotti be a signal for a unification of forces that could potentially unite against fascism? Perhaps it could. But opposition deputies simply left parliament and waited until the king dismissed Mussolini.
And if the head of Popolari Don Sturzo, who condemned the fascist terror, had not resigned from the post of party leader? He could simply be excommunicated, or even killed. After leaving the post of head of Popolari, Sturzo was forced to go abroad.
Was it a mistake to vote in the parliament of the Socialists and Popolari for the adoption of the new electoral law in 1924? Certainly. However, not only the law determines the voting results, but also the course of the election campaign. If it goes on peacefully, "civilized" - the result is one, and if it is accompanied by demagogy and violence - another.
Yes, there were anti-fascists in Italy. Yes, they tried to fight the fascist regime, but ...
Soon after Mussolini came to power, neither elections nor parliament practically disappeared. Consequently, it was impossible to succeed by participating in the elections.
Trade unions were virtually liquidated, therefore, the strike struggle also became either impossible or unsuccessful.
Conduct meetings, demonstrations? What rallies are there ...
IN AND. Lenin, in a report at the IV Congress of the Comintern on November 13, 1922, said: “Maybe the fascists in Italy will render us great services, for example, by explaining to the Italians that they are not yet sufficiently enlightened and that their country is not yet guaranteed against the Black Hundreds. Maybe it will be very useful. "
And the chairman of the Comintern G. Zinoviev noted: "We must understand that what happened in Italy is not a local phenomenon. We will inevitably have to face the same phenomena in other countries, although, perhaps, in other forms. Probably, we are not we can avoid such a period of more or less fascist coups throughout Central and Central Europe. "
Karl Radek (the representative of the Polish communists in the Comintern) said approximately the same: "If our comrades are in Italy, if the Social Democratic Party of Italy does not understand the reasons for this victory of fascism and the reasons for our defeat, then we will have to face the long rule of fascism."
The terror of one political force against political opponents was indeed a completely new phenomenon for Italy, and none of the politicians knew what fascism was and what would happen next. What is armed suppression of strikes or dispersal of demonstrators was represented in all countries. But what is the terror carried out by the parliamentary party, and even supported by the security forces of the state, no one knew, perhaps.
Russian revolutionaries knew about the pogroms, and about the non-intervention of the police and the army in them, as they say, not by hearsay. All this was in Russia in 1905-1906.
However, the course offered by the Comintern to the communist parties in the early 1920s was to prepare for the world communist revolution, and not at all to establish cooperation with other parties. However, this was the beginning of the 20s, when a world revolution might seem possible, and the Nazis were just beginning their path to power. In the early 1920s, Moscow was worried about its own problems - the NEP, the struggle for power under the ailing Lenin, the prospects for a revolution in Germany. In general, there was no time for Italy.
In 1922 (a few months before Mussolini's campaign against Rome), the leadership of the Comintern (that is, the RCP (b)) negotiated with the leaders of the Second International. Negotiations on building and possibly improving relations and interaction in the struggle for the sake of the proletariat. Western socialists worried about the fate of the opposition socialists in Russia (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists), talked about the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. And the Bolsheviks responded with reproaches of betraying the interests of the working class of Russia, the proletarian revolution ... They did not agree ...
And in the late 1920s, the leadership of the Comintern directed the Communist Parties of other countries to a decisive struggle against the Social Democrats and Socialists, who were called nothing more than "Social Fascists."
And the head of the IKP Palmiro Togliatti was forced to support this line and refuse to cooperate with anti-fascists from among the socialists and other parties. Although, in the event of arrests, both the communists, and the socialists, and the "popolari" ended up in the same cells.
The tactics "class against class", the struggle against social democracy in fact, in particular in Italy, led to the fact that in the underground, the communists blamed the socialists.
In the journal "Communist International" dated October 31, 1930 in the article "The Communist Party of Italy and the leadership of the struggle of the masses", signed simply with the initials M.G. said:
“Based on the nature of the Italian economic crisis and its interaction with the world crisis, it can be argued that the current development of mass movements offers the prospect of their rapid growth and their rapid transformation into broad political battles.
Fascism, which had to prove (as opposed to Bolshevism!) Its ability to solve the problems of the working classes, brought the working people to hunger and doomed them to slavery.
The collapse of fascism gives rise to a reshuffle of political forces in the country. "
Further, the author wrote that the decay of the ruling fascist party was taking place, dissatisfaction with the regime was growing within the fascist trade unions, among Catholic organizations, masons and social democratic organizations, leaflets and appeals were being distributed.
"The so-called Anti-Fascist Concentration recently came out with the Pact of Unity and Action, which is the program of its parties. This program is valid" until the overthrow of fascism and until the stabilization of the indestructible Italian state by republican democracy. "
It is clear that the Concentration wants to use the movement of the working masses for its own purposes; Concentration wants to prevent the struggle of the workers and peasants from leading to the overthrow of capitalism, to a socialist revolution, to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Italy, defined in the Pact as an "illusion", as "despotism of the party", "an encroachment on the normal laws of economic evolution ".
It is clear that the Concentration wants to prevent the orientation of the Italian proletariat towards the Communist Party, wants to prevent the implementation of a bloc of workers, peasants, national minorities and the indigenous population of the African colonies, because such a bloc means a victorious struggle of the working masses against fascism, means the overthrow and destruction of the capitalist state.
For the servants of the bourgeoisie, leading the so-called Anti-Fascist Concentration, capitalism currently still has a "normal" function of progressive development. They deny that the Italian crisis is one of the manifestations of the fatal crisis of the capitalist system. They want to be believed that they have the means to resolve the crisis. But their "Pact" will not be able to deceive the masses. Abundant chatter about freedom and democracy cannot gloss over what is essential in the Pact; and essential in it is the idea that the transition from fascism to an "invincible" democratic state is nothing but a new form of the fascist regime.
The Social Democracy can therefore only think politically in a fascist way. It does not present any of the demands of the masses against the bourgeoisie; all the demands of the Concentration are directed against the workers and peasants.
It promises to the workers to clear the way "for all their just demands." Plagiarism is quite obvious here. These gentlemen kindly promise the workers to grant them the right to fight for "every just demand." They, like the fascists, become "above the classes," that is, actually take the side of entrepreneurs. They are preparing to stifle the struggle of the working people who defend their demands, which are always just because they are the cement of the struggle of the exploited against the exploiters.
Our Social Democrats have gone over to the camp of the enemy, like their comrades in all countries, and therefore they are afraid even to make democratic promises, which would still remain unfulfilled.
The "Pact of Unity and Action" confronts the Italian Communist Party with the need for a decisive and merciless struggle against social fascism - a competitor to fascism, in the matter of preserving and defending the capitalist system.
... To the "Pact" of Concentration the CPI opposes the aims of the struggle of the Italian proletariat.
The solution to the crisis of Italian fascism lies in the seizure of power by the proletariat and in the organization of power on the basis of the councils of workers ', peasants', soldiers 'and sailors' deputies; in the expropriation and socialization of factories and banks; in the expropriation of large landowners; in the recognition of the right of “national minorities and colonial peoples to independence up to the distance from Italy; in arming the proletariat to ensure the defense of the workers' state and to suppress the slightest attempt at resistance from its enemies; in the abolition of freedom of the press, organizations and all political rights for the bourgeoisie.
Our program is not only not utopian, but it is relevant. "
It is, of course, difficult to assess the true intentions of the intentions of the aforementioned anti-fascist "Concentration". In approximately the same terms, the author characterized the other group "Justice and Freedom".
And, of course, it is quite difficult to imagine what the opponents of the fascist regime could do inside the country (and outside the country too) to overthrow or soften it. But still, perhaps the most important thing was not to sort things out among themselves, but to prepare for the moment when it would be possible to act and determine how the future of Italy after Mussolini would be determined.
There is no doubt that parliamentary democracy provides more opportunities for asserting rights and expressing one's position than dictatorship and the working people, and the intelligentsia, and even the bourgeoisie (in terms of that time). Nevertheless, the author argued that "the Soviet and socialist solution to the crisis is the only one capable of answering the questions posed by Italian reality, is the only national and democratic solution to the crisis. Any other way out, opposed to this, is a hoax dictated by the interests of defending the capitalist" order " and society. "
The article admitted that the successes of the Italian communists were small:
"... we must urge that the activity of our party, as one of the elements determining the political crisis, is far behind.
So far, however, we have succeeded only to a very small extent in mobilizing and organizing the broad masses on the basis of their most urgent demands. With the aim of restructuring the entire work of the party in this direction, the Politburo of the KPI embarked on a campaign centered on the most important direct economic and political demands of the masses, namely:
a) Increase of all wages by 20%.
b) Allowance for all unemployed in industry and agriculture in the amount of at least 10 lira per day for the entire period of unemployment.
c) Election of in-plant commissions.
d) Freedom of trade unions, press and strikes for the proletariat.
e) Refusal of sharecroppers, colonists, small tenants and small owners from paying taxes.
f) Release of all political prisoners; abolition of the Special Tribunal in emergency laws.
The campaign for these demands, linked to our unfolded revolutionary slogans, should take place in the form of conferences in factories, rural households. enterprises and villages, meetings of the unemployed, on the basis of the broadest possible holding of a united front from below, at these conferences and meetings, struggle committees should be elected to mobilize the masses and to lead the struggle. At the same time, the party issued directives on organizing workers' defense groups. "
How realistic were the ideas of the Comintern about the seizure of power by the proletariat and the creation of soviets in Italy in 1930? It was unrealizable and utopian ..
The Comintern's course towards cooperation with other left-wing parties, and not towards confrontation with them, towards the creation of popular fronts to fight fascism was announced only in the mid-30s, when not only Mussolini, but also Hitler, and their supporters, came to power (albeit less numerous, but just as aggressive) existed in many European countries.
On August 17, 1934, the Italian Communist Party and Socialist Party signed in Paris (in Paris - !!!) the first pact of unity of action.
How to stop the fascists striving for power? Strikes? Rallies? Requiring the authorities to take decisive action? Armed resistance? Speeches in parliament or the press?
Can politicians generally unite to achieve some common goals, and not only when voting on a particular bill?
In 1921, the "Arditi del Popolo" ("People's Daredevils") began to be created - fighting squads from among anarchists, socialists, communists, trade union activists to organize an armed rebuff to the terror of Mussolini's black shirts. Among the organizers and leaders of these squads were Apro Sekondari, Mingrino, Gino Luchetti (he tried to kill Mussolini on September 11, 1926) and others.
Although the squads included members of different parties, the leadership of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party did not officially support them, and critical articles even appeared in the relevant party publications. It is known that Lenin in 1921 criticized the then communist leader A. Bordiga for sectarianism and unwillingness to support the revolutionary initiative (the leadership of the Communist Party demanded that the communists not participate in squads, since they include members of other "unfriendly" parties).
After the Socialist Party signed a "pacification agreement" with Mussolini, it refused to recognize the people's guards. The leadership of the General Confederation of Labor took the same position.
The communists tried to organize their own self-defense combat units (Squadre comuniste d "azione), but their numbers were small, and in general the party adhered to a strategy of non-violent action.
The most consistent in supporting the People's Militias were anarchists who tried to engage in individual terror against fascist activists and leaders.
One of the most important successes of the Druzhin was achieved in Parma in August 1922, when 350 vigilantes, led by World War I veterans Antonio Sieri and Guido Pisella, successfully defended the city against the advance of 20,000 fascists.
Parma 1922. Barricades against fascists in the city streets.
The total number of "vigilantes" was up to 20,000 throughout the country, but within a few years the leaders were either arrested or killed and the movement was effectively liquidated by 1924.
The intelligentsia expressed their protest. Thus, Benedetto Croce wrote the Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intelligentsia, which was published in 1925. Anti-fascist resistance groups arose and in some territories that were annexed to Italy as a result of World War I, the Slovenes and Croats created the TIGR organization, which organized acts of sabotage and attacks on members of the fascist party and the military.
Joint (but organizationally weak) anti-fascist demonstrations began not in Italy, but outside of it.
Emigrants from Italy (and most of them were in France) are socialists, republicans are creating small anti-fascist cells in Marseille, Toulouse, Paris.
In 1929, the socialist Carlo Roselli, who escaped from an Italian prison in the Aeolian Islands, created the anti-fascist movement "Justice and Freedom" with the participation of socialists, radicals, and even "polaris". This "popular front", modest in its capabilities, prepared a program that assumed the establishment of a republican system in Italy and, of course, the fight against the Mussolini regime, tried to organize underground resistance groups in northern Italy, and send anti-fascist literature to the country.
However, the underground cells were defeated, and Roselli himself was killed in 1937.
Small anti-fascist underground cells in Italy itself could do little, except to publish semi-handwritten leaflet newspapers.
Underground edition
During the Spanish Civil War, Franco Mussolini sent about 70,000 soldiers and officers to help General Franco. Volunteers from different countries of the world fought on the side of the anti-fascists of Spain, including 4,000 Italians - including activists and leaders of different parties - and Carlo Roselli himself, and the Secretary General of the Republican Party of Angeloni, and the communist Luigi Longo (later the head of the ICP) , and the socialist Pietro Nenni. The battles in Spain showed that ideological differences do not matter much in the struggle against a common enemy. The Garibaldi brigade managed to inflict several defeats on their compatriots sent by Mussolini. And when it appeared in several Italian newspapers, Mussolini was furious.
Italian volunteers in Spain
In September 1938, the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party addressed an open letter to Italian Catholics with a proposal to cooperate in the struggle against fascism, and later came out with a statement on the need to create a Popular Front.
Representatives of different parties were also united in partisan detachments, which in 1943, after leaving Mussolini, began an active armed struggle against both Italian and German fascists, and the organization of strikes in the occupied territory.
Partisan resistance was widespread, especially in the northern regions of the country. Approximately 44,700 partisans were killed in battles with the Nazis, more than 21,000 people were injured. Several tens of thousands of people died in concentration camps, about 15,000 civilians were killed during the actions of retaliation and intimidation, which were committed by the fascists - both Italian and German.
Italians who emigrated from the country also fought in partisan detachments. More than 250,000 people took part in the fighting in Italy and abroad. More than 70,000 were killed and over 30,000 were injured.
The Italians also helped the prisoners of war who managed to escape from the concentration camps. And in the ranks of the partisans operating in Italy, there were German, French and Russian anti-fascists.
seven brothers Worms, killed on December 28, 1943 -
Allied troops landed in southern Italy in 1943, but some cities in the north of the country were liberated before their approach. In June 1944, the first "free government" was formed by the National Liberation Committee.
overthrown monument to the dictator
In conclusion, it should be added that in April 1945, Mussolini was captured by Italian partisans while trying to move to Switzerland and, together with his mistress Clara Petacci, was shot. Their bodies were transported to Milan and hung upside down in Piazza Loretto.
This was the end of Mussolini.In the first post-war elections in 1946, the Socialists received 21% of the vote, the Communists 19%, and the Christian Democratic Party 35%.
In the 1948 Senate elections, the overall list of Communists and Socialists received 31% of the vote.
Back in the fall of 1943, the territory of Italy was divided in two. Its southern part was occupied by American-British troops, and the German occupation of the northern and part of the central regions dragged on for almost two years.
In southern Italy, the government formed by Badoglio from "specialists" did not have any support among the people and did not enjoy the authority of the Anglo-American authorities. The anti-fascist parties were not united on the issue of their attitude to the monarchy, since the Party of Action and the socialists demanded the immediate abdication of the king.
This made it possible for the occupying powers to sabotage the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and England on the need to include in the government "representatives of those strata of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism."
In the spring of 1944, the Soviet Union took a new step, demonstrating its desire to promote the granting of sovereign rights to the Italian people. In March, direct diplomatic relations were restored between the Soviet Union and Italy.
On March 29, the head of the Italian communists P. Togliatti made a proposal to create a government of national unity, postponing the decision of the question of monarchy until after the end of the war. The proposal of the Communist Party was the only possible way out of the impasse, and all anti-fascist parties agreed with it.
On April 24, 1944, a new government was formed under the chairmanship of Badoglio, which, together with other anti-fascist parties, for the first time in the history of Italy, included the communists.
After the liberation of Rome, the government was reorganized: the leader of the Labor Democracy Party I. Bonomi became the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the anti-fascist parties gained predominant influence in the government.
The most important events took place during this period on the other side of the front. The true masters of Northern Italy were the Nazis, who established strict control over all activities of the Italian administration.
They carried out a systematic export of industrial raw materials and equipment, food, various values \u200b\u200bfrom Northern Italy. Skilled workers and captured Italian soldiers were forcibly sent to Germany.
Without even notifying Mussolini, Hitler seized from Italy the region of Venice, together with Trieste, and included it in the Reich.
After his return to power in Northern Italy, Mussolini publicly announced the "anti-capitalism" of the neo-fascist party he had created.
In November 1943, the "Verona Manifesto" of the neo-fascist party was published, which contained a number of demagogic promises, including the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, the "socialization" of enterprises through the participation of workers in their management, freedom of criticism, etc.
However, such promises could not be deceived, especially since the fascists, soon after they proclaimed the "Social Republic", began organizing a wide network of repressive organs. In all provinces, "special tribunals" were established, to help the Gestapo, special police units were created everywhere, which, without trial or investigation, dealt with anti-fascists.
By disbanding the royal army, Mussolini tried to create an armed force to continue the war on the side of Germany. However, numerous recruits for this army did not give results, since most of the mobilized preferred to go to the mountains.
The four Italian fascist divisions, as well as various paramilitary organizations such as the "black brigades", "Mussolini's battalions", etc., were fully occupied with actions against the partisans.
On the day the German occupation began, September 9, 1943, the anti-fascist parties in Rome formed the Committee for National Liberation. It included representatives of six parties: the Communist, Socialist, Action Party, Labor Democracy Party, Christian Democratic and Liberal.
Although representatives of all parties advocated the development of an armed struggle, in reality, the right-wing parties in every possible way hampered the development of mass resistance and sought to turn the Committee into an inter-party consultative body.
As a result of the paralyzing influence of the bourgeois parties, which were supported by the leaders of the Vatican, the Rome Committee for National Liberation failed to become the militant center for the leadership of the partisan movement. Despite the heroic efforts of the communists and representatives of some other parties, who created partisan detachments around the city, Rome turned out to be one of the few Italian cities where the struggle of the patriots was not crowned with a victorious uprising.
The situation was different in Northern Italy: the Milan Committee for National Liberation, which took the name of the Committee for National Liberation of Northern Italy, from the first days of its existence became the true political leader of the Resistance movement.
Numerous committees of national liberation, created in regions, cities, villages, and sometimes in districts and at individual enterprises, were associated with him. These bodies in Northern Italy consisted of representatives of five parties (there was no Labor Democracy party).
The leading role of the left parties, and especially the communists, manifested itself in the North with full force. The communists were the first to start the struggle in the cities, creating combat groups of patriotic action, which, by bold raids on enemy headquarters, holding meetings and other actions, immediately created a fighting atmosphere that mobilized the masses to fight.
In October 1943, the Communist Party began to form "Model Garibaldi Brigades" in the mountains, which not only served as the nucleus of the partisan army, but also set an example for other political parties. The Action Party and the Socialists also began to create their own fighting units, largely borrowing the organizational principles of the Garibaldi brigades. Later, the others went to the creation of armed formations of Christian democrats and liberals.
The Communist Party relied on the strong support of the working class. As early as the autumn months of 1943, the strike movement in cities such as Turin involved several enterprises simultaneously. In the early spring of 1944, the communists put forward the task of holding a general strike, which they saw as a dress rehearsal for a national uprising.
The strike began on March 1 at the signal of a specially created committee for the leadership of the movement. It was the largest action by the Italian working class; about 1 million workers participated in the movement, supported by more than 20 thousand partisans and numerous patriotic groups.
Just as the 1943 spring strike served as a prelude to the fall of fascism, the 1944 movement opened the way for a national uprising.
On the initiative of the Communist Party, in the spring of 1944 patriotic action detachments began to be created in the villages, which, starting with the tasks of local self-defense, gradually turned into military formations. The partisan army was widely replenished during this period with young peasants who evaded conscription into the fascist army.
If before March 1944 there were 30 thousand partisans in the mountains, then in the summer the partisan army increased to 80 thousand fighters. The partisans fought incessant offensive battles, liberating vast territories from the Nazis and creating partisan areas. In total, by the fall of 1944, there were 15 liberated zones in Northern Italy, where the power belonged to the committees of national liberation.
The summer of 1944 was marked by the political and organizational rallying of the Resistance forces. In June, the guerrilla groups of the various parties were united under a common command, which took the name of the Freedom Volunteer Corps Command.
The leading positions in the command were occupied by the communist L. Longo and the leader of the Action Party F. Parry. During this period, the Committee for National Liberation of Northern Italy put forward the task of preparing a national uprising and adopted a number of program documents in which it stated that the purpose of the uprising is to establish the system of a new democracy in which "all working classes will have a decisive influence."
It seemed that the liberation of Italy from Nazi occupation was a matter of several weeks. However, the reality turned out to be different.
In the fall of 1944, in addition to all the armed formations of the Social Republic, no less than a third of the German forces in Italy acted against the partisans.
The difficult situation in Italy attracted close attention of the British Special Operations Directorate and the American Strategic Intelligence Directorate. Despite some differences between the British and Americans over the attitude towards the forces of the Italian Resistance, both of these organizations were of the same opinion about the need to limit the scope of the partisan movement.
The supply of weapons to the guerrillas was used by the Allies as one of the means to make the Resistance dependent on US-British policy, in particular to support anti-communist forces.
Even the Minister of War in the government of Badoglio and the military leader of the Italian Resistance, General Cadorna, were forced to declare that the “anti-revolutionary units” of the Resistance enjoy the special disposition of the Western allies and receive the greatest amount of weapons and ammunition.
When it was not possible to contain and limit the scope of the national liberation movement, the US-British command officially banned the increase in the number of partisan formations and sent orders to its liaison officers to stop the "indiscriminate" distribution of weapons among the partisans.
In 1933, the National Socialists, led by Adolf Hitler, came to power in Germany during the parliamentary elections. Throughout the 1920s - in the first half of the 1930s. authoritarian, fascist and pro-fascist regimes were established in many European countries. The main fascist countries of Europe were Italy and Germany. Why did citizens of certain countries voluntarily support fascism? This is due to the fact that in the wake of the World Economic Crisis, people's lives are crumbling from despair. And it is precisely on the wave of a decadent mood that a force appears that promises the people a quick solution to all their problems, looks for the main enemy, on whom it blames all the troubles and misfortunes. The fight against fascism and the activities of the anti-fascist movement will be discussed in this lesson.
Anti-fascist movement in European countries in the 1930s
Background
The creation of fascist parties (and sometimes their rise to power) became an important feature of the political life of Europe after the First World War. The popular masses were in many ways close and understandable to their ideology, the characteristic features of which were adherence to conservative values, an authoritarian model of power, reliance on national identity up to aggressive nationalism. The popularity of fascist parties was often facilitated by the low efficiency of the institutions of democracy and parliamentarism: often the confrontation between political parties unable to reach a compromise led to a crisis, while current state problems remained unresolved. The effective propaganda of the fascist forces also played a role.
The main political opponents of the fascists, as a rule, were left-wing forces - socialists and communists. The rhetoric of both opposing camps was often based on accusations against opponents. Where the fascists managed to come to power (for example, in Italy and Germany), the left forces were invariably subjected to persecution and repression. The opposition of the left forces to the fascists in Europe in the 1930s is often viewed as a single anti-fascist movement: first, due to the similarity of processes in different countries; secondly, due to the inherent internationalism and international solidarity of European communism (History of Anti-Fascism).
Events
1935 g. - VII Congress of the Comintern (Communist International), an international communist organization. The main theme of the congress was the growing fascist threat. Within the framework of the congress, a decision was made to create popular fronts in European countries - organizations aiming to counter fascism, including through legal political methods.
1936 g. - Germany and Japan conclude the Anti-Comintern Pact, to which Italy later joins. The purpose of the pact was to counter the spread of communist ideology.
1936 g. - The French Popular Front wins a landslide victory in parliamentary elections. One of the decisions of the Popular Front government was the ban on fascist parties and organizations in France (in previous years, they increased their popularity, largely due to the domestic political successes of the German fascists). At the same time, it should be noted that in foreign policy, France did not oppose Nazi Germany.
1936 g. - The Spanish Popular Front wins by a narrow margin in parliamentary elections. After that, the conservative forces, primarily in the army, staged a military coup, which grew into a civil war (1936-1939), in which the left forces and their allies were defeated. The conservative dictatorship of General Franco was established in Spain.
Conclusion
Success factors of anti-fascist movements
In general, France is perhaps the only example where the confrontation between fascists and anti-fascists was at the same time a full-scale political struggle with the chances of victory for each of the parties and, at the same time, ended with the victory of the anti-fascists. This makes it difficult to analyze the reasons for the success of anti-fascists in some cases and failures in others. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that republican traditions played a role in France, as well as the image of Germany as an eternal enemy, according to which the values \u200b\u200bthat triumphed in Germany were perceived as something foreign.
Abstract
In the 1930s, in response to the arrival of Nazi and fascist regimes in a number of countries, such as Germany, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Poland, etc., in response to the inability of governments to deal with the global economic crisis and its consequences, the so-called " Popular fronts”, Organizations combining left and center-left forces - communists, social democrats, radicals, etc.
IN 1935 onVii Congress of the International Communist Organization - Comintern - it was decided to create Popular Fronts, the purpose of which would be to oppose the fascists and their sympathizers (Fig. 1). The creation of the Popular Front was a response to the formation of the so-called. " Anti-Comintern Pact". With great support among workers and small employees, the Popular Fronts won elections in Spain and France.
Figure: 1.VII Congress of the Comintern ()
In France, the Popular Front banned fascist organizations, and in Spain began an armed struggle against them. One of the main and consistent fighters against world fascism was the Soviet Union. The USSR sought to create a system of "collective security" in Europe in order to prevent the spread of fascism and the start of a new war in Europe. The USSR directly pointed to the anti-human regime of fascism.
The inability of the Spanish government to bring the country to the proper level of development, social and economic problems allowed the Popular Front to win the elections to the Spanish parliament in 1936 and take power into its own hands.
The new government carried out a number of transformations: it granted amnesty to political prisoners, allowed strikes, guaranteed civil rights and freedoms, and eased the plight of workers. At the same time, the country split into two opposing camps - those who supported the Popular Front and those who advocated preserving the existing situation, i.e. opponents of trade unions and left-wing parties.
In the summer of 1936 military, opponents of the Popular Front, led by a general Francisco Franco raised a fascist rebellion. Civil war broke out. The conspirators took over cities and provinces, but the forces republicans were more numerous, therefore francoistswere soon defeated and blocked in the Spanish colony of Morocco. At a critical moment for Franco, Germany and Italy helped him. In essence, by providing aid to Franco, these countries have carried out military intervention. German and Italian "volunteers" were sent to Spain - soldiers and officers - pilots, tankmen, infantrymen, sailors.
Figure: 2. Republican poster
Inspired Francoists moved to Madrid to establish their rule in Spain. In response to this, the USSR and a number of the Popular Fronts of Europe extended a helping hand to the Republicans, also sending military specialists to Spain. In the skies of Spain, Soviet and German pilots first met in an air battle.
The defeat of the Popular Front became inevitable when the anarchists and communists who were part of it began to argue among themselves about further actions. The Francoists, on the other hand, were a powerful, united fist.
In 1938, General Franco, who took advantage of the disagreements in the Popular Front, with a powerful blow cuts Spain in two and finishes each of the units one by one. In addition, the new political forces that came to power in France began to block the goods sent by the USSR to republican Spain.
Spain lay in ruins. The common name was the name of the Spanish city of Guernica, which was razed to the ground during the fighting (Fig. 3).
Figure: 3. Guernica after a raid by fascist aircraft ()
At the beginning of 1939, the Francoists finally won the victory. Mass terror began in the country. Franco restored the monarchy, abolished in 1931, but bequeathed to transfer the reins of government to the king only after his death.
The era of the sole rule of General Franco has begun in the country.
The confrontation between communist and fascist forces in Spain was the first open conflict in Europe before World War II.
1. Aleksashkina L.N. General history. XX - early XXI century. - M .: Mnemosina, 2011.
2. Zagladin N.V. General history. XX century. Textbook for grade 11. - M .: Russian word, 2009.
3. Plenkov O.Yu., Andreevskaya T.P., Shevchenko S.V. General history. Grade 11 / Ed. Myasnikova V.S. - M., 2011.
1. Read Chapter 8 of the textbook by LN Aleksashkina. General history. XX - early XXI century pp. 88-89 and answer question 7 on p. 90, as well as Chapter 11, pages 115-120, and answer questions 1-2 on page 122.
2. Why do you think the USSR found itself alone in its desire to really resist fascism?
3. How can you explain the defeat of the Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War?
Italian patriots played an important role in the struggle against the fascist enslavers in Italy. Their activity was especially intensified since the summer of 1944 under the influence of the major victories of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the Western Allies. This was also facilitated by the strengthening of the positions of progressive forces in Italy itself. During this period, the number of partisans increased sharply. So, if in February - March 1944 in Northern Italy there were 20-30 thousand of them, then by June 15 - already 82 thousand (768). A significant number of Soviet citizens who fled from the fascist camps fought in their ranks.
The organizational structure of partisan formations also changed. The detachments were battalions, which were reduced to brigades, and brigades - in divisions. Organizationally, the underground groups of the patriotic movement in cities (GAP) and armed self-defense units in rural areas (SAP) created by the communists were strengthened. The main partisan forces were concentrated in Piedmont, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, Veneto. In June 1944, all formations were consolidated into a single partisan army - the Freedom Volunteers Corps (CDV) with a single main command. Although the initiator of the unification was the Italian Communist Party, under pressure from the Western allies and the Bonomi government, General R. Cadorna, a representative of the Liberal Party, was appointed commander-in-chief of the CDU in August. The left-wing parties agreed to this appointment on condition that one of the leaders of the IKP, L. Longo, and a prominent figure of the Action Party, F. Parry, would be political commissars under the commander-in-chief. They became Cadorna's deputies, but in fact the leading role in the leadership of the partisan movement belonged to them, which corresponded to the real ratio of the fighters of the partisan army by party affiliation.
In the very first documents it adopted, the main command of the CDS pledged to fulfill the functions assigned to it under the leadership of the Committee for National Liberation of Northern Italy (KNOSI), to coordinate its actions with the Italian government and the allied command (769).
On June 2, 1944, KNOSI took over the functions of the "emergency government" of the occupied part of Italy and declared that its goal was to prepare a national uprising. The directives prepared by the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party P. Togliatti and sent out on June 6, 1944 to all party organizations and Garibaldi detachments, contained instructions on the deployment of preparations for a general uprising in the occupied regions. The directives emphasized that it should be the business of not one party or part of the anti-fascist front, but the entire people, the entire nation.
KNOSI obeyed all partisan formations created by various political parties. In each area where partisans' actions were deployed, an appropriate command was assigned, subordinate to the center, as well as a command of the underground fighters operating in the cities. 41 percent of the guerrilla formations were communist Garibaldi units, 29 percent were units of the Action Party (770).
The communists sought to strengthen the party cells not only in their own, but also in other partisan detachments, advocated an agreed line of all patriots: communists, socialists and members of the Action Party. The leading role of the Communist Party in the armed struggle, its line on rallying the left political forces ensured it a decisive influence in the partisan army. Most of the political commissars of the detachments supported the communist policy aimed at driving out the German occupiers.
In the summer and autumn of 1944, the question of coordinating the actions of the partisan army and the Allied forces arose especially acutely. Usually, the Anglo-American command relied widely on the help of the patriots of Italy, but did not always coordinate their plans with the leadership of the partisan movement. It set only general tasks for the Resistance forces. Thus, the commander-in-chief of the allied forces, in his address of June 6, 1944, called on all patriots in the occupied territory of Italy to "unanimously rise up against the common enemy" (771). The partisan command did not receive the necessary information and therefore was forced to independently determine the goals and objectives of their actions, based on assumptions about the possible development of the course of the Allied operations. At the same time, it believed that “patriotic detachments operating in the mountains, in no case should strive at all costs to transfer their actions to the cities”, that they should enter the “enemy's retreat path” and actively pursue him (772 ).
In a number of cases, the Anglo-American command not only ignored the partisan movement, but also created difficulties in its deployment. The first British and American missions, which began arriving at the guerrilla units in the spring of 1944, settled under what they considered to be the "more rightist" command. When distributing weapons, ammunition and sabotage weapons dropped by the allies from aircraft, the missions pursued a policy of discrimination against the left. “This discrimination,” writes the former commander of the partisan division R. Battaglia, “was definitely directed precisely against the most powerful formations, that is, against the Garibaldi detachments ...” (773) For example, in Liguria, in the province of La Spezia, mission 5- The first American army demanded a categorical assurance that weapons and food would not get to the communist partisan detachments.
These actions of the allies made it difficult, but could not halt the deployment in Italy of a partisan movement, in which the main force was made up of units led by communists (774). The gathering of 1944 the anti-fascist armed struggle entered a new phase and acquired the character of a broad popular war against the German occupiers and their accomplices. During the summer-autumn offensive, the partisans liberated Florence, assisted the allied forces in expelling the enemy from the regions of Tuscany and the Marche, from many settlements and entire regions of Piedmont. Liguria, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto.
In a number of areas of northern Italy occupied by the Nazis, there actually existed a dual power: the fascist regime, which more and more discredited itself, and the power of the anti-fascist bodies, exercised illegally, but enjoyed great popularity among the population (775). In addition, patriots in Northern Italy, at the direction of KNOSI, in June-July created 15 liberated zones behind enemy lines. The largest of them were called “partisan republics”. In particular, 70 thousand people lived in the Republic of Carnia (the administrative center is the city of Ampezzo), 30 thousand people lived on the territory of the Republic of Montefiorino. Most of the "republics" created in June-July existed before August, and some of them - until October, when they were occupied by the fascists. But as a result of the autumn offensive of the partisans, new liberated zones arose. In total, there were ten of them from September to December. The largest of them were the Republic of Torrilla (between Genoa and Piacenza), the Republic of Monferrato (in Piedmont) and the Republic of Ossola (in Lombardy, between the Monte Rosa mountain range and Lake Lago Maggiore), the administrative center of which was the city of Domodossola. In the Republic of Ossola, more than 70 thousand inhabitants lived in 28 communes, it had a direct railway connection with Switzerland (776).
At first, the partisan command often assumed administrative control in the liberated zones. But from the very first days of their emergence, the Italian communists worked hard to create democratic governing bodies. In this respect, the message of the Federal Committee of the Communist Party of Genoa, sent at the end of August 1944 to the command of the Garibaldian division, is characteristic. In it, in particular, it was emphasized: “We must help, encourage, advise, but at the same time we need to find people among the local population who will be responsible leaders of the new democratic administration” (777). Gradually, power in the liberated zones passed into the hands of the central juntas, which included representatives of various anti-fascist political parties (communists, socialists, Christian democrats, and others). They vigorously carried out the democratization of public and political life in the localities. The tribunals of the people judged fascist criminals. According to the decision of the junt, a progressive tax on property was introduced, control over prices was established, surplus food was distributed among those in need, material assistance was provided to partisans, and sometimes to workers of cities occupied by fascists.
The sabotage actions of partisan detachments intensified. The number of acts of sabotage on highways, railways and telephone lines increased from 241 in May to 344 in June. The guerrillas destroyed bridges, ambushed roads, raided transport convoys, derailed trains carrying military supplies and troops, and sowed panic in the enemy camp. To fight them, the German command often had to even remove units from the front. If at first the fascists used ordinary infantry formations, armed mainly with small arms, against the partisans, then specially trained troops were involved in the future, tanks and artillery were used. Since the summer of 1944. the fighting of the members of the Italian Resistance movement fettered large enemy forces. "From that time," Field Marshal Kesselring later admitted, "partisan warfare became a real danger for the German command, the elimination of which was decisive for the outcome of the military campaign" (778).
In September, the Nazis and their accomplices decided to carry out an operation with the aim of eliminating the liberated regions and seizing all the key positions of the partisans. It prepared in secret, was started suddenly and was accompanied by brutal repression. The troops participating in it launched an offensive on September 20 and continued it for three months. Moreover, the operation used the same forces, which were transferred from one zone to another.
For the partisan command, the enemy's action plan was unexpected. It hoped that the Nazis would strike from the Venetian lowlands at the center of the front of the partisan forces. The punishers decided first to crush its flanks: in the west - at Mount Grappa and the adjacent zone, in the east - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Isonzo River. Only then did they strike at the center, but not from the south, as the partisans assumed, but from the north. Taking the partisan forces in a giant ring, the Nazis pushed them back from the foothills of the Carnic Alps to a narrower area. The punitive operation was accompanied by mass shootings and executions of local residents, the destruction of settlements. This was the most difficult period in the Italian Resistance movement. And during this difficult time, the Anglo-American command not only did not provide assistance to the partisan detachments, but also cut off their supply (779). On November 10, General Alexander's appeal was published, in which the partisans were asked to cease conducting operations on a large scale for some time, to keep their weapons and ammunition and to be on standby until new orders.
This appeal was broadcast by radio in clear text, and the enemy, intercepting it, guessed that the Anglo-American command intended to postpone all offensive actions in Italy and that, thus, a respite at the front was coming. Alexander's proposal to weaken the struggle against the occupiers and the Italian fascists greatly facilitated their counter-partisan actions. In the winter of 1944/45, the Hitlerite command attracted up to 15 divisions, including 10 German ones, to conduct punitive expeditions.
In this situation, the Italian Communist Party made great efforts to ensure the activity of the partisan movement. As one of the leaders of the partisan movement, L. Longo, wrote, she vigorously opposed the demoralizing and demobilizing measures of the Anglo-American command and “appealed to the entire people, organized the collection of food, clothing and all materials necessary for the partisan struggle in a harsh winter ... This campaign allowed ... not only to preserve the fighting efficiency of the partisan organization, but also to create new bonds of solidarity between the Resistance fighters and the people ”(780).
By the end of 1944, the partisans suffered heavy losses in the fight against the invaders. According to G. Serbandini (Bini), one of the organizers of the Resistance movement in Italy, at that time they had ten times less forces than the enemy operating against them (781). However, this time too, the Italian-German fascists failed to suppress the Resistance movement. The partisan detachments led by the Italian Communist Party, inspired by the decisive victories of the Soviet Armed Forces and the lofty goals of the liberation struggle, withstood the new onslaught of the enemy. Despite significant losses, the Resistance army became an even more cohesive and organized fighting force.
Thus, the Anglo-American troops on the Italian front, operating in the mountainous terrain, within seven months advanced in a northern direction up to 320 km and captured the central part of the country, found themselves 280 km from the southern border of Austria occupied by the Nazis. By capturing air bases in the areas of Rome and Florence and redeploying large air forces here, the Allies gained great opportunities for delivering powerful air strikes against Germany from the south. With the seizure of a number of Italian seaports (Livorno, Ancona, etc.), the basing of the allied naval forces that supported the coastal groupings improved, and the supply of troops was facilitated.
During the operations of the allied forces, in the ranks of which the British, Americans, Algerians, Brazilians, Greeks, Indians, Italians, Canadians, Poles, French and representatives of other nations fought, 15 German divisions were defeated, including 1 tank and 3 motorized ones. In total, the Wehrmacht troops in June - December lost 19 thousand people killed, 65 thousand wounded and 65 thousand missing (782). At the same time, they suffered significant losses from the strikes of the Anglo-American aviation. Allied damage amounted to about 32 thousand people killed, over 134 thousand wounded and about 23 thousand missing (783).
The success of the Allies in Italy was achieved by the joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces. The actions of the ground forces, which played the main role in the battles on the Apennine Peninsula, were supported by massive air strikes. The ships of the navy provided fire assistance to the troops advancing along the coast, covered their coastal flanks, violated enemy and defended their sea communications.
In mountainous terrain, the allied command sought to strike along the valleys in order to use all types of troops. The breakthrough of the enemy's defense was carried out in narrow sectors of the front. 45-60 percent of all infantry formations, about 70 percent of tanks, up to 70 percent of artillery and the bulk of aviation were concentrated here.
To break through the defensive lines, the troops of the army group were formed in one echelon. Infantry divisions usually broke through the defense after prolonged aviation and powerful artillery preparation, with the support of tanks, aircraft and artillery, by sequentially capturing individual strongholds. The average rate of advance when overcoming the tactical defense zone in mountainous terrain did not exceed 1 - 2 km per day. The troops pursued the enemy hesitantly, they were unable to use favorable opportunities in order to cut his path of retreat. As a rule, the Nazis retreated almost unhindered to the prepared lines, and the Anglo-American troops had to break through again.
The offensive of the allied forces was actively assisted by the Italian partisans. In the period from June 1944. Until March 1945, they carried out 6449 armed actions, 5570 acts of sabotage, destroyed at least 16 thousand fascists and seized a large number of enemy weapons (784). These successes of the Italian partisans and all patriots were achieved in an extremely difficult situation created by the massive terror of Hitler's troops and the Italian fascists who collaborated with them, as well as by the policy of the reactionary circles of the USA and Great Britain directed against the communists and other progressive forces in Italy.
Allied forces in Italy could achieve greater success and bring operations to completion if there was always consistency in their actions. The offensive of the British and American armies, as a rule, was planned and carried out at different times: if one of them went on the offensive, the other was only preparing for it, and vice versa. This allowed the German command not only to maneuver on their own and quickly localize the breakthroughs of the allied forces, but also to transfer formations from the Italian front to southern France, Greece and to the eastern front.
One of the main reasons for the incomplete operations of the Allies in Italy is the indecision of the actions of the Anglo-American command. Former Hitler's general Z. Westphal writes in this regard: “... if the Western allies had shown more courage in resolving operational issues, they could have victoriously ended the campaign on the Apennine Peninsula much earlier and with much less losses for themselves and others” ( 785). Meanwhile, in a number of British and American military history works, this circumstance is ignored. Combat actions of the allied forces against an enemy significantly inferior to them in strength and means are presented as "storming a European fortress," while the "might" of the defense and the fierce resistance of the Nazis are exaggerated. The authors of such books argue that the allied command, when planning operations in Italy, always showed courage and decisiveness, but all its efforts were minimized by the alleged constant superiority of the enemy in the number of troops (except for a short period of time in the summer of 1944).
Churchill’s statements that the main task of the Anglo-American armies in Italy, which was to pin down as many German forces as possible, “was excellently performed” (786) and this allegedly greatly facilitated the landing of the allies, do not correspond to historical facts. in Normandy and the offensive of the Soviet Army. Of course, the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy fettered a certain grouping of German-fascist troops, but the Hitlerite command kept an insignificant part of its forces here. In addition, it, taking advantage of the indecision of the Americans and the British that manifested itself during the fighting, withdrew 6 of the most efficient divisions from Italy, sending 3 of them (including the Hermann Goering Panzer Division) to the eastern front and 3 (including 2 motorized) - To France. The 4 divisions that came instead from France, 2 from the Balkans and Norway, and 11 newly formed formations in Italy (9 divisions and two brigades) had low combat effectiveness and could be used mainly for occupation and coastal defense.
The fascist German command adhered to a purely defensive strategy in Italy. Skillfully using the mountain conditions to create a defense and repel the attacks of the allied forces, it avoided the defeat of its Italian group and stopped their advance at a previously prepared line.
