Stolypin's agrarian reform. Stolypin agrarian reform

Nizhny Novgorod State University

them. Lobachevsky N.I.

Faculty of Law

Department of Theories and History of State and Law.

Course work

theme “Stolypin agrarian reform”

Completed by a 1st year student

College of Law

Zheleznov Pavel Vladimirovich

Scientific supervisor: Rogozhkin Alexey Nikolaevich

Nizhny Novgorod

Chapter 1. Introduction3.

Chapter 2. Biography of Stolypin.................................................... 4.

Chapter 3. Economic, political, social

Advantages....................................... 10.

Chapter 4. Agrarian reform....................................... 13.

a) Goals of the reform.

b) Preparation of reform.

c) Main directions of reform.

d) Progress of reform.

e) Conclusions.

Chapter 5. Historical significance of the reform.................................................21.

Chapter 6. Reasons for the unsuccessful agrarian reform and Stolypin’s mistakes....................................................22 .

1. Introduction

Stolypin's reform caused heated controversy in society - because it touched upon the most painful issue of Russian life - land.

It seems to me that the name of Stolypin is one of the most famous in Russia.

Any person living in Russia will say that there was such a famous

reformer. Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin was a man of a strange fate. He was not eager for power, but unexpectedly for himself and for everyone he found himself at its peak. We do not know the real Stolypin. His name is associated with a reform that affected all of Rus'. His actions were not understood either during his life or after his death. Neither his companions nor his enemies understood. Stolypin was not too difficult person. But the fact is that his actions, specific and purposeful, affected many people, from different classes and groups, and caused negative emotions. In such a situation it was difficult to count on a correct assessment. Stolypin also remains incomprehensible to this day.

This is why it is so important to understand his affairs, ideas and plans.

Pyotr Stolypin corrected the mistakes made by the serf owners in 1861 in resolving the agrarian question. Modern reform is trying to correct what the Bolsheviks “broke” in the countryside. The agricultural issue is still relevant today.

“At first we, too, became interested in farming, but things were more difficult than Stolypin’s with farms and farms. But now the transformation of unprofitable collective farms and voluntary cooperatives is being successfully resolved different types, which is reminiscent of the second stage of Stolypin’s undertakings"

In my opinion, agrarian reform is one of the best topics in Russian history.

2. Biography of Stolypin

Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin belonged to an old noble family, known since the 16th century. The family branched out greatly, owning numerous estates in different provinces. The ancestor of his three most famous lines was Alexey Stolypin (1748-1810). One of them is represented by the descendants of Senator Arkady Alekseevich, a friend of M.M. Speransky. His first son Nikolai was a diplomat, his middle son Alexei lived a short life, his youngest son Dmitry (1818 - 1893) served in the guard, then retired and lived abroad for a long time, where he became interested in the philosophy of O. Comte.

Another branch of the family is connected with Elizaveta Alekseevna Arsenyevna (nee Stolypina), Lermontov’s grandmother. With the exception of Alexei Arkadyevich, perhaps none of the Stolypins loved the famous scion of their family. Everyone complained about his difficult character. One of the aunts stubbornly, until her death, refused to read even a line from the works of “this unbearable boy.”

Another branch comes from the younger brother of Arkady and Elizabeth Dmitry, grandfather of P.A. Stolypin, whose father Arkady Dmitrievich participated in the Crimean War, during which he became an adjutant to the army commander, Prince M.D. Gorchakov, his future father-in-law. In the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 A.D. Stolypin already participated in the rank of general. In subsequent years he held a number of positions in the War Ministry. The last of these was the post of commandant of the Kremlin Palace.

During Crimean War Arkady Dmitrievich became friends with

L.N. Tolstoy and subsequently visited Yasnaya Polyana. Gradually there was a distance. Once in the Kremlin, A.D. Stolypin became close to the court elite. Tolstoy increasingly left the circle to which he belonged by birth; in 1899 he did not even attend the funeral of his old friend, which greatly offended his relatives.

HELL. Stolypin outlived his wife Natalya Mikhailovna by ten years.

P.A. Stolypin born on April 5, 1862 in Dresden, where his mother was visiting relatives. He spent his childhood and early youth mainly in Lithuania. In the summer the family lived in Kolnoberg or went to Switzerland. When it was time for the children to study, we bought a house in Vilna. Stolypin graduated from the Vilna gymnasium. In 1881 he entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of St. Petersburg University.

In addition to physics and mathematics, chemistry, geology, botany, zoology and agronomy were taught here. Unlike father P.A. Stolypin was indifferent to music. But he loved literature and painting, although he had somewhat old-fashioned tastes. He liked the prose of I.S. Turgenev, poetry by A.K. Tolstoy and A.N. Apukhtina. He was personally on friendly terms with the latter, and Apukhtin often read his new poems at Stolypin’s St. Petersburg apartment.

Stolypin married early, being almost the only married student in the entire university. Olga Borisovna, wife of P.A. Stolypin was formerly the bride of his older brother, who was killed in a duel. P.A. also shot at his brother’s killer. Stolypin; having been wounded in right hand, which has performed poorly since then.

Stolypin's father-in-law B.A. Neigardt, honorary guardian of the Moscow Presence of the Board of Trustees of the Institutions of the Empress Maria, was the father of a large family. Subsequently, the Neigardt clan played an important role in Stolypin's career.

The literature of those years often contrasted the rebellious generation that formed in the 60s with the law-abiding, practical generation of the 80s. Stolypin was a typical “eighties”. He never had any misunderstandings with the police, and after graduating from university he chose a bureaucratic career, joining the Ministry of State Property. In 1888, his name first appeared in the “Address-Calendar”. By this time he had the very modest rank of collegiate secretary and held the modest position of assistant to the head clerk. Stolypin's position in the Ministry of State Property was routine, and in 1889 he moved to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was appointed Kovno district leader of the nobility. In the Kovno province, which was quite ethnically diverse, Poles predominated among the landowners, and Lithuanians predominated among the peasants. At that time, Lithuania did not know farmsteads. Peasants lived in villages, and their lands were divided into striped plots. There were no land redistributions.

The family lived in Kovno or Kolnoberg. Stolypin took care of his estate, temporarily giving up his dream of a career. Already in his position as governor, he once took a moment to stop by Kolnoberg. Seeing him doing chores, one of the neighbors remarked that “this is not the governor’s business.” “Not the governor’s, but the landowner’s, which means important and necessary,” answered Stolypin.

The family also owned other estates - in Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Penza and Saratov provinces. Once a year, Stolypin toured his estates.

In the Kovno province, Stolypin had another estate, on the border with Germany. Russian roads have always been bad, and therefore the most convenient route to this estate ran through Prussia. It was on these travels that Stolypin became acquainted with the farmsteads. Returning home, he talked not so much about his estate as about exemplary German farmsteads. In 1899 P.A. Stolypin was appointed Kovno provincial leader of the nobility, and in 1902, unexpectedly for himself, the Grodno governor. He was nominated by the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve, who set a course to fill gubernatorial positions with local landowners. Stolypin stayed in Grodno for only ten months. At this time, local committees were created in all provinces to take care of the needs of the agricultural industry, and at meetings of the Grodno Committee, Stolypin publicly expressed his views for the first time. They basically boiled down to the destruction of the peasant stripes and resettlement in farmsteads. At the same time, Stolypin emphasized: ““To make the moment of the expected reform dependent on the good will of the peasants, to expect that during the rise mental development population, which will arrive unknown when, burning issues will resolve themselves - this means postponing for an indefinite period the implementation of those events, without which neither culture, nor the rise in land profitability, nor the quiet ownership of land property is conceivable.”

In 1903, Stolypin was appointed governor of Saratov. Moving to a new place, the children looked at Russia as an unfamiliar country. Getting comfortable in an unfamiliar “country” required time, and it turned out to be running out. In 1904, war with Japan began. One day his daughter asked him why the same enthusiasm was not visible as in 1812. ''How can a man joyfully go into battle, defending some leased land in unknown lands? - said the father. “War is sad and difficult, not brightened up by a sacrificial impulse.” This conversation took place shortly before departure from Saratov to Far East Red Cross detachment. At a dinner in honor of this event, the governor gave a speech. He said, in particular, that “every son of Russia is obliged, at the call of his tsar, to stand up for the defense of his homeland from any attack on its greatness and honor.” The speech was a resounding success; the young ladies and gentlemen shed tears. “It seems to me that I said it well,” Stolypin later said. “I don’t understand how this happened: I always considered myself tongue-tied and did not dare to make big speeches.” This is how Stolypin discovered his oratorical talent.

In the summer of 1906, the Saratov province became one of the main centers of the peasant movement. Accompanied by Cossacks, Stolypin traveled through rebellious villages. He did not hesitate to use troops against the peasants. Wholesale searches and arrests were carried out.

Speaking at village gatherings, the governor used a lot of swear words, threatened Siberia, hard labor and Cossacks, and sternly suppressed objections.

“At the present time, in the Saratov province, thanks to the energy, complete management and very skillful actions of the governor, the chamberlain of your court Imperial Majesty Stolypin, order has been restored,” Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs D.F. Trepov reported to the Tsar on August 6, 1905. In August 1905, at the height of field work, a decline in the peasant movement was observed throughout Russia. In the fall, unrest resumed with unprecedented force.

In reports to the Tsar, Stolypin argued that the main cause of agrarian unrest was the desire of the peasants to obtain land ownership. If the peasants become small owners, they will stop rebelling. In addition, the question was raised about the desirability of transferring state lands to peasants.

Stolypin’s candidacy was first discussed in October 1905 at a meeting between S.Yu. Witte and “ public figures" Chief Prosecutor of the Synod, Prince A.D. Obolensky, a relative of Stolypin, proposed him for the post of Minister of Internal Affairs, trying to break the deadlock in the negotiations. But Witte did not want to see anyone else in this post except P.N. Durnovo, and public figures knew little about Stolypin. In my opinion, Stolypin was obliged to D.F. Trepov, who was transferred from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs to the post of palace commandant and unexpectedly acquired a huge impact on the king. “Having achieved power without labor or struggle, by the power of luck and family ties alone, Stolypin felt the protective hand of Providence over himself throughout his short but brilliant career,” recalled Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs S.E. Kryzhanovsky

On August 12, 1906, a landau with two gendarmerie officers drove up to the ministerial dacha on Aptekarsky Island. They ran into the hallway, but ran into the general and his guards. Then they threw their briefcases, and the explosion instantly swept away the dacha.

At this time, the minister had a lot of visitors, so the number of victims turned out to be very large. 27 people were killed, including 2 terrorists who belonged to one of the maximalist groups. Among the wounded were Stolypin's three-year-old son and 14-year-old daughter. It seems to me that this assassination attempt further strengthened Stolypin’s prestige. At the Tsar's suggestion, the family moved to the Winter Palace. Stolypin himself has changed a lot.

On September 1, 1911, “The Tale of Tsar Sultan” by N.A. was performed at the Kyiv Opera. Rimsky-Korsakov. The Tsar was in the box, Stolypin was sitting in the first row, and Bogrov was in the 18th row. After the second act there was a break, the king left the box. Stolypin stood with his back to the stage, leaning on the ramp, and talked with the Minister of the Court, Baron V.B. Fredericks and Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov. Bogrov suddenly appeared. Approaching Stolypin, he shot him twice.

On September 9 he was buried in the Kiev Pechersk Lavra. The Octobrists and right-wing Cadets highly appreciated Stolypin's work. And the extreme Black Hundreds were still irreconcilable. In subsequent years, monuments to Stolypin were erected in different cities.

Chapter 3. Economic, political and social benefits.

To carry out his reform, Stolypin skillfully used economic and political “trump cards”. He took advantage of both the fragmentation of the revolutionary opposition and the lack of agreement among the radical intelligentsia.

1905-1911 became the years of decline of the revolutionary movement. A final split occurred in the Social Democratic Party due to different conclusions drawn by each faction due to the defeat of the revolution of 1905-1907. The Mensheviks, having analyzed the failure of the Moscow uprising in December 1905, came to the conclusion that Russia was not yet ripe for a social revolution. Among the Social Democrats there was an internecine struggle between various tendencies, and there was little constructive action. The Socialist Revolutionary Party, despite all the efforts of Chernov, was also in a state of collapse. A group of maximalists, supporters of the immediate implementation of all points of the Socialist Revolutionary program immediately after the seizure of power, gravitated toward former terrorism and acted in militant factions. The other side of the Socialist Revolutionaries were represented by the Trudoviks. They participated in the work of the Duma, discussed land reform, and conducted legal propaganda among the peasants in defense of the socialization of the land. The attraction to nationalism, mysticism, and aesthetics was revived with renewed vigor, while interest in politics was declining.

Also, the implementation of Stolypin’s plans was facilitated not only by the political and ideological situation, but also by the excellent economic situation in the country. Industrial growth in Russia resumed at unprecedented speed. Thanks to the massive export of food products (the Russian Empire exported a third of its commercial products grain and was the largest supplier of grain), foreign trade was profitable, the state budget was balanced. Over 5 years (1908-1913), industrial production increased by 54%, the total number of workers increased by 31% - these were specific indicators of industrial growth. All industries were on the rise, especially steel production, metallurgy, oil, electricity, and agricultural machinery. National income grew every year.

At this time there was a strengthening of nationalism. A form of nationalism can be considered the desire of the bourgeoisie to get rid of the presence of foreign capital. With the spread of education, employees increasingly felt the disadvantage of their position, the financial and hierarchical discrimination to which they were subjected in comparison with foreigners working in the same enterprises. Another form of nationalism in Russia was manifested through all kinds of incitement of power and by Stolypin himself. A sense of superiority of Russians over non-Russians who inhabited the empire.

Chapter 4. Agrarian reform.

a) Goals of the reform.

Socio-political goals of the reform.

The main goal was to win over broad sections of the peasantry to the side of the regime and prevent a new agrarian war. To achieve this, it was supposed to help transform the majority of residents of their native village into “a strong, rich peasantry imbued with the idea of property,” which, according to Stolypin, makes it the best bastion of order and tranquility.” In carrying out the reform, the government did not seek to affect the interests of landowners. In post-reform times and at the beginning of the 20th century. The government was unable to protect noble land ownership from reduction, but the large and small landed nobility continued to make up the most reliable support autocracy. To push him away would be suicide for the regime.

In addition, noble class organizations, including the Council of the United Nobility, had great influence on Nicholas 2 and his entourage. Members of the government, and especially the Prime Minister, who raised the issue of alienation of landowners' lands, could not hold their place, much less organize the implementation of such a reform. The reformers also took into account the fact that landowner farms produced a significant portion of marketable grain. Another goal was the destruction of the rural community in the struggle of 1905-1907. , the reformers understood that the main issue in the peasant movement was the question of land, and did not immediately strive to destroy the administrative organization of the community.

Socio-economic goals were closely related to socio-political ones. It was planned to eliminate the land community, its economic land distribution mechanism, which, on the one hand, formed the basis of the social unity of the community, and on the other hand, hindered the development of agricultural technology. The ultimate economic goal of the reforms was to be a general rise Agriculture countries, transformation of the agricultural sector into an economic base new Russia.

b) Preparation of the reform

The preparation of reform projects before the revolution actually began with the Meeting on the needs of the agricultural industry under the leadership of S.Yu. Witte, in 1902-1903. In 1905-1907. the conclusions formulated by the Conference, primarily the idea of the need to destroy land and transform peasants into land owners, were reflected in a number of projects of government officials (V.I. Gurko.). With the beginning of the revolution and the active participation of peasants in the destruction of landowners' estates, Nicholas 2, frightened by agrarian uprisings, changed his attitude towards the landed peasant community.

The Peasant Bank was allowed to issue loans against peasant plots (November 1903), which actually meant the possibility of alienation of communal lands. P.A. Stolypin in 1906, having become prime minister, supported it without affecting the interests of the landowners. Gurko's project formed the basis of the Decree of November 9, 1906 and marked the beginning of the agrarian reform.

c) Fundamentals of the direction of reform.

A change in the form of ownership of peasant land, the transformation of peasants into full owners of their plots was envisaged by the law of 1910. carried out primarily by “strengthening” plots of private property. In addition, according to the law of 1911, it was allowed to carry out land management (reducing land into farms and cuttings) without “strengthening”, after which the peasants also became landowners.

A peasant could sell an allotment only to a peasant, which limited the right to land ownership.

Organization of farms and cuts. Without land management, technical improvement and economic development of agriculture was impossible in the conditions of peasant stripes (2/3 of the peasants in the central regions had plots divided into 6 or more strips in various places of the communal field) and were far away (40% of the peasants in the center had to walk from their estates to allotments 5 or more miles). In economic terms, according to Gurko’s plan, fortifications without land management made no sense.

Therefore, the work of state land management commissions was planned to consolidate the strips of peasant allotment into a single plot - a cut. If such a cut was located far from the village, the estate was moved there and a farmstead was formed.

Relocation of peasants to free lands.

To solve the problem of peasant land shortage and reduce agrarian overpopulation, resettlement policy was intensified in the central regions. Funds were allocated to transport those interested to new places, primarily to Siberia. Special (“Stolypin”) passenger carriages were built for the settlers. Beyond the Urals, lands were transferred to peasants free of charge, and loans were issued to improve the economy and improvement.

Selling land to peasants in installments through a peasant bank was also necessary to reduce land shortages. Secured by allotment land, loans were issued for the purchase of state-owned land transferred to the Bank's fund and land that was sold by landowners.

The development of agricultural cooperation, both commercial and credit, was given impetus by the publication in 1908 of a model charter. Credit partnerships received some benefits.

d) Progress of reform.

1. Legal basis, stages and lessons of reform.

The legislative basis for the reform was the decree of November 9, 1906, after the adoption of which the implementation of the reform began. The main provisions of the decree were enshrined in the law of 1910, approved by the Duma and the State Council. The law of 1911 introduced serious clarifications to the course of the reform, reflecting a change in the emphasis of government policy and marking the beginning of the second stage of the reform.

In 1915 -1916 Due to the war, the reform actually stopped. In June 1917, the reform was officially terminated by the Provisional Government. The reform was carried out through the efforts of the Main Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture, headed by A.V. Krivoshein, and Stolypinsky Minister of Internal Affairs.

2. The transformation of peasants into landowners at the first stage (1907 -1910) in accordance with the decree of November 9, 1906 went in several ways.

Strengthening interstrip areas of property. Over the years, 2 million plots have been strengthened. When pressure from local authorities ceased, the strengthening process was sharply reduced. In addition, the majority of peasants who only wanted to sell their plot and not manage their farms had already done so. After 1911, only those who wanted to sell their plot applied. In total in 1907-1915 2.5 million people became “fortified” people - 26% of the peasants of European Russia (excluding the western provinces and Trans-Urals), but almost 40% of them sold their plots, most of them moving beyond the Urals, going to the city or joining the stratum of the rural proletariat.

Land management at the second stage (1911-1916) according to the laws of 1910 and 1911. made it possible to obtain ownership of an allotment automatically - after the creation of cuts and farms, without filing an application for strengthening ownership.

In “old-hearted” communities (communities where there have been no redistributions since 1861), according to the law of 1910, peasants were automatically recognized as the owners of plots. Such communities accounted for 30% of their total number. At the same time, only 600 thousand of the 3.5 million members of the lawless communities requested documents certifying their property.

The peasants of the western provinces and some areas of the south, where communities did not exist, also automatically became property owners. They didn't need to sell any special claims to do this. Beyond the Urals, the reform did not formally take place, but even there the peasants did not know communal property.

3. Land management.

Organization of farms and cuts. In 1907-1910, only 1/10 of the peasants who strengthened their plots formed farmsteads and farmsteads.

After 1910 The government realized that a strong peasantry could not arise in multi-lane areas. This required not a formal strengthening of ownership, but an economic transformation of the plots. Local authorities, who sometimes resorted to coercion among community members, were no longer recommended to “artificially encourage” the strengthening process. The main direction of the reform was land management, which now in itself turned into the private property of peasants.

Now the process has accelerated. In total, by 1916, 1.6 million farms and cuts were formed on approximately 1/3 of the peasant allotments (community and household) and land purchased by peasants from the bank. This was the beginning. It is important that in reality the potential scope of the movement turned out to be wider: another 20% of the peasants of European Russia submitted applications for land management, but land management work was suspended by the war and interrupted by the revolution.

4. Relocation beyond the Urals.

By decree of March 10, 1906, the right to resettle peasants was granted to everyone without restrictions. The government allocated considerable funds for the costs of settling settlers in new places, for their medical care and public needs, and for building roads.

Having received a loan from the government, 3.3 million people moved to new lands in Stolypin’s wagons, 2/3 of whom were landless or land-poor peasants. 0.5 million returned, many joined the population of Siberian cities or became agricultural workers. Only a small part of the peasants became rural owners in the new place.

The results of the resettlement campaign were as follows. Firstly, during this period there was a huge leap in economic and social development Siberia. Also, the population of this region increased by 153% during the years of colonization. If before the resettlement to Siberia there was a reduction in sown areas, then in 1906-1913 they were expanded by 80%, while in the European part of Russia by 6.2%. In terms of the pace of development of livestock farming, Siberia also overtook the European part of Russia.

5. Destruction of the community.

To transition to new economic relations, a whole system of economic and legal measures was developed to regulate the agricultural economy. The decree of November 9, 1906 proclaimed the predominance of the fact of sole ownership of land over the legal right of use. Peasants could now allocate land that was actually in use from the community, regardless of its will. The land plot became the property not of the family, but of the individual householder. Measures were taken to ensure the strength and stability of working peasant farms. Thus, in order to avoid land speculation and concentration of property, the maximum size of individual land ownership was legally limited, and the sale of land to non-peasants was allowed. The law of June 5, 1912 allowed the issuance of a loan secured by any allotment land acquired by peasants. The development of various forms of credit - mortgage, reclamation, agricultural, land management - contributed to the intensification market relations in the village.

In 1907 - 1915 25% of householders declared separation from the community, but 20% actually separated - 2008.4 thousand householders. New forms of land tenure became widespread: farms and cuts. On January 1, 1916, there were already 1,221.5 thousand of them. In addition, the law of June 14, 1910 considered it unnecessary for many peasants who were only formally considered community members to leave the community. The number of such farms amounted to about one third of all communal households.

6.Purchase of land by peasants with the help of a peasant bank.

The bank sold 15 million state-owned and landowners' land, of which 30% was bought in installments by peasants. At the same time, special benefits were provided to the owners of farms and cuts, who, unlike others, received a loan in the amount of 100% of the value of the acquired land at 5% per annum. As a result, if before 1906 the bulk of land buyers were peasant collectives, then by 1913 79.7% of buyers were individual peasants.

7.Cooperative movement.

The cooperative movement developed rapidly. In 1905-1915, the number of rural credit partnerships increased from 1680 to 15.5 thousand. The number of production and consumer cooperatives in the village increased from 3 thousand. (1908) to 10 thousand (1915)

Many economists have come to the conclusion that it is cooperation that represents the most promising direction for the development of the Russian village, meeting the needs of modernization of the peasant economy. Credit relations gave a strong impetus to the development of production, consumer and marketing cooperatives. Peasants on a cooperative basis created dairy and butter artels, agricultural societies, consumer shops and even peasant artel dairies.

e) Conclusions.

Serious progress is being observed in the Russian peasant sector. Harvest years and the rise in world grain prices played a big role in this, but bran and farmstead farms especially progressed, where new technologies were used to a greater extent. The yield in these areas exceeded similar indicators of community fields by 30-50%. Exports of agricultural products increased even more, by 61% compared to 1901-1905, in the pre-war years. Russia was the largest producer and exporter of bread and flax, and a number of livestock products. Thus, in 1910, Russian wheat exports amounted to 36.4% of total world exports.

But this does not mean that pre-war Russia should be represented as a “peasant paradise.” The problems of hunger and agricultural overpopulation were not resolved. The country still suffered from technical, economic and cultural backwardness. According to calculations

I.D. Kondratiev in the USA, on average, a farm had a fixed capital of 3,900 rubles, and in European Russia, the fixed capital of an average peasant farm barely reached 900 rubles. The national income per capita of the agricultural population in Russia was approximately 52 rubles per year, and in the United States - 262 rubles.

The rate of growth in labor productivity in agriculture has been comparatively slow. While in Russia in 1913 they received 55 poods of bread per dessiatine, in the USA they received 68, in France - 89, and in Belgium - 168 poods. Economic growth occurred not on the basis of intensification of production, but due to an increase in the intensity of manual peasant labor. But during the period under review, socio-economic conditions were created for the transition to a new stage of agrarian transformation - the transformation of agriculture into a capital-intensive, technologically advanced sector of the economy.

But a number of external circumstances (the death of Stolypin, the beginning of the war) interrupted the Stolypin reform. Stolypin himself believed that it would take 15-20 years for his endeavors to succeed. But during the period 1906 - 1913, a lot was done.

1) Social results of the fate of the community.

The community as a body of self-government of the Russian village was not affected by the reform, but the socio-economic organism of the community began to collapse, the number of land communities decreased from 135,000 to 110,000.

At the same time, in the central non-chernozem regions there was almost no disintegration of the community; it was here that cases of arson were numerous.

2) Socio-political results of the reform.

There was a gradual cessation of peasant exiles. At the first stage 1907 -1909 with the strengthening of property plots, often under pressure from zemstvo bosses, the number of peasant uprisings began to grow, in 1910 -1000. But after the shift in the emphasis of government policy to land management, the abandonment of coercion and some economic successes, peasant unrest almost ceased, ending in 1913. to 128. The main political goal was still not achieved. As 1917 showed, the peasantry retained the ability “as a whole” to oppose the landowners. In 1917, it became obvious that the agrarian reform was 50 years late, but the main reason for the failure was the socio-political half-heartedness of the reforms, which manifested itself in the preservation of the landed estates intact.

Chapter 5. Historical significance of the reform.

The Stolypin agrarian reform is a conditional concept, because it does not constitute a whole plan and is divided into a number of separate events.

As governor of Saratov, Stolypin proposed creating strong peasant farms on lands purchased with the support of the Peasant Bank. The prosperity of these farms was supposed to become an example for the surrounding peasants, who were supposed to gradually abandon communal land ownership. When he headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it turned out that they looked at this problem somewhat differently. The authorities did not seek to preserve the community, since they did not consider it a stronghold of order. For a number of years, a group of officials under the leadership of Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs V.I. Gurko (son of the hero of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878) was developing a project that was supposed to bring about a sharp turn in government policy. In contrast to Stolypin’s plan, Gurko’s project envisioned the creation of farmsteads and farmsteads on peasant lands, not bank lands. The goal of the project was to quickly break up the community.

The project provided that each member of the community could declare his departure from it and secure his own allotment, which the community had no right to reduce or move. But the owner has the right to sell his plot to anyone. From an agrotechnical point of view, this approach did not promise much benefit, because it remained interstriped. But he contributed to the split in the community. At the end of 1906, Stolypin carried out a number of measures to transfer part of the state and appanage lands to the Peasant Bank for sale to peasants. Gurko objected to these events. He believed that they would revive the hopes of the peasants for the transfer of the landowner's land into their hands in the future. In addition, Gurko suspected Stolypin in this matter. In reality, Stolypin did not even allow the thought of completely eliminating landownership. Partial limitation of it is another matter. Many landowners, frightened by the revolution, sold their estates. And it was important that the Peasant Bank buy these lands, divide them into plots and sell them to the peasants. Strong farms began to appear on bank lands. Until 1911, land sales increased annually and then decreased. This is explained by the fact that the landowners lost their fear caused by the revolution, and they reduced the sale of their lands.

The resettlement epic of 1906 -1916, which gave so much to Siberia, had little impact on the position of the peasantry in central Russia. The number of those who left the Urals amounted to only 18% of the natural increase in the rural population over these years. With the beginning of the industrial boom, migration from the countryside to the city increased. But even together, these two factors could not absorb natural growth. Land oppression in the Russian countryside continued to increase.

Chapter 6. Stolypin's mistakes.

Despite favorable economic and political circumstances, Stolypin still made a number of mistakes that put his reform in jeopardy. Stolypin's first mistake was the lack of a well-thought-out policy towards workers. As the experience of Prussia has shown, for the successful implementation of conservative policies it was necessary to combine harsh repressions against revolutionary parties with simultaneous efforts in the field of social security for workers. In Russia, throughout the entire economic boom, the living standards of workers did not rise. The ten-hour day law of 1906 was not enforced, nor was the workers' insurance law. But the number of workers has increased. Stolypin did not realize the significance of the labor question, which arose with renewed vigor in 1912. Stolypin’s second mistake was that he did not foresee the consequences of the intensive Russification of non-Russian peoples. Stolypin did not hide his nationalist convictions. He openly pursued a nationalist Great Russian policy and set all national minorities against himself and against the tsarist regime.

Stolypin also made a mistake on the issue of establishing zemstvos in the western provinces, as a result of which he lost the support of the Octobrists. Stolypin decided to establish a zemstvo form of government in the western provinces in order to improve the life of the Russian population. The Duma willingly supported him; however, the State Council took the opposite position. Stolypin asked Nicholas 2 to interrupt the work of both chambers for 3 days, so that during this time the government would urgently adopt new law. The Duma meetings were suspended and the law was adopted. This procedure demonstrated the government’s disregard for its own institutions. This led to a split between the government and the Liberals. The autocracy isolated itself, and Stolypin lost the trust of Nicholas II.

Bibliography:

1. N. Vert “History of the Soviet State” Moscow “Progress” 1992

2. Collection of speeches "Peter Arkadyevich Stolypin"; "We need a great

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The reform had several goals:

1. socio-political: To create in the countryside a strong support for the autocracy from strong owners (farmers), splitting them off from the bulk of the peasantry and opposing them to it. Strong farms were supposed to become an obstacle to the growth of the revolution in the countryside;

2. socio-economic: Destroy the community, that is, create private farms in the form of farms and farms, and the excess work force send it to the city, where it will be absorbed by growing industry;

3. economic: To ensure the rise of agriculture and the further industrialization of the country in order to eliminate the gap with the advanced powers.

The first step in this direction was taken in 1861. Then the agrarian issue was resolved at the expense of the peasants, who paid the landowners both for land and freedom. The agrarian legislation of 1906-1910 was the second step, while the government, in order to strengthen its power and the power of the landowners, again tried to solve the agrarian question at the expense of the peasantry.

The new agricultural policy was carried out on the basis of a decree on November 9, 1906. The discussion of the decree of November 9, 1906 began in the Duma on October 23, 1908, i.e. two years after he entered life. In total, it was discussed for more than six months.

After the decree was adopted by the Duma on November 9, it, with amendments, was submitted for discussion to the State Council and was also adopted, after which, based on the date of its approval by the Tsar, it became known as the law on June 14, 1910. In its content, it was undoubtedly a liberal bourgeois law, promoting the development of capitalism in the countryside and, therefore, progressive.

Agrarian reform consisted of a number of sequential and interrelated measures. The main direction of the reforms was as follows:

Destruction of community and development of private property;

Creation of a peasant bank;

After the abolition of serfdom, the Russian government categorically advocated the preservation of the community. The turbulent events of the turn of the century, the rapid politicization of the peasant masses and the outbreak of unrest lead to a rethinking of relations towards the community on the part of the tsar, the government and the ruling circles, but, nevertheless, changes in legislative activity do not occur immediately. In particular, the new Decree of 1904 confirms the inviolability of the community, although at the same time it provides for relief for those wishing to leave it.

The “Special Meeting on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry”, which worked for two years under the leadership of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Witte, was generally very radical in its outlook, nevertheless, at the beginning of 1905 it came to the conclusion: “All opinions, so different, agreed that destroy communities, but only eliminate measures that forcibly bind individuals against their will to the community.”

But already in May 1906, the congress of authorized noble societies expressed demands to the government to grant peasants the right to leave the community, to assign to them the communal land already in their use, to resettle peasants to the eastern regions, and to operate a peasant bank to create a special fund from acquired landowners have lands for the next sale to peasants.

In August 1906, decrees were adopted to increase the land fund located in the peasant bank by transferring appanage and state lands to it. And finally, on November 9, 1906, the Decree “On supplementing some provisions of the current law relating to peasant land ownership and land use” was issued, the provisions of which formed the main content of the Stolypin reform. Approved by the Third Duma and the State Council, it became law in 1910.

Both then and subsequent researchers of significant events associated with the first Russian revolution and Stolypin’s land reform agree that “the reassessment of the government’s attitude towards the community occurred mainly due to two reasons:

Firstly, the destruction of the community became desirable for the autocracy, since this would disunite the peasant masses, who had already demonstrated their revolutionary spirit and unity in the outbreak of the first Russian revolution;

Secondly, as a result of the stratification of the community, a rather powerful layer of peasant owners was formed, interested in increasing their property and loyal to others, in particular to the landowners.”

According to the Decree of November 9, 1906, all peasants received the right to leave the community, which in this case allocated land to the exiting individual for his own ownership; such lands were called cuts, farms and hamlets. At the same time, the decree provided privileges for wealthy peasants in order to encourage them to leave the community. In particular, those who left the community received “in the ownership of individual householders” all the lands “consisting of their permanent use.” This meant that people from the community received surpluses in excess of the per capita norm. Moreover, if redistributions were not made in a given community over the last 24 years, then the householder received the surplus for free, but if there were limits, then he paid the community for the surplus according to the redemption payments of 1861. Since prices have increased several times over forty years, this was also beneficial for wealthy immigrants.

An important instrument for the destruction of the community and the establishment of small private property was the credit bank. Through it, the state helped many peasant families acquire land. The bank sold on credit land previously purchased from landowners or owned by the state. At the same time, the loan for an individual farm was half as much as for loans to the community. Between 1905 and 1914 9.5 million hectares of land passed into the hands of peasants in this way. It is necessary, however, to note that the sales conditions were quite strict - for late payments, the land was taken away from the buyer and returned to the bank fund for a new sale. According to N. Werth, this policy was very reasonable in relation to the most productive part of the peasants; it helped them, but could not solve the agrarian question as a whole (poor peasants could not purchase land). Moreover, the allocation to a separate farm usually did not provide plots sufficient for effective work, and even loans did not significantly change things, and Stolypin set a course for the resettlement of peasants to free state lands. According to N. Eidelman, the mass resettlement was organized so that, without giving the peasants landowner land (radicalism), to enrich some peasants at the expense of others, dissolving the community and facilitating the transition of what belonged to the poor into the property of wealthy men. Those left without land had to be accepted by the city, the outskirts, where resettlement would be organized. From this point of view, Stolypin tried to achieve a compromise of social forces so that, on the one hand, not to infringe on the legal rights of landowners to land, and on the other, to provide land for the most conscious part of the peasantry - the support of the autocracy.

At the same time, measures were taken to ensure the strength and stability of working peasant farms. Thus, in order to avoid land speculation and concentration of property, the maximum size of individual land ownership was legally limited, and the sale of land to non-peasants was allowed.

The law of June 5, 1912 allowed the issuance of a loan secured by any allotment land acquired by peasants. The development of various forms of credit - mortgage, reclamation, agricultural, land management - contributed to the intensification of market relations in the countryside.

Simultaneously with the publication of new agrarian laws, the government is taking measures to forcibly destroy the community, without relying entirely on the action of economic factors. Immediately after November 9, 1906, the entire state apparatus was set in motion by issuing the most categorical circulars and orders, as well as by reprisals against those who were not very energetic in implementing them.

The practice of the reform showed that the mass of the peasantry was opposed to separation from the community, at least in most areas. A survey of peasant sentiments by the Free Economic Society showed that in the central provinces peasants had a negative attitude towards separation from the community.

The main reasons for such peasant sentiments:

The community is a kind of trade union for the peasant, so neither the community nor the peasant wanted to lose it;

Russia is a zone of non-permanent agriculture, in such climatic conditions the peasant cannot survive alone;

In 1906-1907, on the instructions of the tsar, part of the state and appanage lands was transferred to the peasant bank for sale to peasants in order to alleviate the land shortage. In addition, the Bank carried out on a large scale the purchase of lands with their subsequent resale to peasants on preferential terms, and intermediary operations to increase peasant land use. He increased credit to the peasants and significantly reduced the cost of it, and the bank paid more interest on its obligations than the peasants paid it. The difference in payment was covered by subsidies from the budget, amounting to 1457.5 billion rubles for the period from 1906 to 1917.

The Bank actively influenced the forms of land ownership: for peasants who acquired land as their sole property, payments were reduced. As a result, if before 1906 the bulk of land buyers were peasant collectives, then by 1913 79.7% of buyers were individual peasants.

The Stolypin reform gave a powerful impetus to the development of various forms of peasant cooperation. Unlike the poor community member, who was in the grip of the village world, the free, wealthy, enterprising peasant, living in the future, needed cooperation. Peasants cooperated for more profitable sales of products, organization of their processing, and, within certain limits, production, joint acquisition of machinery, creation of collective agronomic, land reclamation, veterinary and other services.

The growth rate of cooperation caused by Stolypin's reforms is characterized by the following figures: in 1901-1905, 641 peasant consumer societies were created in Russia, and in 1906-1911 - 4175 societies.

Loans from the peasant bank could not fully satisfy the peasant's demand for money supply. Therefore, credit cooperation has become widespread and has gone through two stages in its development. At the first stage, administrative forms of regulation of small credit relations prevailed. By creating a qualified cadre of small loan inspectors and by allocating significant credit through state banks for initial loans to credit unions and for subsequent loans, the government stimulated the cooperative movement. At the second stage, rural credit partnerships, accumulating their capital, developed independently. As a result, a wide network of small peasant credit institutions, savings banks and credit partnerships was created that served the cash flow of peasant farms. By January 1, 1914, the number of such institutions exceeded 13 thousand

Results of reforms.

What were the results of Stolypin’s agrarian course, which was the last bet of tsarism in the struggle for existence? Was Stolypin's agrarian reform a success? Historians generally believe that the results were very far from expected... According to V. Bondarev, the reform of agrarian relations, giving peasants the right to private ownership of land was only partially successful, while the antagonistic contradiction between peasants and landowners remained; carrying out land management work and separating the peasants from the community succeeded to an insignificant extent - about 10% of the peasants separated from the farmstead; The resettlement of peasants to Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far East was to some extent successful. These are conclusions; for an objective assessment it is necessary to turn to basic figures and facts.

In about ten years, only 2.5 million peasant farms managed to free themselves from the tutelage of the community. The movement to abolish "secular" government in the countryside reached its climax between 1908 and 1909. (about half a million requests annually). However, this movement subsequently decreased noticeably. Cases of complete dissolution of the community as a whole were extremely rare (about 130 thousand). "Free" peasant landholdings accounted for only 15% of the total area of cultivated land. Hardly half of the peasants working on these lands (1.2 million) received plots and farmsteads assigned to them permanently as private property. Only 8% of the total number of workers were able to become owners, but they were lost throughout the country.

Land management policy did not produce dramatic results. The Stolypin land management, having shuffled the allotment lands, did not change the land system; it remained the same - adapted to bondage and labor, and not to the new agriculture of the decree of November 9.

The activities of the peasant bank also did not give the desired results. Total for 1906-1915 the bank purchased 4,614 thousand acres of land for sale to peasants, raising prices from 105 rubles. in 1907 to 136 rubles. in 1914 for a tithe of land. High prices and large payments imposed by the bank on borrowers led to the ruin of the masses of farmers and brat farmers. All this undermined the peasants' trust in the bank, and the number of new borrowers went down.

The resettlement policy clearly demonstrated the methods and results of Stolypin’s agrarian policy. The settlers preferred to settle in already inhabited places, such as the Urals and Western Siberia, rather than engage in the development of uninhabited forest areas. Between 1907 and 1914 3.5 million people left for Siberia, about 1 million of them returned to the European part of Russia, but without money and hopes, because the previous farm was sold.

Using the example of the Tula region, we see the collapse of the agrarian reform: Tula peasants aptly said that “the new law was made in order to confuse the peasants, so that they would squabble over their land and forget about the lord’s land.” The results of the reform indicate the collapse of the calculations of tsarism. In the Tula province, over the eight years of the reform, only 21.6% of all peasant householders left the community, and only 14.5% were assigned communal allotment land.

In a word, the reform failed. The Stolypin reform accelerated the “de-peasantization of the peasants” and the proletarianization of the countryside. The number of horseless peasant farms in the Tula province grew from 26% in 1905 to 34% in 1912. The resettlement policy of tsarism did not bring “calm” to the villages. It achieved neither the economic nor the political goals that were set for it. The village, with its farmsteads and farmsteads, remained as poor as before Stolypin. Although, it is necessary to cite the figures given by G. Popov - they show that some shifts in positive side observed: from 1905 to 1913. the volume of annual purchases of agricultural machinery has increased 2-3 times. Grain production in Russia in 1913 exceeded by a third the volume of grain production in the USA, Canada, and Argentina combined. Russian grain exports reached 15 million tons per year in 1912. Oil was exported to England in an amount twice as large as the cost of the entire annual gold production in Siberia. The surplus of grain in 1916 was 1 billion poods. Encouraging indicators, aren't they? But still, according to Popov, the main task - to make Russia a country of farmers - could not be solved. Most of the peasants continued to live in the community, and this, in particular, predetermined the development of events in 1717. The fact is, and we already briefly touched on this problem when we talked about the results of the elections to the State Duma, that Stolypin’s course failed politically. He did not force the peasant to forget about the landowner's land, as the authors of the decree of November 9 had hoped. The kulak newly created by the reform, plundering the communal land, kept the landowner's land in mind, like the rest of the peasants. In addition, he became an increasingly visible economic competitor of the landowner in the grain market, and sometimes also a political competitor, primarily in the zemstvo. In addition, the new population of “strong” masters, on whom Stolypin was counting, was not sufficient to become a support for tsarism....

Here the main reason for the failure of bourgeois reforms is clearly revealed - the attempt to carry them out within the framework of the feudal system. By the way, let’s say that one can come across the statement that Stolypin’s reforms simply did not have enough time for positive results. In our opinion, these reforms by their nature could not be implemented effectively in that situation. They simply could not have this time: at some stage they would simply get stuck. Let us repeat again that it is impossible, without changing the superstructure, to change the basis - socio-economic relations and, therefore, to carry out bourgeois reforms within the framework of absolutism (even with the election of a representative body the essence of power has changed little) is not possible. Here, of course, we mean the maxim of transformation. It can be assumed that Stolypin’s reforms, if they had continued, say, another 10 years, would have brought certain results, the main one of which would have been the creation of a layer of small peasant owner-farmers, and even then only in the case, as Lenin put it, if “circumstances turned out extremely favorably for Stolypin." But weren't these same farmers in the United States the basis for the emergence of one of the most anti-bureaucratic forms of a democratic republic? In our opinion, the most realistic result would be the creation of a social force that inevitably would not ultimately lead to a revolution. But not socialist, but only bourgeois. But can such a result be considered successful from the point of view of absolutism, within the framework and in the name of which the agrarian reform was implemented!?

In Russian society, the most important issue has always been the agricultural one. The peasants, who became free in 1861, did not actually receive ownership of the land. They were stifled by the lack of land, the community, and the landowners, so during the revolution of 1905 - 1907, the fate of Russia was decided in the countryside.

All the reforms of Stolypin, who headed the government in 1906, were in one way or another aimed at transforming the countryside.

The most important of them is land, called “Stolypin”, although its project was developed even before him.

Its goal was to strengthen the position of a “strong sole owner.”

This was the first step of a reform carried out in three main directions:

Destruction of the community and the introduction of peasant private ownership of land instead of communal ownership;

The essence of the reform was that the government abandoned its previous policy of supporting the community and moved on to its violent breakup.

As you know, the community was an organizational and economic association of peasants for the use of a common forest, pasture and watering place, an alliance in relations with the authorities, a kind of social organism that gave rural residents small everyday guarantees. The community was preserved artificially until 1906, as it was a convenient means of state control over the peasants. The community was responsible for paying taxes and various payments when performing government duties. But the community hampered the development of capitalism in agriculture. At the same time, communal land use delayed the natural process of stratification of the peasantry and put an obstacle to the formation of a class of small owners. The inalienability of allotment lands made it impossible to obtain loans against their security, and striping and periodic redistribution of land prevented the transition to more productive forms of its use, so giving peasants the right to freely leave the community was a long-overdue economic necessity. A feature of the Stolypin agrarian reform was the desire to quickly destroy the community. The main reason for this attitude of the authorities towards the community was the revolutionary events and agrarian unrest in 1905 - 1907.

Other no less important goal land reform was socio-political, since it was necessary to create a class of small owners as the social support of the autocracy as the main unit of the state, which is an opponent of all destructive theories.

The implementation of the reform was initiated by the royal decree of November 9, 1906, under the modest title “On supplementing some provisions of the current law concerning peasant land ownership,” according to which free exit from the community was allowed.

Land plots that had been in the use of peasants since the last redistribution were assigned ownership regardless of changes in the number of souls in the family.

There is an opportunity to sell your plot, as well as allocate land in one place - on a farm or a plot of land. At the same time, all this implied the lifting of restrictions on the movement of peasants around the country, the transfer of part of the state and appanage lands to the Peasant Land Bank to expand operations for the purchase and sale of land, the organization of the resettlement movement to Siberia with the aim of providing landless and land-poor peasants with plots through the development of the vast eastern expanses . But peasants often did not have enough funds to start a farm in a new place.

After 1909 there are fewer displaced people.

Some of them, unable to withstand the harsh living conditions, returned.

The bank provided benefits to farmers. The peasant bank also contributed to the creation of a layer of wealthy kulaks in the village.

From 1907 to 1916 in European Russia, only 22% of peasant households left the community. The emergence of a layer of peasant farmers caused resistance on the part of communal peasants, which was expressed in damage to livestock, crops, equipment, beatings and arson of farmers. Only for 1909 - 1910. The police registered about 11 thousand cases of arson of farmsteads.

Such a reform, with all its simplicity, meant a revolution in the soil structure. The entire structure of life and the psychology of the communal peasantry had to be changed. For centuries, communal collectivism, corporatism, and egalitarianism have been established.

Now it was necessary to move on to individualism, private property psychology.

The decree of November 9, 1906 was then transformed into permanent laws adopted on July 14, 1910 and May 19, 1911, which provided for additional measures to speed up the exit of peasants from the community. For example, in the case of land management work to eliminate striping within a community, its members could henceforth be considered the owners of the land, even if they did not ask for it.

Consequences:

Acceleration of the process of stratification of the peasantry,

Destruction of the peasant community,

The Stolypin agrarian reform did not manage to produce all the results expected from it. The initiator of the reform himself believed that at least 20 years were needed to gradually resolve the land issue. “Give the state 20 years of internal and external peace, and you will not recognize today’s Russia,” said Stolypin. Neither Russia nor the reformer himself had these twenty years.

However, over the 7 years of actual implementation of the reform, noticeable successes were achieved: the sown area increased by a total of 10%, in the areas of the greatest exodus of peasants from the community - by one and a half times, and grain exports increased by one third. Over the years, the amount of mineral fertilizers used has doubled and the use of agricultural machinery has expanded. By 1914, farmers overtook the community in supplying goods to the city and accounted for 10.3% of the total number of peasant farms (according to L.I. Semennikova, this was a lot in a short time, but not enough on a national scale). By the beginning of 1916, farmers had personal cash deposits in the amount of 2 billion rubles.

The implementation of agrarian reform accelerated the development of capitalism in Russia. The reform stimulated not only the development of agriculture, but also industry and trade: a mass of peasants flocked to the cities, increasing the labor market, and the demand for agricultural and industrial products increased sharply. Foreign observers noted that “if things go the same way for most European nations between 1912 and 1950 as they did between 1900 and 1912, then by the middle of this century Russia will dominate Europe, both politically, economically and financially." However, the majority of peasants were still committed to the community. For the poor - she personified social protection

, for the rich - an easy solution to their problems. Thus, it was not possible to radically reform the “soil”.

What were the results of Stolypin’s agrarian course, which was the last bet of tsarism in the struggle for existence? Was Stolypin's agrarian reform a success? Historians generally believe that the results were very far from expected. According to V. Bondarev, reforming agrarian relations and granting peasants the right to private ownership of land was only partially successful, while the antagonistic contradiction between peasants and landowners remained; carrying out land management work and separating the peasants from the community succeeded to an insignificant extent - about 10% of the peasants separated from the farmstead; The resettlement of peasants to Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far East was to some extent successful. These are conclusions; for an objective assessment it is necessary to turn to basic figures and facts.

In about ten years, only 2.5 million peasant farms managed to free themselves from the tutelage of the community. The movement to abolish "secular" government in the countryside reached its climax between 1908 and 1909. (about half a million requests annually). However, this movement subsequently decreased noticeably. Cases of complete dissolution of the community as a whole were extremely rare (about 130 thousand). “Free” peasant landholdings accounted for only 15% of the total area of cultivated land. Hardly half of the peasants working on these lands (1.2 million) received plots and farmsteads assigned to them permanently as private property. Only 8% of the total number of workers were able to become owners, but they were lost throughout the country.

Stolypin agrarian reform

Reasons for the failure of the reform

The reform failed. A number of external circumstances (the death of Stolypin, the beginning of the war) interrupted the Stolypin reform. The agrarian reform took only 8 years, and with the outbreak of the war it was complicated - and, as it turned out, forever. Stolypin asked for 20 years of peace for complete reform, but these 8 years were far from calm. However, it was not the multiplicity of the period or the death of the author of the reform, who was killed in 1911 by the hand of an secret police agent in a Kiev theater, that was the reason for the collapse of the entire enterprise. The main goals were far from being achieved. It achieved neither the economic nor the political goals that were set for it. The village, with its farmsteads and farmsteads, remained as poor as before Stolypin. Although, it is necessary to cite the figures cited by G. Popov - they show that some shifts in a positive direction were observed: from 1905 to 1913. the volume of annual purchases of agricultural machinery has increased 2-3 times. Grain production in Russia in 1913. exceeded by a third the volume of grain production in the USA, Canada, and Argentina combined. Russian grain exports reached in 1912. 15 million tons per year. Oil was exported to England in an amount twice as large as the cost of the entire annual gold production in Siberia. Excess of bread in 1916 amounted to 1 billion poods. Encouraging indicators, aren't they? But still, according to Popov, the main task - to make Russia a country of farmers - could not be solved. Most of the peasants continued to live in the community, and this, in particular, predetermined the development of events in 1717. The fact is, and we already briefly touched on this problem when we talked about the results of the elections to the State Duma, that Stolypin’s course failed politically. He did not force the peasant to forget about the landowner's land, as the authors of the decree of November 9 had hoped. The kulak newly created by the reform, plundering the communal land, kept the landowner's land in mind, like the rest of the peasants. In addition, he became an increasingly visible economic competitor of the landowner in the grain market, and sometimes also a political competitor, primarily in the zemstvo. Moreover, the new population of “strong” masters, on whom Stolypin was counting, was not sufficient to become a support for tsarism.

Here the main reason for the failure of bourgeois reforms is clearly revealed - the attempt to carry them out within the framework of the feudal system. By the way, let’s say that one can come across the statement that Stolypin’s reforms simply did not have enough time for positive results. In our opinion, these reforms by their nature could not be implemented effectively in that situation. They simply could not have this time: at some stage they would simply get stuck. Let us repeat again that it is impossible, without changing the superstructure, to change the basis - socio-economic relations and, therefore, to carry out bourgeois reforms within the framework of absolutism (even with the election of a representative body the essence of power has changed little) is not possible. Here, of course, we mean the maxim of transformation. It can be assumed that Stolypin’s reforms, if they had continued, say, another 10 years, would have brought certain results, the main one of which would have been the creation of a layer of small peasant owner-farmers, and even then only in the case, as Lenin put it, if “circumstances turned out extremely favorably for Stolypin.” But weren't these same farmers in the United States the basis for the emergence of one of the most anti-bureaucratic forms of a democratic republic? In our opinion, the most realistic result would be the creation of a social force, which would inevitably lead, in the end, not to revolution. But not socialist, but only bourgeois. But can such a result be considered successful from the point of view of absolutism, within the framework and in the name of which the agrarian reform was implemented!?

Ignoring regional differences was one of the shortcomings of Stolypin's agrarian reform. It went relatively well in such steppe provinces as Samara, Stavropol, Kherson, Tauride, where the community was weak and inert. With difficulty, but it went in the central black earth provinces, where it was greatly hampered by the peasant shortage of land. It almost did not go on in non-black earth provinces (for example, in Moscow), where the community was more dynamic and became so fused with developing capitalist relations that sometimes it was impossible to destroy it without damaging these very relations. And she met embittered resistance in Ukraine, where there were no land redistributions, where the peasant got used to his scraps and strips, invested labor and money in them and did not want to leave them, not for a farm, nor for a plot of land. In addition, Stolypin himself recognized that this reform could only be successful in combination with other major measures to improve the peasant economy, including credit, land reclamation, agronomic assistance, and the development of education. Due to financial difficulties, this set of measures remained largely unimplemented.

Its other weak point was the idealization of farmsteads and farmsteads, as well as private ownership of land in general. There are no absolutely good and bad forms of ownership in the world. It all depends on historical conditions, in which the same form of ownership can play different, even opposite, roles. Usually in the national economy there are various forms of ownership (private, public, state). It is important that their combinations and proportions are established not “from above”, but “from below”, in the course of natural economic development. Legislation should only limit the interests of each form of ownership.

In total, during the years of reform, about 3 million householders left the community. 22% of land was withdrawn from communal circulation. About half of them went on sale.

However, tension in the village remained. Many peasants, mostly poor and middle peasants, went bankrupt. Due to poor organization of the resettlement process, the flow of “return” migrants grew. Having returned to their homeland, they no longer received either a yard or land. In addition, the peasants did not consider the reform fair, since it did not affect landownership.

Ultimately, the authorities failed to either destroy the community or create a sufficiently massive system of peasant farmers. So we can talk about the general failure of the Stolypin reform.

But a blanket negative attitude towards her would be unfair. Some of the events that accompanied the reform were useful. This concerns giving peasants greater personal freedom (in family matters, movement and choice of occupations, in complete separation from the village).

Undoubtedly, Stolypin’s idea of creating farms and cuts on bank lands was fruitful, although it did not receive sufficient development.

Some types of land management work also brought benefits: the establishment of cuts in the southern provinces, the demarcation of neighboring communities in the Non-Black Earth Region.

Finally, as part of the reform, resettlement to Siberia reached an unprecedented development.

In general, Stolypin's agrarian reform had a progressive significance. By replacing obsolete structures with new ones, it contributed to the growth of productive forces in agriculture. During the reform, noticeable changes have occurred in the country's agriculture. The sown area increased from 1905 to 1913 by 10%. The gross grain harvest increased from 1900 to 1913 by 1.5 times, and industrial crops - by 3 times. Russia accounted for 18% of world wheat production and 52% of rye. It supplied 25% of world grain exports, which was more than the US, Canada and Argentina combined. The value of bread exports from Russia increased by 1 billion rubles compared to the end of the 19th century. The most important consequence The agrarian reform resulted in a significant increase in the marketability of agriculture, and the purchasing power of the population increased.

Trade turnover in 1903-1913 increased 1.5 times (by 2.3 billion rubles). Foreign trade was generally profitable, especially due to the fact that world bread prices before the war (Russian-Japanese (1904-1905) and World War I (1914-1918)) increased by 35% . These circumstances were one of the factors in the industrial boom in the country in 1909-1913. During this time, industrial production increased by 54%, and the total number of workers by 31%. The industrial boom spread primarily to basic industries - metallurgy, oil production, electricity production and mechanical engineering.

The introduction of private household ownership of land instead of communal ownership was only possible for a quarter of community members. It was also not possible to separate territorially from the “world”

Stolypin's reforms are an unsuccessful attempt by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, which met resistance from Russian society. Russian Empire Pyotr Alekseevich Stolypin (held position from 1906 to 1911) to create conditions in Russia for its more powerful economic growth while maintaining autocracy and the existing political and social order

Stolypin (1862-1911)

Russian statesman, served as governor of the Saratov and Grodno provinces, minister of internal affairs, and prime minister.

“He was tall, and there was something majestic in his posture: imposing, impeccably dressed, but without any panache, he spoke loudly enough, without tension. His speech somehow floated above the audience. It seemed that, penetrating through the walls, it sounded somewhere in a large expanse. He spoke for Russia. This was very suitable for a person who, if he did not “sit on the royal throne,” then under certain circumstances would be worthy of taking it. In a word, in his manner and appearance one could see an all-Russian dictator. However, he was a dictator of the type who was not prone to rude attacks. (Having headed the government), Stolypin put forward as a government action program the fight against revolutionary violence, on the one hand, and the fight against inertia, on the other. Rebuff the revolution, patronage of evolution - such was his slogan" (V. Shulgin "The Years")

Reasons for Stolypin's reforms

- exposed a lot of problems preventing Russia from becoming a powerful capitalist country
- The revolution created anarchy that had to be fought
- The ruling class of Russia had too different understandings of the ways of development of the state

Problems of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century

Antediluvian agrarian relations
Dissatisfaction with the situation of workers
Illiteracy, lack of education of the people
Weakness, indecisiveness of power
National question
The existence of aggressive, extremist organizations

The goal of Stolypin's reforms was to transform Russia through an evolutionary process into a modern, developed, strong, capitalist power.

Stolypin's reforms. Briefly

- Agrarian reform
- Justice reform
- Reform local government in Western provinces

The judicial reform was expressed in the establishment of military courts. Stolypin took over Russia during a period of unrest. The state, which was guided by the previous legislation, could not cope with the onslaught of murders, robberies, banditry, robberies, and terrorist attacks. The “Regulations of the Council of Ministers on Courts Martial” made it possible to carry out proceedings regarding violations of laws in an expedited manner. The trial was held without the participation of a prosecutor, a lawyer, and without defense witnesses, behind closed doors. The sentence had to be pronounced no later than 48 hours and carried out within 24 hours. Military courts handed down 1,102 death sentences, and 683 people were executed.

Contemporaries noticed that people whose portraits were created by Repin, and he was considered a popular portrait painter, immediately left this world. He painted Mussorgsky - he died, Pirogov - followed the example of Mussorgsky, Pisemsky and pianist Mercy de Argento died, just about to portray Tyutchev, he fell ill and soon died. “Ilya Efimovich! - the writer Oldor once addressed the artist as a joke - write, please, Stolypin" (from the memoirs of K. Chukovsky)
Reform of local government in Vitebsk, Volyn, Kyiv, Minsk, Mogilev and Podolsk provinces was to divide the electoral congresses and meetings into two national branches, Polish and non-Polish, so that the non-Polish branch would elect a larger number of zemstvo councilors.

The reform drew criticism not only from State Duma deputies, but also from government ministers. Only the emperor supported Stolypin. “Stolypin was unrecognizable. Something broke in him, his former self-confidence was gone somewhere. He himself, apparently, felt that everyone around him, silently or openly, was hostile” (V.N. Kokovtsov “From My Past”)

Agrarian reform

Target

Overcoming patriarchal relations in the Russian village that hinder the development of capitalism
Elimination of social tension in the agricultural sector of the economy
Increasing the productivity of peasant labor

Methods

Granting the right to a peasant to leave the peasant community and assigning him a plot of land in private ownership

The peasant community consisted of peasants who previously belonged to the same landowner and lived in the same village. All peasant allotment land was owned by the community, which regularly redistributed land among peasant households depending on the size of families. Meadow, pasture lands and forests were not divided between peasants and were jointly owned by the community. The community could at any time change the size of the plots of peasant families in accordance with the changed number of workers and the ability to pay taxes. The state dealt only with communities and the amount of taxes and fees collected from the lands was also calculated for the community as a whole. All members of the community were bound by mutual responsibility. That is, the community was collectively responsible for the payment of all types of taxes by all its members.

Granting the right to the peasant to sell and mortgage his plots and pass them on by inheritance
Granting peasants the right to create separate (outside the village) farms (farms)
Issuance by the Peasant Bank of a loan to peasants secured by land for a period of 55.5 years for the purchase of land from a landowner
Preferential loans to peasants secured by land
Resettlement of land-poor peasants to state-owned lands in sparsely populated areas of the Urals and Siberia
State support for agronomic activities aimed at improving labor and increasing productivity

Results

21% of peasants left the community
10% of peasants made an attempt to establish themselves as farms
60% of migrants to Siberia and the Urals quickly returned to their villages
In addition to the contradictions between peasants and landowners, there were added contradictions between those who left and those who remained in the community
The process of class stratification of the peasantry accelerated
Increase in number caused by peasants leaving the community
Growth in the number of kulaks (rural entrepreneurs, bourgeoisie)
Growth of agricultural production due to the expansion of sown areas and the use of technology

Only today are Stolypin’s actions called correct. During his lifetime and during the Soviet regime, agrarian reform was criticized, although it was not completed. After all, the reformer himself believed that the outcome of the reform should be summed up no earlier than after “twenty years of internal and external peace.”

Stolypin's reforms in dates

1906, July 8 - Stolypin became prime minister
1906, August 12 - assassination attempt on Stolypin, organized by the Socialist Revolutionaries. He was not injured, but 27 people died, two of Stolypin’s children were wounded
1906, August 19 - establishment of military courts
1906, August - transfer of appanage and part of state lands to the jurisdiction of the Peasant Bank for sale to peasants
1906, October 5 - decree granting peasants the same rights as other classes in relation to public service, freedom to choose their place of residence
1906, October 14 and 15 - decrees expanding the activities of the Peasant Land Bank and facilitating the conditions for the purchase of land by peasants on credit
1906, November 9 - decree allowing peasants to leave the community
1907, December - acceleration of the process of resettlement of peasants to Siberia and the Urals, encouraged by the state
1907, May 10 - Stolypin delivered a speech to the Duma deputies containing a detailed program of reforms

“The main idea of this document was as follows. There are periods when the state lives a more or less peaceful life. And then the introduction of new laws, caused by new needs, into the thickness of the previous century-old legislation is quite painless. But there are periods of a different nature when, for one reason or another, social thought comes into ferment. At this time, new laws may contradict old ones and great effort is required so that, while rapidly moving forward, not turn social life into a kind of chaos, anarchy. It was precisely such a period, according to Stolypin, that Russia was going through. To cope with this difficult task, the government needed to restrain with one hand the anarchic principles that threatened to wash away all the historical foundations of the state, and with the other, to hastily build the scaffolding necessary for the construction of new buildings dictated by urgent needs. In other words, Stolypin put forward as a government action program the fight against revolutionary violence, on the one hand, and the fight against inertia, on the other. Rebuff the revolution, patronize evolution - such was his slogan. Without going deeper this time into the complex of measures to combat the revolution, that is, without threatening anyone for the time being, Stolypin set about outlining the reforms proposed by the government in an evolutionary direction” (V. Shulgin “The Years”)

1908, April 10 - law on compulsory primary education with a phased introduction over 10 years
1909, May 31 - The Duma adopted a law to strengthen the Russification of Finland
1909, October - Russia took first place in the world in grain production and exports
1910, June 14 - The Duma adopted a law expanding the possibilities for peasants to leave the community
1911, January - student unrest, university autonomy limited
1911, March 14 - introduction of zemstvos in the western provinces
1911, May 29 - a new law making it even easier for peasants to leave the community
1911, September 11 - death of Stolypin at the hands of a terrorist

“Only during the intermission I got out of my seat and approached the barrier... Suddenly there was a sharp crack. The orchestra members jumped up from their seats. The crash was repeated. I didn't realize it was shots. The high school student standing next to me shouted:
- Look! He sat down right on the floor!
- Who?
- Stolypin. Out! Near the barrier in the orchestra!
I looked there. It was unusually quiet in the theater. Sitting on the floor near the barrier A tall man with a black round beard and a ribbon over his shoulder. He fumbled along the barrier with his hands, as if he wanted to grab it and stand up.
It was empty around Stolypin. A young man in a tailcoat walked down the aisle from Stolypin to the exit doors. I couldn't see his face at that distance. I just noticed that he walked very calmly, in no hurry. Someone screamed long-drawnly. There was a crash. An officer jumped down from the benoir box and grabbed the young man by the hand. Immediately a crowd gathered around them.
- Clear the gallery! - said the gendarmerie officer behind me.
We were quickly driven into the corridor. The doors to the auditorium were closed. We stood there, not understanding anything. A dull noise came from the auditorium. Then it died down and the orchestra began playing “God Save the Tsar.”
“He killed Stolypin,” Fitsovsky told me in a whisper.
- Don't talk! Leave the theater immediately! - shouted the gendarmerie officer.
We took the same dark stairs to the square, brightly lit by lanterns. The square was empty. Chains of mounted policemen pushed the crowds standing near the theater into side streets and continued to push them further and further. The horses, backing away, nervously moved their legs. The sound of horseshoes could be heard throughout the entire area. The horn sounded. An ambulance drove up to the theater at a sweeping trot. The orderlies jumped out with a stretcher and ran into the theater. We left the square slowly. We wanted to see what would happen next. The policemen hurried us, but they looked so confused that we did not listen to them. We saw how Stolypin was carried out on a stretcher. They were pushed into the carriage, and it rushed along Vladimirskaya Street. Mounted gendarmes galloped along the sides of the carriage. (The terrorist’s) name was Bagrov. At the trial, Bagrov behaved lazily and calmly. When the verdict was read to him, he said: “I don’t care at all whether I eat another two thousand cutlets in my life or not” (Paustovsky “Distant Years”)