History is always written by the winners, exaggerating their own importance and sometimes belittling the merits of their opponents. Much has been written and said about the significance of the Battle of Kursk for all mankind. This great epic battle was another bitter lesson that took the lives of many people. And it will be a great blasphemy for future generations not to draw the right conclusions from those past events.
General situation on the eve of the General Battle
By the spring of 1943, the resulting Kursk ledge not only interfered with normal railway communication between the German army groups “Center” and “South”. Associated with him was an ambitious plan to encircle 8 Soviet armies. The Nazis have not yet accomplished anything like this, even in a more favorable period for them. According to some historians, the deliberately unrealistic plan was, rather, an act of desperation. Allegedly, Hitler was most afraid of the Allied landings in Italy, so with such measures his army tried to protect itself in the East by getting rid of the Soviets.
This point of view does not stand up to criticism. The significance of the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk lies in the fact that it was in these military theaters that crushing blows were dealt to the well-coordinated military machine of the Wehrmacht. The long-awaited initiative ended up in the hands of Soviet troops. After these great historical events, the wounded fascist beast was dangerous and snarled, but even he himself understood that he was dying.
Preparing for the big moment
One of the key aspects of the significance of the battle is the determination with which the Soviet soldiers were ready to demonstrate to the enemy that two terrible years had not been in vain for them. This does not mean that the Red Army was suddenly reborn, having solved all its old problems. There were still enough of them. This was primarily due to the low qualifications of military personnel. The staff shortage was irreplaceable. To survive, we had to come up with new approaches to solving problems.
One such example can be considered the organization of anti-tank strong points (ATOP). Previously, anti-tank guns were lined up in one line, but experience has shown that it is more effective to concentrate them in unique well-fortified islands. Each PTOPA gun had several positions for firing in all directions. Each of these strong points was located 600-800 meters from each other. If enemy tanks tried to wedge in and pass between such “islands,” they would inevitably come under cross artillery fire. And on the side the tank armor is weaker.
How this would work in a real combat situation was to be found out during the Battle of Kursk. The importance of artillery and aviation, to which the Soviet command paid the closest attention, is difficult to overestimate due to the emergence of a new factor on which Hitler placed great hopes. We are talking about the appearance of new tanks.
In the spring of 1943, Marshal of Artillery Voronov, reporting to Stalin on the state of affairs, noted that the Soviet troops did not have guns capable of effectively fighting the new enemy tanks. It was urgent to take measures to eliminate the backlog in this area, and as soon as possible. By order of the State Defense Committee, production of 57-mm anti-tank guns was resumed. There was also a frantic modernization of existing armor-piercing shells.
However, all these measures were ineffective due to lack of time and necessary materials. A new PTAB bomb has entered aviation service. Weighing only 1.5 kg, it was capable of hitting 100 mm top armor. Such “gifts for the Krauts” were loaded into a container of 48 pieces. The Il-2 attack aircraft could take 4 such containers on board.
Finally, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed in particularly important areas. They were carefully camouflaged and under orders not to fire at enemy aircraft under any circumstances.
From the measures described above, it is clear what importance Soviet soldiers attached to the Battle of Kursk. At the most difficult moment, determination to win and natural ingenuity came to the rescue. But this was not enough, and the price, as always, was huge human losses.
Progress of the battle
A lot of contradictory information and various myths created for propaganda purposes do not allow us to put a final point on this issue. History has long brought to posterity the results and significance of the Battle of Kursk. But all the new details that are revealed make us once again amazed at the courage of the soldiers who won in this hell.
The group of the “defense genius” Model began an offensive in the north of the Kursk salient. Natural conditions limited the space for maneuver. The only possible place for the Germans to appear was a front section 90 km wide. The Red Army soldiers under the command of Konev wisely used this advantage. The Ponyri railway station became a “bag of fire” into which the advanced units of the fascist troops fell.
Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of “flirting guns.” When enemy tanks appeared, they began to fire directly, thereby drawing fire onto themselves. The Germans rushed towards them at full speed to destroy them, and came under fire from other camouflaged Soviet anti-tank guns. The side armor of tanks is not as massive as the frontal armor. At a distance of 200-300 meters, Soviet guns could completely destroy armored vehicles. At the end of the 5th day, Model's attack in the north of the salient fizzled out.
The southern direction, under the command of one of the best commanders of the twentieth century, Heinrich von Manstein, had a greater chance of success. Here the space for maneuver was not limited by anything. To this we must add high training and professionalism. 2 of the 3 lines of Soviet troops were broken through. From the operational report for July 10, 1943, it followed that the retreating Soviet units were closely pursued by German troops. For this reason, there was no way to block the road leading from Teterevino to Ivanovsky settlement with anti-tank mines.
Battle of Prokhorovka
To cool down the ardor of the presumptuous Manstein, the reserves of the Steppe Front were urgently activated. But by this time only a miracle did not allow the Germans to break through the 3rd line of defense near Prokhorovka. They were greatly hampered by the threat from the flank. Being cautious, they waited for the SS Totenkopf fighters to cross to the other side and destroy the artillerymen.
At this moment, Rotmistrov’s tanks, which had been promptly warned by German aviation when approaching Prokhorovka, were assessing the future battlefield. They had to advance in a narrow corridor between the Psel River and the railway track. The task was complicated by an impassable ravine, and in order to go around it, it was necessary to line up behind each other. This made them a convenient target.
Going to certain death, they stopped the German breakthrough at the cost of incredible efforts and colossal sacrifices. Prokhorovka and its significance in the Battle of Kursk are assessed as the culmination of this general battle, after which large-scale attacks of such magnitude were not undertaken by the Germans.
Ghost of Stalingrad
The result of Operation Kutuzov, which began with an offensive to the rear of Model’s group, was the liberation of Belgorod and Orel. This good news was marked by the roar of guns in Moscow, saluting in honor of the winners. And already on August 22, 1943, Manstein, violating Hitler’s hysterical order to hold Kharkov, left the city. Thus, he completed a series of battles for the rebellious Kursk ledge.
If we talk briefly about the significance of the Battle of Kursk, then we can recall the words of the German commander Guderian. In his memoirs, he said that with the failure of Operation Citadel on the Eastern Front, the calm days disappeared. And one cannot but agree with him on this.
Despite the artistic exaggerations associated with Prokhorovka, the Battle of Kursk was indeed the last attempt by the Germans to win back the situation. Taking advantage of the negligence of the Soviet command and inflicting a major defeat on the Red Army near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943, the Germans received another “chance” to play the summer offensive card according to the models of 1941 and 1942.
But by 1943, the Red Army was already different, just like the Wehrmacht, it was worse than itself two years ago. Two years of bloody meat grinder were not in vain for him, plus the delay in starting the offensive on Kursk made the very fact of the offensive obvious to the Soviet command, which quite reasonably decided not to repeat the mistakes of the spring-summer of 1942 and voluntarily conceded to the Germans the right to launch offensive actions in order to wear down them on the defensive, and then destroy the weakened strike forces.
In general, the implementation of this plan once again showed how much the level of strategic planning Soviet leadership since the start of the war. And at the same time, the inglorious end of “Citadel” once again showed the subsidence of this level among the Germans, who tried to reverse the difficult strategic situation with obviously insufficient means.
Actually, even Manstein, the most intelligent German strategist, had no special illusions about this decisive battle for Germany, reasoning in his memoirs that if everything had turned out differently, then it would have been possible to somehow jump from the USSR to a draw, that is, in fact admitted that after Stalingrad there was no talk of victory for Germany at all.
In theory, the Germans, of course, could push through our defenses and reach Kursk, encircling a couple of dozen divisions, but even in this wonderful scenario for the Germans, their success did not lead them to solving the problem of the Eastern Front, but only led to a delay before the inevitable end, because By 1943, Germany's military production was already clearly inferior to the Soviet one, and the need to plug the “Italian hole” did not make it possible to assemble any large forces to conduct further offensive operations on the Eastern Front.
But our army did not allow the Germans to amuse themselves with the illusion of even such a victory. The strike groups were bled dry during a week of heavy defensive battles, and then the roller coaster of our offensive began, which, starting in the summer of 1943, was practically unstoppable, no matter how much the Germans resisted in the future.
In this regard, the Battle of Kursk is truly one of the iconic battles of the Second World War, and not only due to the scale of the battle and the millions of soldiers and tens of thousands of military equipment involved. It finally demonstrated to the whole world and, above all, to the Soviet people, that Germany was doomed.
Remember today all those who died in this epoch-making battle and those who survived it, reaching from Kursk to Berlin.
Below is a selection of photographs of the Battle of Kursk.
Commander of the Central Front, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky and member of the Front Military Council, Major General K.F. Telegin at the forefront before the start of the battle on Kursk Bulge. 1943
Soviet sappers install TM-42 anti-tank mines in front of the front line of defense. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943
Transfer of "Tigers" for Operation Citadel.
Manstein and his generals are at work.
German traffic controller. Behind is an RSO crawler tractor.
Construction of defensive structures on the Kursk Bulge. June 1943.
At a rest stop.
On the eve of the Battle of Kursk. Testing infantry with tanks. Red Army soldiers in a trench and a T-34 tank that overcomes the trench, passing over them. 1943
German machine gunner with MG-42.
Panthers are preparing for Operation Citadel.
Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Grossdeutschland" on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.
German Pz.Kpfw.III tanks before the start of Operation Citadel in a Soviet village.
The crew of the Soviet tank T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" (from the "Revolutionary Mongolia" tank column) and the attached troops on vacation. Kursk Bulge, 1943.
Smoke break in German trenches.
A peasant woman tells Soviet intelligence officers about the location of enemy units. North of the city of Orel, 1943.
Sergeant Major V. Sokolova, medical instructor of anti-tank artillery units of the Red Army. Oryol direction. Kursk Bulge, summer 1943.
A German 105-mm self-propelled gun "Wespe" (Sd.Kfz.124 Wespe) from the 74th self-propelled artillery regiment of the 2nd tank division of the Wehrmacht passes next to an abandoned Soviet 76-mm ZIS-3 gun in the area of the city of Orel. German offensive Operation Citadel. Oryol region, July 1943.
The Tigers are on the attack.
Photojournalist of the newspaper "Red Star" O. Knorring and cameraman I. Malov are filming the interrogation of the captured chief corporal A. Bauschof, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Red Army. The interrogation is conducted by Captain S.A. Mironov (right) and translator Iones (center). Oryol-Kursk direction, July 7, 1943.
German soldiers on the Kursk Bulge. Part of the body of the radio-controlled B-IV tank is visible from above.
German B-IV robot tanks and Pz.Kpfw control tanks destroyed by Soviet artillery. III (one of the tanks has the number F 23). Northern face of the Kursk Bulge (near the village of Glazunovka). July 5, 1943
Tank landing of sapper demolitions (sturmpionieren) from the SS division "Das Reich" on the armor of the StuG III Ausf F assault gun. Kursk Bulge, 1943.
Destroyed Soviet T-60 tank.
The Ferdinand self-propelled gun is on fire. July 1943, village of Ponyri.
Two damaged Ferdinands from the headquarters company of the 654th battalion. Ponyri station area, July 15-16, 1943. On the left is the headquarters "Ferdinand" No. II-03. The car was burned with bottles of kerosene mixture after its undercarriage was damaged by a shell.
The Ferdinand heavy assault gun, destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb from a Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber. Tactical number unknown. Area of Ponyri station and state farm "May 1".
Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "723" from the 654th division (battalion), knocked out in the area of the "1 May" state farm. The track was destroyed by projectile hits and the gun was jammed. The vehicle was part of the "Major Kahl's strike group" as part of the 505th heavy tank battalion of the 654th division.
A tank column is moving towards the front.
Tigers" from the 503rd heavy tank battalion.
Katyushas are firing.
Tiger tanks of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".
A company of American M3s General Lee tanks, supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, is moving to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.
Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. July 1943.
Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "731", chassis number 150090 from the 653rd division, blown up by a mine in the defense zone of the 70th army. Later, this car was sent to an exhibition of captured equipment in Moscow.
Self-propelled gun Su-152 Major Sankovsky. His crew destroyed 10 enemy tanks in the first battle during the Battle of Kursk.
T-34-76 tanks support the infantry attack in the Kursk direction.
Soviet infantry in front of a destroyed Tiger tank.
Attack of T-34-76 near Belgorod. July 1943.
Abandoned near Prokhorovka, faulty "Panthers" of the 10th "Panther Brigade" of the von Lauchert tank regiment.
German observers are monitoring the progress of the battle.
Soviet infantrymen hide behind the hull of a destroyed Panther.
The Soviet mortar crew changes its firing position. Bryansk Front, Oryol direction. July 1943.
An SS grenadier looks at a T-34 that has just been shot down. It was probably destroyed by one of the first modifications of the Panzerfaust, which were first widely used at the Kursk Bulge.
Destroyed German Pz.Kpfw tank. V modification D2, shot down during Operation Citadel (Kursk Bulge). This photograph is interesting because it contains the signature “Ilyin” and the date “26/7”. This is probably the name of the gun commander who knocked out the tank.
Leading units of the 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division engage the enemy in captured German trenches. In the foreground is the body of a killed German soldier. Battle of Kursk, July 10, 1943.
Sappers of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" near a damaged T-34-76 tank. July 7, area of the village of Pselets.
Soviet tanks on the attack line.
Destroyed Pz IV and Pz VI tanks near Kursk.
Pilots of the Normandie-Niemen squadron.
Reflecting a tank attack. Ponyri village area. July 1943.
Shot down "Ferdinand". The corpses of his crew lie nearby.
Artillerymen are fighting.
Damaged German equipment during the battles in the Kursk direction.
A German tankman examines the mark left by a hit in the Tiger's frontal projection. July, 1943.
Red Army soldiers next to a downed Ju-87 dive bomber.
Damaged "Panther". I made it to Kursk as a trophy.
Machine gunners on the Kursk Bulge. July 1943.
Self-propelled gun Marder III and panzergrenadiers at the starting line before the attack. July 1943.
Broken Panther. The tower was torn down by an explosion of ammunition.
Burning German self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" from the 656th regiment on the Oryol front of the Kursk Bulge, July 1943. The photo was taken through the driver's hatch of the Pz.Kpfw control tank. III robotic tanks B-4.
Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. A huge hole from a 152-mm St. John's wort is visible in the turret.
Burnt tanks of the column "For Soviet Ukraine". On the tower torn down by the explosion one can see the inscription “For Radianska Ukraine” (For Soviet Ukraine).
Killed German tankman. In the background is a Soviet T-70 tank.
Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy self-propelled artillery installation of the Ferdinand tank destroyer class, which was knocked out during the Battle of Kursk. The photo is also interesting because of the SSH-36 steel helmet, rare for 1943, on the soldier on the left.
Soviet soldiers near a disabled Stug III assault gun.
A German B-IV robot tank and a German BMW R-75 motorcycle with a sidecar destroyed on the Kursk Bulge. 1943
Self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" after the detonation of ammunition.
The crew of an anti-tank gun fires at enemy tanks. July 1943.
The picture shows a damaged German medium tank PzKpfw IV (modifications H or G). July 1943.
The commander of the Pz.kpfw VI "Tiger" tank No. 323 of the 3rd company of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks, non-commissioned officer Futermeister, shows the mark of a Soviet shell on the armor of his tank to Sergeant Major Heiden. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.
Statement of combat mission. July 1943.
Pe-2 front-line dive bombers on a combat course. Oryol-Belgorod direction. July 1943.
Towing a faulty Tiger. On the Kursk Bulge, the Germans suffered significant losses due to non-combat breakdowns of their equipment.
T-34 goes on the attack.
The British Churchill tank, captured by the "Der Fuhrer" regiment of the "Das Reich" division, was supplied under Lend-Lease.
Tank destroyer Marder III on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.
and in the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34 tank, further on the left edge of the photo is a German Pz.Kpfw. VI "Tiger", another T-34 in the distance.
Soviet soldiers inspect an exploded German tank Pz IV ausf G.
Soldiers from the unit of Senior Lieutenant A. Burak, with the support of artillery, are conducting an offensive. July 1943.
A German prisoner of war on the Kursk Bulge near a broken 150-mm infantry gun sIG.33. On the right lies a dead German soldier. July 1943.
Oryol direction. Soldiers under the cover of tanks go on the attack. July 1943.
German units, which include captured Soviet T-34-76 tanks, are preparing for an attack during the Battle of Kursk. July 28, 1943.
RONA (Russian People's Liberation Army) soldiers among captured Red Army soldiers. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.
Soviet tank T-34-76 destroyed in a village on the Kursk Bulge. August, 1943.
Under enemy fire, tankers pull a damaged T-34 from the battlefield.
Soviet soldiers rise to attack.
An officer of the Grossdeutschland division in a trench. Late July-early August.
Participant in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, reconnaissance officer, guard senior sergeant A.G. Frolchenko (1905 - 1967), awarded the Order of the Red Star (according to another version, the photo shows Lieutenant Nikolai Alekseevich Simonov). Belgorod direction, August 1943.
A column of German prisoners captured in the Oryol direction. August 1943.
German SS soldiers in a trench with an MG-42 machine gun during Operation Citadel. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.
On the left is an Sd.Kfz anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. 10/4 based on a half-track tractor with a 20-mm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun. Kursk Bulge, August 3, 1943.
The priest blesses Soviet soldiers. Oryol direction, 1943.
A Soviet T-34-76 tank knocked out in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed.
A column of captured Germans in the Kursk area.
German PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns captured on the Kursk Bulge. In the background is a Soviet ZiS-5 truck towing a 37 mm 61-k anti-aircraft gun. July 1943.
Soldiers of the 3rd SS Division "Totenkopf" ("Death's Head") discuss a defensive plan with the Tiger commander from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.
German prisoners in the Kursk region.
Tank commander, Lieutenant B.V. Smelov shows a hole in the turret of a German Tiger tank, knocked out by Smelov’s crew, to Lieutenant Likhnyakevich (who knocked out 2 fascist tanks in the last battle). This hole was made by an ordinary armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm tank gun.
Senior Lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov next to the German Tiger tank he destroyed.
Trophies of the Battle of Kursk.
German heavy assault gun "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition along with its crew by soldiers of the Soviet 129th Oryol Rifle Division. August 1943.
The eagle is taken.
The 89th Rifle Division enters liberated Belgorod.
We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report, August 1943, fighting Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka are called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.
This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...
"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is provided by combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.
29th Tank Corps :
“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.
This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.
Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.
There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 aircraft.
With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.
Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.
Units of the brigade, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and units of the brigade were forced to withdraw.
During the attack on the front line of the tank, self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, suffered losses from the tank's anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."
18th Tank Corps :
“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, lacking adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12:00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.
The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.
By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.
Carrying out the assigned task, 18th Tank Corps encountered a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the line of heights 217.9, 241.6.
In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""
"The car is on fire"
Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34
T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed
T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943
Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm
Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943
MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.
MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge
Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60
Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps
OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov
In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield there were T-V (Panther) tanks, a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.
Commanding tank units from the first days Patriotic War I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.
The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.
The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.
When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach from our aimed tank fire .
Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.
The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.
T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.
We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.
If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.
Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.
Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.
As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: German tanks cannot engage in tank combat with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank combat. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to take cover with artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.
And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and 1942.
On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V tank"Panther"), which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, is significantly superior in quality to the T-34 tank and especially in the quality of weapons.
To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:
| Tank brand and control system | Nose armor in mm. | Turret front and stern | Board | Stern | Roof, bottom | Gun caliber in mm. | Col. shells. | Speed max. |
| T-34 | 45 | 95-75 | 45 | 40 | 20-15 | 76 | 100 | 55,0 |
| T-V | 90-75 | 90-45 | 40 | 40 | 15 | 75x) | ||
| KV-1S | 75-69 | 82 | 60 | 60 | 30-30 | 76 | 102 | 43,0 |
| T-V1 | 100 | 82-100 | 82 | 82 | 28-28 | 88 | 86 | 44,0 |
| SU-152 | 70 | 70-60 | 60 | 60 | 30-30 | 152 | 20 | 43,0 |
| Ferdinand | 200 | 160 | 85 | 88 | 20,0 |
x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.
I, as an ardent patriot of tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and will raise with all urgency the question of mass production by the winter of 1943 of new tanks, superior in their combat qualities and design to the present existing types German tanks.
In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.
The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.
TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.
Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5
Something I would definitely like to add:
"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look in the other direction; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.
One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack, it was possible to achieve better results by observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.
Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “when the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our material part, burns and blows up. As a result of this, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)
………………….
And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.
The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12 near Prokhorovka Soviet troops will go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the Adolf Hitler division of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.
In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of the two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).
The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way to conduct combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):
“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing the wrong thing at all. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.
It was necessary, at any cost, to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:
From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without some excitement I picked up the phone.
Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!
I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.
“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.
What are you offering?
For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.
Stalin was silent for some time.
“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."
As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were destroyed (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics fully justified themselves.
However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 issued a new order to carry out a counterattack, only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) was tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 were irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.
Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!
It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, on the German side there were actually attempts to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin withdraw your forces to the previous front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.
At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but, on the contrary, are gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.
It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given “over the heads” of subordinate commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were carrying out some incomprehensible actions.
So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:
So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).
On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging along separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery, which was following the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Regiment) to the front line and had just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96 Tank Brigade for German tanks pursuing the 53 Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to serendipity.
Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.
So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (mistaken by the German command of the OKH ground forces for an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.
On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the sending of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Tank Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Corps was already repelling the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.
The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in favor of Germany everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "
Dates of the Battle of Kursk: 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943. The Great Patriotic War had 3 significant events:
- Liberation of Stalingrad;
- Battle of Kursk;
- Capture of Berlin.
Here we will talk about the greatest tank battle in modern history.
Battle for Kursk. The situation before the battle
Before the Battle of Kursk, Germany celebrated a small success, managing to recapture the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned on the Kursk Bulge. The salient, cut deep into German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved on May 10-11, was called “Citadel”.
Strengths of the parties
The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1,200,000 people (against 900 thousand for the enemy), the number of tanks was 3,500 (2,700 for the Germans), guns were 20,000 (10,000), and aircraft were 2,800 (2,500).
The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) Tiger (Panther) tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns (self-propelled guns), and Foke-Wulf 190 aircraft. Innovations on the Soviet side were the St. John's wort cannon (57 mm), capable of penetrating the armor of the Tiger, and anti-tank mines, which caused significant damage to them.
Plans of the parties
The Germans decided to launch a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk ledge, and then continue a large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided to first defend itself, launching counterattacks, and when the enemy was weakened and exhausted, go on the offensive.
Defense
We managed to find out that Battle of Kursk will begin on 05/06/1943. Therefore, at 2:30 and 4:30, the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00 the enemy’s guns responded, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting intense pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka.
When the attack was repulsed, the Germans intensified their attack on the left flank. They even managed to partially encircle two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance 6-8 km). Then the Germans attempted to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the Orel-Kursk railway.
170 tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second one held out. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200mm frontal armor became impenetrable to Soviet guns. Ponyri station was held due to anti-tank mines and powerful raids by Soviet aviation.
The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 800 Soviet tanks faced 450 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The overall victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost versus 80 for the enemy. Average tanks The T-34 had difficulty resisting the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in open areas. This is where the losses come from.
Offensive
While the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts were repelling enemy attacks, units of the Western and Bryansk Fronts (July 12) went on the attack. For three days (12-14), fighting heavy battles, Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.
The Battle of Kursk was the fighting during the Great Patriotic War in the area of the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the summer 1943 campaign of the Red Army, during which a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War, which began with the victory at Stalingrad, ended.
Chronological framework
In domestic historiography, there is an established point of view that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. It distinguishes two periods: the defensive stage and the counter-offensive of the Red Army.
At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by the forces of two fronts, Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943), with the involvement of strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (Steppe Front), the purpose of which was to disrupt the Citadel plan "
Background and plans of the parties
After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German leadership faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the growing power of the Red Army, and how to keep the allies in their orbit, who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough as was the case in 1942 should have helped not only to solve these problems, but also to raise the morale of the troops.
In April, the Operation Citadel plan was developed, according to which two groups strike in converging directions and encircle the Central and Voronezh fronts in the Kursk ledge. According to Berlin's calculations, their defeat made it possible to inflict huge losses on the Soviet side, reduce the front line to 245 km, and form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group were allocated for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) “Center” deployed the 9th Army (A) of Colonel General V. Model. After several modifications to the plan, she received the task: breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, connecting in the Kursk area with the troops of the GA "Yu" - the 4th Tank Army (TA) of Colonel General G. Hoth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the Voronezh Front line, she had to travel more than 140 km to the meeting place. The external front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 AK 9A and the army group (AG) "Kempf" from the GA "South". Active combat operations were planned to take place over an area of about 150 km.
For the "Citadel" GA "Center" allocated to V. Model, whom Berlin appointed responsible for the operation, 3 tank (41,46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 were tank, and GA "South" - 4 TA and AG "Kempf" 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 SS Tank Corps) and two army (52 AK and AK "Raus"), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) received the first information about Berlin's planning of a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. And on April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky was given the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk Bulge, repelling a possible attack, and then, together with the Western and Bryansk fronts, launching a counteroffensive and defeating the German group in the Orel area.
The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin was supposed to defend southern part Kursk ledge, to bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, after which go on a counter-offensive and, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete his defeat in the area of Belgorod and Kharkov.
The Kursk defensive operation was considered as essential element throughout the summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the Central and Voronezh fronts was stopped, conditions would arise to complete its defeat and launch a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western Fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front to completely thwart the enemy’s plans. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk ledge, and after its concentration it was planned to launch the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and the Southwestern Front.
On July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711,575 people, including combat personnel 467,179, 10,725 guns and mortars, 1,607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and Voronezh - 625,590 military personnel, of which 417,451 combat personnel, 8,583 guns and mortars, 1,700 armored vehicles.
Kursk defensive operation. Fighting in the north of the Kursk Bulge July 5-12, 1943
During April - June, the start of the Citadel was postponed several times. The last date was determined to be dawn on July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles took place over an area of 40 km. 9 A attacked in three directions at short intervals. The main blow was delivered to the 13A of Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov by the forces of 47 Tank Tank - on Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 Tank Tank and 23 AK - to Malo-Arkhangelsk, on the right wing of 13 A and the left 48A of Lieutenant General P.L. .Romanenko and the third - 46 tk - on Gnilets on the right flank of 70A Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.
In the Olkhovat-Ponyrovsk direction, Model launched more than 500 armored units into the attack at once, and groups of bombers were flying in waves in the air, but the powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to immediately break the lines of the Soviet troops.
In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov moved part of the mobile reserves to the main zone, and K.K. Rokossovsky sent howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Counterattacks by tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, stopped the enemy's offensive. By the end of the day, a small “dent” had formed in the center of 13A, but the defense had not been broken anywhere. Troops 48A and the left flank 13A completely held their positions. At the cost of heavy losses, the 47th and 46th Tank Corps managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction, and the 70A troops retreated only 5 km.
To restore the lost position at the junction of 13 and 70A, K.K. Rokossovsky, in the second half of July 5, decided to carry out a counterattack on the morning of July 6 by the 2nd TA of Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19th Tank Tank in cooperation with the second echelon of 13A - 17th Guards . rifle corps (sk). He was unable to fully solve the problems. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A was stuck in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to July 11, the epicenter of the fighting in zones 13 and 70A was the Ponyri station and the area of the villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful resistance centers were created that blocked the path to Kursk. By the end of July 9, the offensive of the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11, it made the last unsuccessful attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front.
On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in the fighting in this area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V. Model, appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops near Oryol aimed at Kursk. And on July 13, Hitler officially stopped the Citadel. The depth of advance of 9A was 12-15 km at a front of up to 40 km. No operational, let alone strategic, results were achieved. Moreover, she did not retain the positions already taken. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive and two days later it basically restored its position until July 5, 1943.
At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of the GA "South" went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered in the 6th Guards zone. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov in the direction of Oboyan by forces of 4TA. More than 1,168 armored units were deployed here by the German side. In the auxiliary, Korochan direction (east and northeast of Belgorod) positions of the 7th Guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 tanks and "Raus" AG "Kempf", which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the tenacity of the soldiers and commanders of the 6th Guards. And, already in the first two days, the offensive schedule of the GA “South” was disrupted, and its divisions suffered great damage. And most importantly, the strike force of the Civil Aviation Unit "South" was split. 4TA and AG "Kempf" failed to create a continuous breakthrough front, because AG Kempf was unable to cover the right wing of 4TA and their troops began to move in diverging directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the strike wedge and direct greater forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider offensive front than in the north of the Kursk Bulge (up to 130 km) and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the Voronezh Front line in a strip of up to 100 km and enter the defense in the main direction up to 28 km by the end of the fifth day, while 66% of the armored vehicles in its corps failed.
On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to Prokhorovka station. The battle for this resistance center lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours in the area of the station, about 1,100 armored units of the warring parties operated at different times in a 40 km area. However, it did not bring the expected results. Although the troops of the GA "South" were able to be kept in the army defense system, all formations of the 4th TA and AG "Kempf" retained their combat effectiveness. In the next four days, the most intense battles took place south of the station in the area between the Seversky and Lipovy Donets rivers, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of 4TA and the left wing of AG Kempf. However, it was not possible to defend this area. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2 SS Tank and 3 Tank surrounded four 69A divisions south of the station, but they managed to escape from the “ring”, although with heavy losses
On the night of July 16-17, the troops of the GA "South" began to retreat in the direction of Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front had pushed the GA "South" back approximately to the positions from which it had launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.
Oryol offensive operation
After two weeks of bloody battles, the Wehrmacht’s last strategic offensive was stopped, but this was only part of the Soviet command’s plan for the summer campaign of 1943. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative into our own hands and turn the tide of the war.
The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel area, codenamed Operation Kutuzov, was developed before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, bordering the Oryol arc, were supposed to strike in the general direction of Orel, cut 2 TA and 9A GA "Center" into three separate groups, encircle them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy them.
To carry out the operation, part of the forces of the Western Front (commander Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), the entire Bryansk Front (Colonel General M.M. Popov) and the Central Front were involved. Breaking through enemy defenses was planned in five areas. The Western Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the left wing - the 11th Guards A, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and the auxiliary one - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Orel (main attack) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). The Central Front, after completely stopping the 9A offensive, had to concentrate the main efforts of 70.13, 48A and 2 TA in the Krom direction. The start of the offensive was strictly linked to the moment when it became clear that strike group 9A was exhausted and tied up in battles on the borders of the Central Front. According to Headquarters, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.
A day before the offensive, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan conducted reconnaissance in force on the left flank of the 2nd TA. As a result, not only was the outline of the enemy's front line and its fire system clarified, but in some areas the German infantry was driven out of the first trench. THEIR. Bagramyan gave the order for the immediate start of a general offensive. The 1 tk introduced on July 13 completed the breakthrough of the second band. After which 5 Tank Corps began to develop an offensive bypassing Bolkhov, and 1 Tank Corps - towards Khotynets.
The first day of the offensive on the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Operating on the main, Oryol direction, 3A of Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A of Lieutenant General V.Ya. By the end of July 13, Kolpakchi had broken through 14 km, and 61A of Lieutenant General P.A. Belova, in the Bolkhov direction, penetrated the enemy’s defenses only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front, which began on July 15, did not change the situation. By the end of July 17, his troops had pushed back 9A only to the positions it occupied at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.
However, already on July 19, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Bolkhov group, because 11th Guards A broke through 70 km in a southern direction, stubbornly moving towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the “key” to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their forces here. On July 19, the 3rd Guards TA of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko advanced in the direction of the main attack of the Bryansk Front. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, by the end of the day it had broken through the second line of defense on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front was also hastily strengthened. The significant superiority of forces, although not quickly, bore fruit. On August 5, 1943, one of the largest regional centers of the European part of the USSR, the city of Oryol was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front.
After the destruction of the group in the area of Bolkhov and Orel, the most intense fighting took place on the Khotynets - Kromy front, and at the final stage of Operation Kutuzov, the heaviest fighting broke out for the city of Karachev, which covered the approaches to Bryansk, which was liberated on August 15, 1943.
On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German defensive line "Hagen", east of Bryansk. This concluded Operation Kutuzov. In 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, a fortified bridgehead and a large enemy group were eliminated in a strategically important direction, and favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.
Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation
It received the code name “Commander Rumyantsev”, was carried out from August 3 to 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: in the first, to defeat the troops of the left wing of the State Guard "South" in the area of Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then to liberate Kharkov. The Steppe Front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and the Voronezh Front was to bypass them from the north-west and develop its success towards Poltava. The main blow was planned to be delivered by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area north-west of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG "Kempf", to fragment them and cut off their path to retreat to the west and south-west. Deliver an auxiliary strike on Akhtyrka with forces 27 and 40A to block the movement of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to be bypassed from the south by 57A of the Southwestern Front. The operation was planned on a front of 200 km and a depth of up to 120 km.
On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery barrage, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6th Guards A under Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5th Guards A under Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov crossed the Vorskla River, made a 5 km gap on the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov. Having passed through the “corridor” of the breakthrough and deployed into battle formation, their troops struck swipe on Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having gone 26 km deep into the enemy’s defenses, cut off the Belgorod group from the Tomarov group and reached the line with. Good Will, and in the morning next day broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And the 6th Guards. And on the evening of August 3rd they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA offered stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5th Guards. The TA was pinned down by enemy counterattacks for two days, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, already on August 5, its brigades were supposed to leave west of Kharkov and capture the city of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan of the entire operation to quickly split the enemy group.
After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards A of the Steppe Front pushed the troops of AG Kempf to the outskirts and began an assault on it, which by evening ended with clearing the main part of it from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, fireworks were given in Moscow for the first time during the war years.
On this day, a turning point came and in the Voronezh Front zone, in the auxiliary direction, Lieutenant General K.S. 40A went on the offensive. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boromlya and 27A Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 liberated Grayvoron and advanced to Akhtyrka.
After the liberation of Belgorod, the pressure on the Steppe Front also intensified. On August 8, 57A of Lieutenant General N.A. was transferred to him. Hagena. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, E. von Manstein on August 11 launched counterattacks on the 1TA and 6th Guards A south of Bogodukhov with the forces of the 3rd Tank AG Kempf, which slowed down the pace of the advance of not only the Voronezh, but also the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of AG Kempf, Konev’s troops continued to persistently advance towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.
On August 18, GA "South" made a second attempt to stop the advance of the two fronts with a counterattack, now on the extended right flank of 27A. To repel it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle the 4th Guards A, Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But it was not possible to quickly turn the situation around. The destruction of the Akhtyrka group dragged on until August 25.
On August 18, the offensive of 57A was resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, moved towards Merefa. In this situation, the capture of a resistance center in the forest north-east of Kharkov on August 20 by units 53A of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov was important. Using this success, 69 A of Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin began to bypass the city from the north-west and west. During August 21, the 5th Guards TA corps concentrated in zone 53A, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later it was cut railways Kharkov - Zolochev, Kharkov - Lyubotin - Poltava and the Kharkov - Lyubotin highway, and on August 22, 57A went south of Kharkov to the area of the villages of Bezlyudovka and Konstantinovka. Thus, most of The enemy's retreat routes were cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.
On August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.
Results, significance
In the battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days, about 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, and up to 12,000 aircraft took part on both sides. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War, its significance goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. “The major defeat on the Kursk Bulge was the beginning of a mortal crisis for the German army,” wrote the outstanding commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the path to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative for action on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly secured in the hands of the Red Army."
