Formation of a one-party political system. Forceful establishment of a one-party system; forced establishment of a one-party system





  • the forced establishment of a one-party system;

  • No separation of powers

  • Control over the media

  • "Iron Curtain"

  • The rights and freedoms of citizens are formally prescribed

  • An ideology that has a monopoly and is recognized by all;

  • Mass repression

  • Command-administrative economy (state property only)

  • A system of mass public organizations through which control over every member of society (Octobers, Pioneers, Komsomol)

  • Cult of personality (leader) - deification, absolute concentration of power in the hands of the leader, relying on the ruling party. The principle of leaderism (or Fuhrerism)

  • One-dimensionality: “One party, one idea, one leader, one property”

  • “He who is not with us is against us.” If there is a person, there is a problem; if there is no person, there is a problem...”


Bolshevism Russia-70 years

  • Bolshevism Russia-70 years

  • Fascism in Italy 30 years

  • The Ceausescu regime in Romania is 30 years old

  • Fascism in Germany 10 years

  • Pol Pot Communism in Cambodia - 10 Years


  • In 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia (Kampuchea). The head of the regime was a student of the Parisian “free-thinking” philosopher Sartre named Pol Pot. So he set out to establish a completely communist society in the unfortunate country in two, maximum three years.

  • Money was abolished, and along with it, shops and goods. The only shop remaining in Phnom Penh was visited once a week by foreign diplomats accompanied by police. The border between city and countryside was completely erased: all city residents were forcibly relocated to rural communes, and they were so successful in doing so that in the end, out of the former million inhabitants, only a few hundred people remained in the capital. Destroyed for all education is unnecessary - higher, secondary and even primary; transport was abolished; There was no need to print books and magazines... 95% of the intelligentsia were physically destroyed. They worked 12 hours in the field without days off or holidays, men lived separately from women.

  • In four and a half years, out of a population of 8 million, about three were killed


Signs:

  • Signs:

  • an intermediate position between totalitarianism and democracy;

  • relations between the state and the individual are built more on coercion than on persuasion;

  • liberalization of public life, the absence of imposing a clearly developed official ideology on society;

  • limited and controlled pluralism in political thinking, opinions and actions, the existence of an opposition;

  • management of various spheres of social life is not as comprehensive as under totalitarianism: there is no strictly organized control over the social and economic infrastructure of civil society, over production, trade unions, educational institutions, mass organizations, and the media;

  • autocracy (from the Greek “autokrateia” - autocracy, autocracy, that is, the unlimited power of one person) does not require a demonstration of loyalty on the part of the population, as with totalitarianism; the absence of open political confrontation is sufficient for it;

  • ruthlessness towards manifestations of real political competition for power, towards the actual participation of the population in decision-making on the most important issues in the life of society;

  • suppression of basic civil rights.




  • 1) recognition of the people as the supreme source of power;

  • 2) election of the main bodies of the state;

  • 3) equality of citizens (primarily equality of voting rights);

  • 4) subordination of the minority to the majority when making decisions.

  • 5) publicity

  • competition of different opinions and positions


Liberalism - this is a doctrine that calls for ensuring individual freedom, civil, political and other human rights.

  • After the Bolsheviks came to power, the Cadets Party took an active part in the formation of various kinds of armed detachments and underground organizations to fight the new regime. In the spring of 1918, an underground National Center was created in Moscow, headed by the former mayor N.I. Astrov and large homeowner N.N. Shchepkin. The main task of the National Center was to organize the fight against Soviet power and establish relations with the Entente countries in order to receive military and financial assistance. In November, the board of the National Center moved to Yekaterinodar. The cadets played a major role in the preparation and conduct of the military coup in Siberia, were part of the inner circle of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, and occupied key positions in the governments of generals A.I. Denikin, N.N. Yudenich and others.

    Prominent figures of the Cadet Party V. A. Maklakov, P. N. Milyukov and some others, while abroad, played a large role in securing support for the White armies from Western governments. By the spring of 1920, almost all of the most active members People's freedom parties went abroad, where at the beginning of 1921, on the issue of new tactics of struggle, they were divided into “right” and “left”. Underground organizations operating in the territory Soviet Russia, including in Moscow and Petrograd, were defeated.
    The main political rivals of the Bolsheviks in the struggle for influence over workers and peasants were the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. In the fight against them, the leadership of the Bolshevik Party used various methods: violent suppression of the political activity of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks; an agreement with those factions and movements that shared the ideas of the world revolution and recognized the inviolability of the principles of Soviet power; bringing the split within the socialist parties to a final organizational break between those who supported the Bolsheviks and those who refused to cooperate with them.

    The leadership of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, taking into account the will of the majority of local Soviets to prevent a new Kornilov revolt, temporarily abandoned the tactics of violent liquidation of the Bolshevik regime. The Mensheviks pursued an agreement with the Bolsheviks with the aim of creating a “uniform socialist government.” At the beginning of November 1917, the Left Social Revolutionaries decided to join such a government. As a result, the socialist parties finally split into two camps - into supporters of Soviet and parliamentary democracies (Constituent Assembly). In the first half of 1918, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries managed to strengthen their influence in a number of industrial centers of Russia and among the peasantry. In June 1918, the Social Revolutionaries became part of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly, created in Samara. All this gave rise to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to adopt a resolution in the same month to expel the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks from its membership. However, in November, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee reversed this decision regarding the Mensheviks in exchange for their recognition of the historically inevitable Bolshevik coup and the launch of a political campaign in the West against interference in Russia's internal affairs. The Socialist Revolutionaries finally rejected the attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime through armed struggle and abandoned any bloc with the bourgeois parties in February 1919. At the same time, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee reversed its decision regarding the Socialist Revolutionaries. However, the legalization of the activities of opposition socialist parties was incomplete, since the punitive authorities in every possible way prevented them from enjoying the freedom of the press, speech, assembly and re-establishing their organizations. Relations between them and the Bolsheviks became especially tense since the summer of 1919 due to the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks’ criticism of command-administrative methods of management and the call to abandon the utopia of a direct transition to socialism. Using the participation of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the anti-Bolshevik uprisings, the Cheka authorities made a number of arrests from September 1920 to March 1921, which forced the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to go underground. Subsequently, they were subjected to repression, and by the summer of 1923 the socialist opposition in Russia was practically crushed.

    Anarchists, due to their ideological disunity and organizational confusion, were unable to create a “united anarchism”, taking an active part in the insurgency in various regions. The Bolsheviks, accusing the anarchists of supporting “bourgeois counter-revolutionaries” and creating their own armed formations - “hotbeds of anarcho-banditry”, used all methods against them, including punitive ones. In 1921, the majority of anarchists collaborated with the Bolsheviks, while the other part emigrated.

    Unlike other political parties, the Bolsheviks were the most mobile and disciplined and soon acquired the status of the ruling party. At the same time, there was no unity in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party on some political, economic and military issues. The discussion about concluding an agreement with Germany led to the emergence of a faction of “left communists”, supporters of the idea of ​​“revolutionary war”, led by N. I. Bukharin (1888-1931), a lawyer and active participant in the revolutionary movement, theorist of the policy of “war communism”. Since May 1918, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) began to gradually subordinate Soviet, trade union, youth and other public organizations to itself. The armed forces and other security structures were completely politicized. The Bolsheviks in practice turned the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of the Soviets into the dictatorship of their party. In March 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, it was recognized that it was necessary to achieve complete dominance of the party “in modern state organizations, which are the Soviets.” All this allowed the party leadership to pursue a policy based on coercive methods in all areas of the country's life. This line was opposed by the group of “democratic centralism” (N. Osinsky, T.V. Sapronov, etc.) at the IX Congress of the RCP(b), held on March 29 - April 5, 1920. In September of the same year, at the IX All-Russian Party Conference, they managed to achieve the adoption of a resolution on the radical democratization of internal party life, the elimination of bureaucratic centralism and the establishment of greater equality between party members. At the end of 1920, the party was involved in a discussion about the tasks and functions of trade unions, but the decisions of the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b), held in March 1921, put an end to all internal party discussions. This was accompanied by a further narrowing of the rights of the Soviets, and as a result, by the end of the civil war, all power was practically concentrated in the hands of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the regime of one-party dictatorship in the country was finally strengthened.

    Within six months in Germany, the Nazis established a one-party dictatorship of the Nazi Party. At the first stage, the Nazis, with the support of conservatives, carried out the forcible liquidation of left-wing parties. The activities of the German Communist Party were not formally prohibited. However, from February 28, 1933, it became illegal. The Social Democratic Party was banned in June 1933. Then, at the end of June - beginning of July 1933, under pressure from the Nazis, the remaining political parties - liberals, the Catholic Center Party, conservative nationalists - announced their self-dissolution.

    On July 14, 1933, the Reichstag adopted a law “against the formation” of new parties.” He declared the National Socialist Party to be the only legal political party, and participation in any other political parties a criminal offense.

    In May 1933, the Nazis crushed the trade unions. Trade union buildings were seized by stormtroopers. Their leaders were arrested. Trade union property was confiscated. Instead of independent trade unions, the Nazis created the German Labor Front.

    In November 1933, new elections to the Reichstag were held. At them, the overwhelming majority of voters (92%) voted for the only list of candidates from the Nazi Party - the Fuhrer's list. On December 1, 1933, the new Nazi Reichstag adopted the law “On ensuring the unity of the party and the state.” He declared the National Socialist Party “the bearer of state thought and inextricably linked with the state.” The party was declared not to be the bearer of state power, but only of the “state idea”, that is, the party did not receive any power functions under this law.

    Law on the Supreme Head of the German Empire of August 1, 1934

    After the death of the elderly President Hindenburg on August 1, 1934, the government passed the law on the Supreme Head of the German Empire. According to this law, the positions of chancellor and president were combined in the person of the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor Hitler. The post of president was abolished. His powers passed to Hitler. The rights of head of state were assigned to Hitler for life. At the same time, Hitler, as a monarch, was given the right to appoint a successor. Hitler became supreme commander of the armed forces. Officers and officials took the oath of allegiance in unconditional obedience to Hitler personally.

    Due to its special significance, this law was approved by popular vote and thereby acquired the highest constitutional force. This law to give Hitler unlimited power was approved by the overwhelming majority of Germans: 90% or more than 38 million voters voted in favor, only four million two hundred and fifty thousand voted against. The result of the referendum on support for the Fuhrer does not raise any particular doubts about their general more or less correspondence with reality. Hitler's policies thereby received the support of all sections of the Germans. The Third Reich arose through the free expression of mass will.

    Lecture No. 7. The state mechanism of the Nazi dictatorship. The essence of a totalitarian political regime

    1) Establishment of Soviet power in Russia

    From late October 1917 to February 1918, Soviet power established itself (mostly peacefully) over most of the territory of the former Russian Empire.

    At the end of 1917 - beginning of 1918, simultaneously with the liquidation of the old government bodies, a new state apparatus was being created. The Congress of Soviets became the highest legislative body. In the intervals between congresses, these functions were performed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK). The highest executive body was the Council of People's Commissars (government) headed by V.I. Lenin.

    After the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918, which at its first meeting refused to support the October Revolution, the Third Congress of Soviets was held. At this congress, Russia was declared the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

    New organization power was enshrined in the Constitution of the RSFSR, adopted at the V Congress of Soviets in 1918.

    The Left Socialist Revolutionaries were the only party that entered into a government bloc with the Bolsheviks. However, already in March 1918, the bloc collapsed: the Left Social Revolutionaries left the government in protest against the imprisonment Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

    After the exclusion of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and local Soviets (June 1918), we can talk about the actual establishment of a one-party system in the Soviet Republic.

    One of the key issues of the young Soviet government was the issue related to the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, over which even a large internal party struggle unfolded.

    Having embarked on a grandiose transformation of Russia, the Bolsheviks were in dire need of calm in the country. external borders. Continued World War. The Entente countries ignored the Bolshevik Peace Decree. It was obvious that the Russian army was not able to fight, and mass desertion began.

    I had to negotiate a separate peace with Germany. They took place in Brest-Litovsk. The conditions proposed by the enemy were humiliating: Germany demanded the separation of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Estland and Livonia from Russia. Trotsky disrupted the negotiations. On February 18, 1918, the Germans resumed hostilities. February 23 (birthday Soviet army) the Germans are presenting even more difficult peace conditions, according to which Finland, Ukraine and some regions of Transcaucasia are torn away from Russia. Finally, on March 3, 1918, the agreement was signed.

    It must be said that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was still a forced measure; it was necessary for the young Soviet Republic to keep the Bolsheviks in power.

    2) Formation of a one-party system

    We can talk about the formation of a one-party system in our country since July 1918, because the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, not participating in the government in October-November 1917 and March-July 1918, had seats in the Councils of all levels, the leadership of the People's Commissariats and the Cheka , with their significant participation, the first Constitution of the RSFSR and the most important laws of Soviet power were created. Some Mensheviks also actively collaborated in the Soviets at that time.

    The suppression of pluralism began immediately after the October Revolution. By the decree “On the arrest of the leaders of the civil war against the revolution” of November 28, 1917, one party was banned - the Cadets. The strength of the cadets lay in their intellectual potential, connections with commercial, industrial and military circles, and support from the allies. But it was precisely this ban on the party that could not be undermined; most likely it was an act of revenge against the once most influential enemy.

    The real rivals of the Bolsheviks in the struggle for the masses were the anarchists. They took an active part in establishing and consolidating Soviet power, but posed a threat to the Bolsheviks with their demand for centralism. They expressed the spontaneous protest of the peasantry and urban lower classes against the state, from which they saw only taxes and the omnipotence of officials. In April 1918, the anarchists were dispersed. The pretext for their defeat was their undoubted connection with criminal elements, which gave the authorities a reason to call all anarchists, without exception, bandits. Some anarchists went underground, others joined the Bolshevik Party.

    On the other hand, the right-wing Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries competed with the Bolsheviks, expressing the interests of more moderate layers of workers and peasants who longed for political and economic stabilization in order to improve their financial situation. The Bolsheviks relied on the further development of the class struggle, transferring it to the countryside, which further widened the gap between them and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries that formed in connection with the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace. As a result, in June the Mensheviks and Right Socialist Revolutionaries, and after July, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries were expelled from the Soviets. There were still maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries in them, but due to their small numbers they did not play a significant role.

    During the years of foreign military intervention and the civil war, depending on changes in the policy of the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary parties in relation to the power of the Soviets, they were either allowed or prohibited again, moving to a semi-legal position. Attempts from both sides to achieve conditional cooperation did not gain momentum.

    The course towards eradicating political pluralism and preventing a multi-party system was confirmed by resolution XII All-Russian Conference RCP(b) in August 1922 “On anti-Soviet parties and movements”, which declared all anti-Bolshevik forces anti-Soviet, i.e. anti-state, although in reality most of them encroached not on the power of the Soviets, but on the power of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets. First of all, measures of ideological struggle had to be directed against them. Repression was not excluded, but officially had to play a subordinate role.

    The process of the Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, organized in the summer of 1922, was intended to play primarily a propaganda role. Conducted in the Column Hall of the House of Unions in Moscow in the presence of a large public, foreign observers and defenders, and widely covered in the press, the trial was intended to present the Socialist Revolutionaries as ruthless terrorists. After this, the Extraordinary Congress of ordinary members of the AKP passed easily, announcing the self-dissolution of the party. Then the Georgian and Ukrainian Mensheviks announced their self-dissolution. In recent literature, facts about the role of the RCP(b) and the OGPU in the preparation and conduct of these congresses have been made public.

    Thus, on a multi-party system in 1922-1923. the cross was finally put up. It seems that from this time we can date the completion of the process of forming a one-party system, decisive step to which it was made in 1918.

    21. Civil war in Russia: causes, stages, results, consequences.

    After the October Uprising, a tense socio-political situation developed in the country, which led to the Civil War. Causes of the Civil War: the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks; internal politics of the Bolshevik leadership; the desire of the overthrown classes to preserve private property and their privileges; refusal of the Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists to cooperate with the Soviet regime. The uniqueness of the Civil War in Russia lay in its close intertwining with foreign intervention. Germany, France, England, the USA, Japan, Poland and others took part in the intervention. They supplied the anti-Bolshevik forces with weapons and provided financial and military-political support. The policy of the interventionists was determined by the desire to put an end to the Bolshevik regime and prevent the “spreading” of the revolution, to return the lost property of foreign citizens and to gain new territories and spheres of influence at Russia’s expense. In 1918, the main centers of the anti-Bolshevik movement were formed in Moscow and Petrograd, uniting the Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. A strong anti-Bolshevik movement developed among the Cossacks. On the Don and Kuban they were led by General P.N. Krasnov, in the Southern Urals - Ataman P.I. Dutov. basis white movement in the south of Russia and the North Caucasus became the Volunteer Army of General L.S. Kornilov. In the spring of 1918, foreign intervention began. German troops occupied Ukraine, Crimea and part of the North Caucasus, Romania captured Bessarabia. In March, an English corps landed in Murmansk. In April, Vladivostok was occupied by a Japanese landing. In May 1918, soldiers of the Czechoslovak corps who were held captive in Russia rebelled. The uprising led to the overthrow of Soviet power in the Volga region and Siberia. At the beginning of September 1918, the troops of the Eastern Front under the command of I.I. Vatsetis went on the offensive and during October-November drove the enemy beyond the Urals. The restoration of Soviet power in the Urals and Volga region ended the first stage of the civil war. At the end of 1918 - 1919. The white movement reached its maximum extent. In 1919, a plan was created for a simultaneous attack on Soviet power: from the east (A.V. Kolchak), south (A.I. Denikin) and west (N.N. Yudenich). However, the combined performance failed. Troops of S.S. Kamenev and M.V. Frunze stopped the advance of A.V. Kolchak and pushed him out to Siberia. Two attacks by N.N. Yudenich's attack on Petrograd ended in defeat. In July 1919 A.I. Denikin captured Ukraine and launched an attack on Moscow. The Southern Front was formed under the command of A.I. Egorova. In December 1919 - early 1920, the troops of A.I. Denikin was defeated. Soviet power was restored in southern Russia, Ukraine and the North Caucasus. In 1919, the interventionists were forced to withdraw their troops. This was facilitated by the revolutionary ferment in the occupation units and the social movement in Europe and the USA under the slogan “Hands off Soviet Russia!” The main events of the final stage of the Civil War in 1920 were the Soviet-Polish war and the fight against P.N. Wrangel. In May 1920, Polish troops invaded Belarus and Ukraine. The Red Army under the command of M.N. Tukhachevsky and P.I. Egorova defeated the Polish group in May 1920 and launched an attack on Warsaw, which soon fizzled out. In March 1921, a peace treaty was signed, according to which Poland received the lands of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. General P.N. Wrangel, elected “ruler of the south of Russia,” formed the “Russian Army” in Crimea and launched an attack on the Donbass. At the end of October 1920, the Red Army troops under the command of M.V. Frunze defeated the army of P.N. Wrangel in Northern Tavria and pushed its remnants into the Crimea. Defeat of P.N. Wrangel marked the end of the civil war. The Bolsheviks won civil war and repelled foreign intervention. This victory was due to a number of reasons. The Bolsheviks managed to mobilize all the country's resources, turn it into a single military camp, great importance had international solidarity, assistance from the proletariat of Europe and the USA. The policies of the White Guards - the abolition of the Decree on Land, the return of land to the previous owners, reluctance to cooperate with liberal and socialist parties, punitive expeditions, pogroms, mass executions of prisoners - all this caused discontent among the population, even to the point of armed resistance. During the civil war, opponents of the Bolsheviks failed to agree on a single program and a single leader of the movement. The Civil War was a terrible tragedy for Russia. Material damage amounted to more than 50 billion rubles. gold. Industrial production decreased by 7 times. In battles, from hunger, disease and terror, 8 million people died, 2 million people were forced to emigrate.

    If we analyze the events described in the previous chapter and add to them the current state Russian Federation then we can highlight the following consequences of one-party politics:

    • * Destroy enemies within the party
    • * Complete merging of the party and state apparatuses
    • * Elimination of the system of separation of powers
    • *Destruction of civil liberties
    • * Creation of mass public organizations
    • * Spread of the cult of personality
    • * Mass repression
    • * great human losses, often best representatives various social groups
    • * technical, economic and selectively scientific lag behind the developed democratic countries of the West and East
    • * ideological confusion in the heads, lack of initiative, slave psychology among many Russians and residents of some other republics former USSR currently

    one-party political state regime

    Controversies

    The question of the fate of various political parties before the October Revolution was not raised even theoretically. Moreover, from the Marxist theory of classes the thesis about the preservation of a multi-party system in a society divided into classes, even after the victory of socialism, naturally followed. However, the practice of Soviet power came into striking contradiction with this theory.

    Repressions against non-Bolshevik parties began immediately after the victory of the October Revolution and did not stop until their complete disappearance, which allowed us to draw the first conclusion: the conclusion about the decisive role of violence in establishing one-party rule. Another approach to this problem was based on the fact that most of the leaders of these parties emigrated, which made it possible to draw a different conclusion - about their separation from the country and the remaining membership mass in it. However, the cessation of the CPSU in August 1991 gave us a new historical experience the death of the party, where repression or emigration played no role. Thus, there is now sufficient empirical material to consider the cycle of evolution political party in Russia until its collapse and determine its causes. In my opinion, they are rooted in the contradictions inherent in the party, like historical phenomenon. Single-party politics facilitates this analysis by ensuring unity of subject matter.

    The dividing line between a multi-party system and a single-party system lies not in the number of parties existing in the country, but in their real impact on its politics. At the same time, it is not so important whether the parties are in the government or the opposition: what is important is that their voice is heard, they are taken into account, and state policy is formed with their participation. From this point of view, the existence in the People's Republic of Belarus, East Germany, North Korea, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia in the second half of the 40s - early 80s. several parties, and in the USSR, NRA, or Hungarian People's Republic - only one party does not play a role, because the “allied parties” did not have their own political line and were entirely subordinate to the leadership of the communists. It is no coincidence that they hastened to distance themselves from the ruling party as soon as the crisis of the 80s began.

    Therefore, we can talk about the formation of a one-party system in our country since July 1918.

    Because the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, not participating in the government in October-November 1917 and March-July 1918, had seats in the Councils of all levels, the leadership of the People's Commissariats and the Cheka, with their noticeable participation the first Constitution of the RSFSR and the most important laws of Soviet power were created ( especially the Basic Law on the Socialization of the Land). Some Mensheviks also actively collaborated in the Soviets at that time.

    In the early 20s. a phenomenon called the “dictatorship of the party” is emerging. This term was first put into circulation by G.E. Zinoviev at the XII Congress of the RCP(b) and was included in the resolution of the congress. J.V. Stalin hastened to dissociate himself from it, however, in my opinion, this term reflected the real picture: since October 1917, all state decisions were previously made by the leading institutions of the Communist Party, which, having a majority in the Soviets, carried them out through its members and formalized in the form of decisions of Soviet bodies. In a number of cases, this procedure was not followed: a number of decisions of national importance existed only in the form of party resolutions, some - joint resolutions of the party and the government. Through communist factions (since 1934 - party groups), the party led the Soviets and public associations, through the system of political bodies - power structures and sectors of the economy that became “bottlenecks” (transport, Agriculture). Almost all “top officials” in government agencies, public organizations, enterprises, and cultural institutions were party members. This leadership was reinforced by a nomenclature system for the appointment and approval of managers and responsible employees.

    The theoretical justification for the right of the Communist Party to lead was a unique interpretation of the idea of ​​classes, put forward, as is known, even before Karl Marx by French historians during the Restoration. Its Leninist interpretation consisted of a consistent narrowing of concentric circles: the carriers of progress, the most important part of the people, are only the working people, among them the working class stands out, behind which stands the future. Within it, the leading role belongs to the factory proletariat, and within it, to the workers large enterprises. The most conscious and organized part, constituting a minority of the proletariat, unites into a communist party, led by a narrow group of leaders, to whom the right to leadership is given “not by the power of power, but by the power of authority, the power of energy, greater experience, greater versatility, greater talent.”

    Under one-party conditions, the last part of the formula did not correspond to reality. Having full state power, the ruling elite maintained its leadership position precisely by the “force of power”, with the help of repressive bodies. But this meant for the party the loss of one of the essential signs of party membership - the voluntariness of unification. Everyone striving for political activity, understood that there was no other way into politics except belonging to a single party. Exclusion from it meant political (and in the 30-40s, often physical) death, voluntary withdrawal from it, condemnation of its policies, and therefore disloyalty to the existing state, at least the threat of repression.

    Political pluralism, which presupposed the rivalry of different parties representing the multiple interests of social groups, the struggle of parties for influence on the masses and the possibility of one of them losing its ruling status, was the opposite of this system. Its presumption was a tacit assertion that the leaders knew their interests and needs better than the masses, but only the Bolsheviks possessed this all-vision. The suppression of pluralism began immediately after the October Revolution. By the decree “On the arrest of the leaders of the civil war against the revolution” of November 28, 1917, one party was banned - the Cadets. This was hardly justified by practical considerations: the Cadets were never represented in the Soviets; in the elections to the Constituent Assembly they managed to get only 17 deputies into it, and some of them were recalled by decision of the Soviets. The strength of the cadets lay in their intellectual potential, connections with commercial, industrial and military circles, and support from the allies. But it was precisely this ban on the party that could not be undermined; most likely, it was an act of revenge against the once most influential enemy. The repressions only further weakened the prestige of the Bolsheviks in the eyes of the intelligentsia and raised the authority of the Cadets.

    The real rivals of the Bolsheviks in the struggle for the masses were, first of all, the anarchists who stood to the left of them. Their strengthening on the eve of the October Uprising was indicated at an expanded meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) on October 16, 1917. They took an active part in the establishment and consolidation of Soviet power, but posed a threat to the Bolsheviks with their demand for centralism. The strength of the anarchists was that they expressed the spontaneous protest of the peasantry and urban lower classes against the state, from which they saw only taxes and the omnipotence of officials. In April 1918, the anarchists who occupied 26 mansions in the center of Moscow were dispersed. The pretext for their defeat was their undoubted connection with criminal elements, which gave the authorities a reason to call all anarchists, without exception, bandits. Some anarchists went underground, others joined the Bolshevik Party.

    On the other hand, the right-wing Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries competed with the Bolsheviks, expressing the interests of more moderate layers of workers and peasants who longed for political and economic stabilization in order to improve their financial situation. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, relied on the further development of the class struggle, transferring it to the countryside, which further widened the gap between them and the Left Social Revolutionaries that formed in connection with the conclusion of the Brest Peace. It is characteristic that both the Bolsheviks and their political opponents and even former allies did not think about legal competition on the basis of the existing regime. Soviet power was firmly identified with the power of the Bolsheviks, and the only method of resolving political contradictions was the armed way. As a result, in June the Mensheviks and Right Socialist Revolutionaries, and after July, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries were expelled from the Soviets. There were still maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries in them, but due to their small numbers they did not play a significant role.

    During the years of foreign military intervention and the civil war, depending on changes in the policy of the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary parties in relation to the power of the Soviets, they were either allowed or prohibited again, moving to a semi-legal position. Attempts from both sides to achieve conditional cooperation did not gain momentum.

    New, much more solid hopes for the establishment of a multi-party system were associated with the introduction of the NEP, when the allowed multi-structure economy seemed to be able to be naturally continued and consolidated in political pluralism. And first impressions confirmed this.

    At the X Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1921, when discussing the issue of replacing surplus appropriation with a tax in kind, when People's Commissar of Food A.D. Tsyurupa spoke out against the revival of free cooperation due to the predominance of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries there; the rapporteur V.I. Lenin objected to him in a broader sense: “Of course, any separation of the kulaks and the development of petty-bourgeois relations give rise to corresponding political parties, which took decades to form in Russia and which we well known. Here we have to choose not between whether to give or not give way to these parties - they are inevitably generated by petty-bourgeois economic relations - but we need to choose, and then only to a certain extent, only between forms of concentration, unification of the actions of these parties.”

    However, just a year later, in the Final Remark on the Political Report of the Central Committee to the XI Congress of the RCP(b), Lenin said the exact opposite: “Of course, we allow capitalism, but within the limits that are necessary for the peasantry. It is necessary! Without this, the peasant cannot live and farm. And without Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik propaganda he, the Russian peasant, we assert, can live. And whoever claims the opposite, then we say to him that it would be better for us all to perish, every single one, but we will not yield to you! And our courts must understand all this." What happened this year for the Bolsheviks to diametrically change their approach to the issue of political pluralism?

    In my opinion, the decisive role here was played by two different, but deeply interconnected events: Kronstadt and the “Smenovekhovtvo”.

    The rebels in Kronstadt, like the Left Social Revolutionaries earlier, did not set the task of overthrowing Soviet power, as the Bolsheviks accused them of. Among their slogans were: “Power to the Soviets, not to the parties!” and “Soviets without communists!” We can talk about the slyness of P.N. Milyukova and V.M. Chernov, who suggested these slogans to the Kronstadters, but they themselves obviously believed in them. The implementation of these slogans meant not only the elimination of the monopoly of the RCP(b) on power or its removal from power, but, taking into account the experience of the just ended civil war, the prohibition of the RCP(b), repression not only against the leaders, but also the mass of members, and non-party Soviet activists. The “Russian revolt, senseless and merciless” never knew the generosity of the victors. For the Bolsheviks it was literally a matter of life and death.

    Peaceful “change of leadership” approached this problem from a different angle. Having posed the fundamental question: “What is the NEP - is it tactics or evolution?”, its leaders gave an answer in the second sense. In their opinion, the NEP meant the beginning of the evolution of Soviet society towards the restoration of capitalism. From here the next step of the Bolsheviks should logically follow: complementing the multi-structured economy with the “political NEP” - the assumption of pluralism in politics. This is exactly what the Bolsheviks did not want to do, rightly fearing that in free elections voters, remembering the “Red Terror”, food appropriation, etc., would refuse to support them, handing over power to other parties. Moreover, such a vote had an important advantage over an armed rebellion - legitimacy. It seems that this is why “smenovekhism” frightened Lenin more than the Kronstadt uprising. In any case, he repeatedly spoke about the warning against the “Change of Milestones” in 1921-1922.

    The course towards eradicating political pluralism and preventing a multi-party system was confirmed by the resolution of the XII All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b) in August 1922 “On anti-Soviet parties and movements”, which declared all anti-Bolshevik forces anti-Soviet, i.e. anti-state, although in reality most of them encroached not on the power of the Soviets, but on the power of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets. First of all, measures of ideological struggle had to be directed against them. Repression was not excluded, but officially had to play a subordinate role.

    The process of the Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, organized in the summer of 1922, was intended to play, first of all, a propaganda role. Conducted in the Column Hall of the House of Unions in Moscow in the presence of a large public, foreign observers and defenders, and widely covered in the press, the trial was intended to present the Socialist Revolutionaries as ruthless terrorists. After this, the Extraordinary Congress of ordinary members of the AKP passed easily, announcing the self-dissolution of the party. Then the Georgian and Ukrainian Mensheviks announced their self-dissolution. In recent literature, facts about the role of the RCP(b) and the OGPU in the preparation and conduct of these congresses have been made public.

    Thus, on a multi-party system in 1922-1923. the cross was finally put up. It seems that from this time we can date the completion of the process of forming a one-party system, the decisive step towards which was taken in 1918.

    By defending their monopoly on power, the Bolshevik leadership defended its life. And this could not help but distort the system of political relations, in which there was no place for traditional means of political resolution of the conflict: compromise, blocs, concessions. Confrontation became the only law of politics. And a whole generation of politicians was brought up in the belief that this was inevitable.

    Political pluralism threatened to break through in Soviet Russia in another way - through factionalism in the RCP(b) itself.

    Having become the only legal party in the country, it could not help but reflect, albeit in an indirect form, the diversity of interests, which intensified even more with the introduction of the NEP. The fact that factions really serve as the basis for the formation of new parties is evidenced by the experience of both the beginning and the end of the 20th century. But it seems that the leadership of the RCP(b) was no longer concerned about this, but about the threat of “shifting power” first to those closest to ruling group factions, and then - to the forces of open restoration. It was precisely the fear that the internal party struggle would so weaken the leading narrow layer of the party that “the decision will no longer depend on it,” and were dictated by the harsh measures against platforms, discussions, factions and groupings contained in the resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b) “On Unity party." For decades, there was no worse crime in the Bolshevik Party than factionalism.

    Fear of factionalism led to a deformation of the ideological life of the party. Traditional discussions among the Bolsheviks began to be seen as undermining ideological unity. First, in 1922, the activities of party discussion clubs, where high-ranking party members had the courage to share doubts in their circles, were curtailed. Then, in 1927, the opening of a general party discussion was surrounded by difficult conditions: the absence of a strong majority in the Central Committee on the most important issues of party policy, the desire of the Central Committee itself to verify its correctness by polling party members or, if several provincial-level organizations demanded it. However, in all these cases, the discussion could begin only by decision of the Central Committee, which actually meant the cessation of any discussions.

    The former struggle of opinions by the end of the 20s. was replaced by external unanimity. The only theorist was general secretary, stages of ideological life - his speeches. This led to the fact that the party, which was proud of the scientific validity of its policies, began to call the last instruction of its leaders a theory, intellectual level which was decreasing more and more. Marxism-Leninism began to be called a set of dogmas and platitudes, which was united with it only by an ornament in the form of Marxist terms. Thus, the Communist Party has lost another essential attribute of party membership - its own ideology. It could not develop in the absence of discussions both within its own environment and with ideological opponents.

    On the contrary, a number of new parties in the early 90s (Democratic, Republican, Social Democrats, etc.) arose in the depths of party discussion clubs that spontaneously arose in the CPSU in the late 80s. However, the general decline in the level of ideological life in the country also affected them. One of the main difficulties of most modern Russian parties: developing a clear ideological line that would be understandable to the people and could claim their support.

    The one-party system simplified the problem of political leadership to the limit, reducing it to administration. At the same time, it predetermined the degradation of the party, which did not know its political rivals. At its service were the repressive apparatus of the state and the means of mass influence on the people. An all-powerful, all-penetrating vertical was created, working in a one-way mode - from the center to the masses, devoid of feedback. Therefore, the processes taking place within the party acquired self-sufficient significance. The source of its development was the contradictions inherent in the party. In my opinion, they are characteristic of a political party in general, but they occurred in our country in a specific form, due to the one-party system.

    The first contradiction is between the personal freedom of a party member, his own beliefs and activities, and belonging to a party whose program, regulations and political decisions limit this freedom. This contradiction is inherent in any public association, but is especially acute in a political party, where everyone is required to act together with other members.

    A generic feature of Bolshevism was the subordination of a party member to all its decisions. “After the decision of the competent authorities, all of us, party members, act as one person,” emphasized V.I. Lenin. True, he stipulated that this should be preceded by a collective discussion, after which the decision would be made democratically. However, in practice this became increasingly formal.

    The iron discipline that the Bolsheviks were proud of ensured the unity of their actions at turning points in history, in combat situations. However, this created a tradition of prioritizing coercion over conscious submission. The majority always turned out to be right, and the individual was initially wrong in front of the collective.

    This was expressed very clearly by L.D. Trotsky, in his well-known repentance at the XIII Congress of the RCP(b) in May 1924: “Comrades, none of us wants and can be right against our party. The party, in the final analysis, is always right, because the party is the only historical instrument given to the proletariat to resolve its main tasks... I know that it is impossible to be right against the party. You can only be right with the party and through the party, because history has not provided any other ways to realize rightness. The British have a historical proverb: right or wrong, this is my country. With much greater historical right, we can say: right or wrong in certain private specific issues, in certain moments, but this is my party.” Such open conformism gave I.V. Stalin the opportunity to condescendingly object: “The Party is often mistaken. Ilyich taught us to teach the party leadership from its own mistakes. If the party had no mistakes, then there would be nothing to teach the party from.” In fact, he himself adhered to the thesis of the infallibility of the party, which was identified with the infallibility of its leadership, and more precisely, with his own infallibility. Mistakes were always the fault of others.

    Already in the early 20s. a system of strict regulation of spiritual, social and personal life communist All of it was placed under the supervision of cells and control commissions. Created in September 1920 in connection with the raising of the question of the growing gap between the “tops” and “bottoms” of the party and the latter’s demand to revive party equality, the Central and then local control commissions from the very beginning turned into party courts with all their attributes : “Party investigators”, “Party assessors” and “Party troikas”.

    General purges and partial checks of party personnel played a special role in instilling conformity in the party. First of all, they hit the party intelligentsia, who could be blamed not only for their non-proletarian origin, but also for their social activity, which did not fit into the framework prescribed from above. “Hesitations in pursuing the general line of the party,” speeches during discussions that were still ongoing, simply doubts were sufficient grounds for exclusion from the party. Another accusation was brought against the workers, who were officially considered the main support and core of the party: “passivity,” which meant non-participation in numerous meetings, the inability to speak out with approval of decisions issued from above. The peasants were accused of “economic fouling” and “connections with class alien elements,” i.e. exactly what naturally followed from the NEP. Purges and checks kept all categories of the party “lower classes” in constant tension, threatening exclusion from political life, and from the beginning of the 30s. - repressions.

    But the “tops” did not at all enjoy freedom. Charges of factionalism were brought against them. At the same time, as it turned out, the main danger to the unity of the party ranks came not from factions that had platforms and group discipline, which to a certain extent imposed restrictions on their supporters, but from unprincipled blocs, of which Stalin was such a master. At first it was the “troika” of Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin against Trotsky, then the bloc of Stalin with Bukharin against the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc and, finally, the majority in the Central Committee that Stalin had been gathering for a long time against Bukharin and his “right deviation.” The signs of factionalism defined by the resolution of the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) “On the unity of the party” did not apply to them. But then reprisals began against members of the majority, the main accusation against whom was connections with factionalists, real or imaginary. It was enough to ever work with one of the convicts. Even personal participation in the repressions was not considered as proof of loyalty to the Stalinist leadership; on the contrary, it made it possible to shift the blame for them from the organizers to the perpetrators.

    Thus, throughout the 20-30s. a mechanism for the artificial selection of conformists and careerists was formed. The latter, moving up the career ladder, competed in performance. Intelligence, knowledge, popularity served more as an obstacle than as an aid to advancement, because they threatened the authorities, who possessed less and less of these qualities. It was mediocrity that had the greatest chance of promotion. (Trotsky once called Stalin a “genius of mediocrity”). Once at the top, the mediocre leader was held on by the forces of the repressive apparatus. It was impossible to replace him through a democratic election procedure.

    However, it was impossible for the Stalinist leadership to abandon intra-party democracy, even in words: the democratic tradition was too strong, and an open rejection of democracy would have destroyed the propaganda image of “the most democratic society.” But he managed to reduce election and turnover to a pure formality: at each election, starting with the district committee and rising higher, the number of candidates exactly corresponded to the availability of seats in the elected body, and the secretaries of party committees were selected in advance by the higher body. In moments of crisis, this election was replaced by co-optation based on recommendations from above. This was the case during the civil war, at the beginning of the New Economic Policy and in the mid-30s.

    The accumulation of mediocrity in management ultimately led to a new quality: the inability of managers either to adequately assess the situation themselves or to listen to competent opinion from the outside. This, in my opinion, explains many of the obvious mistakes of the 20s and 30s. and later times.

    Due to the lack of feedback within the party, its members did not have any influence on policy. They became hostages of anti-democratic intra-party relations. Moreover, non-party people were removed from decision-making and control over their implementation. The second contradiction of a political party is between the desire for sustainability and the need for renewal in connection with changes in society.

    This, first of all, manifested itself in ideology, as mentioned above. The result of the frozen ideology was a growing gap between the official point of view and reality: persistent references to the kulak threat contradicted the fact of its insignificant share in the country's economy. Likewise, the size of the rural population and the elimination of antagonistic classes contradicted the thesis about the intensification of class struggle as we move towards socialism, growing social differentiation and the growth of interethnic contradictions - the thesis about solving the national question, achieving social homogeneity of Soviet society and the emergence of a new historical community - the Soviet people.

    In the economic field, the desire to remain faithful to old dogmas led to repeated economic and political crises. In domestic policy growing diversity and the strengthening of the economic base and local power were contradicted by traditional centralism. This led to the expansion of the executive apparatus and the growth of bureaucracy on the one hand, and the strengthening of local separatism on the other. In foreign policy the original class approach prevailed over healthy pragmatism. An obsession with the old policy was especially dangerous at turning points: the establishment of a new government, the transition to civil war, its end in the mid-20s, on the verge of the 20s and 30s. etc.

    The result of the persistent desire for stability was the inertia of thinking of both leaders and led, misunderstanding of new trends and processes and, ultimately, the loss of the ability to lead the development of society.

    The third contradiction is between the integrity of the association and its connection with the society of which it is a part. In the party, it finds resolution in the definition of membership, rules of admission, openness of internal party life to non-party members, methods of party leadership and relationships with mass public organizations. Here, too, it increasingly came down to the administrative method of solving the problems facing the party: regulating admission to the party from above, establishing quotas for the admission of people from different social categories, commanding non-party organizations, party instructions to writers, journalists, artists, musicians, actors. In the absence of feedback, this subsequently led to the collapse of the CPSU and the loss of its ability to influence society, as soon as the usual administrative methods of pressure began to fail.

    These are the main contradictions of the one-party system, inherent both to the party itself and to Soviet society as a whole. Accumulated and not resolved, they manifested themselves in numerous crises of the 20s and 30s, but were restrained by the hoops of the administrative influence of the authorities. The experience of the one-party system in our country has proven the deadlock in the development of society under conditions of a monopoly on power. Only political methods in an environment of free competition of doctrines, strategic and tactical guidelines, rivalry between leaders in full view of voters could help the party gain and maintain strength, develop as a free community of people united by unity of beliefs and actions.